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International Communication

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION (MCM604)

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The Historical Context of International Communication

International communication (also referred to as global communication or transnational communication) is the communication practice that occurs across international borders. The need for international communication was due to the increasing effects and influences of globalization. As a field of study, international communication is a branch of communication studies, concerning with the scope of "government-to-government", "business-to-business", and "people-to-people" interactions at a global level. Due to the increasingly globalized market, employees who possess the ability to effectively communicate across cultures are in high demand. International communication "encompasses political, economic, social, cultural and military concerns.

The study of contemporary international communication can be illuminated by an understanding of the elements of continuity and change in its development. The nexus of economic, military and political power has always depended on efficient systems of communication, from flags, beacon fires and runners, to ships and telegraph wires, and now satellites. The evolution of telegraphic communication and empire in the nineteenth century exemplifies these interrelationships, which continued throughout the twentieth century, even after the end of empire. During the two World Wars and the Cold War, the power and significance of the new media - radio and then television - for international communication were demonstrated by their use for international propaganda as well as recognizing their potential for socioeconomic development.

Communication and empire

Communication has always been critical to the establishment and maintenance of power over distance. From the Persian, Greek and Roman empires to the British, efficient networks of communication were essential for the imposition of imperial authority, as well as for the international trade and commerce on which they were based. Indeed, the extent of empire could be used as an 'indication of the efficiency of communication'. Communications networks and technologies were key to the mechanics of distributed government, military campaigns and trade.

The Greek historian, Diodorus Cronus (4th century BC) recounts how the Persian king, Darius I (522-486 BC), who extended the Persian Empire from the Danube to the Indus, could send news from the capital to the provinces by means of a line of shouting men positioned on heights. This kind of transmission was 30 times faster than using runners. In *De Bello Gallico*, Julius Caesar (100-44 BC) reports that the Gauls, using the human voice, could call all their warriors to war in just three days. Using fire at night and smoke or mirrors during the day is mentioned in ancient texts, from the Old Testament to Homer.

While many rulers, including the Greek polis, used inscription for public information, writing became a more flexible and efficient means of conveying information over long distances: 'Rome, Persia and the Great Khan of China all utilised writing in systems of information-gathering and dispersal, creating wide-ranging official postal and dispatch systems'. It is said that the *Acta Diurna*, founded by Julius Caesar and one of the forerunners of modern news media, was distributed across most of the Roman Empire: 'as communication became more efficient, the possibility of control from the centre became greater'.

The Indian Emperor Ashoka's edicts, inscribed on rock in the third century BC, are found across South Asia, from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka and writ writers had a prominent place in the royal household. During the Mughal period in Indian history, the *tvaqi'a-nawis* (newswriters) were employed by the kings to appraise them of the progress in the empire. Both horsemen and despatch runners transmitted news and reports. In China, the T'ang Dynasty (618-907) created a formal hand-

written publication, the *ti pao* or 'official newspaper' which disseminated information to the elite and in the Ching Period (1644-1911) private news bureaux sprang up which composed and circulated official news in the printed form known as the *Ch'ingpao*.

In addition to official systems of communication, there have also always been informal networks of travellers and traders. The technologies of international communication and globalization may be contemporary phenomena but trade and cultural interchanges have existed for more than two millennia between the Graeco-Roman world with Arabia, India and China.

Indian merchandise was exported to the Persian Gulf and then overland, through Mesopotamia, to the Mediterranean coast, and from there onwards to Western Europe. An extensive trans-Asian trade flourished in ancient times, linking China with India and the Arabic lands. Later, the Silk Route through central Asia linked China, India and Persia with Europe. Information and ideas were communicated across continents, as shown by the spread of Buddhism, Christianity and Islam.

The medium of communication developed from the clay tablet of Mesopotamia, the papyrus roll in ancient Egypt and in ancient Greece, to parchment codex in the Roman empire. By the eighth century, paper introduced from China began to replace parchment in the Islamic world and spread to medieval Europe. Also from China, printing slowly diffused to Europe, aided by the Moors' occupation of Spain, but it was not until the fifteenth century, with the movable type printing press developed by Johann Gutenberg, a goldsmith in Mainz in Germany, that the means of communication were transformed.

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the printing presses were turning out thousands of copies of books in all the major European languages. For the first time the Scriptures were available in a language other than Latin, undermining the authority of priests, scribes and political and cultural elites. As a consequence, 'the unified Latin culture of Europe was finally dissolved by the rise of the vernacular languages which was consolidated by the printing press'. Coupled with vernacular translations of the Bible by John Wycliffe in England and Martin Luther in Germany, the printing revolution helped to lay the basis for the Reformation and the foundations of nation-state and of modern capitalism.

The new languages, especially Portuguese, Spanish, English and French, became the main vehicle of communication for the European colonial powers in many parts of the world. This transplantation of communication systems around the globe resulted in the undermining of local languages and cultures of the conquered territories. The Portuguese Empire was one of the first to grasp the importance of the medium for colonial consolidation, with the kings of Portugal sending books in the cargoes of ships carrying explorers. They opened printing presses in the territories they occupied – the first printing press was opened in Goa in 1557 and in Macao in 1588. Other European powers also used the new technology and the printed book played an important role in the colonization of Asia. European languages – especially Portuguese, Spanish, English and French - became the main vehicle of communication for the colonial powers in many parts of the world. This transplantation of communication systems around the globe created a new hierarchy of language and culture in the conquered territories.

The Industrial Revolution in Western Europe, founded on the profits of the growing international commerce encouraged by colonization, gave a huge stimulus to the internationalization of communication. Britain's domination of the sea routes of international commerce was to a large extent due to the pre-eminence of its navy and merchant fleet, a result of pioneering work in the mapping out of naval charts by the great eighteenth-century explorers, such as James Cook, enabled also by the determination of longitude based on the Greenwich Meridian. Technological advances such the development of the iron ship, the steam engine and the electric telegraph all helped to keep Britain ahead of its rivals. The growth of international trade and investment required a constant source of reliable data about international trade and economic affairs, while the Empire required a

constant supply of information essential for maintaining political alliances and military security. 

Waves of emigration as a result of industrialization and empire helped to create a popular demand for news from relatives at home and abroad, and a general climate of international awareness.

The postal reform in England in 1840, initiated by the well-known author, Anthony Trollope as Post-Master General, with the adoption of a single-rate, one penny postage stamp (the Penny Black), irrespective of distance, revolutionized postal systems. This was followed by the establishment of the Universal Postal Union in 1875 in Berne, under the Universal Postal Convention of 1874, created to harmonize international postal rates and to recognize the principle of respect for the secrecy of correspondence. With the innovations in transport of railways and steamships, international links were being established that accelerated the growth of European trade and consolidated colonial empires.

The Growth of the Telegraph and the Era of News Agencies

The second half of the nineteenth century saw an expanding system of imperial communications made possible by the electric telegraph. Invented by Samuel Morse in 1837, the telegraph enabled the rapid transmission of information, as well as ensuring secrecy and code protection. The business community was first to make use of this new technology. The speed and reliability of telegraphy were seen to offer opportunities for profit and international expansion.

The rapid development of the telegraph was a crucial feature in the unification of the British Empire. With the first commercial telegraph link set up in Britain in 1838, by 1851 a public telegraph service, including a telegraphic money order system, had been introduced. By the end of the century, as a result of the cable connections, the telegraph allowed the Colonial Office and the India Office to communicate directly with the Empire within minutes when, previously, it had taken months for post to come via sea. By providing spot prices for commodities like cotton, the telegraph enabled British merchants, exporting cotton from India or Egypt to England, to easily beat their competitors.

The new technology also had significant military implications. The overhead telegraph, installed in Algeria in 1842, proved a decisive aid to the French during the occupation and colonization of Algeria. During the Crimean War (1854-56), the rival imperial powers, Britain and France, trying to prevent Russian westward expansion that threatened overland routes to their colonial territories in Asia, exchanged military intelligence through an underwater cable in the Black Sea laid by the British during the conflict. (The Crimean conflict was notable for the pioneer war reports of Irishman William Howard Russell in *The Times* of London, who was to become the first 'big name' in international journalism.) Similarly, during the Civil War in the US (1861-65) over 24000 kilometres of cable was laid to send more than 6.5 million telegrams. The American Civil War was not only one of the earliest conflicts to be extensively reported, but also the first example both of co-operative news gathering among the American and European journalists, and of the use of photo-journalism.

The first underwater telegraphic cable which linked Britain and France became operational in 1851 and the first transatlantic cable, connecting Britain and the USA, in 1866. Between 1851 and 1868, underwater networks were laid down across the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. During the 1860s and 1870s, London was linked up by cable to the key areas of the Empire. The first line between Europe and India via Turkey was opened in 1865. Two other cables to India - one overland across Russia and the other undersea via Alexandria and Aden were both started in 1870. India was linked to Hong Kong in 1871 and to Australia in 1872 and Shanghai and Tokyo were linked by 1873. By the 1870s, telegraph lines were operating within most countries in Asia and an international communication network, dominated by Britain, was beginning to emerge. The expansion of cable was marked by the rivalry between British and French Empires, which intensified after 1869, with the opening of the Suez Canal.

The decade from 1870 to 1880 saw the successive inaugurations of communications links between the English coast and the Dutch East Indies (Batavia), the Caribbean network, the line from the British West Indies to Australia and China, the networks in the China and Japanese seas, the cable from Suez to Aden, communication between Aden and British India, the New Zealand cables, communication between the east and south coasts of Africa, and the cable from Hong Kong to Manila.

In South America, the south transatlantic cable, opened in 1874, linked Lisbon with Recife, Brazil, via the Cape Verde Islands and Madeira. Two years later, a network was established along the coast

of Chile. The British cable of 1874 was joined in 1879 by a new French cable across the North Atlantic, with a spur to Brazil, and by a new German cable from Emden to the Azores to Moravia on the African coast, and from there to Recife. By 1881, a network along the Pacific coast from Mexico to Peru was in operation. In the 1880s, France established a series of links along the coast of Indochina and Africa, with networks in Senegal.

The British-sponsored Indo-European landline telegraph between India and the Prussian North Sea coast had gone into operation in 1865. The cable had been extended from British shores to Alexandria by 1869, to Bombay in 1870, and other cables had been extended from Madras to Ceylon and from Singapore to Australia and New Zealand by 1873, and also to Hong Kong, Shanghai and the Japanese coast. Connections were made in China in 1896 with a spur of the Great Northern Telegraph Company Danish-owned line across Siberia to Russia and other points in Europe. This made a Tokyo-Shanghai-St Petersburg-London communications link possible.

Undersea cables required huge capital investment, which was met by colonial authorities and by banks, businessmen and the fast-growing newspaper industry, and the cable networks were largely in the hands of the private sector. Of the total cable distance of 104000 miles, not more than 10 per cent was administered by governments. To regulate the growing internationalization of information, the International Telegraph Union was founded in 1865 with 22 members, all Europeans, except Persia, representing, 'the first international institution of the modern era and the first organization for the international regulation of a technical network'.

According to the International Telegraph Union, the number of telegraphic transmissions in the world shot from 29 million in 1868 to 329 million in 1900. For the first time in history, colonial metropolis acquired the means to communicate almost instantly with their remotest colonies. The world was more deeply transformed in the nineteenth century than in any previous millennium, and among the transformations few had results as dazzling as the network of communication and transportation that arose to link Europe with the rest of the world.

Military operations - such as the Japanese-Russian war of 1904-5, were both assisted and reported by the first transpacific cable which had been completed in 1902, joint property of the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Britain and Canada. It ran from Vancouver to Sydney and Brisbane, by way of Fanning Island, Suva, and Norfolk Island, with a spur from Norfolk Island to Auckland. A connection already existed, established in 1873, linking Tokyo and London, with spurs to Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Colombo, Calcutta, Bombay, and Alexandria, and with cable and telegraphic spurs by way of Singapore and Batavia to Darwin, Sydney and Auckland, where ties were made to the new transpacific cable to Vancouver. A second transpacific cable was completed in 1903 by US interests, providing a link between San Francisco and Manila, through Honolulu, to Midway Island and Guam, and from there to the Asian mainland and Japan by existing British cables. All of these landing points were controlled by the United States: the Hawaiian Islands had been a US territory since 1900 and Midway was claimed by it in 1867, while Guam and the Philippines had become US colonies as a result of the 1898 Spanish-American War. Control over cables as well as sea routes was also of enormous strategic importance in an age of imperial rivalry. The cables were, in the words of Headrick, 'an essential part of the new imperialism'. 

The outcomes of the two imperial wars - the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Boer War (1899-1902) - strengthened the European and US positions in the world and led to a rapid expansion in world trade that demanded immediate and vastly improved communications links, as well as more advanced naval capabilities. The new technology of 'wireless' telegraphy (also called radiotelegraphy) promised to meet these needs. In 1901 Guglielmo Marconi harnessed the new discovery of electromagnetism to make the first wireless transatlantic telegraph transmission, with support from naval armament companies and newspaper groups. The British Empire had a great technological advantage since the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of Great Britain dominated

global telegraph traffic and had a virtual monopoly on international telegraph exchanges, as it refused to communicate with any other system other than its own. The operators of a Marconi apparatus were prohibited from responding to radio signals emanating from a non-Marconi transmitter, a policy that had the effect of blocking the exchange of critically important information relating to the safe passage of ships. However, at the Berlin Conference on Wireless Telegraphy in 1906 the first multilateral agreements on radiotelegraphy were signed and the International Radiotelegraph Union was born. By 1907 Marconi's monopoly was being challenged by other European countries as well as the United States. The dominance of British cable companies, which lasted until the end of the First World War, was based on direct control through ownership, and indirect control by means of diplomatic censorship, which Britain exercised over the messages travelling through its cables.

Britain had a critical advantage in its control of the copper and gutta-percha markets - the raw materials for the manufacture of cable - since the world rates of these were fixed in London and British mining companies owned copper deposits and mines in Chile, the world's biggest producer. Colonial governments supported the cable companies, either scientifically by research on maps and navigation, or financially by subsidies. In 1904, 22 of the 25 companies that managed international networks were affiliates of British firms; Britain deployed 25 ships totalling 70 000 tons, while the six vessels of the French cable-fleet amounted to only 7000 tons. As a result, British supremacy over the undersea networks was overwhelming: in 1910, the Empire controlled about half the world total, or 260 000 kilometres. France, which in contrast to the USA and UK, opted for the state administration of cable, controlled no more than 44000 kilometres.

The Anglo-American domination of international communication hardware was well established by the late nineteenth century, with the two countries owning nearly 75 per cent of the world's cables. Much of the global cabling was done by private companies, with Britain's Eastern Telegraph Company and the US-based Western Union Telegraph Company dominating the cable industry. By 1923, private companies had nearly 75 per cent of the global cabling share, with British accounting for nearly 43 per cent, followed by the American companies which owned 23 per cent. Within a quarter of a century, the world's cable networks had more than doubled in length. As British companies were losing their share of global cable, the Americans increased their control on international communication channels by leasing cables from British firms. US companies challenged Britain's supremacy in the field of international cables and telegraph traffic, which, they claimed, gave unfair advantage to British trade. The American view was that the pre-war cable system had 'been built in order to connect the old world commercial centres with world business' and that now was the time to develop 'a new system with the United States as a centre'.

The cables were the arteries of an international network of information, of intelligence services and of propaganda. Their importance can be gauged from the fact that the day after the First World War broke out, the British cut both German transatlantic cables. After the war, the debates over who should control the cables, which had been taken over early in the war, one by the British and another by the French, dominated discussions at the 1919 peace talks at Versailles and reflected the rivalry between the British cable companies and the growing US radio interests for ownership and control of global communications networks. The USA proposed that the cables be held jointly under international control or trusteeship and that a world congress be convened to consider international aspects of telegraph, cable and radio communication (Luther, 1988). Unlike cables, the Americans dominated the new technology of telephones. Following the patenting of the telephone by the Bell Telephone Company, established by the inventor of telephony Alexander Graham Bell in 1877, telephone production increased in the US. In 1885, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), later to become the head office of Bell Systems, was founded and for the next 80 years it succeeded in keeping a near-monopoly over US telecommunications networks. The first

international telephone calls were made between Paris and Brussels in 1887. At the end of the nineteenth century, the USA had the largest number of telephones, due largely to the fact that they were manufactured there. International Western Electric, subsidiary of Western Electric, itself owned by AT&T, was the first multinational network of production and sales, setting up branches in most European countries including Britain, Spain, France and Italy as well as in Japan, China and Australia. However, the area covered by telephones was very limited - telephone networks acquired a global dimension only in 1956 when the first telephone cable was laid under the Atlantic.

The Era of News Agencies

The newspaper industry played a significant role in the development of international telegraph networks, to be able to exploit the rapid increase in demand for news, especially the financial information required to conduct international commerce. The establishment of the news agency was the most important development in the newspaper industry of the nineteenth century, altering the process of news dissemination, nationally and internationally. The increasing demand among business clients for commercial information - on businesses, stocks, currencies, commodities, harvests - ensured that news agencies grew in power and reach. The French Havas Agency (ancestor of AFP) was founded in 1835, the German agency Wolff in 1849 and the British Reuters in 1851. The US agency, Associated Press (AP) was established in 1848, but only the three European agencies began as international ones; not until the turn of the century did an American agency move in this direction. From the start, Reuters made commercial and financial information its speciality, while Havas was to combine information and advertising. These three European news agencies, Havas,

Wolff and Reuters, all of which were subsidized by their respective governments, controlled information markets in Europe and were looking beyond the continent to expand their operations. In 1870 they signed a treaty to divide up the world market between the three of them. The resulting association of agencies (ultimately to include about 30 members), became known variously as the League of Allied Agencies (les Agences Alliees), as the World League of Press Associations, as the National Agencies Alliances, and as the Grand Alliance of Agencies. More commonly, it was referred to simply as the 'Ring Combination'. In the view of some it was a 'cartel', and its influence on world opinion was used by governments to suit their own purposes.

The basic contract, drawn up in 1870, set 'reserved territories' for the three agencies. Each agency made its own separate contracts with national agencies or other subscribers within its own territory. Provision was made for a few 'shared' territories, in which two, sometimes all three agencies had equal rights. In practice, Reuters, whose idea it was, tended to dominate the Ring Combination. Its influence was greatest because its reserved territories were larger or of greater news importance than most others. It also had more staff and stringers throughout the world and thus contributed more original news to the pool. British control of cable lines made London itself an unrivalled centre for world news, further enhanced by Britain's wideranging commercial, financial and imperial activities.

In 1890, Wolff, Reuters and Havas signed a new treaty for a further ten years. Havas emerged stronger than ever - it gained South America as an exclusive territory, and also Indo-China. But Havas yielded its position in Egypt, which became exclusive Reuters territory but continued to share Belgium and Central America with Reuters. 'The major European agencies were based in imperial capitals. Their expansion outside Europe was intimately associated with the territorial colonialism of the late nineteenth century'. After the First World War, although Wolff ceased to be a world agency, the cartel continued to dominate international news distribution.

The first challenge to their monopoly came from AP when it started supplying news to Latin America. With the international news cartel broken by the 1930s, AP and other US agencies such as United Press (UP), founded in 1907, (which later became United Press International (UPI) in 1958 after merger with Hearst's International News Service), began to encroach on their terrain. AP began

to expand internationally, paralleling political changes in Europe with the weakening of the European empires after the First World War.

The rise of Reuters

Communication was central to the expansion and consolidation of modern European empires, the largest and the most powerful being the British Empire, which at its height, 1880-1914, dominated a quarter of humanity. The fortunes of Reuters, the most famous international news agency, can be seen to run in parallel with the growth of the British Empire. The expansion of trade and investment during the nineteenth century had led to a huge growth in the demand for news and contributed to the commercialization of news and information services.

Reuters astutely exploited this demand, helped by the new communication technologies, especially the telegraph. For British and other European investors Reuters telegrams were essential reading for the latest news from various corners of the British Empire. By 1861 these were being published from more than a hundred datelines, including from the major colonies - India, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. By the 1870s, Reuters had offices in all the major strategic points of the empire - Calcutta, Bombay and Point de Galle on the southern tip of Sri Lanka, the end of the cable connection with London, from where Reuters supervised its services to Southeast Asia, China, Japan and Australia. In 1871, Shanghai became the headquarters of the growing Reuters presence in East Asia, and after the beginning of commercial mining of gold in southern Africa in the late nineteenth century, Cape Town became another nodal point in Reuters' global network.

By 1914, Reuters news service had three main channels covering the empire: London to Bombay; London to Hong Kong via the Mediterranean to Cairo, Aden, Ceylon and Singapore, and another to Cape Town, Durban, Mombasa, Zanzibar, the Seychelles, and Mauritius. The expansion of European capitalism had created a pressing need for improved commercial intelligence and with the development of communication, the value of world trade itself grew more than 25-fold between 1800 and 1913. This relationship between capital and communication was an aspect of what has been called 'the Reuters Factor', which 'functions like a multiplier that turns an increase in the supply of information into an increase in business'.

Reuters also enjoyed very close relationships with the British foreign and colonial administrations. During the second half of the nineteenth century the agency increasingly functioned, in the words of its official historian 'as an institution of the British Empire'. As Britain's most important colony, India played a 'central part in the Reuter empire within the British Empire', constituting a major market for commercial news. Reuters' revenues from India more than trebled from 1898 (£11500) to 1918 (£35 200). Though it claimed to be an independent news agency, Reuters was for the most part the unofficial voice of the Empire, giving prominence to British views. This subservience to imperial authority was most prominent during imperial wars such as the Boer War (1899-1902), during which agency reports supported the British cause and the British troops.

In the same way Reuters news from India was mostly related to economic and political developments in the Empire and largely ignored the anti-colonial movement. Defending the Empire came naturally to Reuters: in 1910 Reuters started an imperial news service and a year later, the agency made a secret arrangement with the British Government under which it offered to circulate on its wires official speeches to every corner of the Empire, in return for an annual fee of £500 from the Colonial Office. During the First World War, Reuters launched a wartime news service by arrangement with the Foreign Office, which by 1917 was circulating about one million words per month throughout the Empire. Reuters' Managing Director during the war years, George Jones, was also in charge of cable and wireless propaganda for the British Department of Information. Though this service was separate from the main Reuters wire service, whose support for the war was more subtle, it rallied opinion within the Empire and influenced the attitudes of the neutral countries. As

one British official wrote in 1917, 'At Reuters the work done is that of an independent news agency of an objective character, with propaganda secretly infused'.

Though this service was discontinued after the end of the war, Reuters entered into another agreement with the Foreign Office under which the agency would circulate specific messages on its international wires, to be paid for by the government. This agreement remained in force until the Second World War. However, apart from support from the government the major reason for the continued success of Reuters was the fact that it 'sold useful information enabling businesses to trade profitably'. The wider availability of wireless technology after the First World War enabled Reuters in 1920 to launch a trade service, which became a crucial component of the economic life of the Empire. New technology made it easier to send and receive more international industrial and financial information at a faster speed.

As the globe was being connected through trans-oceanic trade, such information - for example, New York prices for Indian cotton - had a high premium for traders who were depending on the accuracy of Reuters commodity prices and stock market news from around the world. Reuters' domination of international information was helped by its being a member of the cartel and it remained the world news leader between 1870 to 1914. But the weakening of the British Empire and the ascendancy of the USA forced Reuters to compete with the American news agencies, especially Associated Press, with which it signed, in 1942, a wartime news-sharing agreement, effectively creating a new cartel for news. In the post-war period, Reuters continued to focus on commercial information, realizing that in order to succeed in a free trade environment, it had to work towards integration of commodity, currency, equity and financial markets, 'around the clock and around the world'.

By 1999, Reuters was one of the world's biggest multimedia corporations dealing 'in the business of information', supplying global financial markets and the news media with a range of information and news products, including 'real-time financial data, collective investment data, numerical, textual, historical and graphical databases plus news, graphics, news video, and news pictures'. In the past five years to 1998, financial information products revenue accounted for 64 per cent of the total while media products revenue accounted for less than 7 per cent of the total revenue.

By the end of the twentieth century, what had been started in 1851 by entrepreneur Julius Reuter, whom Karl Marx called 'a grammatically illiterate Jew', had become the world's largest provider of financial data, besides being the largest news and television agency with nearly 2000 journalists in 183 bureaux, serving 157 countries. Its news was gathered and edited for both business and media clients in 23 languages, more than 3 million words were published each day.

With 1998 revenue of £3032 million, Reuters was one of the world's largest media and information corporations, with regional headquarters in London, New York, Geneva and Hong Kong, and offices in 217 cities. One major growth area for the agency which started sending news and commercial information via pigeon in its early years, is the Internet, given the steady growth in online trading. By 1999, it was providing news and information to over 225 Internet sites reaching an estimated 12 million viewers per month. It was planning a global news service on the Internet and had created Reuters Ventures to co-ordinate its on-line operations which include a joint venture with Dow Jones to provide a business database.

The Advent of Popular Media

The expansion of printing presses and the internationalization of news agencies were contributing factors in the growth of a worldwide newspaper industry. *The Times of India* was founded in 1838 while Southeast Asia's premier newspaper *The Straits Times* was started as a daily newspaper from Singapore in 1858. Advances in printing technology meant that newspapers in non-European languages could also be printed and distributed. By 1870 more than 140 newspapers were being printed in Indian languages; in Cairo *Al-Abram*, the newspaper which has defined Arab journalism for more than a century, was established in 1875, while in 1890, Japan's most respected newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* (Morning Sun) was founded.

In Europe, the growth of popular press was unprecedented in the 1890s - France's *Le Petit Parisien* had a circulation of 1 million in 1890, while in Britain, the *Daily Mail*, launched in 1896, which redefined boundaries of journalism, was doing roaring business. Newspapers were used by leaders to articulate nascent nationalism in many Asian countries. The Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat Sen founded *Chung-kuo Jih-pao* (Chinese daily paper) in 1899 while in India Mahatma Gandhi used *Young India*, later named *Harijan* to propagate an anticolonial agenda.

However, it was the USA which had the biggest international impact on media cultures symbolized by William Randolph Hearst, one of the world's first media moguls. His *New York Journal* heralded the penny press in the USA, while the International News Service, which sold articles, crossword puzzles and comic strips to newspapers, created the world's first syndicate service. It was succeeded in 1915 by the King Feature Syndicate, whose comic strips were used by newspapers all over the world, for most of the twentieth century.

The internationalization of a nascent mass culture, however, began with the film industry. Following the first screening in Paris and Berlin in 1895, films were being seen a year later from Bombay to Buenos Aires. By the First World War, the European market was dominated by the firm Pathe, founded in 1907 in France, whose distribution bureaux were located in seven European countries as well as in Turkey, the USA and Brazil. The development of independent studios between 1909 and 1913 led to the growth of the Hollywood film industry which was to dominate global film production.

In the realm of popular music, the dog and trumpet logo of 'His Master's Voice' (HMV) label of the Gramophone Company, became a global image. Within a few years of the founding of the company, in 1897, its recording engineers were at work in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, India, Iran and China. By 1906, 60 per cent of the company's profits were earned from overseas sales. After its merger with the US giant Columbia Gramophone Company in 1931 it formed EMI (Electric and Musical Industries), beginning a process of Anglo-American domination of the international recording industry that has lasted throughout the twentieth century.

By the end of the nineteenth century, US-based advertising companies were already looking beyond the domestic market. J. Walter Thompson, for example, established 'sales bureau' in London in 1899. The USA, where advertising was given its modern form, was an early convert to the power of advertising, making it the world's most consumerist society. The spending on advertising in the USA increased from \$0.45 billion at the start of the century to \$212 billion by its end.

In the twentieth century, advertising became increasingly important in international communication. From the 1901 advertisement for the record label His Master's Voice to the famous 1929 line 'The pause that refreshes', to De Beers' hugely popular campaign 'A diamond is forever' put out in 1948, advertisers have aimed at international audiences. This trend became even stronger with the growth of radio and television, with messages such as Pepsi-Cola's 1964 'The Pepsi generation'; Coca-Cola's

1970 rebuke 'It's the real thing'; Nike's 1988 slogan 'Just do it' and Coca-Cola's 1993 one-word advice, 'Always', being consumed across the world.

The American cowboy and masculine trademark of The Marlboro Man, introduced in 1955 and identified with Philip Morris's Marlboro cigarettes, became a worldwide advertising presence, making Marlboro the best-selling cigarette in the world. Though tobacco advertisements were banned on the USA television in 1971 and since then health groups have fought against promoting smoking through advertisement in the USA and other Western countries, The Marlboro Man was nominated as the icon of the twentieth century by the US trade journal *Advertising Age International*.

Radio and International Communication - The Battle of the Airwaves

As with other new technologies, Western countries were the first to grasp the strategic implications of radio communication after the first radio transmissions of the human voice in 1902. Unlike cable, radio equipment was comparatively cheap and could be sold on a mass scale. There was also a growing awareness among American businesses that radio, if properly developed and controlled, might be used to undercut the huge advantages of British-dominated international cable links. They realized that, while undersea cables and their landing terminals could be vulnerable, and their location required bilateral negotiations between nations, radio waves could travel anywhere, unrestrained by politics or geography.

At the 1906 international radiotelegraph conference in Berlin, 28 states debated radio equipment standards and procedures to minimize interference. The great naval powers, who were also the major users of radio (Britain, Germany, France, the USA and Russia), had imposed a regime of radio frequency allocation, allowing priority to the country that first notified the International Radiotelegraph Union of its intention to use a specific radio frequency. As worldwide radio broadcasting grew, stations that transmitted across national borders had, in accordance with an agreement signed in London in 1912, to register their use of a particular wavelength with the international secretariat of the International Radiotelegraph Union. But there was no mechanism for either assigning or withholding slots; it was a system of first come, first served. Thus the companies or states with the necessary capital and technology prevailed in taking control of the limited spectrum space, to the disadvantage of smaller and less developed countries.

Two distinct types of national radio broadcasting emerged: in the USA, the Radio Act of 1927 enshrined its established status as a commercial enterprise, funded by advertising, while the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), founded in 1927, as a non-profit, public broadcasting monopoly, provided a model for several other European and Commonwealth countries. As the strongest voice in the World Radio Conference in Washington in 1927, private companies helped to write an agreement that allowed them to continue developing their use of the spectrum, without regard to possible signal interference for other countries. By being embodied in an international treaty, these provisions took on the character of 'international law', including the principle of allocating specific wavelengths for particular purposes. A major consequence of this conference was to reinforce US and European domination of the international radio spectrum. However, it was the Soviet Union which became the first nation to exploit this new medium for international broadcasting.

The battle of the airwaves

The strategic significance of international communication grew with the expansion of the new medium. Ever since the advent of radio, its use for propaganda was an integral part of its development, with its power to influence values, beliefs and attitudes. During the First World War, the power of radio was quickly recognized as vital both to the management of public opinion at home and propaganda abroad, directed at allies and enemies alike. As noted by a distinguished scholar of propaganda: 'During the war period it came to be recognized that the mobilization of men and means was not sufficient; there must be mobilization of opinion. Power over opinion, as over life and property, passed into official hands'.

The Russian communists were one of the earliest political groups to realize the ideological and strategic importance of broadcasting, and the first public broadcast to be recorded in the history of wireless propaganda was by the Council of the People's Commissar's of Lenin's historic message on 30 October 1917: 'The All-Russian Congress of Soviets has formed a new Soviet Government. The

Government of Kerensky has been overthrown and arrested. Kerensky himself has fled. All official institutions are in the hands of the Soviet Government'.

The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to take advantage of a medium which could reach across continents and national boundaries to an international audience. The world's first short-wave radio broadcasts were sent out from Moscow in 1925. Within five years, the All-Union Radio was regularly broadcasting communist propaganda in German, French, Dutch and English. By the time the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, radio broadcasting had become an extension of international diplomacy. The head of Hitler's Propaganda Ministry, Josef Goebbels, believed in the power of radio broadcasting as a tool of propaganda. 'Real broadcasting is true propaganda. Propaganda means fighting on all battlefields of the spirit, generating, multiplying, destroying, exterminating, building and undoing. Our propaganda is determined by what we call German race, blood and nation'.

In 1935, Nazi Germany turned its attention to disseminating worldwide the racist and anti-Semitic ideology of the Third Reich. The Nazi *Reichsender* broadcasts were targeted at Germans living abroad, as far afield as South America and Australia. These short-wave transmissions were rebroadcast by Argentina, home to many Germans. Later the Nazis expanded their international broadcasting to include several languages, including Afrikaans, Arabic and Hindustani and, by 1945, German radio was broadcasting in more than 50 languages. In Fascist Italy, under Benito Mussolini, a Ministry of Print and Propaganda was created to promote Fascist ideals and win public opinion for colonial campaigns such as the invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, and support for Francisco Franco's Fascists during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39).

Mussolini also distributed radio sets to Arabs, tuned to one station alone - *Radio Bari* in southern Italy. This propaganda prompted the British Foreign Office to create a monitoring unit of the BBC to listen in to international broadcasts and later to start an Arabic language service to the region. The Second World War saw an explosion in international broadcasting as a propaganda tool on both sides. Japanese wartime propaganda included short-wave transmissions from *Nippon Hoso Kyokai* (NHK) the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, to South-east and East Asia and also to the West coast of the United States, which had a large Japanese-American population. In addition, NHK also transmitted high-quality propaganda programmes such as *Zero Hour* aimed at US troops in the Pacific islands. Although the BBC, apart from the Empire Service (the precursor of the BBC World Service), was not directly controlled by the British Government, its claim to independence during the war, was 'little more than a self-adulatory part of the British myth'.

John Reith, its first Director General and the spirit behind the BBC, was for a time the Minister of Information in 1940 and resented being referred to as 'Dr Goebbels' opposite number'. The Empire Service had been established in 1932 with the aim of connecting the scattered parts of the British Empire. Funded by the Foreign Office, it tended to reflect the government's public diplomacy. At the beginning of the Second World War, the BBC was broadcasting in seven foreign languages apart from English - Afrikaans, Arabic, French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish.

By the end of the war it was broadcasting in 39 languages. The French General De Gaulle used the BBC's French service, during the war years, to send messages to the resistance movement in occupied France and for a time between October 1942 and May 1943, the BBC broadcast a weekly 15-minute newsletter to Russia with the co-operation of the Russian news agency TASS (*Telegrafnoe agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza*). It also broadcast *The Shadow of the Swastika*, the first of a series of dramas about the Nazi Party.

The BBC helped the US Army to create the American Forces Network, which broadcast recordings of American shows for US forces in Britain, Middle East and Africa. More importantly, given Britain's proximity to the war theatre, the BBC played a key role in the propaganda offensive and often it was more effective than American propaganda which, as British media historian Asa Briggs

comments was 'both distant and yet too brash, too unsophisticated and yet too contrived to challenge the propaganda forces already at-work on the continent'.

Until the Second World War radio in the USA was known more for its commercial potential as a vehicle for advertisements rather than a government propaganda tool, but after 1942, the year the Voice of America (VOA) was founded, the US Government made effective use of radio to promote its political interests - a process which reached its high point during the decades of Cold War.

Covert communication - Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Among the explicitly propagandist radio stations that thrived during the Cold War were Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), operating from West Germany. While the Voice of America was the legitimate broadcasting arm of the United States Information Agency, the Munich-based RFE and RL were covert organizations carrying out a propaganda war against communism in Europe. They were part of what is now called 'psychological warfare' in which the 'campaign for truth' became the 'crusade for freedom'. Free Europe Inc. was established in 1949 as a non-profit-making, private corporation to broadcast news and current affairs programmes to Eastern European countries behind the Iron Curtain. Radio Liberation (the name Radio Liberty was adopted in 1963) was created two years later along the same lines to broadcast to the Soviet Union.

Both were covertly funded by the US Government, mainly through the Central Intelligence Agency until 1971, when funding and administrative responsibilities were transferred to a presidentially appointed Board for International Broadcasting (BIB). The two corporations were merged into RFE/RL in 1975. In 1994, its duties were transferred to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which oversaw all non-military US international broadcasting. Regular broadcasts of RFE began in 1951 and though RL was also established in 1951, it did not begin broadcasting until 1953. Both stations broadcast from studios in Munich: RFE using transmitters in Germany and Portugal for its programmes in Polish, Czech, Slovak, Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian; RL from transmitters in Germany, Spain and Taiwan for its programmes in Russian (over half the output) and 17 other languages spoken in the Soviet Union.

Fighting communism was the *raison d'être* of these radio stations and therefore programmes were deliberately provocative to the communist governments, broadcasting *émigré* petitions and extracts from banned books, including works by anti-establishment writers like Alexander Solzhenitsyn and scientists such as Andrei Sakharov. The often crude and insensitive propaganda broadcast led to accusations from the Soviet Union of stirring up the 1956 revolt in Hungary. During the crisis, RFE encouraged the Hungarian people to rebel against the communist authorities, even misleading them with the promises of the imminent arrival of a 'UN Delegation' - a euphemism for US military intervention - which never materialized while the Soviet tanks crushed the uprising. RFE and RL claimed to provide an alternative 'Home Service', intended to challenge the state or party monopoly over the media in the communist countries. The Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact regularly jammed RFE/RLs signals, denouncing them as a network of 'radio saboteurs,' and an integral part of US 'electronic imperialism'.

Under US President Ronald Reagan's administration US public diplomacy became more strident and radio stations were directed to undertake a 'vigorous advocacy' of American foreign policy (Tuch, 1990). The Polish service of RFE played a key role in its support for Solidarity, the first 'independent' trade union in a communist country. During the industrial unrest of 1980s, two-thirds of the Polish adult population tuned in and this level of penetration of Western radio was 'a major factor in the Soviet's decision not to intervene militarily in the country as they had in Czechoslovakia in 1968'.

In 1981, the Munich headquarters of RFE/RL were bombed, allegedly by Soviet secret services (ibid.). In 1988, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ended the jamming, allowing RFE/RL signals to

reach a broader audience. RFE/RL's contribution to the end of communism in this region is now widely acknowledged.

As one broadcaster wrote: 'well before the Iron Curtain rusted - let alone was dismantled - its metal had been perforated by the sounds on the airwaves'. Even the Russian President Boris Yeltsin personally intervened to help create an RFE/RL bureau in Moscow after the failed August 1991 coup. After many years in Munich, RFE/RL's headquarters moved to Prague in 1995. It was only in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, that these covert organizations came under public scrutiny, especially with the memoirs of George Urban, a former Director of Radio Free Europe.

Because of RFE/RL's role in fighting communism, many thought that the radios had fulfilled their mission and might be disbanded. But officials across the region stressed the continuing need for precisely the kind of broadcasts RFE/RL had brought to this region. Nevertheless, RFE/RL did cut back in some areas even as it expanded in others. It closed its Polish Service, while its Czechoslovak Service was substantially reduced and joined with Czech Public Radio to establish a new public affairs radio programme.

In 1994, RFE/RL began broadcasts to the former Yugoslavia, and in 1998, it launched its Persian Language Service and Radio Free Iraq. Such out-of-area activities were not new for these radios - during the years of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, RFE/RL established a bureau in Peshawar in Pakistan for propaganda purposes and in 1984 a new service Radio Free Afghanistan was created within RL, broadcasting in two major languages of Afghanistan - Dari and Pashto.

In 1999, RFE/RL was reaching 20 million listeners, broadcasting for more than 700 hours a week, in 25 languages, to countries stretching from Poland to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the Persian Gulf and 'providing an alternative "home service" to countries where the media are struggling amid chaotic economic conditions to achieve genuine financial and editorial independence'. RFE/RL maintains 22 bureaux across the region and has broadcasting links with more than 1000 freelancers and stringers. It uses short-wave broadcasts to reach its listeners, but increasingly it is utilizing AM/FM stations through more than 90 affiliate partners and more than 220 transmission sites located in all its broadcast countries except Belarus, Iran, Iraq, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In addition, RFE/RL maintains an active presence on the Internet, claiming that more than 5 million people visit its website every month.

Apart from Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the United States supported other clandestine radio stations such as Radio Free Russia which aimed to use the Christian message to subvert atheistic states. It started operations in 1950 from South Korea and Taiwan as well as from West Germany. Run by the militantly anti-communist Popular Labour Union (NTS), this station also carried religious propaganda in Russian and in the Baltic languages, produced by a parallel organization, Radio Omega. In addition to political propaganda, religious radio stations also contributed to the ideological battles against 'Godless communism'.

One key player was Trans World Radio, which started transmitting the gospel message from Tangier in Morocco in 1954 and has since evolved into one of the world's largest radio networks, broadcasting in 75 languages. It now has an international network of transmitters located in every continent - Monte Carlo and Cyprus for Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, Swaziland for Africa; Sri Lanka for Asia, Guam for the Pacific region and Montevideo in Uruguay for Latin America.

International Communication and Development

For nearly half a century, the Cold War divided the world into hostile East-West blocs. This had significant implications for the development of Third World countries, most of whom wanted to avoid bloc politics and concentrate on the economic emancipation of their populations. The phrase 'Third World' itself was a product of the Cold War, said to have been coined by French economic historian Alfred Sauvy in 1952, when the world was divided between the capitalist First World, led by the United States and the communist Second World with its centre in Moscow. The 'Third World' was the mass of countries remaining outside these two blocs.

National liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America had altered the political map of the world. The vast territory occupied in 1945 by European colonial powers extended over 36 million sq. km; by 1960 as a result of decolonization the area under colonial occupation had shrunk to 13 million sq. km. For the newly independent ex-colonial states, international communication opened up opportunities for development. The Non-Aligned Movement, through the Group of 77, established in 1964, began to demand greater economic justice in such UN forums as UNCTAD and in 1974, the UN General Assembly formally approved their demand for the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), a democratic interdependent economic order, based on equality and sovereignty, including the right to 'pursue progressive social transformation that enables the full participation of the population in the development process'.

While this remained largely an ideal, it provided a new framework to redefine international relations, for the first time after the Second World War, not in terms of East-West categories but by the North-South divide. At the same time, it was argued that the new economic order had to be linked to a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The general improvement in superpower relations in the age of detente, as marked by the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), encouraged the Non-Aligned countries to demand these changes in global economic and informational systems. The conference recognized the need for 'freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds'.

As Chilean scholar Juan Somavia, writing in the mid-1970s, observed:

It is becoming increasingly clear that the transnational communications system has developed with the support and at the service of the transnational power structure. It is an integral part of the system which affords the control of that key instrument of contemporary society: information. It is the vehicle for transmitting values and lifestyles to Third World countries which stimulate the type of consumption and the type of society necessary to the transnational system as a whole.

Apart from highlighting the structural inequalities in international communication, there were also efforts made among many developing countries, often with financial or technical support from the West, to use communication technologies for development. This could take different forms - from promoting literacy and information about healthcare to spreading consumerism. One area which received particular attention from policy-makers was satellite television, which given its reach, was considered a powerful medium that could be harnessed for educational purposes, and in the long run, to help change social and cultural attitudes of 'traditional' people and 'modernize' societies.

Lecture # 06

New World Information and Communication Order and its Influence Over Developed World and Over Developing Countries

The international information system, the NWICO protagonists argued, perpetuated and strengthened inequality in development, with serious implications for the countries of the South, which were heavily dependent on the North for both software and hardware in the information sector. It was argued by Third World leaders that through their control of major international information channels, the Western media gave an exploitative and distorted view of their countries to the rest of the world. The existing order, they contended, had, because of its structural logic, created a model of dependence, with negative effects on the polity, economy and society of developing countries.

Their demands were articulated by Tunisian Information Minister Mustapha Masmoudi, who was later a member of the MacBride Commission. The chief complaints from the long litany of the Third World demands were as follows:

- owing to the socio-technological imbalance there was a one-way flow of information from the 'centre' to the 'periphery,' which created a wide gap between the 'haves' and the 'have nots;'
- the information rich were in a position to dictate terms to the information poor, thus creating a structure of dependency with widespread economic, political and social ramifications for the poor societies;
- this vertical flow (as opposed to a desirable horizontal flow of global information) was dominated by the Western-based transnational corporations;
- information was treated by the transnational media as a 'commodity' and subjected to the rules of the market;
- the entire information and communication order was a part of and in turn propped up international inequality that created and sustained mechanisms of neo-colonialism.

Masmoudi argued that there existed a 'flagrant quantitative imbalance between North and South created by the volume of news and information emanating from the developed world and intended for the developing countries and the volume of the flow in the opposite direction'. He contended that gross inequalities also existed between developed and developing countries in the distribution of the radio-frequency spectrum as well as in the traffic of television programmes. He saw a de facto hegemony and a will to dominate - evident in the marked indifference of the media in the developed countries, particularly in the West, to the problems, concerns and aspirations of the developing countries.

Current events in the developing countries are reported to the world via the transnational media; at the same time, these countries are kept 'informed' of what is happening abroad through the same channels. According to Masmoudi, 'by transmitting to developing countries only news processed by them, that is, news which they have filtered, cut, and distorted, the transnational media impose their own way of seeing the world upon the developing countries'.

These structural problems were also echoed by other scholars who viewed the Western-dominated, international information system, with its origins in the international news media network, as geared to Western economic and political interests and projecting their version of reality through these global networks to the rest of the world.

The demands and proposals for NWICO emerged from a series of meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, most notably Algiers in 1973 and Tunis in 1976. A landmark was reached with the Mass Media Declaration by UNESCO General Conference in 1978, which recognized the role the mass media played in development, and in December of that year, the 33rd session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). As a result, in 1979 the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, was set up. The MacBride Commission, as it was popularly known, submitted its final report to UNESCO in 1980, a document which, for the first time, brought information- and communication related issues on the global agenda.

The MacBride Commission

The International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems that was established under the chairmanship of Sean MacBride by UNESCO occupies a prominent place in the debate regarding the establishment of a NWICO. The Commission report, commonly known as the MacBride Report, gave intellectual justification for evolving a new global communication order. For this reason the NWICO protagonists considered it to be a seminal document. The Commission was created in 1977 as a direct response to Resolution 100 of the 19th General Session of UNESCO held in Nairobi in 1976.

The Commission took two years after going through one hundred working papers especially commissioned for it, to bring out one interim and a final report in 1980. The Commission had the following 16 members: Sean MacBride, chairman (Ireland), Elie Abel (USA), Hubert Beuve-Mery (France), Elebe Ma Ekonzo (Zaire), Gabriel Garcia Marquez (Columbia), Mochtar Lubis (Indonesia), Mustapha Masmoudi (Tunisia), Betty Zimmerman (Canada), Michio Nagai (Japan), Fred Isaac Akporuaro Omu (Nigeria), Bogdan Osolnik (Yugoslavia), Gamal el Oteifi (Egypt), Johannes Pietar Pronk (the Netherlands), Juan Somavia (Chile), Boobli George Verghese (India), and Leonid Zamatin (USSR) (Zamatin was replaced by Sergei Losev during the study). The Commission was established to study four main aspects of global communication: the current state of world communication; the problems surrounding a free and balanced flow of information and how the needs of the developing countries link with the flow; how, in light of the NIEO, a NWICO could be created, and how the media could become the vehicle for educating public opinion about world problems.

The interim report generated a good deal of controversy as it tended to legitimize the movement towards the establishment of a NWICO. It levelled charges against the Western wire services for their inadequate coverage of the Third World. The 100 background papers that the Commission prepared generated international interest in NWICO and helped provide insights into the various dimensions of the problems of global information system. This enriched the debate and raised its standard from mere rhetoric to more sophisticated criticism of international inequity in media relations.

Among its 82 recommendations that covered the entire gamut of global communication issues, the most innovative were those dealing with democratization of communication. The Commission agreed that democratization was impeded by undemocratic political systems, bureaucratic administrative systems, technologies controlled or understood only by a few, the exclusion of disadvantaged groups, and illiteracy and semi-literacy. To break through these barriers, the Commission recommended many steps, including: participation in media management by representatives of the public and various citizens groups, horizontal communication, counter-information and three forms of alternative communication: radical opposition, community or local media movements and trade unions or other social groups with their particular communication networks.

Following the UNESCO definition of 'a free flow and a wider and more balanced dissemination of information', the MacBride Report related freedom of the press to freedom of expression, to the rights to communicate and receive information, rights of reply and correction, and the civil political economic-social-cultural rights set forth in the UN's 1966 covenants. The MacBride Report pointed out that the freedom for the 'strong' and the 'haves' had had undesirable consequences for the 'weak' and the 'have nots'. It called for abolition of 'censorship or arbitrary control of information' asking for 'self-censorship by communicators themselves'. The report was critical of the constraints imposed by commercialization, pressures from advertisers and concentration of media ownership. It related the growth of transnational corporations to 'one way flow', 'market dominance' and 'vertical flow'. It pointed out that some of the strongest transnational corporations, while vociferous for freedom for themselves, were reluctant to open up flows to share scientific and technological information.

The Commission charged that under the guise of the free flow of information, some governments and transnational media had 'on occasion tried to undermine internal stability in other countries, violating their sovereignty and disturbed national development'. The MacBride Report, which was hailed as 'the first international document that provides a really global view on the world's communication problems', received a mixed response. The protagonists of NWICO generally welcomed the report while the West criticized it. The World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC), consisting of journalistic organizations, including the International Federation of Journalists, AP, UPI and the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), was critical of what it considered to be the report's bias against private ownership of media and communication facilities and the 'problems created in a society by advertising'.

Following the submission of the report of the MacBride Commission, at the 21st General Conference Session of UNESCO held in Belgrade in 1980, a resolution for the attainment of a NWICO was passed, thereby formally approving the demand. The resolution proposed:

- elimination of the imbalance and inequalities which characterize the present situation;
- elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolists, public or private, and excessive concentrations;
- removal of the internal and external obstacles to a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information and ideas;
- plurality of sources and channels of information;
- freedom of the press and information;
- the freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication media, a freedom inseparable from responsibility;
- the capacity of developing countries to achieve improvement of their own situations, notably by providing their own equipment, by training their personnel, by improving their infrastructures and by making their information and communication media suitable to their needs and aspirations;
- the sincere will of developed countries to help them attain these objectives;
- respect for each people's cultural identity and for the rights of each nation to inform the world public about its interests, its aspirations and its social and cultural values;
- respect for the right of all peoples to participate in international exchange of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit;
- respect for the right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively in the communication process.

Opposition to NWICO

The West, led by the USA, saw in the new order a 'Soviet-inspired' Third World design to control the mass media through state regulation. As a concept it was seen as one fundamentally in conflict with liberal Western values and the principle of the 'free flow of information'. The Western response was also affected by the Cold War assumptions which made them place the issues regarding the problems of global news flow in the context of East-West rivalry. The opponents of NWICO argued that the demand for NWICO was a pretext for Third World dictators to stifle media freedom, to impose censorship and keep away foreign journalists. Such slogans as 'cultural self-determination', 'media imperialism' and 'national sovereignty over a country's communications', they argued, were designed to control channels of communication.

The Western news organizations stoutly fought any change in the old information order. They maintained that they were only reporting the reality of life in the Third World - political instability, economic backwardness, human and natural disasters - and that this objective journalism was disapproved of by undemocratic governments in the South. Many Western observers claimed that UNESCO, the site of those heated debates, was neglecting its true objectives by sponsoring this Third World encroachment on international information and communication. Even the MacBride Commission, which had members from both developed and developing countries, was criticized for providing an intellectual justification for the reform of international communication.

The comments of one US observer were typical of this: 'The administration's lack of vigorous opposition to the UNESCO/Soviet/Third World's campaign for the total take-over of all means of communication is an indication that the US is abandoning its traditional values of freedom and opposition to totalitarianism'.

The Western media viewed the NWICO demands of 'national communication policies', 'national sovereignty over information' and 'democratization of communications' as 'entailing too interventionist a role for the state and also as likely to result in the exclusion of foreign journalists, with consequent restriction of information flows'. A closer scrutiny of the arguments against NWICO put forward by Western governments and the media, reveals that the entire debate was seen only in terms of the threat to the 'freedom of the Press' posed by Third World governments under the new order. As Colleen Roach comments: 'To state that virtually every NWICO-related issue or subject ('social responsibility of the press', 'protection of journalists', 'right to communicate', etc.) was reduced to the slogan of 'government control of the media' is no exaggeration. The reason for this strategy is not merely the US predilection for over-simplification of complex issues, or even the historical commitment to the First Amendment, although these factors are certainly not to be neglected. The emphasis on the 'government control' argument reflects, above all, the need to ensure that the NWICO would not reinforce government-run public sector communications media at the expense of the private sectors.

In the 1970s, when the superpower relations were relatively stable, the New World Information and Communication Order was seen by Southern leaders as an integral part of an ongoing North-South dialogue. Under President Jimmy Carter, for whom defence of human rights was a matter of personal commitment, the US administration appeared to take a favourable view of the problems faced by developing countries. Facing opposition from domestic conservative quarters, which found confusion and contradictions in Carter's human rights campaigns, limited progress was made in this North-South dialogue. However, the Carter administration played an important part in launching UNESCO's International Programme for the Development of Communications (IPDC). The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 as a result of anti-Western Islamic revolution, and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in the same year, not only denied Carter a second term in office but also signified the abandonment of the North-South dialogue and the advent of the New Cold War.

Approaches to Theorizing International Communication - 'Free Flow of Information'

Theories have their own history and reflect the concerns of the time in which they were developed. This chapter examines some that offer ways of approaching the subject of international communication and assesses how useful their explanations are in terms of an understanding of the processes involved. This is by no means a comprehensive account of theories of communication, nor does it set out an all-embracing theorization of the subject, but looks at the key theories and their proponents, which together with the preceding chapter on the history of international communication, should help to contextualize the analysis of contemporary global communication systems in subsequent chapters. It is not surprising that theories of communication began to emerge in parallel with the rapid social and economic changes of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, reflecting the significance of the role of communications in the growth of capitalism and empire, and drawing also on advances in science and the understanding of the natural world.

One of the first concepts of communication, developed by the French philosopher Claude Henri de Saint Simon (1760-1825), used the analogy of the living organism, proposing that the development of a system of communication routes (roads, canals and railways) and a credit system (banks) was vital for an industrializing society and that the circulation of money, for example, was equivalent to that of blood for the human heart.

The metaphor of the organism was also fundamental for British philosopher Herbert Spenser (1820-1903), who argued that industrial society was the embodiment of an 'organic society', an increasingly coherent, integrated system, in which functions became more and more specified and parts more interdependent. Communication was seen as a basic component in a system of distribution and regulation. Like the vascular system, the physical network of roads, canals and railways ensured the distribution of nutrition, while the channels of information (the press, telegraph and postal service) functioned as the equivalent of the nervous system, making it possible for the centre to 'propagate its influence' to its outermost parts. 'Dispatches are compared to nervous discharges that communicate movement from an inhabitant of one city to that of another'.

At the same time, contemporary commentators were anxious about the social and cultural impact of the speed and reach of the new means of communication and the rise of a mass society fuelled and sustained by them. In the twentieth century, theories of international communication evolved into a discrete discipline within the new social sciences and in each era have reflected contemporary concerns about political, economic and technological changes and their impact on society and culture. In the early twentieth century, during and after the First World War, a debate arose about the role of communication in propagating the competitive economic and military objectives of the imperial powers, exemplified in the work of Walter Lippmann on 'public opinion' and Harold Lasswell on wartime propaganda.

Lippmann's concerns were mainly about the manipulation of public opinion by powerful state institutions, while Lasswell, a political scientist, did pioneering work on the systematic analysis of propaganda activities. After the Second World War, theories of communication multiplied in response to new developments in technology and media, first radio and, then television, and the increasingly integrated international economic and political system. Two broad though often interrelated approaches to theorizing communication can be discerned: the political-economy approach concerned with the underlying structures of economic and political power relations, and the perspectives of cultural studies, focusing mainly on the role of communication and media in the process of the creation and maintaining of shared values and meanings.

The political-economy approach has its roots in the critique of capitalism produced by the German philosopher, Karl Marx (1818-83), but it has evolved over the years to incorporate a wide range of critical thinkers. Central to a Marxian interpretation of international communication is the question of power, which ultimately is seen as an instrument of control by the ruling classes. In his seminal text, *German Ideology*, Marx described the relationship between economic, political and cultural power thus: The class which has the means of material production has control at the same time over the means of mental production so that, thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it... Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they ... among other things ... regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.

Much of the critical research on international communication has been an examination of the pattern of ownership and production in the media and communication industries, analyzing these within the overall context of social and economic power relations, based on national and transnational class interests. Researchers working within the Marxist tradition were concerned, for example, with the commodification of communication hardware and software and its impact on inequalities of access to media technologies. The influence on international communication of the growing literature of cultural studies, increasingly transnational in intent, if not yet in perspectives, grew significantly in the late twentieth century. Social-science analyses of mass communication have been enriched by concepts from the study of literature and the humanities.

Cultural Studies, which started in Britain with the study of popular and mass culture and their role in the reproduction of social hegemony and inequality, is now more generally concerned with how media texts work to create meaning (on the basis of analysis of the texts themselves), and how culturally situated individuals work to gather meaning from texts (increasingly based on observation of media consumers). Cultural Studies' discovery of polysemic texts (the potential for readers to generate their own meanings) fitted well with a politically conservative era and the reinvigoration of liberal capitalism which accompanied it.

Free flow of information

After the Second World War and the establishment of a bi-polar world of free market capitalism and state socialism, theories of international communication became part of the new Cold War discourse. For the supporters of capitalism, the primary function of international communication was to promote democracy, freedom of expression and markets, while the Marxists argued for greater state regulation on communication and media outlets.

The concept of the 'free flow of information' reflected Western, and specifically US, antipathy to state regulation and censorship of the media and its use for propaganda by its communist opponents. The 'free flow' doctrine was essentially a part of the liberal, free market discourse that championed the rights of media proprietors to sell wherever and whatever they wished. As most of the world's media resources and media-related capital, then as now, were concentrated in the West, it was the media proprietors in Western countries, their governments and national business communities that had most to gain.

The concept of 'free flow' therefore served both economic and political purposes. Media organizations of the media-rich countries could hope to dissuade others from erecting trade barriers to their products or from making it difficult to gather news or make programmes on their territories. Their argument drew on premises of democracy, freedom of expression, the media's role as 'public watchdog' and their assumed global relevance.

For their compatriot businessmen, 'free flow' assisted them in advertising and marketing their goods and services in foreign markets, through media vehicles whose information and entertainment products championed the Western way of life and its values of capitalism and individualism. For

Western governments, 'free flow' helped to ensure the continuing and unreciprocated influence of Western media on global markets, strengthening the West in its ideological battle with the Soviet Union. The doctrine also contributed to providing, in generally subtle rather than direct ways, vehicles for communication of US government points of view to international audience.

Modernization Theory

Complementary to the doctrine of 'free flow' in the post-war years was the view that international communication was the key to the process of modernization and development for the so-called 'Third World'. Modernization theory arose from the notion that international mass communication could be used to spread the message of modernity and transfer the economic and political models of the West to the newly independent countries of the South. Communications research on what came to be known as 'modernization' or 'development theory' was based on the belief that the mass media would help transform traditional societies. This pro-media bias was very influential and received support from international organizations such as UNESCO and by the governments in developing countries.

One of the earliest exponents of this theory was Daniel Lerner, a political science professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whose classic work in the field, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958) - the product of research conducted in the early 1950s in Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran - examined the degree to which people in the Middle East were exposed to national and international media, especially radio. In this first major comparative survey, Lerner proposed that contact with the media helped the process of transition from a 'traditional' to a 'modernized' state, characterizing the mass media as a 'mobility multiplier', which enables individuals to experience events in far-off places, forcing them to reassess their traditional way of life. Exposure to the media, Lerner argued, made traditional societies less bound by traditions and made them aspire to a new and modern way of life.

The Western path of 'development' was presented as the most effective way to shake off traditional 'backwardness': according to Lerner:

[The] Western model of modernisation, exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global. Everywhere for example increasing urbanisation has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation.

Western society, Lerner argued, provided 'the most developed model of societal attributes (power, wealth, skill, rationality)', and 'from the West came the stimuli which undermined traditional society that will operate efficiently in the world today, the West is still a useful model'. Another key modernization theorist Wilbur Schramm, whose influential book, *Mass Media and National Development*, was published in 1964 in conjunction with UNESCO, saw the mass media as a 'bridge to a wider world', as the vehicle for transferring new ideas and models from the North to the South and, within the South, from urban to rural areas. Schramm, at the time Director of the Institute for Communication Research at Stanford University, California, noted: the task of the mass media of information and the 'new media' of education is to speed and ease the long, slow social transformation required for economic development, and, in particular, to speed and smooth the task of modernising human resources behind the national effort.

Schramm endorsed Lerner's view that mass media can raise the aspirations of the peoples in developing countries. The mass media in the South, he wrote, 'face the need to rouse their people from fatalism and a fear of change. They need to encourage both personal and national aspirations. Individuals must come to desire a better life than they have and to be willing to work for it'. The timing of Schramm's book was significant. The UN had proclaimed the 1960s as 'the Decade of Development' and UN agencies and Western governments, led by the USA, were generously funding research, often in conjunction with private companies, through universities and development bureaucracy, notably the newly established United States Agency for International

Development (USAID), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Peace Corps, to harness the power of the mass media to 'modernize' the newly independent countries of the South. In the 1970s, modernization theorists started to use the level of media development as an indicator of general societal development.

Leading theorists of the 'development as modernization' school, such as Everett Rogers, saw a key role for the mass media in international communication and development. Such research benefited from the surveys undertaken by various US-government-funded agencies and educational foundations, especially in Asia and Latin America for what Rogers (1962) called 'disseminating innovations'.

This top-down approach to communications, a one-way flow of information from government or international development agencies via the mass media to Southern peasantry at the bottom, was generally seen as a panacea for the development of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. But it was predicated on a definition of development that followed the model of Western industrialization and 'modernization', measured primarily by the rate of economic growth of output or Gross National Product (GNP). It failed to recognize that the creation of wealth on its own was insufficient: the improvement of life for the majority of the populations depended on the equitable distribution of that wealth and its use for the public good. It also failed to ask questions like development for whom and who would gain or lose, ignoring any discussion of the political, social, or cultural dimensions of development. In many Southern countries, income disparities in fact increased over the succeeding thirty years - despite a growth in GNP.

Moreover, the mass media were assumed to be a neutral force in the process of development, ignoring how the media are themselves products of social, political, economic and cultural conditions. In many developing countries economic and political power was and remains restricted to a tiny, often unrepresentative, elite, and the mass media play a key role in legitimizing the political establishment. Since the media had, and continue to have, close proximity to the ruling elites, they tend to reflect this view of development in the news. The international communication research inspired by the modernization thesis was very influential, shaping university communication programmes and research centres globally. Though such research provided huge amount of data on the behaviour, attitudes and values of the people in the South, it tended to work within the positivist tradition of what sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld (1941) had long identified as 'administrative' research, often failing to analyse the political and cultural context of international communication.

However, the outcomes of this type of research in international communication can be useful in analysing the relationship of media growth to economic development, measured in terms of such indicators as sales of communication hardware and gross national product. They are also useful in international promotion of advertising and marketing. It is important to understand the Cold War context in which modernization theory emerged, a time when it was politically expedient for the West to use the notion of modernization to bring the newly independent nations of Asia, the Middle East and Africa into the sphere of capitalism. As Vincent Mosco comments: "The theory of modernisation meant a reconstruction of the international division of labour amalgamating the non-Western world into the emerging international structural hierarchy".

It is now being accepted that some of modernization research was politically motivated. It has been pointed out that Lerner's seminal study was a spin-off from a large and clandestine government-funded audience research project, conducted for the Voice of America by the Bureau of Applied Social Research. Despite its enormous influence in the field of international communication, Lerner's research had more to do with the East-West ideological contest of those days of Cold War, when in the Middle East radical voices were demanding decolonization - Iran had nationalized its oil industry in 1951, leading to the CIA-backed coup, two years later, which removed the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Musaddiq. Given the prominence of radio propaganda during

the 1950s, this research could also be seen as an investigation of radio listening behaviour in a region bordering the Soviet Union.

In this context it is interesting to note that Lerner had worked for the Psychological Warfare Division of the US Army during the Second World War. One major shortcoming of the early modernization theorists was their assumption that the modern and the traditional lifestyles were mutually exclusive, and their dismissive view of the culture of the 'indigent natives' led them to believe in the desirability and inevitability of a shift from the traditional to the modern. The dominant cultural and religious force in the region - Islam - and a sense of collective pan-Islamic identity were seen as 'sentimental sorties into the symbolism of a majestic past'. The elites in the region had to choose between 'Mecca or mechanisation'. The crux of the matter, Lerner argued, was 'not whether, but how one should move from traditional ways toward modern life-styles. The symbols of race and ritual fade into irrelevance when they impede living desires for bread and enlightenment'.

What modernizers such as Lerner failed to comprehend was that the dichotomy of modern versus traditional was not inevitable. Despite all the West's efforts at media modernization, Islamic traditions continue to define the Muslim world, and indeed have become stronger in parts of the Middle East. In addition, these cultures can also use modern communication methods to put their case across. In the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, for example, radical groups produced printed material and audiocassettes and distributed them through informal networks to promote an anti-Western ideology based on a particular Islamic view of the world.

In Latin America most communication research, often funded by the US government, was led by proponents of the modernization thesis. However, since the gap between the rich and poor was growing, as elsewhere in the developing world, critics started to question the validity of the developmentalist project and raised questions about what it left out - the relationship between communication, power and knowledge and the ideological role of international organizational and institutional structures. This led to a critique of modernization in Latin America, most notably from Brazil's Paulo Freire, whose *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) had a major influence on international development discourse, though how far his views were adopted in devising international communication strategies remains an open question. Southern scholars, especially those from Latin America, argued that the chief beneficiaries of modernization programmes were not the 'traditional' rural poor in the South but Western media and communication companies, which had expanded into the Third World, ostensibly in the name of modernization and development, but in fact in search of new consumers for their products. They argued that modernization programmes were exacerbating the already deep social and economic inequalities in the developing countries and making them dependent on Western models of communication development.

Partly as a result of the work of Latin American scholars, the proponents of modernization in the West acknowledged that the theory needed reformulation. Despite decades of 'modernization', the vast majority of the people in the South continued to live in poverty, and by the mid-1970s the talk was of the 'passing of the dominant paradigm'. In a revised version of modernization theory, a shift has been detectable from support for the mass media to an almost blind faith in the potential of the new information and communication technologies - in what has been called 'a neo-developmental view'.

Also noticeable is the acceptance of a greater role for local elites in the modernization process. However, the importance of Western technology remains crucial in the revised version too. According to this view, modernization requires advanced telecommunication and computer infrastructure, preferably through the 'efficient' private corporations, thus integrating the South into a globalized information economy.

Dependency Theory

Dependency theory emerged in Latin America in the late 1960s and 1970s, partly as a consequence of the political situation in the continent, with increasing US support for right-wing authoritarian governments, and partly with the realization among the educated elite that the developmentalist approach to international communication had failed to deliver. The establishment, in 1976, in Mexico City of the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios (ILET), whose principal research interest was the study of transnational media business, gave an impetus to a critique of the 'modernization' thesis, documenting its negative consequences in the continent. The impact of ILET was also evident in international policy debates about NWICO, particularly through the work of Juan Somavia, a member of the MacBride Commission. Though grounded in the neo-Marxist political-economy approach, dependency theorists aimed to provide an alternative framework to analyse international communication.

Central to dependency theory was the view that transnational corporations (TNCs), most based in the North, exercise control, with the support of their respective governments, over the developing countries by setting the terms for global trade - dominating markets, resources, production, and labour. Development for these countries was shaped in a way to strengthen the dominance of the developed nations and to maintain the 'peripheral' nations in a position of dependence - in other words, to make conditions suitable for 'dependent development'. In its most extreme form the outcome of such relationship was 'the development of underdevelopment'. This neo-colonial relationship in which the TNCs controlled both the terms of exchange and the structure of global markets, it was argued, had contributed to the widening and deepening of inequality in the South while the TNCs had strengthened their control over the world's natural and human resources.

The cultural aspects of dependency theory, examined by scholars interested in the production, distribution and consumption of media and cultural products, were particularly relevant to the study of international communication. The dependency theorists aimed to show the links between discourses of 'modernization' and the policies of transnational media and communication corporations and their backers among Western governments. Dependency theorists both benefited from, and contributed to, research on cultural aspects of imperialism being undertaken at the time in the USA. The idea of cultural imperialism is most clearly identified with the work of Herbert Schiller, who was based at the University of California.

Working within the neo-Marxist critical tradition, Schiller analysed the global power structures in the international communication industries and the links between transnational business and the dominant states. At the heart of Schiller's argument was the analysis of how, in pursuit of commercial interests, huge US-based transnational corporations, often in league with Western (predominantly US) military and political interests, were undermining the cultural autonomy of the countries of the South and creating a dependency on both the hardware and software of communication and media in the developing countries. Schiller defined cultural imperialism as: the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant centre of the system.

Schiller argued that the declining European colonial empires - mainly British, French and Dutch - were being replaced by a new emergent American empire, based on US economic, military and informational power. According to Schiller, the US-based TNCs have continued to grow and

dominate the global economy. This economic growth has been underpinned with communications know-how, enabling US business and military organizations to take leading roles in the development and control of new electronically- based global communication systems. Such domination had both military and cultural implications. Schiller's seminal work, *Mass Communications and American Empire* (1969/1992), examined the role of the US government, a major user of communication services, in developing global electronic media systems, initially for military purposes to counter the perceived, and often exaggerated, Soviet security threat. By controlling global satellite communications, the USA had the most effective surveillance system in operation - a crucial element in the Cold War years. Such communication hardware could also be used to propagate the US model of commercial broadcasting, dominated by large networks and funded primarily by advertising revenue. Nothing less than the viability of the American industrial economy itself is involved in the movement toward international commercialisation of broadcasting.

The private yet managed economy depends on advertising. Remove the excitation and the manipulation of consumer demand and industrial slowdown threatens. According to Schiller, dependence on US communications technology and investment, coupled with the new demand for media products, necessitated large-scale imports of US media products, notably television programmes. Since media exports are ultimately dependent on sponsors for advertising, they endeavour not only to advertise Western goods and services, but also promote, albeit indirectly, a capitalist 'American way of life', through mediated consumer lifestyles. The result was an 'electronic invasion', especially in the global South, which threatened to undermine traditional cultures and emphasize consumerism at the expense of community values. US dominance of global communication increased during the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the failure of the UNESCO-supported demands for NWICO, Schiller argued in the 1992 revised edition of the book. The economic basis of US dominance, however, had changed, with TNCs acquiring an increasingly important role in international relations, transforming US cultural imperialism into 'transnational corporate cultural domination'.

In a recent review of the US role in international communication during the past half-century, Schiller saw the US state still playing a decisive role in promoting the ever-expanding communication sector, a central pillar of the US economy. In US support for the promotion of electronic-based media and communication hardware and software in the new information age of the twenty-first century, Schiller found 'historical continuities in its quest for systemic power and control,' of global communication.

Other prominent works employing what has come to be known as 'the cultural imperialism thesis' have examined such diverse aspects of US cultural and media dominance as Hollywood's relationship with the European movie market; US television exports and influences in Latin America; the contribution of Disney comics in promoting capitalist values and the role of the advertising industry as an ideological instrument.

Internationally, some of the most significant work has been the UNESCO supported research on international flow in television programmes. One prominent aspect of dependency in international communication was identified in the 1970s by Oliver Boyd-Barrett as 'media imperialism', examining information and media inequalities between nations and how these reflect broader issues of dependency, and analysing the hegemonic power of mainly US-dominated international media - notably news agencies, magazines, films, radio and television. Boyd-Barrett defined media imperialism as: The process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one country are singly or together subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other country or countries, without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so affected.

For its critics, dependency literature was 'notable for an absence of clear definitions of fundamental terms like imperialism and an almost total lack of empirical evidence to support the arguments'. Others argued that it ignored the question of media form and content as well as the role of the audience. Those involved in a cultural studies approach to the analysis of international communication argued that, like other cultural artefacts, media 'texts' could be polysemic and were amenable to different interpretations by audiences who were not merely passive consumers but 'active' participants in the process of negotiating meaning.

It was also pointed out that the 'totalistic' cultural imperialism thesis did not adequately take on board such issues as how global media texts worked in national contexts, ignoring local patterns of media consumption. Quantifying the volume of US cultural products distributed around the world was not a sufficient explanation, it was also important to examine its effects. There was also a view that cultural imperialism thesis assumed a 'hypodermic-needle model' of media effects and ignored the complexities of 'Third World' cultures.

It was argued that the Western scholars had a less than deep understanding of 'Third World' cultures, seeing them as homogeneous and not being adequately aware of the regional and intra-national diversities of race, ethnicity, language, gender and class. However, there have yet been few systematic studies of the cultural and ideological effects of Western media products on audiences in the South, especially from Southern scholars. Despite its share of criticism, the cultural imperialism thesis was very influential in international communication research in the 1970s and 1980s. It was particularly important during the heated NWICO debates in UNESCO and other international fora in the 1970s. However, even a critic such as John Thompson, while rejecting the main thesis, has conceded that such research is 'probably the only systematic and moderately plausible attempt to think about the globalization of communications and its impact on the modern world'.

Defenders of the thesis found the 1990s' debates criticizing cultural imperialism 'lacking even the most elementary epistemological precaution and sometimes actually bordering on intellectual dishonesty', arguing that the critics of this theory have often 'taken the notion out of context, abstracting it from the concrete historical conditions that produced it: the political struggles and commitments of the 1960s and 1970s'. With changes in debates on international communication reflecting the rhetoric of privatization and liberalization in the 1990s, theories of media and cultural dependency have become less prominent. However, Boyd-Barrett has argued that while media imperialism theory, in its original formulation, did not take into account intra-national media relations, gender and ethnic issues, it is still a useful analytical tool to make sense of what he terms as the 'colonization of communications space'.

One of the limits of the cultural and media imperialism approach is that it did not fully take into account the role of the national elites, especially in the developing world. However, though its influence has dwindled, the theory of structural imperialism developed by the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung, also offers an explanation of the role of international communication in maintaining structures of economic and political power.

Media Imperialism

Galtung argues that the world consists of developed 'centre' states and underdeveloped 'periphery' states. In turn, each centre and periphery state possesses a 'core' - a highly developed area - and a less developed 'periphery'. He defines structural imperialism as a 'sophisticated type of dominance relation which cuts across nations basing itself on a bridgehead which the centre of the centre nation establishes in the centre of the periphery nation for the joint benefit of both'. For Galtung, there is a harmony of interest between the core of the centre nation and the centre in the periphery nation; less harmony of interest within the periphery nation than within the centre nation and a disharmony of interest between the periphery of the centre nation and the periphery of the periphery nation.

In other words, there exists in the countries of the South a dominant elite whose interests coincide with the interests of the elite in the developed world. This 'core' thus not only provides a bridgehead by which the centre nation can maintain its economic and political domination over the periphery nation, but is also supported by the centre in maintaining its dominance over its own periphery. In terms of values and attitudes, the elite group is closer to other elites in the developed world than with groups in their own country. Galtung defines five types of imperialism that depend upon the type of exchange between centre and periphery nations: economic, political, military, communication and cultural. The five types form a syndrome of imperialism, and interact, albeit through different channels, to reinforce the dominance relationship of centre over periphery.

Communication imperialism is intimately related to cultural imperialism and news is a combination of cultural and communication exchange. Periphery-centre relationships are maintained and reinforced by information flows and through the reproduction of economic activities. These create institutional links that serve the interests of the dominant groups, both in the centre and within the periphery. Institutions in the centre of the periphery often mirror those of the developed world and thus recreate and promote the latter's value systems. According to Galtung, the basic mechanism of structural imperialism revolves around two forms of interaction, 'vertical' and 'feudal'. The 'vertical' interaction principle maintains that relationships are asymmetrical; that the flow of power is from the more developed state to the less developed state, while the benefits of the system flow upwards from the less developed states to the centre states. The 'feudal' interaction principle states that there 'is interaction along the spokes, from the periphery to the centre hub; but not along the rim, from one periphery nation to another'.

The feudal interaction structure reinforces the inequalities produced by the vertical interaction structures. Communication and information flow from the centre to the periphery and back again: for example, Southern states receive information about the North but little information about fellow developing countries. Galtung's theory maintains that communication imperialism is based on the feudal interaction structure in which the periphery states are tied to the centre in particular ways. Information flows from different core states in different proportions, determined by capital and trade flows, as well as historical, colonial ties. According to Galtung, the pattern of news flow exhibits these vertical and feudal patterns: news flows from the core to the periphery via the transnational news agencies, while journalists gather information in Southern countries that is eventually retransmitted via the agencies.

The effect of this feudal structure is that Southern nations know virtually nothing about events in neighbouring countries that has not been filtered through the lenses of the developed media systems. The theory argues that if the core actors are defining news according to the criteria and demand for news in the developed world market, then the demand for and criteria of news will be similar in the centre of the peripheral nation. This has been called the 'agenda-setting function' of

the international media. Information is transferred to the Southern elite in such a way that primary importance is attached to the same issues the developed world sees as important.

The identity of interests between the centre of the centre and the centre of the periphery greatly influences the acceptance of an international agenda and thus Galtung's theory is particularly relevant in understanding global news flow. A striking similarity can be found in Galtung's theory of structural imperialism with Schiller's definition of cultural imperialism. Both maintain that the structure of political and economic domination exercised by the centre over the periphery results in the re-creation of certain aspects of the centre's value system in the periphery. There is also evidence of a dependency relationship in the field of media and communication research in Southern countries. As British media analyst James Halloran notes: Wherever we look in international communication research - exports and imports of textbooks, articles and journals; citations, references and footnotes; employment of experts (even in international agencies); and the funding, planning and execution of research - we are essentially looking at a dependency situation. This is a situation which is characterised by a one-way flow of values, ideas, models, methods and resources from North to South. It may even be more specifically as a flow from the Anglo-Saxon language fraternity to the rest of the world.

Dependency theory has enjoyed widespread influence and equally widespread criticism. It was criticized for concentrating on the impact of transnational business and the role of other external forces on social and economic development to the neglect of internal class, gender, ethnic and power relations. Theorists such as Galtung responded by examining the roles of the often unrepresentative elites in the South in maintaining and indeed benefiting from the dependency syndrome. While the globalization of new information and communication technologies and the resultant wiring up of the globe, and the emphasis on cultural hybridization rather than cultural imperialism, have made dependency theories less fashionable, the structural inequalities in international communication continue to render them relevant. Another concern for scholars working within the political economy approach has been to analyse the close relationship between media and foreign policy.

The role of the mass media as an instrument of propaganda for corporate and state power has been an important area of inquiry among critical scholars. In their 'propaganda model' US economist, Edward Herman, and the renowned linguist, Noam Chomsky, examine through a range of detailed case studies, how news in mainstream US media system passes through several 'filters', including the size, concentrated ownership and profit orientation of media firms; their heavy reliance on advertising and dependence on business and governmental sources for information; and the overall dominant ideology within which they operate. These elements, write Herman and Chomsky, 'interact with and reinforce one another and set the premises of discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy'.

For Herman and Chomsky, a propaganda approach to media coverage suggests: a systematic and highly political dichotomisation in news coverage based on serviceability to important domestic power interests. This should be observable in dichotomised choices of story and in the volume and quality of coverage ... such dichotomisation in the mass media is massive and systematic: not only are choices for publicity and suppression comprehensible in terms of system advantage, but the modes of handling favoured and inconvenient materials (placement, tone, context, fullness of treatment) differ in ways that serve political interests'.

Despite meticulously researched case studies - ranging from the US media's coverage of the war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, to its treatment of US involvement in subversive activities in Central America during the 1980s - the propaganda model has received more than its share of criticism, especially in the West. Internationally, however, *Manufacturing Consent*, a title borrowed from a phrase used by Lippmann in a 1922 publication, had a profound influence. Though criticized

for its 'polemical' style, the book remains one of the few systematic and detailed studies of the politics of mass media.

Gramsci's Media Hegemony

By arguing that the propaganda model succeeds because there is no significant overt coercion from the state, Herman and Chomsky, in some ways, were following the European analyses of the role of ideology and state power in a capitalist society, articulated by, among others, the French Marxist Louis Althusser who called the media 'ideological state apparatus'.

Another major influence on critical theorists as well as on cultural critics in the study of ideology is the writings of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). The impact of the ideas of Gramsci, who died in prison under the Fascist regime, has been widespread in critical studies of international communication. However, it was not until the translation into English of his most famous work, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, in 1971, that Gramsci's ideas became a major influence in the Anglo-Saxon world.

Gramsci's conception of hegemony is rooted in the notion that the dominant social group in a society has the capacity to exercise intellectual and moral direction over society at large and to build a new system of social alliances to support its aims. Gramsci argued that military force was not necessarily the best instrument to retain power for the ruling classes, but that a more effective way of wielding power was to build a consent by ideological control of cultural production and distribution. According to Gramsci, such a system exists when a dominant social class exerts moral and intellectual leadership - through its control of such institutions as schools, religious bodies and the mass media - over both allied and subordinate classes. Social and intellectual authority is exercised by the government 'with the consent of the governed - but with this consent organised, and not generic and vague' in such a fashion that its right to govern is rarely challenged seriously. 'The 'state does have and request consent but it also "educates" this consent'.

One of the most important functions of the state, Gramsci wrote in his *Prison Notebooks*, 'is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes'. Schools, courts and a multitude of 'initiatives and activities ... form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes'. This, he argued, was in contrast with a situation in which the dominant class merely rules, that is, coercively imposes its will on subordinate classes. This consent thus manufactured, however, cannot simply be assumed or guaranteed and has to be renewed, indicating that hegemony is more of a process - which is to be continually reproduced, secured and lost - rather than an achieved state of affairs. In international communication, the notion of hegemony is widely used to conceptualize political functions of the mass media, as a key player in propagating and maintaining the dominant ideology and also to explain the process of media and communication production, with dominant ideology shaping production of news and entertainment. Thus, though the media are notionally free from direct government control, yet they act as agents of legitimization of the dominant ideology.

Cyber Space and Public Sphere

A natural heir to the critical theorists, the German sociologist Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) also lamented the standardization, massification and atomization of the public. Habermas developed the concept of the public sphere in one of his earliest books, though it was 27 years before it appeared in English translation as *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, in 1989. He defined the public sphere as an arena, independent of government (even if in receipt of state funds) and also enjoying autonomy from partisan economic forces, which is dedicated to rational debate (i.e. to debate and discussion which is not 'interests', 'disguised' or 'manipulated') and which is both accessible to entry and open to inspection by the citizenry. It is here, in this public sphere, that public opinion is formed.

Habermas argued that the 'bourgeois public sphere' emerged in an expanding capitalist society exemplified by eighteenth-century Britain, where entrepreneurs were becoming powerful enough to achieve autonomy from state and church and increasingly demanding wider and more effective political representation to facilitate expansion of their businesses. In his formulation of a public sphere, Habermas gave prominence to the role of information, as, at this time, a greater freedom of the press was fought for and achieved with parliamentary reform. The wider availability of printing facilities and the resultant reduction in production costs of newspapers stimulated debate contributing to what Habermas calls 'rational-acceptable policies', which led by the mid-nineteenth century to the creation of a 'bourgeois public sphere'.

This idealized version of a public space was characterized by greater accessibility of information, a more open debate within the bourgeoisie, a space independent of both business interests and state apparatus. However, as capitalism expanded and attained dominance, the call for reform of the state was replaced by an effort to take it over to further business interests. As commercial interests became prominent in politics and started exerting their influence - for example, by lobbying parliament, funding political parties and cultural institutions - the autonomy of the public sphere was severely reduced. In the twentieth century, the growing power of information management and manipulation through public relations and lobbying firms has contributed to making contemporary debates a 'faked version' of a genuine public sphere.

In this 'refeudalization' of the public sphere, public affairs have become occasions for 'displays' of power in the style of medieval feudal courts rather than a space for debate on socioeconomic issues. Habermas also detects refeudalization in the changes within the mass media systems, which have become monopoly capitalist organizations, promoting capitalist interests, and thus affecting their role as disseminators of information for the public sphere. In a market-driven environment, the overriding concern for media corporations is to produce an artefact which will appeal to the widest possible variety of audiences and thus generate maximum advertising revenue. It is essential, therefore, that the product is diluted in content to meet the lowest common denominator - sex, scandal, celebrity lifestyles, action adventure and sensationalism. Despite their negligible informational quality such media products reinforce the audience's acceptance of 'the soft compulsion of constant consumption training'.

Though the idealized version of the public sphere has been criticized for its very male, Eurocentric and bourgeois limitations, the public sphere provides a useful concept in understanding democratic potential for communication processes. In recent years, with the globalization of the media and communication, there has been talk about the evolution of a 'global public sphere' where issues of international significance - environment, human rights, gender and ethnic equality - can be articulated through the mass media, though the validity of such a concept is also contested.

Lecture # 13

Cultural Studies Perspectives on International Communication

While much of the debate on international communication post-1945 and during the Cold War emphasized a structural analysis of its role in political and economic power relationships, there has been a discernible shift in research emphasis in the 1990s in parallel with the 'depoliciticization' of politics towards the cultural dimensions of communication and media. The cultural analysis of communication also has a well established theoretical tradition to draw upon, from Gramsci's theory of hegemony to the works of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School.

One group of scholars who adapted Gramsci's notions of hegemony were based at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in Britain. Led by the Caribbean-born scholar Stuart Hall, 'the Birmingham School', as it came to be known in the 1970s did pioneering work on exploring the textual analysis of media, especially television, and ethnographic research. Particularly influential was Hall's model of 'encoding/decoding media discourse' which theorized about how media texts are given 'preferred readings' by producers and how they may be interpreted in different ways - from accepting the dominant meaning; negotiating with the encoded message, or taking an oppositional view.

The model was widely adopted by scholars interested in the study of the ideological role of the mass media. However, the research focus of the Birmingham School was largely British, and more often than not, its perceptions of the 'global' were based on the ethnographic studies of migrant populations - their television viewing habits, consumption of music and other leisure activities. The undue emphasis on ethnic and racial identity and 'multiculturalism', tended to limit their research perspectives, exposing them to the danger, for example, of confusing 'British Asian cultural identity' with the diverse cultures and subcultures of the South Asian region, with its multiplicity of languages, ancient religions and ethnicities. The dominant Western view of the global South is profoundly influenced by Eurocentricism, defined by the Egyptian theorist Samir Amin as constituting 'one dimension of the culture and ideology of the modern capitalist world'.

Many other scholars from the developing world have argued that contemporary representations of the global South are affected by the way the Orient has been historically constructed in Western thinking, for example, through travel writing, literature and films, contributing to a continuity of subordination of non-European peoples in Western imagination. The US-based Palestinian scholar Edward Said has explored how dominant culture participated in the expansion and consolidation of nineteenth-century imperialism. Taking the Gramscian view of culture, Said writes: Western cultural forms can be taken out of the autonomous enclosures in which they have been protected, and placed instead in the dynamic global environment created by imperialism, itself revised as an ongoing contest between North and South, metropolis and periphery, white and native.

Though the cultural studies approach professes to give voice to such issues - race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality remain its key concerns - it has generally rendered less importance to class-based analysis, despite the fact that championing the 'popular' has been a major achievement of this tradition. The cultural studies approach to communication has become increasingly important, especially in the USA and Australia and with its new-found interest in 'global popular', the trend is towards the internationalization of cultural studies.

Theories of the Information Society

Spectacular innovations in information and communication technologies, especially computing, and their rapid global expansion have led to claims that this is the age of the information society. Breakthroughs in the speed, volume and cost of information processing, storage and transmission have undoubtedly contributed to the power of information technology to shape many aspects of Western, and increasingly, global society. The convergence of telecommunications and computing technologies and the continued reductions in the costs of computing and international telephony have made the case for the existence of the information society even stronger. According to its enthusiasts, an international information society is under construction which will digitally link all homes via the Internet - the network of networks.

The information grid of networked computers is being compared with the electricity grid, linking every home, office and business, to create a networked society, based on what has been termed as the 'knowledge economy'. These networks have become the information superhighways, providing the infrastructure for a global information society. However, critics have objected to this version of society, arguing that these changes are technologically determined and ignore the social, economic and political dimensions of technological innovation.

The technologically-determinist view of communication was promoted by Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan (1911-80), one of the first thinkers to analyse the impact of media technology on society. Arguing that, 'the medium is the message', he maintained that viewed in a historical context, media technology had more social effect on different societies and cultures than media content.

McLuhan, a Professor at the University of Toronto, was working within the tradition of what came to be known as 'the Toronto School' of thought, identified with the research of economic historian Harold Innis. McLuhan argued that printing technology, for example, contributed to nationalism, industrialism and universal literacy. Though at the time he was writing, electronic media, especially television, were confined to few Northern nations, McLuhan foresaw the impact of international television, suggesting that new communication and information technologies would help create, what he called a 'global village'.

The rapid changes in international communications, spurred on by the expansion of direct satellite broadcasting in the 1980s and the Internet in the 1990s, seem to have made the world shrink, generating renewed interest in McLuhan's concept of global village. The term 'information society' originated in Japan, but it was the USA where the concept received its most ardent intellectual support. In the USA, even in the early 1960s the 'economics of information' was being considered as an important area of research activity. Fritz Machlup (1902-83), whose 1962 work, *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*, was one of the first attempts to analyse information in economic terms. Changes in industrial production and their effect on Western societies informed the work of sociologist Daniel Bell, who became an internationally known exponent of the idea of a 'post-industrial' society - one in which the service industries employ more workers than manufacturing. In his hugely influential book, *The Coming of Post Industrial Society*, published in 1973, Bell argued that US society had moved from an industrial to post-industrial one, a society characterized by the domination of information and information-related industries.

Bell contended that not only was more information being used but a qualitatively different type of information was available. Bell's ideas were keenly adopted by the scholars who wanted to pronounce the arrival of 'the information age'. Another key figure, Alvin Toffler, though more populist than Bell, was very influential in propagating the idea of an information society, calling it the third wave - after the agricultural and industrial eras - of human civilization. The 'third wave' was

characterized by increasing 'interconnectedness', contributing to the 'evolution of a universal interconnected network of audio, video and electronic text communication', which, some argue, will promote intellectual pluralism and personalized control over communication.

In this version of the information society, the democratic potential of new technologies is constantly stressed. However, critics such as Frank Webster emphasize 'historical antecedents', arguing that 'there is no novel, "postindustrial" society: the growth of service occupations and associated developments highlight the continuities of the present with the past'. These continuities need to be underlined, especially in the global context, as the transnationalization of media and communication industries has been greatly facilitated by expansion of new international communication networks, for example, among non-governmental organizations.

The resultant 'time-space compression' is implicated in what has been called, taking up McLuhan's phrase, the phenomenon of 'global villagization'. With its growing commodification, information has come to occupy a central role as a 'key strategic resource' in the international economy, the distribution, regulation, marketing and management of which are becoming increasingly important. Real-time trading has become a part of contemporary corporate culture, through digital networking, which has made it possible to transmit information on stock markets, patent listings, currency fluctuations, commodity prices, futures, portfolios, at unprecedented speed and volume across the globe. The growing 'informatization' of the economy is facilitating the integration of national and regional economies and creating a global economy, which continues to be dominated by a few megacorporations, increasingly global in the production, distribution and consumption of their goods and services. The growth of Internet-based trading, the so-called E-commerce (electronic commerce) has given a boost to what has been called 'digital' capitalism.

In the analysis of the emerging global information society, the most significant input has come from the Spanish theorist Manuel Castells. In his trilogy *The Information Age*, Castells gives an extensively researched and detailed analysis of the emerging trends in global condition. The first volume focuses on the new social structures at work in what Castells calls the 'network society'; the second volume examines social and political processes within the context of such a society, while the third volume includes integration and information-based polarization in the international 'informational economy' in which communication becomes both global and customized. Informational capitalism, Castells argues, is increasingly operating on a global basis, through exchanges between electronic circuits linking up international information systems.

This bypasses the power of the state and creates regional and supranational units. In this 'networked' globe, he contends, flows of electronic images are fundamental to social processes and political activity, which has been progressively affected by mediated reality. Though he rejects technological determinism, his ideas are fundamentally shaped by the new technological paradigm. It has also been claimed that new technologies have contributed to the decline of ideology. For example, a visually based medium such as television has shifted ideology from 'conceptual to iconic symbolism'.

The growing use of computer-mediated communication could further reduce the impact of ideology in daily life, though the empowering potential of Internet could, on the other hand, create new forms of transnational ideological alliances. However, the possibilities of the Internet creating new communicative space, have been opposed with questions about access to the new technologies, within and between nations. Some critics have been concerned with the growing commodification of personal information, from database marketing to individually targeted personalized advertising and consumer sales.

With the growing use of the Internet, companies can exploit commercially valuable data on their users, for example, by so-called Cookies (Client-Side Persistent Information). Others have raised questions about the use of new technologies for personal and political surveillance. US dominance of global military surveillance and intelligence data gathering through spy satellites and advanced

computer networks, for political, and increasingly trade-related espionage, must also be considered an integral part of the push towards creation of a global information society. The 'control revolution', though more pronounced in all modern organizations in 'networked societies', is in the process of going global.

Discourses of Globalization

Despite the disputed nature of the utility of globalization as a concept in understanding international communication, there is little doubt that new information and communication technologies have made global interconnectivity a reality. It has been argued that 'globalization may be the concept of the 1990s, a key idea by which we understand the transition of human society into the third millennium'. The term has also been used more generally to describe contemporary developments in communication and culture. Wallerstein (1974 ; 1980) sees globalization as a world system, a theory rejected by others on the grounds that his 'mechanisms of geosystematic integration are exclusively economic', while Robertson argues that 'globalization analysis and world-systems analysis are rival perspectives'.

In its most liberal interpretation, globalization is seen as fostering international economic integration and as a mechanism for promoting global liberal capitalism. For those who see capitalism as the 'end' of history, globalization is to be welcomed for the effect that it has in promoting global markets and liberal democracy. The triumph of democracy is celebrated through increasing emphasis on global governance, 'cosmopolitan democracy' and even 'cosmopolitics'. In this dominant view of globalization, the expansion of information and communication technologies coupled with market-led liberal democracies are contributing to the creation of what has been called a global civil society, though others have identified tensions between globalization and fragmentation.

The economic conception of globalization views it as denoting a qualitative shift from a largely national to a globalized economy, in which although national economies continue to predominate within nations, they are often subordinate to transnational processes and transactions. The arguments for economic globalization focus on the increasingly internationalized system of manufacture and production, on growing world trade, on the extent of international capital flows and, crucially, on the role of the transnational corporations. Liberal interpretations of globalization see markets playing the key role at the expense of the states.

Japanese business strategist Kenichi Ohmae, who has been included in the category of 'extreme globalization theorists', claims that, in the globalized economy the nation-state has become irrelevant and market capitalism is producing a 'cross-border civilisation'. Both Marxists and world-system theorists stress the importance of the rise of global dominance of a capitalist market economy that is penetrating the entire globe - pan-capitalism is how one commentator described the phenomenon.

With the collapse of communism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc, seen by many as alternative to capitalism, the shift within Western democracies from a public to a private sector capitalism, and the international trend towards liberalization and privatization have contributed to the acceptance of the capitalist market as a global system. However, questions remain about the extent of globalization. It is argued that many of the indices of globalization are concentrated within the OECD countries, especially between the USA-EU-Japan triad, prompting scholars to talk of 'triadization' rather than the globalization of the world economy. It is beyond dispute, however, that in the post-Cold War world, transnational corporations have become extremely powerful actors, dominating the globalized economy. They must compete internationally and will, if necessary, sever the links to the nations where they originally operated, a trend which has been described as reflection of the 'global footlooseness of corporate capitalism'.

In sociological interpretations of globalization, the notion of culture is of primary importance. British sociologist Anthony Giddens sees globalization as the spread of modernity, which he defines as the extension of the nation-state system, the world capitalist economy, the world military order and the international division of labour. Waters argues that globalization is 'the direct consequence

of the expansion of European culture across the planet via settlement, colonisation and cultural mimesis'.

Enthusiasts talk of a new 'global consciousness' as well as physical compression of the world, in which cultures become 'relativized' to each other, not unified or centralized, asserting that globalization involves 'the development of something like a global culture'. Others have been more cautious, arguing that globalizing cultural forces, such as international media and communication networks, produce more complex interactions between different cultures.

Some have made the case for considering cultural practices as central to the phenomenon of globalization. Global homogenizing forces such as standardized communication networks - both hardware and software, media forms and formats - influence cultural consciousness across the world. However, as the US-based anthropologist Arjun Appadurai argues, these globalizing cultural forces in their encounters with different ideologies and traditions of the world produce 'heterogeneous dialogues'. Appadurai specifies five 'scapes' - ethnoscap, technoscap, finanscap, mediascap and ideoscap - to describe the dynamics of contemporary global diversity. 'Ethnoscap' denotes the flow of people - such as tourists, refugees, immigrants, students and professional - from one part of the globe to another. 'Technoscap' includes the transfer of technology across national borders while 'finanscap' deals with international flow of investment.

'Mediascap' refers to global media, especially its electronic version - both its hardware and the images that it produces while 'ideoscap' suggests ideological contours of culture. Appadurai argues that the five 'scapes' influence culture not by their hegemonic interaction, global diffusion and uniform effects, but by their differences, contradictions and counter-tendencies- their 'disjunctures'.

Some critics see globalization as a new version of Western cultural imperialism, given the concentration of international communication hardware and software power among a few dominant actors in the global arena who want an 'open' international order, created by their own national power and by the power of transnational media and communication corporations.

A fear of what the US sociologist George Ritzer called the McDonaldization of society, is also expressed by scholars. Ritzer says he prefers the term 'Americanization' to globalization, since the latter implies more of a 'multidimensional relationship among many nations'. While conceding the pre-eminence of Western media and cultural products in international communication, scholars influenced by post-structuralism dispute whether the global flow of media and cultural products is necessarily a form of domination or even a strictly one-way traffic, arguing that there is a contra-flow from the periphery to the centre and between the 'geo-cultural markets', especially in the area of television and films.

Ulf Hannerz contests the notion that globalization reinforces cultural movement from the 'centre' (the modern industrial West) to the peripheral 'traditional' world in a largely one-way flow, arguing that centre-periphery interactions are more complex with cultural flows moving in multiple directions, and thus the outcomes are opposite tendencies, both towards what he calls saturation and maturation, for homogenization and heterogenization.

Scholars broadly following this line of argument also question the assumptions about the process of homogenization as a result of the diffusion of the Western media and cultural products globally, arguing that the forces of fragmentation and hybridity are equally strong and they affect all societies. Tomlinson argues that 'the effects of globalization are to weaken cultural coherence in all individual nation-states, including the economically powerful ones - the imperial powers of a previous era.

Others such as Mexican anthropologist Nestor Garcia Canclini see possibilities offered by migration and modernity to broaden cultural territory beyond the nation-state. The so-called 'deterritorialization' and the relocation of 'Third World' cultures in the metropolitan centres is considered an enriching experience for the receiving as well as the migratory cultures. The apparent growth of alternative media and the possibilities opened up by the Internet are also seen to be a

trend towards the disruption of the oneway flow of information. Robertson adopts the concept of 'glocalization', a term whose origins are in the discipline of marketing, to express the global production of the local and the localization of the global, while Nederveen Pieterse maps out how hegemony is not merely reproduced but 'refigures' in the process of hybridization.

The increased level of transnational information flows, made possible by the new technologies of communication and shifts in the institutional organization - economic, political and legal - on the means of communication, have profoundly affected global media industries. Increasingly, the emphasis is shifting from the traditional approach of considering the role of media in the vertical integration of national societies, to studying information flows which show patterns of transnational horizontal integration of media and communication structures, processes and audiences.

This has become necessary because of the harmonization of international regulatory and legal frameworks and the globalization of ownership and control in the telecommunication and media sectors - including television, films and on-line media. This horizontal communication is facilitating transnational patterns of marketing and political communication, where people are increasingly being addressed across national boundaries on the basis of their purchasing power. Transnational communication is also used by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) whose politics and actions are being affected by the use of the Internet. The increasingly complex relations between local, national, regional and international production, distribution and consumption of media texts in a global context further complicate the globalization discourse. Accompanying the dramatic expansion of capitalism and new transnational political organisation is a new global culture, emerging as a result of computer and communication technology, a consumer society with a wide range of products and services consumed internationally.

Global culture includes the proliferation of-media technologies, especially satellite and cable television, that veritably create McLuhan's dream of a global village in which people all over the world watch spectacles like the Gulf War, major sports events, entertainment programmes and advertisements which relentlessly promote free market capitalism. With the expansion of Internet access, more and more people are entering into the global computer networks that instantaneously circulate ideas, information and images throughout the world, overcoming boundaries of space and time. What kind of international communication this is generating remains a hotly disputed subject, given that culture is an especially complex and contested terrain as 'modern' culture permeates traditional ones and new configurations emerge. The debates about global culture have been largely ignored by many previous forms of modernization theories that tended towards economic, technological and political determinism.

In classical Marxism, culture was sometimes reduced to a crass economic commodity, with scarce importance given to local forms of associations - whether based on ethnicity, religion, race or gender. It also did not take on board the issue of cultural diversity, aesthetics and spirituality, being preoccupied with the study of the production and consumption of material culture. For traditional liberalism, the advancement of the modern economy and technology was necessary for creating world markets and consumers. Both classical Marxists and liberals predicated a borderless world - in the idealized Marxian version the proletariat across the world were to lead international communism that would eliminate nationalism, class exploitation and war, while liberal interpretations saw the market as eroding cultural differences and national and regional particularities, to produce a global consumer culture. Missing from both models has been an understanding of the complexity of the interaction of class with nationalism, religion, race, ethnicity and feminism to produce local political struggles.

Despite claims for the end of ideology and history and the 'peace dividend' since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed a rise in ethnic and religious conflict. The intellectual uncertainty that the end of the Cold War produced in the West and the dismantling of the last vestiges of progressive

ideology in the former socialist camp, are reflected in an increasing blurring of boundaries between various strands of international communication theory. In this postmodern landscape, there appears to be a fragmentation of theories, with an emphasis on the personal and the local while macro issues affecting international communication are often ignored. Postmodernists argue that developments in transnational capitalism are producing a new global historical configuration of post-Fordism, or postmodernism as a new 'cultural logic' of capitalism.

Yet the proliferation of difference and the shift to more local discourses and practices define the contemporary scene, and theory, postmodernists argue, should shift from the level of globalization and its often totalizing macrotheories to focus on the micro, the specific and the heterogeneous. A wide range of theories associated with postculturalism, postmodernism, feminism and multiculturalism and postcolonial studies tend to focus on difference and specificity rather than more global conditions.

Media Freedom : Control Vs Liberty

Freedom of the Press

John Stuart Mill in his famous writing *On Liberty* argues that freedom of expression is the most inviolable right of an individual in a society. In *On Liberty* (1859), John Stuart Mill identifies a number of reasons why it is morally important to protect freedom of expression. One reason is that freedom of expression is a freedom that intrinsically matters a lot to most people. It involves both the freedom to express our beliefs and values, and the freedom to be informed by the publicly expressed beliefs and values of others. A second reason that it is morally important to protect freedom of expression is that freedom of expression typically promotes the discovery of, and the respect for, the truth. The knowledge gained matters both in its own right and because it leads to better decisions and thus a better quality of life. Although there are other reasons for some sort of protection of freedom of expression, these two reasons are sufficient to establish the moral importance of such protection.

Given the importance of human freedom generally, J.S. Mill concludes that legal restrictions on freedom are morally legitimate only if they are the least restrictive means of reducing the extent to which innocent people are significantly harmed by others. Applied to freedom of expression, this yields the result that legal restrictions that do not reduce significant harms to others, or which are not the least restrictive means of doing so, are not morally legitimate.

Nonetheless, J.S. Mill restricts freedom of expression only when it is harmful. His 'Harm Principle' is also quite interesting. Mill's Harm Principle says that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over members of a civilized community, against their will, is to prevent harm to others.

What is Harm? Mill is not clear on this, but in general: an action is **harmful** if it involves a setback in some person's interests; e.g. chopping of their leg or stealing their laptop

The Orthodox Opinion

Mill: The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the 'liberty of the press' as one of the securities against corrupt government.

We cannot be democratically free without a free press because we need government-independent information to be able to properly evaluate the current government and make free voting/protesting/information-seeking decisions.

Summary of Mill's thought:

- any opinion could be true
- we shouldn't censor any opinion because any opinion could help lead to the truth
- even if they're false (which we can't be sure of), they can still help us appreciate the truth
- so, freedom of expression should be upheld
- that includes freedom of the press

Some Other Opinions

We need an impartial press to provide us facts (and only facts) about how we are governed in order to exercise our democratic rights. But, we can't because there is a liberal bias in the media! And, also there is a conservative bias in the media!

Two Kinds of Freedoms

Freedom of action

Hardly anyone believes that citizens should be allowed unrestricted freedom of action

Freedom of thought and expression

But should we be restricted in what we can think or say? Mill thinks it's more harmful to censor expression (even seemingly harmful ones!) because of the importance of truth. "It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can".

Freedom of Press

Freedom of Press is born or ensured by Freedom of expression which is a constitutional provision and widely acknowledged as a basic human right that should be available to all, playing a crucial role in a fair and open society. 

Press freedom means liberty to print or to disseminate info. in print, broadcasting, electronic or modern media, without prior restraints such as censorship or content review and without subsequent punishment for what is said.

Definitions:

Freedom of Press means that the media should be free to publish news and ideas without government control (World Public Opinion.com).

It is a condition of being free of restraints. It is the liberty of a person which empowers him/her to think, feel, do just as one pleases.

As human beings with complicated thought processes, we have the capacity to develop intelligent and informed opinions. We all need a venue to express these opinions and to be heard. Expressing ourselves in writing, in conversation, and through the arts is crucial to our development and sense of self.

The freedom to express our thoughts is an important part of our individual identity. When we talk and write about our opinions we are contributing ideas and participating in society. Freedom of expression is covered in article 19 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers". Freedom of expression is widely acknowledged as a basic human right that should be available to all, playing a crucial role in a fair and open society.

Many countries and organizations place limits on freedom of expression. These limitations can be a way of controlling people. Restricting voting rights, censoring speech and art and outlawing specific religious and political groups are some of the tools governments have used to control public opposition. Even societies that consider themselves free and democratic suppress opposing views. Consider your local newspaper; although you might expect objectivity, if you were to analyze the content, you might not find a variety of informed opinions and critiques. Editorial and news writers may be influenced by their own political views. In some places, reporters are trained to manipulate or omit information that could harm those in power.

Should there be no limits on freedom of expression? If we are entitled to express ourselves freely we must accept that others will express ideas very different from our own. This might include ideas that offend and possibly even hurt us. Hate speech attacks people based upon such distinctions as race,

religion and gender. Should we censor ideas that damage and promote cruelty? The content of a book, a song or a film may cross societal lines of morality and decency. Should we censor art works that are violent, insulting or degrading? These are some of the complex questions you must think about. Feeling intimidated and forced to subscribe to traditional or mainstream beliefs is a violation of your personal freedom. But sometimes authorities set rules and boundaries for good reason. Understanding why the rules exist is more important than automatically obeying them.

According to UNESCO, it is Promoting Freedom of Expression, Press Freedom, Independence and Pluralism of the Media, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance

UNESCO promotes freedom of expression and freedom of the press as a basic human right, through sensitization and monitoring activities. It also fosters media independence and pluralism as prerequisites and major factors of democratization by providing advisory services on media legislation and sensitizing governments, parliamentarians and other decision-makers.

Normative Theories of the Media

Four Theories of the Press given by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm

Frederick S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm in their famous work Four Theories of the Press published by University of Illinois Press, 1963 are as under:

Authoritarian Theory

According to this theory, the mass media though not under the direct control of the State, had to follow its bidding. Under the Authoritarian set up in Western Europe, freedom of thought was jealously guarded by a few people (ruling classes), who were concerned with the emergence of a new middle class and were worried about the effects of the printed matter on their thought process. Steps were taken to control the freedom of expression - the result was a complete dictatorial set up. The theory advocated zealous obedience to the hierarchical superior and reliance on threat and punishment to those who did not follow the censorship rules or did not respect authority. The censorship of the Press was justified on the ground that the State always took precedence over the individual's right to freedom of expression.

This theory stemmed from the authoritarian philosophy of **Plato** (407 - 327 B.C), who thought that the State was safe only in the hands of a few wise men. **Thomas Hobbes** (1588 - 1679), a British academician, argued that the power to maintain order was sovereign and individual objections were to be ignored. **Engel**, a German thinker further reinforced the theory by stating that freedom came into its supreme right only under Authoritarianism.

The world has been witness to authoritarian means of control over media by both dictatorial and democratic governments.

Libertarianism or Free Press Theory

This movement is based on the right of an individual, and advocates absence of restraint. The basis of this theory dates back to 17th century England when the printing press made it possible to print several copies of a book or pamphlet at cheap rates. The State was thought of as a major source of interference on the rights of an individual and his property. Libertarians regarded taxation as institutional theft. Popular will (**vox populi**) was granted precedence over the power of State.

Advocates of this theory were **Lao Tzu**, an early 16th century philosopher, **John Locke** of Great Britain in the 17th century, **John Milton**, the epic poet ("Aeropagitica") and **John Stuart Mill**, an essayist ("On Liberty"). Milton in his Aeropagitica in 1644, referred to a "self righting process if free

expression is permitted....let truth and falsehood grapple”.In 1789, the French in their Declaration Of The Rights Of Man wrote, “Every citizen may speak, write and publish freely”. Out of such doctrines came the idea of a ‘free marketplace of ideas’. George Orwell defined libertarianism as “allowing people to say things you do not want to hear”. . Libertarians argued tat the press should be seen as the Fourth Estate reflecting public opinion.

What the theory offers in sum is power without social responsibility.

Social Responsibility Theory

Virulent critics of the Free Press Theory were Wilbur Schramm, Siebert and Theodore Paterson. In their book Four Theories Of Press, they stated “pure libertarianism is antiquated, outdated and obsolete”. They advocated the need for its replacement by the Social Responsibility theory. This theory can be said to have been initiated in the United States by the Commission of The Freedom Of Press, 1949. The commission found that the free market approach to press freedom had only increased the power of a single class.

And has not served the interests of the less well-off classes. The emergence of radio, TV and film suggested the need for some means of accountability. Thus the theory advocated some obligation on the part of the media to society. A judical mix of self regulation and state regulation and high professional standards were imperative.

Social Responsibility theory thus became the modern variation in which the duty to one’s conscience was the primary basis of the right of free expression.

Soviet Media/Communist Theory

This theory is derived from the ideologies of Marx and Engel that “the ideas of the ruling classes are the ruling ideas”. It was thought that the entire mass media was saturated with bourgeois ideology. Lenin thought of private ownership as being incompatible with freedom of press and that he modern technological means of information must be controlled for enjoying effective freedom of press.

The theory advocated that the sole purpose of mass media was to educate the great masses of workers and not to give out information. The public was encouraged to give feedback as it was the only way the media would be able to cater to its interests.

Two more theories were later added as the ‘four theories of the press’ were not fully applicable to the non-aligned countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, who were committed to social and economic development on their own terms. The two theories were:

Development Communication Theory

The underlying fact behind the genesis of this theory was that there can be no development without communication. Under the four classical theories, capitalism was legitimized, but under the Development communication theory, or Development Support Communication as it is otherwise called, the media undertook the role of carrying out positive developmental programmes, accepting restrictions and instructions form the State. The media subordinated themselves to political, economic, social and cultural needs. Hence the stress on ‘development communication’ and ‘development journalism’. There was tacit support from the UNESCO for this theory. The weakness of this theory is that ‘development’ is often equated with government propaganda.

Democratization/Democratic Participant Media Theory

DeFluer later added this theory which vehemently opposes the commercialization of modern media and its top-down non-participant character. The need for access and right to communicate is stressed. Bureaucratic control of media is decried.

Defining the Limits of Media Freedom

We shall shed some light on the limits of media freedom from two different perspectives; though not exhaustive in nature, but the most popular indeed.

Freedom of the Press 1

Taking 'The Harm Principle' of Mill, which provides that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over members of a civilized community, against their will, is to prevent harm to others.

Mill's *basic argument is this regard is that every* dissenting opinion either could be true or could not be true. If it could be true, then the dissenting opinion should not be censored. If it couldn't be true, then the dissenting opinion should not be censored (*as it will automatically die in a short span of time, while killing a dissenting opinion would make it live long*). Therefore, no dissenting opinion should be censored.

The Orthodox Liberal View sets some limitations on free expression; like defamation. For instance, A defames B. This may be allowed as A is eroding the B's right of peaceful living.

More on it, for instance, causing panic like imagine the room is more crowded. If we don't disallow people entering in it, it may cause panic and result in a kind of stampede, causing damage to peoples' live. Similarly, invasion of privacy is another instance. Incitement to crime also falls in the same category and we could many examples in this regard like 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Mill's Harm Principle, though not much clear, also talks about some limitations on freedom of expression.

Feinberg's Offense Principle

Joel Feinberg, a retired soldier and then a philosopher, gives another way of defining limits to freedom of expression. He says, "It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of preventing [wrongful] offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor." An action is wrongfully offensive if it willfully or recklessly causes unpleasant experiences (but not harm) in others without a good reason for doing so, to him. Unpleasant experiences such as: anger, disgust, shock, shame, embarrassment, annoyance, fear, humiliation, and affronts to one's senses and sensibilities are required to be prevented if caused by freedom of expression, as Fienberg's Offense Principle.

Wrongful Offense or Offense?

When you feel queasy because you happen to see an accident victim while at the hospital, then the victim has not wronged you – your offense was not caused wrongfully. *However, when a colleague sends you a surprise picture of an accident victim via email and it makes you queasy*, then they have wrongfully caused you offense.

Wrongful offense should be dealt with by law, but not criminal law if civil law or regional legislation can better deal with it (because offense is not as serious a problem as harm).

Balancing Freedom & Offense

Curtailing someone's freedom requires a good reason; *either it should be causing offense or harm*. The damage to the offender that prosecution would cause needs to be outweighed by the damage to other members of society through their unpleasant feelings caused by the offense.

Other considerations should also be considered *including* the accessibility of alternate options open to the offender, the motives of the offender, and the location of the offending.

The Harm and Offense Principles should limit freedom of expression in the following cases:

- Defamation and "Malicious Truth"
- Invasions of privacy
- Causing panic
- Provoking retaliatory violence
- Incitement to crime or insurrection
- But not in cases of sedition (where it is not going to lead to the exceptions above)

Summary of Feinberg on the Freedom of the Press

- Actions and expressions should be restricted by the harm principle and the offense principle
- The press should be allowed to publish anything of legitimate public interest that does not cause a greater balance of harm or offense
- It should be very rare for a published opinion to be restricted (or punished) because of the large furthering of public interests from publishing compared to the small harm or offense caused a to much smaller group

Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion

Following text by Mogens Schmidt Deputy Assistant Director-General, Communication and Information Sector UNESCO provides a good insight into the limits that should universally be accepted.

Following is the language of Article 19 of the UDHR, which guarantees the right to freedom of expression and information in the following terms:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

As such, one may argue that freedom of opinion and of expression constitute the cornerstone of any democratic society and a solid and fundamental basis for development. Indeed, the right that guarantees freedom of expression is widely seen as underpinning all other human rights and democratic freedoms. If the individual does not have the right to freely seek, receive and impart her ideas and opinions, she will also not be able to benefit from her other human rights. This also has consequences for the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as laid down in Article 18, for without freedom of expression, as a fundamental principle, this right cannot be practiced.

The right to freedom of expression and opinion also has a corollary, namely freedom of the press, which is normally perceived as the individual's right to freedom of expression extended to the media.

It is more and more generally accepted that freedom of expression and freedom of the press are of importance for the “three D’s”: Development, Democracy and Dialogue. In many studies researchers have documented the correlations between a free press and the three D’s. Without an open space for the marketplace of ideas to flourish, societies fail to progress by any measure on the human, social, and economic development scale.

Participatory democracy requires citizens to reflect and debate in order to distill public opinion into a clear will of the people that enable the political leadership to absorb these values and translate them into policy. Democracy is also about accountability and good governance. The public not only has a right, but is obliged by the very definition of a democracy, to scrutinize the actions of their elected leaders and to engage in full and open debate about their priorities and actions. One of the most effective ways of addressing poor governance is through open and informed debate. This open and informed debate can take many forms and one should not ignore that in the light of day, well documented criticism can increase both knowledge and understanding, even though it might be both harsh and controversial.

From this point of view, any restrictions to Article 19, and especially straight forward censorship, would undermine the fundamentals of a democracy, doing harm to the public good. It is vital that political, national, and religious themes are discussed without being subjected to knee-jerk criticisms that are designed to stifle debate. It is not the rights of a particular political party, conviction or religion which are protected in such open and frank debate but the rights of the individual citizens or believers.

Human rights are universal, inalienable and indivisible. Their universality and indivisibility embolden and protect these rights. Their inalienability is their guarantee to every citizen of the world upon birth. These basic human rights, which are non-discriminatory and non-flexible, are the same for all, and give us dignity as individuals. There is no hierarchy between these rights. They exist in a nexus-relationship. Equal respect and adherence to these rights rests with the political, social and religious leadership from the most local level to the heads of state. Therefore, there cannot be any cultural, historic, religious or political qualification for which rights to respect and apply. The UN must refuse attempts to subordinate one right in favor another as this is clearly against the core principles, which imply the non-hierarchical status of the various rights. If we start subordinating Article 19, for example, to Article 18, as has been argued by some representatives from the large monotheistic religions, what would be the consequences for all the other 28 articles of the UDHR? Would we need to tailor them as well, and in doing so obliterate universality, inalienability and the indivisibility of all human rights?

For UNESCO, respect for freedom of expression and respect for religious beliefs and symbols are two inseparable principles and go hand in hand in combating ignorance and lack of understanding with a view to building peace and establishing dialogue among cultures, civilizations, religions and peoples. All societies must comply with international standards advocating human dignity and human rights, including freedom of expression and respect for religious and cultural beliefs and values. Any conflict between the two must be expressed peacefully and constructively and must give precedence to seeking collective, lasting solutions. Given the importance of religion to peoples and to their sense of dignity and their way of life, respect for different religious beliefs is essential to international peace and security and to humanity’s progress.

This is also the background for the Executive Board of UNESCO’s unanimous decision at its 174 Meeting in 2005, in which it among other reads:

4. Reaffirming the international instruments that uphold freedom of expression and freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
5. Also reaffirming UNESCO's commitment to respect for freedom of expression and respect for religious beliefs and religious symbols,
6. Emphasizing that the media can have an important role to play in promoting tolerance, respect for and freedom of religion and belief,
7. Upholding the exercise of freedom of expression in a spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding, urges mutual respect for cultural diversity, religious beliefs and religious symbols;
8. Requests the Director-General to strengthen UNESCO's programmes and actions, in its fields of competence, to fulfil its commitment towards mutual understanding and respect for all peoples' religious and cultural values, and freedom of expression;
9. Also requests the Director-General to accelerate the implementation of the plan of action for the dialogue among civilizations, cultures and peoples with a view to creating a culture of peace and of living together;

While universality, indivisibility and inalienability are sacrosanct, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights lays out the general principles for their implementation.

For Article 18, the Covenant says:

"3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions."

And for Article 19, the Covenant says:

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Absolute versus Responsible Freedom of Media

Freedom of Press means that the media should be free to publish news and ideas without government control. It is a condition of being free or restraints. It is the liberty of a person which empowers him/her to think, feel, do just as one please.

Absolute Freedom

Summary of John Stuart Mill "On Liberty"

- If we silence an opinion, *we may be silencing the truth.*

- A wrong opinion MAY contain the grain of truth *needed to secure the whole truth*.
- Commonly accepted opinion may not be truth but simply a prejudice that the public tends to hold until *it is forced to defend it*.
- Unless commonly accepted opinion is contested from time to time, it loses its vitality and its *affect on conduct and character*.

Mill's Defence of Unrestricted Freedom of Expression

- No one has the right to censor a dissenting opinion, no matter how small.
- If the opinion is right, “they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth”.
- If wrong, they lose “the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error”.
- We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still

More on Absolute Freedom

John Milton's *The Areopagitica* says, “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to *conscience, above all liberties*”.

Milton, John (1608-1674) - English poet and prose writer who is one of the most highly regarded figures in world literature and is widely considered the *greatest poet since Shakespeare*. Often called the “Puritan Poet,” he had many of the good traits of the Puritans as well as many of the bad and spent much of his life immersed in political and religious controversy. *Areopagitica* (1644) - Milton's best-known prose work is a political pamphlet which argues against restricting the freedom of the press.

Freedom of Expression Theories

Four major theories of freedom of expression are described below:

Absolutist Theory of Freedom of Expression

This theory advocates absolute or complete barrier to censorship. As said by Louis Brandeis, “Only remedy for bad speech is more speech.” If you limit any speech it means you fear it may be right. J.S. Mills and John Milton are considered to be the main advocates of this approach towards freedom of expression and speech.

Some people have argued that the First Amendment (in the US Constitution which guarantees media freedom) presents an absolute or complete barrier to government censorship of speech or press. When the First Amendment declares that “no law” shall abridge freedom of expression, the framers of the Constitution meant no law. This is the essence of the absolutist theory. The government cannot censor the press for any reason. There are no exceptions, no caveats, no qualifications. Few have subscribed to this notion wholeheartedly. US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, who sat on the high court from 1937 to 1971, and William O. Douglas, whose term lasted from 1939 to 1975, claimed adherence to this philosophy, but they were unable to persuade their brethren that this idea had much merit. A majority of the Supreme Court never has adopted an absolutist position. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that there are several types of speech that fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection and thus can be abridged without violating the freedoms of speech or press. As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the court in 2002, when striking down a federal law prohibiting virtual child pornography, “[t]he freedom of speech has its

limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.”

Preferred Position Balancing

Free expression is the most important right; however, sometimes rights come in conflict, then scale should be tipped toward freedom of expression. This theory, nonetheless, does not trump all other rights, just most other rights.

The US Supreme Court has held in numerous rulings that some constitutional freedoms, principally those guaranteed by the First Amendment, are fundamental to a free society and consequently are entitled to more judicial protection than other constitutional values are.

Freedom of expression is essential to permit the operation of the political process and to permit citizens to protest when government infringes on their constitutionally protected prerogatives. The Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom from illegal search and seizure surely has diminished value if citizens who suffer from such unconstitutional searches cannot protest such actions. Freedom of expression does not trump all other rights. Courts, for example, have attempted to balance the rights of free speech and press with the constitutionally guaranteed right of a fair trial. On the other hand, courts have consistently ruled that freedom of expression takes precedence over the right to personal privacy and the right to reputation, neither of which is explicitly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Giving freedom of expression a preferred position presumes that government action that limits free speech and free press to protect other interests is usually unconstitutional. This presumption forces the government to bear the burden of proof in any legal action challenging the censorship. The city, county, state or federal government must prove to the court that its censorship is, in fact, justified and is not a violation of the First Amendment. In most instances the government must only prove that the accused violated the law, not that the law itself is constitutional. Were it not for this presumption, the persons whose expression was limited would be forced to convince a court that they had a constitutional right to speak or publish. This difference sounds minor, but in a lawsuit this presumption means a great deal.

While this theory retains some of the negative features of ad hoc balancing, by tilting the scales in favor of freedom of expression, it adds somewhat more certainty to our definition of freedom of expression. By basing this balancing strategy on a philosophical foundation (the maintenance of all rights is dependent on free exercise of speech and press), it becomes easier to build a case in favor of the broad interpretation of freedom of expression under the First Amendment.

Ad hoc Balancing Theory

This theory says that free expression is just one important right, and a separate decision should be made with regard to all different kinds of speech. This does not guarantee any predictability on what right will win out ultimately.

Freedom of speech and press are two of a number of important human rights we value. These rights often conflict. When conflict occurs, it is the responsibility of the court to balance the freedom of expression with other values. For example, the government must maintain the military to protect the security of the nation. To function, the military must maintain secrecy about many of its weapons, plans and movements. Imagine that the press seeks to publish information about a secret weapons system. The right to freedom of expression must be balanced with the need for secrecy in the military. This theory is called ad hoc balancing because the scales are erected anew in every case; the meaning of the freedom of expression is determined solely on a case-by-case basis.

Freedom of the press might outweigh the need for the government to keep secret the design of its new weapons, but the need for secrecy about a new fighter plane might take precedence over freedom of expression.

Ad hoc balancing is really not a theory; it is a strategy. Developing a definition of freedom of expression on a case-by-case basis leads to uncertainty. Under ad hoc balancing we will never know what freedom means except as it relates to a specific, narrow problem (e.g., the right to publish information about some government secret). If citizens cannot reasonably predict whether a particular kind of expression might be protected or prohibited, they will have the tendency to play it safe and keep silent. This is known as a “chilling effect” on speech. This will limit the rights of expression of all persons. Also, ad hoc balancing relies too heavily in its final determination on the personal biases of the judge or justices who decide a case.

Authoritarian Control Theory

According to this theory, people may not be intelligent enough to understand the power of bad speech so the government should control. The control over speech will protect people and keep peace. This theory advocates that decisions are easily made as government will determine whether speech is acceptable. For more on this, please refer to Four Theories of the Press.

Meiklejohnian theory

Philosopher and educator Alexander Meiklejohn presented the legal community with a rather complex set of ideas about freedom of expression in the late 1940s. Meiklejohn argued that freedom of expression is worth little as an abstract concept; that its primary value is as a means to an end. That end is successful self-government or, as Meiklejohn himself put it, “the voting of wise decisions.” Freedom of speech and press are protected in every constitution so that the system of democracy can function, and that is the only reason they are protected. Expression that relates to the self-governing process must be protected absolutely. There can be no government interference with such expression. Expression that does not relate to the self-governing process is not protected absolutely. The value or worth of such speech must be balanced by the courts against other rights and values. Meiklejohnian theory thus represents a hierarchical approach with political speech placed at the top of this hierarchy.

Critics of this theory argue in a telling fashion that it is not always clear whether expression pertains to self-government (public speech) or to other interests (private speech). While not providing the specific definition sought by critics, Meiklejohn argued that a broad range of speech is essential to successful self-government. He included speech-related education (history, political science, geography, etc.), science, literature and many other topics. This theory has been embraced by some members of the Supreme Court of the United States, most notably former justice William Brennan. American libel law was radically changed when Brennan led the Supreme Court to give First Amendment protection to persons who have defamed government officials or others who attempt to lead public policy, a purely Meiklejohnian approach to the problem.

Marketplace of Ideas Theory

The marketplace of ideas theory, writes professor Matthew Bunker, “represents one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers and for laypersons.” It could be taken as “the truth-seeking rationale for free expression.” Although the theory itself can be traced back to the work of poet John Milton and John Stuart Mill, it was US Supreme Court Justice

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. who introduced the marketplace rationale for protecting speech to First Amendment case law more than 85 years ago. In his dissent in *Abrams v. United States*, Holmes famously wrote:

But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.

Today, the economics-based marketplace metaphor consistently dominates the Courts discussion of freedom of speech. For instance, in writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in 2003 in *Virginia v. Hicks*, Justice Antonin Scalia described how overbroad laws—laws that are drafted so broadly that they punish a substantial amount of protected free speech along with unprotected speech—are unconstitutional because they harm “society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”

The marketplace theory, however, is often criticized by scholars. Common condemnations are that much shoddy speech, such as hate speech, circulates in the marketplace of ideas despite its lack of value and that access to the marketplace is not equal for everyone. In particular, those having the most economic resources (today, large conglomerates such as Viacom, News Corp. and Clear Channel) are able to own and to control the mass media and, in turn, to dominate the marketplace of ideas. Nonetheless, law professor Martin Redish observes that “over the years, it has not been uncommon for scholars or jurists to analogize the right of free expression to a marketplace in which contrasting ideas compete for acceptance among a consuming public.”

The premise of this idealistically free and fair competition of ideas is that truth will be discovered or, at the very least, conceptions of the truth will be tested and challenged.

Freedom of Media in the Americas

First Amendment in the US constitution introduced in 1897 is a hall mark achievement to preserve and protect freedom of expression and media. It reads:

- Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of **religion**, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of **speech**, or of the **press**; or the right of the people peaceably to **assemble**, and to **petition** the Government for a redress of grievances.

In the US, mass media are often referred to be as the fourth estate besides legislatures, judiciary and executives. In the U.S, speech or news is NOT censored or restrained! The Government *cannot* block any speech or publication **BEFORE** it actually occurs. **AFTER** something has been published, there is an analysis of whether content breaks any laws. The Government can't restrain a publication **PRIOR** to its printing or broadcast, **UNLESS.....WAR**.

Freedom of expression as a human right in the Americas has been inextricably linked to the concept of democratic governance. The first formal recognition of the right to freedom of expression by a government was in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution ("U.S. Constitution"), the first written constitution of a democratic government. That was in 1791, just four years after the Constitution entered into force.

Freedom of expression is guaranteed under the first amendment of the ten amendments which compose the bill of rights – a position that speaks to its primacy. The text does not use the term freedom of expression as such. But it encompasses essential elements of freedom of expression as we know it today – freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. It provides that the federal government of the United States may not abridge those freedoms. Through the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, adopted some seventy-seven years later in 1868, the United States Supreme Court, in its jurisprudence, has characterized freedom of expression as a "fundamental right" essential to sustaining principles of ordered liberty in the United States and which cannot be abridged by the states either.

Despite the unambiguous language in the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting abridgement of freedom of expression by governments, freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has established that like any other fundamental human right recognized under the Constitution, it may be subordinated to compelling state interests, including the interest in protecting other rights of equal or greater importance. Furthermore, in its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has developed a systematic methodology for determining the circumstances under which freedom of expression may be limited by a compelling state interest. All courts in the United States are subordinate to the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to questions of law arising out of the United States Constitution, and they are therefore bound to follow that methodology.

In simplistic terms, a U.S. court, in applying that methodology, first determines whether the governmental limitation on speech restricts content, or whether it restricts conduct by restricting the time and place where the expressive act is to take place. If the restriction is on content, then the court will require the government applying the restriction to prove that it has a compelling state interest that it will not be able to pursue unless the restriction is imposed. The defendant government also has the burden of proving to the Court that the restriction is the "least restrictive means." That is, of all the mechanisms practicably available to the government for achieving its compelling state interest, the restriction must be means that restricts freedom of expression less than the others. If the restriction does not limit the message or content, but principally is intended to limit conduct and the time and place where it takes place, then the burden on the government is

slightly less. It must show that it has an “important,” but not necessarily “compelling” interest, and that the measure is carefully tailored to realize that interest; however, it need not be the least restrictive means.

A brief discussion of several well-known Supreme Court cases serves to illustrate how the doctrine is applied. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the plaintiff questioned the constitutionality of an Alabama defamation statute as applied to limit criticism of local officials. The statute in question provided that the only defense to defamation was that the defaming statement was true “in all its particulars.” The Supreme Court accepted that the state of Alabama, through its defamation law, had a compelling state interest in protecting citizens from defamation; nonetheless, it held that the statute was not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest, particularly as applied to news and discussion involving public figures. It said that the requirement that a defendant to a charge of defamation brought by a public figure show that a statement about the public figure was true in all its particulars had the impact of chilling press and other public comment about those figures. Satisfying the burden of proof that a statement is true in all its particulars is difficult under most circumstances. Thus, if the press and other citizens were required to take the necessary efforts to be assured that they could satisfy that burden every time they published news about public officials, the free flow of information about those public officials would dry up. That would be prejudicial to democratic governance, which relies on the free flow of information on public officials for the purpose of holding them accountable, and for evaluating the suitability of candidates for public office.

In Sullivan, the court went on to suggest content for a “model” defamation statute that would, on one hand, recognize the state’s interest in curtailing defamation, but, on the other, would be less restrictive of freedom of expression, at least as it applies to comment about public officials. It held that such a statute should not place the burden of showing the truth of a defamatory statement about a public official on the defendant commentator or media. Rather, it should require the plaintiff public figure to show that the statement was issued with malice. Malice, for purposes of such a statute, is defined as acting with the intent to harm, or with reckless abandonment as to whether the statement is true or false. The Sullivan case is highly relevant to a discussion of freedom of expression in the Inter-American system because the doctrine established in that case with respect to the permissible limits of defamation laws as they apply to suits brought by public officials in defense of their honor and reputation has been emulated in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights Court in applying the American Human Rights Convention.

Another case worthy of mention is Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In that case, plaintiff Cohen challenged the constitutionality of a California Statute prohibiting willful disruption of the peace by “offensive misconduct” under which he had been convicted of a misdemeanor for wearing a jacket in the halls of the Court House that had the words “Fuck the Draft” stenciled on the backside. The supreme Court held that the statute, as applied to Cohen, violated Cohen’s right to freedom of expression, and vacated the conviction. Notwithstanding California’s argument that the statute limited “conduct,” not “content, the Court concluded that the statute, as so applied, restricted the content of the message Cohen intended to convey with his jacket. It then proceeded to analyze whether the State of California had shown it had a compelling state interest in punishing Cohen for the content of his message.

The court reviewed its own jurisprudence and recounted that government has a compelling state interest in protecting the public from obscenity (child pornography, for instance) and from speech which immediately gives rise to individual or group violence against human life and property. But the facts in this case, concluded the Tribunal, showed that Cohen’s jacket neither was obscene nor provoked anyone to violence. For that reason, the California could not sustain its position that it had a compelling state interest in banning Cohen’s message. The court also suggested that even if

the “offensive misconduct” statute was to be viewed more as limiting the time and place where Cohen could publish his message – that is as prohibiting unsavory speech in the courthouse – it could still not be sustained. The reason was that it prohibited “offensive misconduct” in all public places in the state, not just the courthouse, and was therefore overbroad and not sufficiently tailored to achieve its objective without unduly infringing upon freedom of expression.

Another significant case from the U.S Supreme Court is Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991). The plaintiff in Barnes, a striptease dancer challenged an Indiana statute which banned public nudity. She claimed that the application of the statute to shut down the place of business where she danced, the Glen Theatre, restricted her ability to express herself fully through nude dancing. The Court asked whether the law was directed at limiting the content of the plaintiff’s message or her conduct. It concluded it primarily intended to limit conduct, and then went on to determine whether the state of Indiana had met its burden of showing that it had an important state interest. It concluded that the laws was one designed and promoting public morality and that such an interest was indeed important. As to whether the statute was sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s interest while still allowing for a maximum of expression, the Court concluded that it was. It reached its conclusion based on the fact that the statute was “carefully tailored” to allow the persons in public to show must of their flesh, provided minimal clothing was used so as not to expose the dancer’s most intimate privates.

It becomes evident from these cases that in their adjudication of disputes involving freedom of expression, courts are called upon to balance carefully the right of freedom of expression against other significant governmental interests and citizen rights. In that balancing exercise, there is a strong bias towards freedom of expression due to the universal recognition of its vital importance to democracy. The remainder of this discussion focuses on how the balance has been achieved in the Inter-American Human Rights System and the institutions charged with achieving it.

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS WITHIN THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

A. The OAS (Organization of American States) Charter

An international multilateral treaty, the OAS Charter reflects the strong commitment of the OAS Member States to promoting and sustaining representative democracy in the region. Insofar as freedom of expression is an “essential component” for democracy, the commitment to democracy is also a commitment to the right of freedom of expression. First adopted in 1948, the Charter has been amended four times since.

The third paragraph of the Charter’s Preamble states that “representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region.” Article 2 lists as among the “essential purposes” of the OAS “to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention” and “to eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to full democratic development of the peoples of the hemisphere.” Article 3 includes as one of the several principles reaffirmed by the OAS as: “The solidarity of the American States and aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of their effective exercise of representative democracy.”

B. Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man

Adopted at the same inter-American conference in 1948 in which the OAS Member States created the modern OAS and approved the OAS Charter, the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man (“Declaration”) antedates the more well known UN Universal Declaration on human rights by some six months. The Declaration is not a treaty and does not have the same binding force as a treaty under international law. Nonetheless, the Inter-American Human Rights Court and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have held those Member States that are not State Parties to

the Inter-American Human Rights Commission accountable for complying with the Declaration's terms.

The Declaration recognizes two rights which often must be balanced against each other, particularly in state efforts to penalize and create civil liability for defamation. One is freedom of expression, and in that regard Article IV of the Declaration states "Every person has the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever." The other is the right to privacy, honor, and reputation. Article V of the Convention states: "Every person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his private and family life."

C. American Human Rights Convention

Although the OAS member states adopted the American Human Rights Convention in 1969, it did not enter into force until some nine years later in 1978. Only twenty-four of the 35 OAS member states are state parties to the Convention. Indeed, two of the largest players in the inter-American system, Canada and the United States, plus most of the Caribbean OAS members have not ratified the Convention. As a result, some have referred to the Inter-American Convention as "the Latin American Convention."

1. General Provisions for Implementation and Interpretation

Before moving directly to a discussion of the substantive dimensions of Freedom of Expression as a human right under the Convention, it is useful to highlight the provisions in the Convention which obligate the state parties to respect that right and the general provisions which apply to interpreting and respecting the right of freedom of expression.

Article 1 of the Convention obligates the state parties to respect and "ensure the free exercise of" the twenty-six substantive rights defined in the Convention, of which Freedom of Expression is one. Together with Article 2 it binds those states, to guaranty to all persons within their territory the full and free use of those rights, and to adopt internal legislation, including constitutional reform, if necessary to implement the recognition and free exercise of those rights.

Article 32 recognizes that the rights in the Convention are not absolute rights and that, under certain circumstances, they may be limited by state action. Specifically it states that some rights may be compromised by efforts to protect others. It also establishes that governments may impose limitations on rights in the interest of public security and the exigencies of "general welfare, in a democratic society." Similarly, Article 30 affirmatively permits states to limit those rights, as long as the limitations are enacted in the general interest and, as required under universally accepted notions of due process, consistent with their stated purpose.

Finally, article 29 sets out four rules for applying and interpreting the Convention. Those rules require the state parties, and in particular, their courts, to interpret the scope of some rights in such a way so as not to limit rights derived from representative democracy – e.g., freedom of expression. They also require that the rights not be applied in any way that restricts the rights guaranteed under the Declaration. Specifically, Article 29 states:

Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation

No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:

a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein;

b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party;

c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or

d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.

The clear message imparted by articles 29, 30, and 32, is that there are a number of reasons a state party can advance to justify any actions it might take in limiting the rights recognized under the Convention. They include the need to restrict one right for the purpose of giving recognition and protection to other rights. What is obvious is that there is a pecking order of rights. Some are more precious than others, and they include those rights associated with freedom which advance the general interests of democratic society. Those rights that are integral to democracy, like freedom of expression, have a preference over other rights in the balancing of competing interests courts must consider in adjudicating adverse claims against state parties accused of not protecting or of restricting the free exercise of those rights.

2. The Scope of Freedom of Expression as a Substantive Right

Article 13 of the Convention establishes and defines the right to freedom of expression, as well as its limitations. It consists of five separate sections. The first, defines the basic elements of freedom of expression; the remaining sections, in general, outline the conditions under which freedom of expression may be limited.

Section 1 states:

Article 13. Freedom of Thought and Expression

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.

As the plain meaning of Section 1 states, the right of freedom of expression includes not only the right to transmit information and ideas of all kinds, but also the right to seek and receive information and ideas from others. The Court, in its jurisprudence has referred to the right to impart information and ideas as an individual right and the right to seek and receive it as a collective right of all citizens in a free democratic society. Freedom of expression is not just limited to the expression of political ideas. Rather it covers “ideas of all kinds.” That includes art and all other intellectual property. The right to seek and receive government held information pertains to the

relationship between a citizen and his/her government and is essential to assure governmental accountability and transparency. A number of the states have adopted freedom of information statutes, pursuant to their obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to adopt implementing legislation to protect the rights guaranteed under the Convention. More must do the same.

Section 2, in conjunction with Section 4, expressly prohibits all forms of state censorship except censorship of entertainment for the purpose of protecting children and adolescents from pornography. Those Sections state:

2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:

a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or

b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainment may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.

Censorship is generally conceived of as any process by which a government reviews information and ideas prior to their publication and dissemination for the purpose of preventing the publication and distribution of all or any part of that information and those ideas. Although Section 2 prohibits censorship in general, it does permit, under limited conditions, the imposition of laws which penalize or establish civil liability for certain kinds of communications after they have been published. Those kinds of laws may, however, have the same net effect as censorship because they operate as self-imposed limitations on the authors of ideas. They are often referred to as “prior restraints”. Prior restraints can chill the free flow of information in a democratic society. An example of a prior restraints is the Alabama defamation law struck down by the United States Supreme Court in the Sullivan case.

Section 2 expressly permits restraints on freedom of expression, provided, however, that they are “expressly established by way of law” and that they are “necessary” to ensure respect for other human rights, like the right to reputation, or to protect national security, public order, public health, and morals. The list of specific other rights and other interests established in Section 2 of Article 13 that might, under special circumstances, justify the restriction of freedom of expression are mentioned in other parts of the Convention. For Example, Article 11 of the Convention establishes a right to privacy, which includes rights to honor and dignity and right not to have private information freely disclosed. It states:

Article 11. Right to Privacy

1. *Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized.*
2. *No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.*

Similarly, as already noted, Article 32 of the Convention provides that “The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.” National security, public order, public health, and morals, as mentioned in Section 2 of Article 13 as permissible bases for adopting laws to limit freedom of expression, all fall within the concepts of “security” and “general welfare” mentioned in Article 32.

Borrowing from both the jurisprudence of both the U.S Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights (“EU Court”) in the Sunday Times Case, Judgment No. 26 *1979), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has taken a very restrictive view of a government’s authority to limit freedom of expression. In fact, it has construed the words “necessary to ensure” in Section 2 as requiring a government to demonstrate that it has a “compelling state interest” in adopting any such restriction in its laws and that it has used “the least restrictive means” – that is, the means which compared to all other feasible alternatives for obtaining the compelling state interest, is least restrictive of freedom of expression. Accordingly, the Court has struck down laws requiring the licensing of journalists as unduly restrictive of the free flow of information, not sustainable as a compelling state interest, and not the least restrictive means for obtaining the state’s interest in responsible and ethical journalism. Following the recommendation of the Commission, the Court has held that the so called “desacato” laws once in force in many Latin American states – laws criminalizing public criticism of public officials – are disproportionately restrictive of freedom of speech when balanced against their purpose of protecting the honor of those officials, and are they are therefore inconsistent with Article 13 of the Convention.

The Court has also held that state parties to the Convention are obligated to guarantee freedom of expression, which is much more than just refraining from taking measures to restrict it. To comply with that obligation, they must assure that private groups, like trade associations, private businesses, unions, guilds, and other organizations do not engage in activities which restricts freedom of

expression. Such measures could include adopting and enforcing anti-trust laws and licensing laws which prevent monopolization of the media by any single person, group, or interest.

Section 3 of the Convention recognizes that in addition to censorship and laws which directly seek to prohibit certain kinds of speech, Governments that seek to limit freedom of expression have a number of other “indirect” means at their disposal. They include distributing licenses only to television and radio broadcasters who do not criticize the government, taxing or limiting the importation of newsprint, or restricting the importation of broadcast equipment and technology, particularly as applied to those who are critical of the government, powerbrokers, and mainstream thought. The purpose of Section 3 is to prevent and prohibit Governments from using those “indirect” means. It states:

3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.

Unlike Article 10 of the European Convention and Article 19 of the Covenant, Article 13 of the Convention includes an affirmative duty of the state parties to punish certain kinds of speech pernicious to a democratic society. In that regard, Section 5 of Article 13 states:

5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.

The message here is that even in a democratic society which places the highest premium on freedom of speech, there is zero tolerance for speech that promotes hate and prompts others to take violent action against others based on the race, color, religion, language, or national origin.

It would be remiss in discussing freedom of expression under the Convention not to mention the right of reply under Article 14. It states:

Article 14. Right of Reply

1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated medium of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction using the same communications outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish.

2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit other legal liabilities that may have been incurred.

3. For the effective protection of honor and reputation, every publisher, and every newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television company, shall have a person responsible who is not protected by immunities or special privileges.

The inclusion of this right in the Convention, which is not expressly stated in the European Convention and the United Nations Covenant, is an effort to introduce balance into the use of the media for the expression of ideas. It attempts to level the playing field so that those who have easy access or even control over the major media cannot entirely dominate the marketplace of ideas or harm with impunity those people and organizations with less access. To that end, it requires that any media outlet that injures a person by its false and offensive statements provide an opportunity to the injured person to respond to or correct those statements by way of the same media outlet. But

that is not enough, in addition to the right to respond, persons injured by the media shall have a right to whatever other legal remedies exist, including, for example, recovery of damages under a proper defamation statute. The right to reply and the right to seek damages are two separate rights. Neither is exclusive of the other.

So far, there has not been much litigation surrounding the right of reply. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights suggested in its Advisory Opinion OC-7/85 (1986) that states may have to pass legislation regulating the right to reply and sanctioning those media institutions that fail to comply with it. Some commentators have suggested that the right of reply might have the unintended affect of chilling free speech because media may refrain from publishing controversial news stories if they are forced to bear the cost of printing or broadcasting replies from all those who claim to have been injured by them.

D. The Democratic Charter

As part of a renewed commitment to strengthening democracy in the Americas, the 2001 Summit of Presidents and Heads of Government of the Americas held in Quebec City charged the OAS with promulgating a Democratic Charter. The resulting document was approved by a Special General Assembly of the OAS held in Lima on September 11th of that year. It declares the right to democratic governance to be a human right; sets out a consensual definition of democratic governance and its essential elements; establishes a mechanism for helping fragile democracies strengthen their democratic institutions, and provides for sanctions against those governments which suffer and fail to rectify “an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order.”

Article 4 of the Democratic Charter defines the “essential components” for the exercise of democracy. Among those elements are “freedom of expression and freedom of the press.” Under Article 21 of the Democratic Charter, the General Assembly, by a two thirds vote of its members, may suspend the participation of a member state from OAS activities where that member state has suffered an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order and efforts to restore that order have failed. Inasmuch as freedom of expression is an essential component of democracy, the failure of an OAS member state government to recognize and protect that right could be construed as an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order and give grounds to the sanction of suspension.

E. The Principles of Freedom of Expression

At its 108th Session in 2000, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission approved a document entitled “Principles of Freedom of Expression.” Prepared for the Commission’s approval by the Special Rapporteur for Freedom Expression of the Commission’s secretariat, the Principles of Freedom of Expression (“Principles”) are a summary of doctrine gleaned from the jurisprudence of the Commission and the Inter-American Human Rights Court with respect to Article 13 of the Convention. There are thirteen principles in all, and they tend to flesh out the skeletal text of Article 13 of the Convention. Their purpose is to guide governments in their efforts to provide appropriate protection to the right of freedom of expression.

Space and time limitations mitigate against a discussion of all thirteen of the principles in this presentation. Some of the more significant ones are as follows:

7. Prior conditioning of expressions, such as truthfulness, timeliness or impartiality is incompatible with the right to freedom of expression recognized in international instruments.

9. The murder, kidnapping, intimidation of and-or threats to social communicators . . . strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the state to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.

10. *Privacy laws should not inhibit or restrict investigation and dissemination of information of public interest. The protection of a person's reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person, or a private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest. In addition, in those cases, it must be proven that in disseminating the news, the social communicator has the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that false news was disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine the truth or falsity of such news.*

11. *Public officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict freedom of expression and the right to information.*

12. *Monopolies or oligopolies in the ownership and control of the communication media must be subject to anti-trust laws, as they conspire against democracy by limiting the plurality and diversity which ensure the full exercise of people's right to information. In no case should such laws apply exclusively to the media. The concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies should take into account democratic criteria that provide equal opportunity of access for all individuals.*

13. *The exercise power and the use of public funds by the state, the granting of customs duty privileges, the arbitrary and discriminatory placement of official advertising and government loans; the concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies, among others, with the intent to put pressure on and punish or reward and provide privileges to social communicators and communications media because of the opinion they express threaten freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited by law. The means of communication have the right to carry out their role in an independent manner. Direct or indirect pressures exerted upon journalists or other social communicators to stifle the dissemination of information are incompatible with freedom of expression.*

F. OAS General Assembly Resolutions

The OAS General Assembly is the supreme organ of the Organization of American States. In that capacity, it receives the annual reports of both the Inter-American Court and the Commission, and it provides general policy support and guidance to those two OAS organs. The General Assembly holds one regular meeting each year and occasionally meets in special session to take urgent decision which cannot be postponed until the regular annual meeting.

In recent years, the General Assembly has given higher recognition to the importance of freedom of expression in the hemisphere by adopting annual Resolution on that issue. For example, at its 2007 meeting in Panama, the General Assembly passed a resolution on access to governmental information urging member states to adopt the necessary laws and regulatory schemes necessary for protecting the right to receive and access government held information; encouraging civil society and the Office of the Special Rapporteur to cooperate with the member states in that effort, and assigning tasks to the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the Department of International Law, and the Permanent Council designed to provide technical assistance and support to member states in drafting legislation to promote and facilitate access to public information.

That same meeting, the General Assembly adopted another entire resolution on freedom of expression. That Resolution urged the OAS Member States to take affirmative action to foster "a more pluralistic approach" to the disseminating information by promoting diversity in ownership of the media. It also urged them to decriminalize defamation and to abolish, in particular, the "desacato" laws which penalize defamatory communications directed at public officials in many countries. But that was not all. The General Assembly also adopted a separate resolution on the "Right to the Truth." That resolution encouraged member states to disseminate and make public the

findings and recommendations of truth and reconciliation commissions, encouraged states that had reason to establish those commission to do so, and encouraged the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to provide technical cooperation assistance to states in respecting the right to truth.

The Resolution of the OAS General Assembly do not have the same legal force as treaty obligations. Nonetheless, they are part of the continuing effort of the OAS to keep human rights issues like freedom of expression foremost in the public conscience of its members.

Freedom of Media in Europe

Here's the brief history of freedom of expression and media in the Europe:

- In 1215, the Magna Carta signed also known as the Charter of Freedoms
- In 1516, the book "The Education of a Christian Prince" was published
- In 1644, John Milton's "Areopagitica" published
- 1770, a letter written by Voltaire writes, "I detest what you write but I would give my life to make it possible for you to continue to write"
- In 1859, John Stuart Mill's, "On Liberty" published as is Darwin's controversial "On the Origin of Species"
- 1918-1945 saw two world wars and a rapid rise in the use of media
- In 1997, the death of Princess Diana
- In 2004 a Dutch film maker is killed for releasing a film about the violence against women in Islamic societies

The Association of European Journalists (AEJ) conducted a survey to investigate the barriers to media freedom in Europe, of which findings are as under:-

Violence and intimidation directed against journalists is unfortunately common in the two states of the former Soviet Union covered, Russia and Armenia. In **Russia** the failure so far of the judicial authorities to clarify the truth about the murder of Anna Politkovskaya in 2006, and of more than ten other journalists in the past several years, is especially grave. Harsh security and press laws threaten journalists with prosecution or loss of employment, leading to a climate of oppression and acting as a warning to journalists against investigating cases of official corruption or abuse of power. Manana Aslamazyan, one of the authors of the Russia report, was head of the Educated Media Foundation in Moscow until the Russian authorities raided its offices and forced its extensive training operations to end – all in response to a minor infringement of currency regulations. The **Russia** Report cites an example of the "guidance" on coverage given by Kremlin figures to leading editors and journalists. The **Armenia** Report mentions 13 cases of physical violence against journalists. Assaults on journalists have also occurred in Greece and other countries. In **Turkey** a newspaper editor, Hrant Dink, was murdered early this year. In **Spain** many journalists have received death threats from violent Islamist groups and the Basque separatists of ETA.

Criminal prosecution of journalists using secrecy or defamation laws has taken place or been attempted recently in almost all the 20 countries surveyed, despite the OSCE's campaign for libel and defamation laws to be treated as civil not criminal matters. Security laws have been tightened in many states in response to the increased threat of terrorism. The many recent and current criminal investigations and court cases against journalists for leaking official secrets suggests that governments have grown tougher. In **Hungary**, two newspapers were prosecuted for publishing state secrets. But in many cases detailed in the Survey – including in **Germany** and the **Netherlands** – governments themselves stand accused of misusing the law to protect themselves from evidence found by journalists pointing to official deception or incompetence. **Poland** has laws on the statute book allowing special penalties for insulting the country's President. A similar law in **Spain** specifically outlawing insults against the Royal Family was used in July this year to suppress a cartoon making fun of the heir to the throne, the Crown Prince. In **France** several news organisations have defied the courts by refusing to reveal their confidential sources of information about doping in the sport of cycling. **Slovakia** still uses media laws, little changed, that were devised by a totalitarian communist system. And in **Ireland** the editor and a reporter on The Irish Times are currently threatened with jail for refusing the orders of the courts and of a special Tribunal to

disclose the source of published information related to an investigation into allegations of corruption surrounding the country's serving prime minister.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has made several recent rulings protecting media freedom and free expression. In July 2007 the Strasbourg court overturned the conviction of a **Greek** radio journalist previously fined for chairing a discussion programme on which another speaker made damaging remarks about other public figures. However the authorities in **Slovakia** have refused to accept their obligation to bow to a similar ruling by the ECHR. In that case the Strasbourg court overturned the conviction and fine imposed on a journalist who had insulted a senior church figure and accused him of collaborating with the communist secret police.

In **Turkey**, incidents of legal harassment and violence against journalists are sharply down compared to the situation in the 1990s. But the murder of the Armenian-language newspaper editor Hrant Dink last January outside his Istanbul office and the attempt to prosecute the Nobel Literature Prize-winner Orhan Pamuk highlight the twin dangers of nationalist violence against liberal-minded writers and of criminal prosecution through Turkey's archaic laws banning insults against Turkish identity or state institutions. In 2006 a total of 293 people faced legal action based on the country's illiberal laws on free expression. In some cases the army itself has brought prosecutions against journalists who investigated or criticised the military's involvement in politics. Turkey's criminal laws are out of line with its Council of Europe obligations and incompatible with press freedom.

Cyprus illustrates how the overwhelming influence of partisan politics and rival nationalisms make a free and independent media all but impossible. The two-part Report by a Greek Cypriot journalist, Kyriakos Pieredes, and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart and colleague, Hasan Kahvecioglu, finds a surprising amount of common ground. It recognizes serious limitations on free expression and media on both sides, although the Greek Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus alone is recognised by the rest of the world. Crucially, they agree that the role of the media of both communities has overall been harmful, not helpful, to the cause of political healing as a result of distorting influences on journalists and their work. The Turkish military still operates blacklists against journalists in northern Cyprus whom they regard as disloyal to Turkish interests. But the most significant example of a government stifling media freedom was provided by the government and media of the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus. In 2004, the European Commissioner Günter Verheugen was refused air-time on any Greek Cypriot TV Channel to refute the arguments for rejecting the UN Plan for a Cyprus settlement made by the Cyprus President Tassos Papadopoulos. In that Cyprus referendum vote, effective control of the mass media was important, perhaps even decisive, to the outcome. The tight media control robbed the population of the right to hear the full facts and the opposing arguments before Cyprus acceded to the European Union a few days later with the island still divided. Some EU figures protested, but media freedom was sacrificed to political expediency.

Public broadcasting: The Reports on public TV and Radio across Europe reveal an alarming picture of failures of independence and of journalistic integrity. Party political influence has brought sharp accusations of political interference and distortion in old European Union member states like **Austria**, **Spain** and **Italy**. **Spain** has recently enacted a new law aimed at establishing the independence of public broadcasting. Our Report on **Italy** examines the "anomaly" of the limited ownership and blatant political influences on Italian television, which the OSCE has criticised as threatening the "quality of democracy" there. Changes have been made to the Gasparri Law in response to strong pressure from the European Union and others. But critics are not yet confident that the result will be real journalistic independence for employees of RAI.

In many of the new and aspiring members of the EU the legacy of the communist one-party control of media and government is heavy-handed party political influence over public broadcasting. In the Report on **Poland** Krzysztof Bobinski describes the arrival of “political officers” in public TV to enforce the partisan editorial slant of the Law and Justice Party-led government, which was ousted in last month’s elections. He casts doubt on the prospect for Polish journalism to escape from the corrupting influence of partisan reporting in the near future. In **Hungary** the oppressive influence of party politics in the management of public TV has led to a drastic decline in quality and viewing figures, throwing the whole future of public TV in doubt. In **Slovakia** the political parties stand accused of manipulating the choice of public TV managers for their own advantage. In **Croatia** the ruling parties are accused of the same trick in appointments to the management and editorial leadership of HINA, the national news agency that exerts a big influence on news coverage by the rest of Croatia’s media..

Media ownership and exploitation: France provides a Case Study of a wider trend, in our fluid economic times, for powerful business figures from unrelated big industries like defence to take over the ownership of leading newspapers and other media titles. They include *Le Figaro* and *Le Journal du dimanche*. French journalists warn of the danger of interference in editorial matters in favour of the government or commercial interests. Journalists already point to examples of censorship, including one of an article revealing that the then wife of Nicolas Sarkozy failed to vote at all on election day when he was elected President. Media organisations have called for new safeguards in the law and the French constitution.

The **Slovak** Country Report picks up a warning by the chairman of the European Federation of Journalists, Arne König, that extreme job insecurity and poor wages are damaging the quality of journalism in many parts. He says many freelances should rather be called “forced-lances” because they have little or no choice about their terms of employment. In the Report on **Belgium** Michel Theys finds that the proportion of freelances among the country’s journalists is a quarter of the total. The Report concludes that owners and publishers should be obliged to fulfil their proper responsibilities to provide decent working conditions.

The Survey demonstrates that the media is often at the heart of wider political debates and of landmark legal decisions. The Report on **Austria** focuses on efforts to enforce the country’s laws against denial of the Holocaust. An Austrian court ruled in 2000 in favour of the right-wing politician Jörg Haider when he was accused in a magazine article of trivialising the Holocaust. The journalist responsible was fined; but last year the European Court of Human Rights reversed that ruling and decided that Austria’s justice system was at fault for its original judgement.

The **Romania** Report links recent setbacks in the country’s anti-corruption drive to a fierce battle taking place within the media for and against the reformist President, Traian Băsescu. A recent episode when the president lost his temper, insulting a woman journalist who questioned him while he was shopping in a supermarket with his wife, showed up the partisan agenda of some news coverage as well as the media’s preference for scandal and sensation over matters of substance, including issues such as social discrimination and high-level corruption. A draft law has been prepared which would create new “press offences” in Romania, including secret filming in the course of corruption investigations, attracting sentences of up to seven years in prison for journalists who break the rules.

Media “wars” with those in political power: As the impact of the media, especially television, has grown, political leaders have not only grown more sophisticated, hiring “spin doctors” and trying to win the media over with blandishments or privileges. They have also grown more intolerant of criticism. The **Czech** prime minister, Mirek Topolánek, accused the media of bias against him and threatened to enact a new law to curb press freedom. In **Slovakia** prime minister Robert Fico branded the media as “the political opposition”. And in **Britain** Tony Blair, who is widely seen as

having charmed and cajoled the media into giving him favourable coverage for many years, criticised them as destructive “wild beasts” shortly before his departure from office in June 2007. The British media continue, however, to scrutinise all political parties with often brutal thoroughness.

The **UK** has a fast-growing and lucrative Internet market, and the UK Report explains why the media are suspicious of the decision by European Union governments to impose new rules on self-regulation of content to **Internet** sites which offer “TV-like video-on-demand services”. The European Commission’s original plans for heavier regulation have been set aside, but the new rules which are due to come into force in 2010 still go against advice from the industry and may lead to censorship.

The evidence from the AEJ Survey of 20 countries leads to these broad conclusions:-

- Media freedom and independence in Europe are not assured, and in some of the countries surveyed they are growing weaker. They must be won in law and in practice.
- The problems of direct political interference in media affairs and contents are more acute in the “new democracies” of Central and Eastern Europe; but Western European countries can no longer be confident that they offer a more secure model of media freedom. New political and economic pressures in many of the older EU states mean that media freedom and independence there, too, are insecure.
- Most of the Reports in the Survey describe a marked trend in the media towards sensationalism and reporting about celebrities and trivia, which have served to downgrade the reputation of journalists in the mind of the general public.
- Impartial and thorough reporting about alleged failings or abuses by those in authority depend on the media’s confidence in their own independence, on a legal framework for openness and on a broad level of support for the media as representatives of the public interest.
- In Europe, popular concern for freedom of expression and media freedom is undeveloped compared with the support for other causes. National sections of the Association of European Journalists are actively involved in strengthening cross-border links between journalists in different regions of Europe. The Spanish Section organises a valuable annual forum for exchanges with journalists from Central and Eastern Europe. Representatives of the Turkish and Romanian Sections of the AEJ are actively working to raise journalistic standards and to represent journalists in their quest for independence and freedom.

Freedom of Media in South Asia

Following table explains the state of media freedom in Asia:

Free	Partly Free	Not Free
Japan	India	Bangladesh
South Korea	Mongolia	Cambodia
PNG	Indonesia	Malaysia
Taiwan	Timor Leste (↓)	Singapore
Hong Kong	Bhutan (↑)	Brunei
	Philippines (↓)	Pakistan (↓)
	Thailand (↓)	Nepal (↓)
	Sri Lanka (↑)	Vietnam
		China
		Laos
		Burma
		North Korea

Key Challenges to Freedom of Media in South Asia:

CENSORSHIP

- Direct censorship: pre and post publication censor, list of banned subjects, official request, pulling programme off the air, jamming.
- Indirect censorship through: ownership, advertising, license regulation, broadcasting commission
- Self-censorship

LEGAL THREAT

- Defamation Law: Indonesia, Philippines, China, Bangladesh
- Security Law: Malaysia, China
- Secrecy Law: Malaysia, India
- Blasphemy Law: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia
- Lese Majeste: Thailand

ATTACKS & KILLINGS

- Journalists working in conflict and tribal areas/provinces are the most vulnerable: Sri Lanka, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Indonesia/Papua, .
- Journalists who cover cases of corruption have been targeted, especially in the Philippines, Cambodia.

- Culture of impunity: lack of commitment of the government and the police to solve cases of violence against media and killings of journalists.

Other Challenges:

- Lack of Access to Information
- Commercialisation of the media
- Professionalism of the media

An Overview of Media Laws in Pakistan:

- No constraints free media system exists in the world. Exception to quite a few countries, the states of the world invest energies, enact laws and frame regulations to keep the media performing its most desired functions (Weaver, 1985, p.11), particularly the watchdog role.
- Governments – whether popular or with weak public support, more often feel vulnerable to media criticisms which results in hatching plans to hoodwink the watchdogs or strap it to avoid perils.
- Hardly any isolated example can be quoted from the civilized world which talks about the protection and perpetuation of the media freedom in a country, despite having tall claims in their constitutions.
- Mass media in this part of the globe have more often been enjoying adversarial relations with the governments.
- The strained relations were partly due to the potential threat by the mass media as being critical to the wrong doings of the governments.
- Nevertheless, poor economy of the mass media, weak potential of the private sector, low literacy, poor professionalism of media men and absence of mass media appearance as a social institution have been some of the other reasons which provided logical grounds to the governments to introduce control measures for the mass media through direct and indirect laws and regulations.
- The contemporary state of mass media is a mix of controls and allures.
- The most prominent feature of present day mass media scene is the emergence of state of the art communication technologies.
- Technological developments have altogether altered the shape of media, both print and broadcast, and opened up new means of expression, consequently loosening the government controls on the mass media.
- However, the government also followed off-the-beaten tracks of control and suppression to avoid media criticism which is increasing in size, reach and serration.
- The Article 19 guarantees the freedom of expression and freedom of the media, subject to "reasonable restrictions".
- Nevertheless, it is the judiciary to determine the scope and parameters of the permissible freedoms and the extent of the restrictions placed by the constitution.
- Of course, the judiciary has to be free and independent to decide about these freedoms and controls.
- Long bureaucratic practices and militarization in the country has produced about **56 constitutional provisions, ordinances and laws** which restrict the media freedom.
- Some special laws like PEMRA, Pakistan Television Act, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation Act, Electronic Crime Ordinance etc., of which magnitude is more than a dozen, particularly deal with the broadcast media in Pakistan.

- Sections 499 and 500 of Pakistan Penal Codes 1860, amended in the General Zia ul Haq regime, also dent the freedom of mass media and have been excessively used in various points in time in the history of Pakistan.

Contemporary Mass Media Laws – An Analysis

The contemporary state of mass media is a mix of controls and allures. The most prominent feature of present day mass media scene is the emergence of state of the art communication technologies ushering new horizons for the familiar mass media from across the frontiers. Broadcast media, which was solely state owned in the past, introduced new avenues of expressions in the present time. Technological developments have altogether altered the shape of media, both print and broadcast, and opened up new means of expression, consequently loosening the government controls on the mass media. However, the government also followed off-the-beaten tracks of control and suppression to avoid media criticism which is increasing in size, reach and serration. Following lines sketch those regulations and laws which are either enshrined in the Constitution of the country, Pakistan Penal Codes or the present government adopted to eschew the media criticism and perpetuate its rule.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan protects the fundamental rights of an individual and the media in its Article 19 in the following words:

“Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defense of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, commission of or incitement to an offense.”

The Article 19 guarantees the freedom of expression and freedom of the media, subject to "reasonable restrictions". Nevertheless, it is the judiciary to determine the scope and parameters of the permissible freedoms and the extent of the restrictions placed by the constitution. Of course, the judiciary has to be free and independent to decide about these freedoms and controls. Usually, the controls on judiciary are placed in the form of executive's authority of appointment, transfer, and tenure of judges. This fact can be observed when President General Musharraf required all judges to take an oath of loyalty to his regime. The Supreme Court Justice and five colleagues refused and were dismissed.

Nevertheless, this constitutional guarantee ceased to be functional after the proclamation of Provisional Constitutional Order No.1 of 1999, introduced on October 14, 1999, immediately after the military de coup headed by General Musharraf. This state of emergency continued till the restoration of so-called democracy in 1992. Even the democracy is restored and constitution has been made functional, this constitutional guarantee fails to protect the right to freedom of expression as it is subjected to “any reasonable restrictions imposed by law”. It stands contrary to the international guarantee which requires any restriction to be ‘necessary’ rather than merely ‘reasonable’. Furthermore, some of the grounds for restricting freedom of expression under the Constitution, such as friendly relations with other States, are not permitted under international law (www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/pakistan.prs.02.pdf).

Long bureaucratic practices and militarization in the country has produced about 56 constitutional provisions, ordinances and laws which restrict the media freedom (<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN011668.pdf>). Some special laws like PEMRA, Pakistan Television Act, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation Act, Electronic Crime Ordinance etc., of which magnitude is more than a dozen, particularly deal with the broadcast media in Pakistan. Sections 499 and 500 of Pakistan Penal Codes 1860, amended in

the General Zia ul Haq regime, also dent the freedom of mass media and have been excessively used in various points in time in the history of Pakistan.

Besides some of the laws, regulations, ordinances and acts discussed in the earlier episodes of this chapter, some of the prominent ordinances which have recently been introduced are analyzed in the following lines.

Press Council of Pakistan Ordinance 2002

Press Council is an old idea that has been floated again by the President General Musharraf to give a legal cover to the constitution of a Press Council. It aims at safeguarding the freedom of press and conduct investigations against the newspapers or journalists on public complaints in case the Code of Conduct / Ethics is violated. The Code which deals with the issues of morality, plagiarism, fairness, accuracy, privacy, sensationalism, confidentiality and privilege will be observed and will allow journalists to operate in accordance with the canons of decency, principles of professional conduct and precepts of freedom and responsibility.

The Council will be an independent corporate body. It would have its own staff, secretariat and budget in the shape of government grant-in-aid and other donations and fees which it will levy on the registration of new newspapers and wire service agencies.

The Council will be comprised of 19 members. The detail of members is as follow:

Chairman	1	To be nominated by the President among retired Supreme Judges or persons qualified to be a Judge of the SC
All Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS)	3	Nominees, but he must not be an officer-bearer in the APNS nor will take up any office till the time he is in the Council
Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE)	3	Nominees, but he must not be an officer-bearer in the CPNE nor will take up any office till the time he is in the Council
Journalist Associations	3	Nominees, but he must not be an officer-bearer nor will take up any office till the time he is in the Council
Pakistan Bar Council	1	Nominee
Educationists	4	One from each province nominated by the Governor
Nominated by Leader of the House in National Assembly	1	Nominee
Nominated by the Leader of Opposition in National Assembly	1	Nominee
Renowned Human Rights Activist	1	With atleast ten years of working in any human rights organization
Nominated by National Commission on the	1	Nominee

Status of Women in Pakistan		
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Source: Press Information Department, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Government of Pakistan

The Council will entertain complaints and constitute a court of inquiry to probe into matters. It will also be empowered to probe into the alleged interference of the government, a political party or any other organization or individual in the freedom of the press.

The recent government-judicial crisis has necessitated the existence of press council as declared by Federal Minister of Information Mr. Muhammad Ali Durrani. The severe criticism on the government stance against the judiciary by the media all over the country including the foreign experts and civil society organizations has been perceived by the ruling leaders as ‘indecent portrayal of national institutions’ by the media, particularly broadcast media (Daily The Nation, June 02, 2007).

With all for and contra arguments, the idea of Council is taken with great resentment by the journalist bodies. For them it is barter between the government and the media owners to slave the journalists.

Freedom of Information Ordinance 2002

Freedom of Information Ordinance is considered to be a step in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which stresses on right to expression, with great focus on the right to receive and seek information unlike other laws and declarations.

Although the Ordinance acknowledges the right of citizens to know, but it still seems to be in a formative phase as it restricts the disclosure of certain records which mars its true spirit. Its Article 3 defines the public record covered by disclosure regime includes some of the items like ‘studies’ which are covered. It may be considered that the government can hide certain types of document having public value and the principles of transparency and freedom demand its disclosure.

Similarly, Article 4 of the Ordinance restricts making public a number of records including minute sheets, notings on the files, interim orders, classified documents, private documents and certain financial information. These are declared exclusions and no provision has been provided to disclose them. While, no exclusions are defined to scrutiny of these documents by law enforcement, public safety and national security.

Article 4(e) excludes any record which is made classified from being open to public scrutiny. This amounts to declaring public scrutiny inferior to any privacy regime thus undermining the significance of the Ordinance.

Article 7 levies tax or asks for payment (fee) as may be prescribed for disclosure of any record from the government offices. Usually, it is the practice universally acceptable; however, its cost should be well prescribed as to avoid it becoming so high to deter the potential applicants to ask for information.

Article 19 provides right to the applicant to appeal to Ombudsman in case he is denied access to declared public record. However, the right of appeal to Ombudsman is only valid when it is not made for the disclosure of classified record.

In a nutshell, the Ordinance is a welcome step towards the freedom of information in Pakistan. Although it inherits many flaws, but it is all because its being on the infancy stage. Successive developments will make it worth comparing with international standards.

The Press, Newspapers and News Agencies Registration Ordinance 2002

PNNARO 2002 repeals Press and Publication Ordinance 1963 and Registration of Printing Press Ordinance 1988. Earlier two laws vested enormous powers with the government to the closure of a press, forfeiting the security and punishing the journalists. However, this law introduces code of conduct to provide the press a mechanism of self-governance.

It happened first time in the history of press laws in Pakistan that affairs of news agencies are being brought under some regulations. Unlike the establishment of a press, anyone could have initiated a news agency with a fax and e-mail service to several newspapers without any consent from any government quarters in the past.

Under this law, the government may impose certain minor penalties for violation of any precepts but it cannot ban the publishing of any newspaper. The minor penalties include explanations or clarification or warning for any alleged irresponsible reporting of the newspaper.

Conspicuous enough is the registration of an individual as 'Page-in-charge' who will, 'in the supervision and superintendence of editor be responsible for checking the contents of the pages and ensure due satisfaction of the material sent to the printer and publisher for publication'. It is hard to understand what this legal requirement caters for. Is it merely making the journalists responsible at each and every step of their business, or an attempt to freedom of job and expression?

As claimed by the government that introduction of new laws will protect the freedom of the press in Pakistan, it is yet to be seen as how it tames or tightens the press when it attempts to be an adversary. In the past, it has been seen that less the laws controlled the press, more were the intimidations through other coercive means.

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)

Dawn of 21st century ushered a new era for media development in the country. Dozens of television and FM radio stations took birth in the last less than one decade. Present government showed resilience towards opening up of new information and entertainment channels as this development supported its soft and liberal look to the world. Moreover, technological development also contributed to push the country into a new arena. Thus, Pakistan could not remain indifferent to the InfoTech developments taking place in other corners of the world. Nevertheless, these developments were supposed to be monitored under some legal cover, and then the PEMRA took birth.

The Government introduced PEMRA on March 1, 2002 to regulate and develop broadcast media in Pakistan. Under this law, an autonomous body has been established being an attached department of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

PEMRA will grant licenses for the establishment of any radio or TV station and will ensure and facilitate open and fair competition. It will also ensure the undue concentration of media ownership in any area under its jurisdiction. However, Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) and Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) will remain beyond its control as being independent and government functionaries.

PEMRA law has proved to be the draconian law for the electronic media in the wake of present day government-judicial crisis. Live coverage of dysfunctional Chief Justice of Pakistan has shaken the

government which resulted in closure of some TV channels and banning of live coverage. Analyzing the media coverage of events taking place in the realm of judicial crisis, there does not seem to have sarcastic portrayal of the government and its actions against judiciary, but the media have been banned as the government has significantly lost the popularity among the masses. The assumption that weak and unpopular governments control the media using laws and regulations seems quite relevant in this regard.

Not only PEMRA law, but the government functionaries also seemed furious on the rapidly declining graph of the popularity and the media have been taken as the main cause of this traumatic situation. So much so that the founder of Pakistan Muslim League (Q), the ruling party leader, announced “shoot to death” in a public meeting if any journalist, lawyer and anyone else pronounced anything against the military (Daily The News, June 03, 2007). Moreover, one of the famous TV column on Geo TV “Meray Mutabaq” has been ordered to be closed being anti-state and the anchor person has been threatened to death if he had not lowered his tone (Daily The News, June 04, 2007).

President General Pervaiz Musharraf imposed fresh curbs on the electronic media in the second such move within three days, sparking protests from journalists, lawyers and politicians. He issued fresh ordinance of PEMRA (Amendment) 2007 empowering the concerned authorities to take action on its own against television channels which violated the rules. This move authorizes the PEMRA to confiscate the equipment and seal the property of broadcasters without consulting the council of complaints. Moreover, the fine for violators has been increased from Rs. 1.0 million to Rs.10.0 millions (Daily The News, June 05, 2007). These amendments are introduced in 10 Sections of the PEMRA including the Sections 29, Sub-Section 6 of the same section, 30(4) etc. (Daily Dawn, June 05, 2007). Interestingly, the government has also taken assistance from the Cable Operators Association of Pakistan (COAP) to take action against those who play negative roles in the name of freedom of media and malign the national institutions. COAP representatives warned the media to avoid negative propaganda against the government in a press conference which is unprecedented (Daily Jang, June 05, 2007).

Defamation Ordinance 2002

In these series of development on media laws, yet another change was introduced in the Defamation Law through an ordinance. Main focus of the change was on penalties for a proven guilty from Rs.50,000 to Rs.100,000 and prison term from three months to five years.

This ordinance advocates the Press Council to look into the complaints by the people for defamation or libel who claim to have been defamed by any print or electronic media. Moreover, it also suggests having a code of ethics for the journalists and media organizations to avoid the chances of defamation and any other irregularities by the media or mediamen.

Looking deep into the Ordinance, it becomes evident that the aim behind seems to be to unduly restrict the scope of the watchdog functions of the media in relation to the acts, omissions and irregularities by officials and institutions in dealing with matters of public interest. Moreover, the ordinance does not clearly distinguish between ‘defamation’ and ‘actionable defamation’, of which favour may go to the wrongdoer.

In a further move, the government introduced amendment in the bill in August 2004 and increased the penalty for defamatory utterances and publication to Rs.300,000, and publication of an apology or retraction does not diminish the aggrieved party's right to demand compensation (Daily Dawn, April 15, 2007). It means that, even if an apology has been published, the plaintiff reserves the right

to demand damages. Furthermore, the plaintiff can also proceed against the defamer both under the civil and criminal law.

Other than media organizations and journalist representative bodies, the Supreme Court Bar Association also raised its voice against the amended ordinance by terming it another attempt by the government to contain the freedom of expression and information. Earlier, Mr. Hamid Haroon, a member of the All Pakistan Newspaper Society (APNS), said that the government had included “tough clauses” in the draft bill of defamation, which were “against the freedom of the press, democracy and human rights”.

As such there does not seem to have any need of defamation law as Sections 499 and 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code deal with it. It defines comprehensively and is in use since decades in the country. Primarily, the purpose of introducing the ordinance does not seem to be anything else except to push the dissidents to the flock of followers. The ordinance may bring into its ambit the charges politicians level against each other. Once a reporter reports it in a newspaper, he may be brought into the books under this law, hence, making it difficult for the journalists to report the utterances.

Freedom of Media in Arab world

History of the Press in the Middle East / Arab World

During the Ottoman Empire, media was the tool of the Turkish authorities—no history or culture of independent press. End of the Ottoman Empire brought little change to journalism. It did not reach beyond the confines of a traditional system which organized the relationship between the political class and the rest of the population according to principles of obedience and respect for the established political authority. Colonialism brings Western media concepts to Morocco, Algeria, Syria, and Lebanon. After World War II, the press became the privileged instrument in the fight for national independence from colonial rule.

From Nationalism to Authoritarianism

1945 to 1970s

- As the “nationalists” win power as colonialism fades, they move to take back control of the press
- Egypt’s 1952 revolution brings an end to the independent press that fought against **British** colonialism. Press is nationalized.
- Coups in Iraq and Syria bring their press under the control of military dictators
- Journalists lived under threat of censorship and legislation that put public order ahead of free speech and independent press

1980s to 1990s

- Gulf and Middle East states use profits from oil to fund journalists operating outside of the region to be supportive of their nationalism and authority
- Most of this media—inside and outside the region—are controlled by a Ministry of Information
- Two counter-forces in the region—politicized Islam and nascent democracies begin to change the landscape for media in the Middle East
- The power of satellites...and the Internet
- Countries such as Saudi Arabia invest in satellites and set up stations that support their governments
- In 1996, Al-Jazeera breaks the mold as Qatar’s emir sees the network as one way to modernize his country
- Like Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, the Qatari emir wants to turn his tiny nation into a safe haven in the Middle East
- Unlike Lee, Sheikh Hamad doesn’t view a more open press as a problem, but as a sign of development.
- But it is not democracy that brought about a free press in Qatar, but an “act of liberalism” as Hugh Miles writes.
- Al-Jazeera is changing the way Qataris see the rest of the world and the way the rest of the world sees the Middle East
- The power of satellites and the Internet
- War also changes the media landscape—from inside and out. Americans begin to pay

attention to the Middle East in the first Gulf War.

- The Middle East begins to pay attention to the rest of the world
- Residents of the Middle East see the power of satellite television as they watch the First Gulf War on CNN.
- They also see the U.S. bomb Baghdad. They can see what is happening in Gaza and the West Bank. They watch what is happening in Kosovo
- Satellites and the Internet cont.
- Al-Arabiya—owned by Saudi Arabia
- Al Alam—supported by the Iranian government
- Al-Hurra—American-backed station that is considered to be American propaganda
- Internet is also a place to find websites on radical Islam

2008: State of the Press in the Middle East (Reporters without Borders report)

- Iran—still the region's biggest jail for journalists.
- Iraq—56 media workers killed in 2007, all but one were Iraqis. 207 media workers have been killed since the war started in 2003
- Iraq—so violent that many international news agencies have left and once U.S. troops leave...what then?
- Iraq—ban on filming bomb sites
- Iraq—press is told to stress the fight against terrorism and to “reassure and encourage” Iraqis to return home
- Egypt—blogger sentenced to four years in prison for “incitement to hatred of Islam.”
- Saudi Arabia—monarchy and religion cannot be criticized
- Gaza—Alan Johnston of the BBC kidnapped for 114 days

What is the ‘Arab Spring?’

- Began in the winter of 2010/spring of 2011 and is still happening now!
- Pro-democracy protesters across North Africa and the Middle East rose up against the dictatorial regimes that had ruled their home countries for years.

How did the ‘Arab Spring’ begin?

Began in Tunisia when a 26 year old street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire after a policewoman confiscated his unlicensed vegetable cart and its goods on Dec. 17, 2010. It wasn't the first time it had happened!

Countries the ‘Arab Spring’ has impacted include Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman

Tunisia

- Leader: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, ruled for 24 years (now in exile)
- Country where the Arab Spring began!
- In October of 2011, the moderate Islamist Ennahda party won the country's first democratic elections.
- President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali resigned in January of 2011 after weeks of protests against

poverty, injustice, the greed of the political elite, and corruption.

- He was forced from power after nearly a quarter of a century and flew to exile in Saudi Arabia.
- On June 20, 2011, the former leader and his wife were sentenced in absentia to 35 years in jail by a court in Tunis. Some of his former ministers have also faced trial.
- Around 300 people died during the unrest, which led to the toppling of Mr. Ben Ali.
- In October, the moderate Islamist Ennahda party won the country's first democratic elections. Some 80 new parties officially registered for the polls with Ennahda winning more than 41% of the vote to secure 90 seats in the 217-member parliament.
- One key reform enacted even before the election was the dissolution of the notorious political police and state security apparatus, which were blamed for many human rights abuses.

Jordan

- Leader: King Abdullah II, in power since 1999 .
- Protesters have been demanding better employment prospects and cuts in food and fuel costs.
- Replaced his prime minister, and promised to give up his power and appoint prime ministers and cabinet members, though he has not given a specific date.
- Unrest has simmered since January of 2011 but while protesters have clashed with the security forces, and one man was killed in the capital Amman in March, the country has seen nothing like the deadly violence in Syria and Egypt.
- Protesters have been demanding electoral reforms that would see the prime minister directly elected and more powers granted to parliament.
- King Abdullah II has replaced his prime minister with Marouf al-Bakhit, a former general and ambassador to Israel, together with a new cabinet.
- In a speech to mark the 12th anniversary of his rule, the king also promised to give up his power to appoint prime ministers and their cabinets, though he has not given a precise indication as to when this will take place.
- A powerful Islamist opposition group, the Islamic Action Front, has called for the dissolution of parliament and has criticized the king's efforts to initiate reform.
- Jordan is a small country with few natural resources, but it has played a pivotal role in the power balance in the Middle East, as one of only two Arab nations to have made peace with Israel.

Egypt

- Leader: President Hosni Mubarak, in power for 30 years.
- Left office after 18 days of protests in the capital of Cairo.
- He has been put on trial (accused of ordering the killings of protesters). He has been suffering from poor health.
- The military has been running the country since President Hosni Mubarak, in power for three decades, resigned on February 11, 2011.
- As time passed since Mr. Mubarak's departure, dissatisfaction grew with the pace of change and the refusal of the military to give a firm date for presidential elections.
- Violence in late 2011 prompted a statement from Egypt's military leader, Field Marshal

Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, in which he promised presidential elections by the end of June 2012.

- Much of the unrest in Egypt was driven by poverty, rising prices, social exclusion and anger at corruption and personal enrichment among the political elite, as well as a demographic bulge of young people unable to find work.
- At least 846 people were killed during the uprising that toppled Mr. Mubarak and more than 6,400 people were injured, according to an Egyptian government fact-finding panel. Those figures do not include those killed or injured in the more recent unrest.

Egypt - Today

- The army, led by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, is overseeing Egypt's transition to democracy.
- The new parliamentary assembly met for the first time after elections in January of 2012.
- Protests and clashes between the military and Egyptian protestors over a new constitution, presidential elections, and military oversight have continued to plague Egypt.

Libya

- Leader: Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was in power for 40 years. He was ousted when rebels took the capital of Tripoli in August of 2011.
- After an 8 month civil war and with NATO's help, Gaddafi was captured and killed (Oct. 31).
- The National Transitional Council (NTC) which led the revolt is now recognized by the UN as Libya's legitimate ruling body.
- Libya's uprising began in mid-February when, inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, hundreds came out onto the streets of several towns and cities demanding the end of Col Gaddafi's rule.
- The authorities responded with violence, opening fire on protesters, as the rallies grew and spread across the country. The revolt soon evolved into an armed conflict pitting forces loyal to Col Gaddafi - based in Tripoli in the west - against rebel forces based in the eastern port city of Benghazi.
- In March, the UN Security Council passed a resolution which authorized "all necessary measures" - except troops on the ground - to protect civilians. Coalition operations were largely confined to air attacks, initially aimed at imposing a no-fly zone and later widened to include government targets. Following six months of fighting, rebel forces took Tripoli in late August, after gaining pockets of territory in the west. Thousands of people poured out of their homes in celebration at the ousting of Col Gaddafi.
- After four decades in power, Col Gaddafi and his family went on the run. On 31 October the former leader was captured and killed on the outskirts of Sirte.
- Three weeks later, his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Libya's intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Sanussi, were captured trying to flee the country and now face trial in Libya.
- Several thousand people have been killed and many more have been injured in the conflict and Amnesty International has reported extensive human rights abuses by both sides. The UN believes at least 335,000 people have fled Libya since the beginning of the conflict, including at least 200,000 foreign nationals.

Syria

- Leader: Bashar al-Assad, in power since 2000 (inherited power from his father).
- Since March of 2011, at least 5,000 Syrians have been killed according to the UN.
- Protestors are calling for political freedom, an end to corruption, action on poverty, and an end to the emergency law of 1963.
- Syrian govt. claims the protestors are 'terrorists and armed gangs'.
- The U.S. and EU have imposed sanctions on Syria, but the conflict has not ended.
- The wave of popular unrest sweeping the Arab world came late to Syria but since the first protests in March 2011 in the city of Deraa, at least 5,000 Syrians have been killed, according to the UN.
- With a leadership determined to cling to power, and a revolt that shows no sign of easing, correspondents say any resolution looks a distant prospect.
- Mr. Assad has promised reform since 2000, when he inherited power from his father Hafez, but little has changed.
- Events in Syria, one of Israel's most bitter enemies and a strong ally of Lebanon's Hezbollah militants, could have a major impact on the wider Middle East.

Algeria

- Leader = President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999.
- Strikes and protests has pressured Algeria to change its constitution to allow private radio and television stations to exist for the first time in 40 years.
- President Bouteflika has promised constitutional reforms and has lifted the country's state of emergency laws.
- President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has been under pressure to change the constitution and limit presidential terms after protests that began in January.
- Attempts by protesters to march through the capital, Algiers, have been broken up by huge numbers of riot police. The trigger for the unrest appears to have been mainly economic - in particular sharp increases in the price of food.
- On 16 April, Mr. Bouteflika promised to amend the constitution to "strengthen democracy".
- The country's state of emergency was lifted in February after 19 years.
- In September, President Bouteflika announced sweeping media reforms which will allow private radio and television stations to exist for the first time in almost four decades.

Morocco

- Leader: King Mohammed VI, in power since 1999.
- Morocco is facing economic crisis, but its monarchy has a lot of public support.
- Protesters want a symbolic monarchy and a limit on the King's authority.
- King Mohammed announced a series of constitutional reforms and can no longer appoint the prime minister.
- In June, King Mohammed VI announced a series of constitutional reforms in response to February's nationwide protests, but unrest has continued.
- The reforms were passed in a referendum on 1 July, with 98% voting in favor, according to the ruling authorities. The changes reduced the king's wide-ranging powers. Where previously he had a free hand in selecting a prime minister, under the new constitution he

has to nominate someone from the largest party in parliament.

- Many protesters want a full constitutional monarchy, with more powers transferred from the king than the new constitution allows.

Bahrain

- Leader: King Hamad, in power since 1999.
- Tiny island, closely allied with U.S.
- The monarchy retaliated harshly to the protests and was accused of torturing and executing protestors and using excessive force.
- Predominantly Shia Muslim protesters have been demanding action to tackle economic hardship, the lack of political freedom and employment discrimination in favor of the ruling Sunni Muslim minority.
- For weeks, the demonstrators occupied the center of the capital, Manama. King Hamad clamped down hard on March 16, clearing the protesters' camp in a show of force condemned by the UN as "shocking".
- He imposed a state of emergency and used hundreds of soldiers from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to beef up security. Security measures remain in place to stop large gatherings and the authorities have continued to use force to break up small protests.
- Forty-seven doctors and nurses who treated some of the wounded protesters have gone on trial, accused of disseminating false information about the casualties and attempting to topple the monarchy.
- In November an independent commission published a report stating that "excessive force" had been used when the government crushed the protests. The report stated that detainees had been blindfolded, whipped, kicked, given electric shocks and threatened with rape to extract confessions. King Hamad expressed "dismay" at the findings and promised reforms to prevent abuses by the security forces.

Yemen

- Leader: President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in power for 33 years).
- Poorest Middle Eastern country.
- Protesters wanted President Saleh to step down and hold elections, and were against unemployment, economic conditions, and corruption.
- Saleh responded violently with military troops attacking protesters.
- Eventually he signed a deal for immunity (*cannot be put in jail*) and agreed to step down.
- Beginning in February 2011, hundreds of people were killed in violence between security forces and demonstrators calling for an end to the 33-year rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
- In September, a new wave of violence broke out when about 50 protesters were killed and some 600 injured in a two-day crackdown in Sanaa. Witnesses say government snipers were firing on people from rooftops, while military aircraft shelled positions held by the protest-supporting troops.
- On October 21 the UN Security Council called on the president to sign a deal brokered by Gulf states, under which he would step down in return for immunity from prosecution. The decision to offer him immunity was to avoid civil war.
- The deal eventually cleared the path for elections to take place, but many protesters are

angry that Mr. Saleh will be not face justice for the suppression of the protests.

- After stalling for months, Mr. Saleh finally signed an agreement on November 23 to begin the transfer of power to his deputy.
- In January 2012, he left the country, travelling to the US for a short-term private medical visit. In February 2012, a presidential election was held in Yemen.

Oman

- Leader: Sultan Qaboos bin Said, in power since 1970.
- Oil rich country with close ties to the U.S.
- Protesters want more jobs to be created, stabilized food prices, and greater power given to the semi-elected Consultative Council that checks corruption in the government.
- Unprecedented protests erupted at the beginning of March, with the deaths of several people.
- Following the mass protests Oman's ruler, Sultan Qaboos, promised to give some legislative and regulatory powers to the Consultative Council. The extent of the new powers it will have is not yet clear.
- Oman has been ruled by Sultan Qaboos since he seized power from his father, Sultan Said bin Taimur, in 1970. The oil-rich country is a popular tourist destination and a long-standing ally of the US and UK.

What happens now?

- Many of these countries have to decide what types of governments they want, now that their dictators have been kicked out! Should they have a democracy or a theocracy? Many Islamic fundamentalists have gained popularity in these countries and Western countries are worried that secular democracies will be difficult to maintain.

Intercultural Communication

Introduction

The study of intercultural issues is by no means a new area. People have interacted with others from different cultures throughout our history in wars, religious journeys and exchange of goods. They have also been well aware of the difficulties these encounters may cause. Even though the history of intercultural contact is long, it has never before reached the magnitude of today's world. Earlier it was only people in certain professions or status that had the contact to the foreign cultures. Nowadays even the most isolated and marginal groups of people have the opportunity to interact with people all over the world. Intercultural interaction has become a reality of everyday life for almost everyone. The growth of interdependence of people and cultures in the global society of the twenty-first century has forced us to pay even more attention to intercultural issues.

There are several reasons for the development of the world into a global village of today. The development of technology has enabled a constant flow of information and ideas across boundaries. Communication is faster and more available than ever. Also the development of transportation has increased face-to-face contact with people from different cultural backgrounds immensely. These developments, in turn, have affected the world economy. The business world is becoming more international and interrelated and international economies face a true interdependence. Widespread population migrations have changed the demographics of several nations and new intercultural identities and communities have been born. Cultural diversity and multiculturalism are the realities of working and domestic life everywhere. In the process of migration and general internationalisation the idea of a national identity has changed. International alliances and subcultures inside the nations have caused a de-emphasis on the nation-state.

In order to live and function in this multicultural environment as effectively and meaningfully as possible, people must be competent in intercultural communication. Intercultural education has been brought up in many countries since the 60s. Previously, however, these educational programs have mainly concentrated on acculturating immigrants and other minorities into the majority population of a nation. With the new technology in communication and education we can now go further than this. The goal is to make the intercultural learning interactive so that both parties teach and learn from each other. Located almost at the opposite sides of the world, Finland and South Africa are very interesting partners in intercultural terms.

Communication

The term communication can be defined in many ways. Myron W. Lustig and Jolene Koester defined communication as “a symbolic process in which people create shared meanings”. A symbol in this definition refers to a word, action or object that represents a meaning. Meaning, then, is a perception, thought or feeling experienced and communicated by a person. Meaning can be a personal experience which cannot be shared with others as such but needs to be interpreted as a message. A message, in turn, is a set of symbols used to create shared meanings. For example, the words in this text are symbols that form the message that is communicated. Symbolical interpretations are often attached to certain behaviour. For example, blushing can be interpreted as a feeling of embarrassment, at least in some cultures.

In communication, everything is based on an interpretive processing. Communication is not always intentional. In fact we send messages unconsciously all the time. Still people around us interpret and give meaning to these symbolic behaviours of ours. For example, we may not give the choice of clothes for a normal day much thought but people who meet us that particular day might interpret our outfit as a clear message of our personality. There are no guarantees that two people will

interpret the same message in the same way. It is quite the opposite. This is especially true for intercultural encounters.

Communication is a dynamic process. It changes, moves and develops all the time. All the communication situations are unique in nature and the process can be seen as “a sequence of distinct but interrelated steps”. Finally, communication involves shared meanings. This means that as people experience the world and everyday activities, they create and share meanings with other people and groups. Communication is interpretive in nature and people actively attempt to understand and organize their experiences in the world.

According to Larry A. Samovar and Richard E. Porter communication is “a *dynamic transactional behavior-affecting process in which people behave intentionally in order to induce or elicit a particular response from another person*”. In addition to the previous definition, they add the proponents of a *channel*, through which the communication takes place; a *responder*, who observe the communicative behaviour; *encoding* and *decoding*, i.e. the processes of producing and interpreting information; and *feedback*, which refers to the information available to a source that permits him or her to make qualitative judgements about communication effectiveness. As Samovar and Porter put it “*communication is complete only when the intended behavior is observed by the intended receiver and that person responds to and is affected by the behavior*”. Thus their definition is largely based on intentional communication. This is only to show that there are several ways to define and understand communication.

Intercultural communication

Intercultural communication refers to the communication between people from different cultures.

According to Samovar and Porter intercultural communication occurs whenever a message is produced by a member of one culture for consumption by a member of another culture, a message must be understood. Because of cultural differences in these kinds of contacts, the potential for misunderstanding and disagreement is great. To reduce this risk, it is important to study intercultural communication.

The relationship between culture and language has been studied for many decades, but scholars from different disciplines still have not reached consensus on the degree to which culture and language are related to each other. The first argument is that language determines our culture. This approach comes from the “Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis” which claims that language not only transmits but also shapes our thinking, beliefs, and attitudes. In other words, language is a guide to culture. Other scholars argue that language merely reflects, rather than shapes, our thinking, beliefs, and attitudes. Despite these differences in approaches, all scholars still agree that a close relationship exists between language and culture.

Verbal Communication (VC)

Language is one of the most important differences between many cultures, and one of the greatest barriers. Differences in language make intercultural interactions difficult. Even if a person is fluent in a language, severe mistakes can still occur. Linguistic conventions may cause significant misunderstandings related, for instance, to speech acts, interaction management, lexicon and politeness forms. As Argyle says visitors to another culture should be aware of the impression they are creating by the speech style which they use. A person can indicate a positive or negative attitude to another by shifting towards a more similar or less similar speech style as the respondent, using e.g. a different accent or dialect. This can happen unconsciously.

Argyle further explains how most cultures have a number of forms of polite usage of language, which can be misleading. For instance, Americans ask questions which are in fact orders or requests (Would you like to...?). In all the cultures there are special features of language, certain words or types of conversation, which are considered appropriate for certain situations, e.g. introducing

people to one another or asking someone for a favour. There are differences in the amount of directness/indirectness one chooses and in the structure of conversations. The usual question-answer speech sequence is not used in all cultures and, for example, negations (the word 'no') are not used in some Asian countries. In any case, language fluency is a necessary condition in order to make intercultural communication function.

Nonverbal Communication (NVC)

In addition to verbal language there are great differences in cultural norms and practices of nonverbal behaviour. Nonverbal communication refers to all intentional and unintentional stimuli between communicating parties, other than spoken word. These nonverbal processes are sometimes accounted for as much as 70% of the communication. Successful interaction in intercultural settings requires not only the understanding of verbal messages but of nonverbal messages as well. Characteristic to nonverbal communication is that it is less systematized than verbal communication; it is culture-bound and ambiguous.

Nonverbal communication can be divided to four categories: *kinesics*, *proxemics*, *paralanguage* and *chronemics*. Kinesics refers to the body movements in communication. It has also been called body language. The four most common body activities are facial expressions, eye contact, hand gestures, and touch. Severe misunderstandings can occur if one does not know the rules of, for example, touching others or level of eye contact in another culture. Proxemics refers to the study of how we use space in communication process. This space can mean anything from architecture and furniture to the distance between interactants in communication situations. Paralanguage comprises of all the sounds we produce with our voices that are not words. These include for instance laughter, tone and pace of voice and “empty” words such as *um*, *uh* or *You know*. Chronemics is the study of how we use time in communication. Hall’s time orientations belong to this category, as well as our understanding of present, past and future.

Globalization and Hybridization in Cultural Products

Media globalization cannot be stopped. It is a result of new communications technology. It is also the prerequisite and facilitator for all other forms of globalization. Multi-national media is critical to global industries. Many Americans feel that we ought to enjoy the benefits of media globalization, such as global communication, rather than fearing and attempting to avoid the consequences—which ironically include hindrance of free speech.

Communicating internationally has never been easier. Thanks to new media platforms, we can have a video conversation with a loved one who is 10,000 miles away or keep up-to-date on the stock market with our cell phones. The internet can also improve our health or save our lives. Your doctor may send an X-ray or MRI to another doctor in India or China for a second opinion and have it within hours. “...An Israeli company is making big advances in compression technology to allow for easier, better transfers of CAT scans via the Internet so you can quickly get a second opinion from a doctor half a world away”.

Thomas L. Friedman, quoting Craig J. Mundie, a chief technical officer for Microsoft: “The Windows-powered PC enabled millions of individuals, for the first time ever, to become authors of their own content in digital form, which meant that content could be shared far and wide”. Friedman’s book underlines his belief that media has the power to cross cultural gaps, bring people closer together and generally make our lives more convenient as it never has before. Through the worldwide web, endless amounts of information are readily available to us. Yet it is important to consider what the chief technical officer of Microsoft did not say: readily available information does not necessarily mean we are better informed. And while new global media can cross cultural boundaries, this does not always bring people closer together. In truth it can deteriorate foreign relations as cultural barriers are broken down by American media.

Despite the benefits, there are also very real consequences. A majority of all media is owned by a very small percentage of wealthy corporations. Local media is being swallowed alive by conglomerations. Freedom of speech is threatened by these multinational corporations; they drown out the voice of local media with profit-maximizing formulas. Media moguls have the most to gain from globalization of media. Their power is concentrated; they have merged, often with companies that are unrelated to the field, as when GE bought NBC. Naturally, the political ideas and bias of GE can be seen in NBC: GE expels criminal amounts of pollution. Therefore, pollution is not a topic covered by NBC. Imagine, for example, what our local news would sound like if it had been bought by Phillip-Morris.

Multi-national media corporations produce products which maximize their profits while decreasing the cost of production. Globalization has made it “easy to shift production to low-wage, high-repression areas of the world....and...easy to play off one immobile national labor force against another”. Jobs which might usually have been performed locally are being shipped internationally and performed at less than half the cost. Corporations are increasing profit by cutting costs and selling to an international audience. Meanwhile, the American middle class is disappearing along with the jobs. Robert McChesney, in a documentary titled *Orwell Rolls in His Grave*, stated that the income for the wealthiest 1% of Americans has risen 141% over the past twenty years. The income for the American middle class, however, has only risen a pathetic 9%. These statistics ought to appall and frighten, yet they go largely unnoticed by the American people because they are not handed over to us by our media. Charles Klotzer of *St Louis Journalism Review*: “The top 5% is capturing an increasingly greater portion of the pie while the bottom 95% is clearly losing ground,

and the highly touted American middle class is disappearing”. Klotzer claims that the media intentionally ignore these facts.

The benefits of media globalization may make it difficult to see these consequences, which are often subversive. After all, why should the media inform us about the negative effects of their global dominance? To do so does not support their main interest: profit. According to Noam Chomsky, “Their first interest is profits, but broader than that. It’s to construct an audience of a particular type...One that is addicted to a certain life-style with artificial wants”. The wealthiest countries have the resources to produce the most media; therefore, the media delivered to the global audience will promote the culture of the wealthiest countries. And it is the wealthiest minority within these countries who defines the content of the media, thereby influencing culture around the world.

The multi-national media corporations are not held accountable for their actions. Only the government has the power to regulate media; in the past twenty years there has been a rising trend in decreasing regulation for the media. Between 1980 and 2000, the U.S. witnessed an “unprecedented historical explosion of mergers”. These corporations were allowed to merge at least in part due to free market principles on behalf of the government. However, one of the consequences of the mergers is they have led to “...lowered public service obligations of media organizations...as free market ideology has ironically created near monopoly business practices”. Not only does the oligopoly have the government’s blessing; the American media oligopoly is also subsidized by the government. Anyone who believes in a true democratic society ought to feel outraged that tax dollars are being given to lobbyists to fund a lucrative oligopoly.

More media is readily available to us than there ever has been before. As the number of media vehicles increases, so does competition in the open market. This increase in competition has not led to an increase in content diversity. Instead, media content, or media products, have become standardized to fill a profit formula as the largest media corporations compete with each other for audience share. Even news stations have taken up the profit formulas. It can be inferred that what occurs is a lower quality of journalistic content and an unspoken agreement across the board as to what news is. “There’s just a common consensus among extremely narrow sectors of power as to the way the world should be perceived and as to what kind of people there should be”. The effect of a self-censored media is thought-control, controlled by personalized media content.

According to Lance Bennett in an address presented to the UNESCO-EU Conference, “...The journalistic abandonment of the public interest is not driven by changes at the individual level in professional journalism norms or motives. Nor is it driven by...popular demand for less substantial information. To the contrary, the media, and their news products in particular, have fallen in public esteem to the lowest levels recorded in the modern era of polling”. The pursuit of profit, not truth, is at the core of multi-national media. There have been increases in advertising in media while journalistic quality plummets. A memo from Coca-Cola’s ad agency to magazines states:

“The Coca-Cola company requires that all insertions are placed adjacent to editorial that is consistent with each brand’s marketing strategy ... We consider the following subjects to be inappropriate: hard news, sex, diet, political issues, environmental issues ... If an appropriate positioning option is not available, we reserve the right to omit our ad from that issue”.

Media is largely funded by advertising. The Coca-Cola memo makes it explicit that media content is affected by the desires and politics of advertising agencies. Noam Chomsky, when asked what globalization means for the press and media, replied: “It means much narrower concentration of media sources...It will reflect the points of view of those who can amass the huge capital to run international media. Diversity and information will decline, media will get more and more advertiser-oriented”.

If Noam Chomsky is correct and advertising in media increases, we can expect our media to be overwhelmingly dominated by advertiser interests and bias. In summary, we can expect the quality of journalism to wither.

Media is a unique “product” in that it shapes how people think and behave. It is a product of culture which also shapes culture. Sean Siochru made note of this in an address at the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, held in Geneva: “Media products are different, not least because they are more than mere consumer goods: in important respects they also ‘produce’ us”.

Because of the societal influence demonstrated by media, it is imperative to regulate it differently than other commodities. Currently, America enforces very little regulation over media for the sake of an open and free market. While the free market principle works for most other goods and services, the theory as applied to media has been detrimental to society. The media falls victim to strong consumerist desires, which they encourage American citizens to exhibit. “For capitalism’s cheerleaders, like Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, all this suggests that the human race is entering a Golden Age. All people need to do is sit back, shut up and shop and let markets and technologies work their magical wonders”.

The truly frightening aspect of the consumerist philosophy is that America is not the only country affected; globalization has allowed us to share our culture of greed with the world. When multi-national corporations are granted free speech rights, the voice of the people is stifled. The authors of the Constitution intended to guarantee these rights for individuals only; individuals do not have the same voice as a global media corporation. Furthermore, when one considers that media shapes culture and that American oligopolies are largely in control of media globalization, one could come to the conclusion that media globalization is an imperialistic effort on the part of media conglomerates.

Thomas L. Friedman, author of the best-selling book *The World is Flat* and an opinion editorial columnist for *The New York Times*, noted the significance of the recent explosion of media. Says Friedman,

“[Media globalization] ... will be seen in time as one of those fundamental shifts or inflection points, like Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press, the rise of the nation-state, or the Industrial Revolution—each of which, in its day, noted Rothkopf, produced changes in the role of individuals, the role and form of government, the ways business was done and wars were fought, the role of women, the forms religion and art took, and the way science and research were conducted, not to mention the political labels that we as a civilization have assigned to ourselves and our enemies.”

Friedman acknowledges that media globalization currently does, and will continue to have a profound impact on the way people conduct their lives. While media globalization is in itself more helpful than harmful, American media corporations are setting a dangerous trend in their media “products”. If we assume that the example that America is setting as the forerunner of media globalization will be imitated on a global scale, the consequences are beyond frightening: they will threaten democracy by silencing the voice of the people.

Hybridization

Hybridization is a mix and match from different sources, old & new, local and global - music, popular culture, restaurants, home decoration. Hybrids help negotiate change and continuity while helping individuals to establish identity and difference in local structures, social hierarchies. Hybridity involves integration of the global into the practice of local life strategies.

Understanding Hybrid Media

In the second part of the 1990s, moving-image culture went through a fundamental transformation. Previously separate media—live-action cinematography, graphics, still photography, animation, 3D

computer animation, and typography—started to be combined in numerous ways. By the end of the decade, the “pure” moving-image media became an exception and hybrid media became the norm.

Here are a few examples. A music video may use live action while also employing typography and a variety of transitions done with computer graphics. Or it may embed the singer within an animated painterly space. A short film may mix typography, stylized 3D graphics, moving design elements, and video.

In some cases, the juxtaposition of different media is clearly visible. In other cases, a sequence may move between different media so quickly that the shifts are barely noticeable. Yet in other cases, a commercial or a movie title may feature continuous action shot on video or film, with the image periodically changing from a more natural to a highly stylized look.

Such media hybridity does not necessarily manifest itself in a collage-like aesthetics that foregrounds the juxtaposition of different media and different media techniques. As a very different example of what media remixability can result in, consider a more subtle aesthetics well captured by the name of the software that to a large extent made the hybrid visual language possible: After Effects (first released in 1993). If in the 1990s computers were used to create highly spectacular special effects or “invisible effects,” toward the end of that decade we see something else emerging: a new visual aesthetics that goes “beyond effects.” In this aesthetics, the whole project—whether a music video, a TV commercial, a short film, or a large segment of a feature film—displays a hyper-real look in which the enhancement of live-action material is not completely invisible but at the same time it does not call attention to itself the way special effects usually tended to do.

Although the particular aesthetic solutions vary from one video to the next and from one designer to another, they all share the same logic: the simultaneous appearance of multiple media within the same frame. Whether these media are openly juxtaposed or almost seamlessly blended together is less important than the fact of this co-presence itself.

Today, hybrid visual language is also common to a large proportion of short “experimental” and “independent” (i.e., not commissioned by commercial clients) videos being produced for media festivals, the web, mobile media devices, and other distribution platforms. Many visuals created by VJs and “live cinema” artists are also hybrid, combining video, layers of 2D imagery, animation, and abstract imagery generated in real time. And as the animations of Jeremy Blake, Ann Lislegaard, and Takeshi Murata demonstrate, works created explicitly for art-world distribution similarly often choose to use the language of hybridity.

In contrast to other computer revolutions, such as the fast growth of World Wide Web in the second part of the 1990s, the revolution in moving-image culture that took place around the same time was not acknowledged by the popular media or by cultural critics. What received attention were the developments that affected narrative filmmaking—the use of computer-produced special effects in Hollywood feature films or the inexpensive digital video and editing tools outside of it. But another process that happened on a larger scale—the transformation of the visual language used by most forms of moving images outside of narrative films—has not been critically analyzed. In fact, although the results of these transformations were fully visible by about 1998, at the time of this writing, I am not aware of a single theoretical article discussing them.

One reason is that in this revolution no new media per se were created. Designers were making still images and moving images just as they had in the previous decade, but the visual language of these images was now very different. In fact, it was so new that, in retrospect, the postmodern imagery of the 1980s, which at the time looked strikingly radical, now appears as a barely noticeable blip on the radar of cultural history.

Since the end of the 1990s, the new hybrid visual language of moving images has dominated global visual culture. While narrative features still mostly use live-action footage, and videos shot by “consumers” and “prosumers” with commercial video cameras and cell phones are similarly usually left

as is (at least, for now), almost everything else is hybrid. This includes commercials, music videos, motion graphics, TV graphics, dynamic menus, graphics for mobile media content, and other types of animated, short non-narrative films and moving-image sequences being produced around the world today by media professionals, including companies, individual designers and artists, and students. I believe that at least 80 percent of such sequences and films follow the aesthetics of hybridity. (This includes practically all “motion graphics,” i.e., animated non-narrative sequences that appear as parts of longer pieces.)

Today, narrative features rarely mix different graphical styles within the same frame. However, a number of recent films have featured the kind of highly stylized aesthetics that would have previously been identified with illustration rather than filmmaking: Larry and Andy Wachowski’s *Matrix* series (1999–2003), Robert Rodriguez’s *Sin City* (2005), and Zack Snyder’s *300* (2007). These feature films are a part of a growing trend to shoot a large portion of the film using a “digital backlot” (green screen). Consequently, most or all shots in such films are created by composing the footage of actors with [or: making a composite of the footage with actors and] computer-generated sets and other visuals.

These films do not juxtapose their different media in as dramatic a way as what we commonly see in motion graphics. Nor do they strive for the seamless integration of CGI (computer-generated imagery) visuals and live action that characterized the earlier special-effects features of the 1990s, such as *Terminator 2* (1991) and *Titanic* (1997) (both by James Cameron). Instead, they explore the space in between juxtaposition and complete integration.

Matrix, *Sin City*, *300*, and other films shot on a digital backlot combine multiple media to create a new stylized aesthetics that cannot be reduced to the already familiar look of live-action cinematography or 3D computer animation. Such films display exactly the same logic as motion graphics, which at first sight might appear to be very different. This logic is the same one we observe in the creation of new hybrids in biology. That is, the result of the hybridization process is not simply a mechanical sum of the previously existing parts but a new “species”—a new kind of visual aesthetics that did not exist previously.

Lecture # 23

Global Media Consumption

Mass media shape the world, and those who control them control the world. Interestingly, none of world media empires have any visible share from the Muslim world. Hence, even being the richest, the Muslims world is at the receiving end. Though this aspect of the strategy needs a separate and long discussion; nonetheless, we shall share a little on the state of world media for today's discussion.

Concentration of Media Ownership

Following table indicates the number of global media organizations:

early 1980s	50
early 1990s	24
Today	5

Major Media Conglomerates

Walt Disney

Walt Disney is the world largest media conglomerate that owns multiple channels at state, national and international levels including:

- Walt Disney Television,
- Touchstone Television,
- Buena Vista Television,
- ABC News,
- ESPN sports channel, and
- Walt Disney Motion Pictures.

The media conglomerate is owned by **Robert Iger**, a Jew, who is an active member of a Zionist group supporting Israel's settlements in Palestine area.

Television Networks

- ABC
- The Disney Channel
- SoapNet
- ESPN
- A&E
- The History Channel
- Lifetime
- E!
- **Production**
- Buena Vista Television
- Touchstone Television
- Walt Disney TV, Animation

Publishing

- **Books**
- Walt Disney Co. Books
- Hyperion Books
- Talk/Miramax Books
- **Magazines**
- Discover, Disney
- ESPN, US Weekly (50%)
- **Daily Newspapers**
- County Press (MI)
- Oakland Press and
- Reminder (MI)
- Narragansett Times
- St. Louis Daily Record

Internet

- **Buena Vista Internet Group:**
- ABC.com, ABCNews.com
- Oscar.com, Disney.com
- Family.Com
- ESPN Internet Group
- NFL.com
- NBA.com
- NASCAR.com
- Soccernet.com (60%)
- Infoseek (43%)
- Toysmart.com (majority stake)

Radio

- ABC Radio Networks
- Radio Disney
- ESPN Radio
- 27 Radio Stations

Music

- Buena Vista Music Group
- Hollywood Records
- Lyric Street Records
- Mammoth Records

Film

- Walt Disney Pictures
- Touchstone Pictures

- Hollywood Pictures
- Caravan Pictures
- Miramax Films
- Buena Vista Home
- Entertainment

Recreation

- **Sports**
- Mighty Ducks of Anaheim
- Anaheim Angels
- **Theme Parks**
- Disneyland
- Walt Disney World
- Disney-MGM Studios
- EuroDisney , Disneyland
- Japan, Epcot,
- Disney's Animal Kingdom
- Disney's California
- Adventure,
- Disney Cruise Line
- **Theater**
- Walt Disney Theatrical
- Productions

News Corporation

News Corporation is the second larger media conglomerate owned by Rupert Murdoch. The Corporation owns one of the largest film studio; i.e.

- Twentieth Century Fox.
- Fox Television Network,
- Fox News,
- Fox Sports,
- ESPN Star Sports are some of the renowned media channels owned by Murdock.

Similarly, most influential newspapers like:

- *The Wall Street Journal* and
- *New York Post* are also owned by the News Corporation.

It has many publishing houses as well like

- News Limited,
- Harper Collins etc.

Though Rupert Murdock's own ancestry is unconfirmed, but his support to Israel and the main players of projects are visibly Jews.

Television and Radio

- **Networks - U.S.**

- FOX Broadcasting Company
- FOX News Channel
- FOX Kids Network
- FOX Sports
- (partial in some markets)
- The Health Network FX
- National Geographic's cable channel (50%)
- Golf Channel
- TV Guide Channel (44%)
- **Stations**
- 22 Fox affiliated stations
- Fox Sports Radio Network

Publishing

- **Books**
- HarperCollins General Book Group
- Regan Books
- Amistad Press
- William Morrow & Co.
- Avon Books
- **Magazines**
- TV Guide (partial ownership)
- The Weekly Standard
- Maximum Golf
- **Newspapers**
- New York Post (U.S.)
- The Times (U.K.)
- The Sun (U.K.)
- News of the World (U.K.)
- The Australian (Australia)
- The Herald Sun (Australia)
- The Advertiser (Australia)

Internet

- TheStreet.com (partial ownership with New York Times Co.)
- Healtheon/WebMD Corp. (partial ownership)

Sports

- Los Angeles Dodgers
- New York Knicks (partial ownership)
- New York Rangers (partial ownership)
- Los Angeles Kings (partial ownership)
- Los Angeles Lakers (partial ownership)
- Dodger Stadium
- Staples Center (partial ownership)

- Madison Square Garden (partial ownership)

Film

- Twentieth Century Fox
- Blue Sky Studios
- Fox Searchlight Pictures

Viacom

- **Summer Redstone**, a Jew again, heads Viacom – the third largest media conglomerate in the US.
- The Viacom empire includes
 - CBS News,
 - MTV,
 - VH1,
 - Nickelodeon,
 - BET,
 - Comedy Central,
 - Paramount Pictures,
 - Dreamworks,
 - Spike, to name a few.

Television Networks

- CBS
- UPN
- MTV Networks
- Nickelodeon
- Nick-at-Nite
- TV Land
- CMT
- TNN (Spike TV)
- VH1
- Showtime Networks
- The Movie Channel
- Sundance Channel
- FLIX
- BET
- **Production**
- Paramount
- Spelling Entertainment
- Big Ticket Television
- Viacom Productions
- King World Productions

Publishing

- **Books**

- The Free Press
- MTV Books
- Nickelodeon Books
- Simon & Schuster
- Pocket Books
- Scribner
- Touchstone

Radio

- **Networks**
- Infinity Broadcasting (manages Westwood One Radio networks)
- Metro Networks
- **Stations**
- Infinity Broadcasting
- (owns and operates over 180 radio stations)

Film

- **Production**
- Paramount Pictures
- MTV Films
- Nickelodeon Movies
- **Theater Operations**
- United Cinemas Intl.
- Paramount Theaters
- Famous Players
- **Video**
- Blockbuster

Internet

- MTVi Group
- CBS Internet Group
- Nickelodeon Online
- BET.com
- Contentville.com

Others

- Famous Music Publishing (copyright owners)
- Theme Parks
- Paramount Parks
- Infinity Outdoors/
- TDI Worldwide (the largest outdoor Advertising group in US)
- Star Trek franchise

Time Warner

Time Warner stands at fourth position in terms of worth of assets. Time Warner earlier known as AOL-Time Warner is chaired by Barry M. Meyer with many other popular personalities known for their attachment with Jewish community.

- The Time Warner owns
- CNN,
- HBO,
- Cartoon Network,
- DC Comics,
- Warner Bros. Games,
- Boomerang,
- Kid's WB,
- New Line Cinema,
- Castle Rock Entertainment, Time Inc.,
- CW Television Network,
- AOL,
- Warner Bros. Entertainment etc.

Time, *Harry Potter*, *Lords of the Rings* and *People* magazines are also the subsidiaries of Time and Warner. Time Warner is famous for its reach and popularity among the US population and world at large even being much lesser in assets than its sister media groups.

Television

- **Networks**
- WB Network
- HBO
- Cinemax
- Time Warner Sports
- Comedy Central
- CNN
- TBS
- TNT
- Cartoon Network
- Turner Classic Movies
- Court TV
- **Production**
- New Line Television
- Turner Original Productions
- Warner Bros. Television
- Looney Tunes
- Hanna-Barbera
- **Cable Systems**
- Time Warner Cable

Publishing

- **Books**
- Time Life Books
- Book-of-the-Month Club

- Little, Brown & Co.
- Bulfinch Press
- Back Bay Books
- Warner Books
- Oxmoor House
- **Magazines**
- Time
- Life
- Fortune
- Sports Illustrated
- People
- Entertainment Weekly
- In Style
- Ski
- Travel & Leisure
- Popular Science
- DC Comics
- Mad Magazine

Music

- The Atlantic Group
- Rhino Records
- Elektra Entertainment Group
- London-Sire Records
- Warner Bros. Records
- Warner Music International
- Time Life Music
- Columbia House
- Giant (Revolution) Records
- Maverick
- Qwest Records
- RuffNation Records
- Sub Pop Records
- Tommy Boy Records

Internet

- AOL
- CompuServe
- Netscape
- AOL Moviefone
- Digital City
- Mapquest.com

Film

- Warner Bros. Studios

- Castle Rock Entertainment
- New Line Cinema
- Fine Line Features

Recreation

- **Sports**
- Atlanta Braves
- Atlanta Hawks
- Atlanta Trashers
- Turner Sports
- World Championship
- Wrestling
- Goodwill Games

Regionalization and Localization in the Media Market

Although there is enough evidence of the globalization of Western media products to raise profound concerns for cultures outside the USA and UK, there is also a trend towards the regionalization and localization of media content to suit cultural priorities of audiences, and fears of a homogenized world culture may be premature. Just as market logic leads McDonald's to develop a vegetarian version of the Big Mac in Delhi and the McCarnaval in Brazil, so international media organizations are increasingly becoming conscious of the varying tastes of their consumers in different parts of the world in a gradually fragmenting global market. As they now operate in a global market, adapting their products and services to local cultural conditions has become a commercial imperative.

The global media conglomerates tend to make use of local cultural resources in order to promote their products, being influenced not so much by any particular regard for national cultures but by market forces. They realize that people prefer to watch programmes in their own languages; it is also cheaper to dub, for example, Cartoon Network programming into Hindi or a holiday programme into Mandarin, than to produce country-specific television. For broadcasters in the developing world, it makes sense to localize global programming through dubbing or sub-titling, as the cost of indigenous production is prohibitive. Even in Europe, regionalization has become a commercial imperative for international broadcasters. Adaptation of US programming is easier in the countries where English is widely used, as in Scandinavia, but in France and Italy subtitled or dubbed programmes do not seem to work. As a result, there is a trend towards publishing regional or local editions of newspapers or magazines; transmitting television channels in local languages and even producing local programming.

The strategies adopted to sell these products can have a distinctly local flavour, for example, using national languages to promote cable television programmes through innovative and customized marketing. This regionalization takes place also in terms of the price paid by broadcasters in key territories for various genres of US television programming. According to the US trade weekly *Variety*, a feature film can be sold for between \$200000 to \$3.5 million in Germany to \$5 000 in Egypt, while a TV drama per hour can be priced for the Canadian market at \$50000 or just \$2000 for India. Similarly prices for a 30-minute children's programme vary a great deal from \$12000 in France to \$700 in Russia.

Even the BBC channels, only available in English, which 'is almost part of their selling proposition', have regionalized their content after attempts to run a BBC Arabic television service and a Hindi language television channel for India failed. In 1998, the BBC introduced local editions of BBC magazines for the first time in Australia and established seven branded blocs with broadcasters in Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, mainly in the factual and natural history genres and began to regionalize publishing in Asia, managing book, video and audio sales in Hong Kong and exports in Sydney. BBC programmes have traditionally done well in countries like Canada - *Antiques Roadshow* is one of the highest-rated shows on CBC. The BBC comedy hit *The Fast Show* was re-titled *Brilliant* in the USA while an American version of its popular children's series *Noddy* was adapted for the US market in 1998 as *Noddy in Toyland*.

Some version of the British game show *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire* which captured 73 per cent of the market when it was launched in 1998, has been shown in more than 50 countries. British TV programme *Till Death Us Do Part* was remade in the USA as *All in the Family* and ran for eight years, while Australian ABC's sitcom *Mother and Son* was adapted by Australian television company Grundy (since 1995 owned by Pearson group) for Chilean market as *Madre e Hijo*. Australian Broadcasting

Corporation (ABC) has adapted British formats for many programmes including the current affairs slot *Panorama* and *Tomorrow's World*. In the other direction, Grundy, makers of *Neighbours*, an Australian soap which is very popular in Britain, has also produced shows such as *How Do They Do That* for the BBC. It adapted its popular game show *Going for Gold* for French television as *Questions pour le champion*. A version of the popular British soap *Coronation Street* became *Lindenstrasse* (Linden Street) on German television while British sitcom *Man About the House* was adapted as *Three's Company* in the USA.

Local versions of the Disney Club have been in existence for over a decade and, in 1998, 35 versions tailored to individual countries were operating. Since 1995, major US studios are increasingly going for local production facilities in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Columbia TriStar, Warner Brothers and Disney have set up international TV subsidiaries to produce English-language co-productions, to be followed by country-specific programming. Sony is contributing to local-language film production in Germany, Hong Kong, France, and Britain, and television programming in eight languages.

In other genres of television, such as the chat and game shows there is also evidence of extensive adaptation. The US game show *Wheel of Fortune*, first broadcast in 1975 on NBC, had been shown in 55 countries, with more than 100 million viewers watching it every week, in such diverse countries as Japan, Canada, Ghana and Singapore, making it the most popular TV game show. It has been licensed to 60 countries and in Germany it becomes *Glücksrad*, in Columbia it goes by the name of *La Rueda De La Suerte*; in Malaysia it is christened as *Roda Impian* and in Turkey the programme is called *Carkifelek*.

In the Middle East, key Western television channels, such as Star Select and Showtime, are increasingly localizing their contents to go beyond the expatriate constituency in the Gulf region. Showtime, a DTH operation, for example, has undergone changes 'to make its output more friendly to Arabic ears and eyes'. This 'Arabization' has included subtitles on The Movie Channel and on other channels such as Style. Since depiction on TV or in films of nudity and sex is particularly objectionable to the censors in the Islamic countries, the global media channels have to edit out the sections which may be censored by the authorities. However, such US serials as *The Bold and the Beautiful*, *Dallas*, and *Santa Barbara* which portray the brighter or glamorous side of life, have been popular in the Arab world. Star is a major player in Asia, the world's most populous continent, with a huge potential for growth.

The regionalization of all the major global channels is clearly evident when ESPN STAR Sports, for example, the result of STAR'S agreement with ESPN to provide coverage of pan-Asian and international sport events, has become Asia's most widely watched channel. In Asia, STAR TV has aggressively adopted the policy of indigenization, with localized channels including, STAR Chinese Channel (for Taiwan), STAR Plus Japan, STAR Plus and STAR News (for India which makes programmes both in English and Hindi) and VIVA Cinema for the Philippines. The BBC has also expanded into Asia, with the 1998 launch of Animal Planet, its joint venture with Discovery.

Global media companies are particularly keen to consolidate their position in the two major markets in Asia - China and India. Increasingly Asian languages are being used, with Columbia (owned by Sony) making programmes for the vast Chinese and Indian markets. Of the 2 000 hours Columbia produced in Asia in one year, about 1 300 was Hindi language programming made for Sony Entertainment Television (SET), launched in 1995.

Based on data from *Advertising Age International*, 8 February 1999, figures rounded. In Latin America, traditionally considered as within the 'sphere of influence' of the USA, the American networks dominate television, with CNN in the lead. According to UNESCO's World Culture Report, 62 per cent of television programmes shown on Latin American channels originate from the USA. Since the launch of the 24-hour movie channel TNT Latin America, in 1991, the first pan-regional

network in Latin America, available in English, Spanish and Portuguese, US-based television companies have considerably expanded into the Latin market, often using innovative marketing techniques. To promote itself in Latin America, Discovery, for example, organized an interactive promotion through its Latin American affiliate Net Brazil, in which consumers travelled through a large interactive tunnel in which they experienced the different genres available in Discovery programming - nature, science, technology and culture. Having travelled through the tunnel the public were given the opportunity to sign up for cable subscription.

One of the most popular channels in the region is Canal Fox, a 24-hour pan-regional general entertainment channel, launched in 1993 and available to over seven million homes, in Spanish, Portuguese and English. Fox's other major regional interests are Fox Kids Network, broadcast in the region in Spanish, Portuguese and English, and Fox Sports Americas, an all-Spanish 24-hour sports network. CNN En Espanol, CNN's first independently produced 24-hour network in a language other than English is seen throughout Latin America and among the Hispanic Americans. Columbia is making gameshows for TV channels in Mexico and Chile.

However, the dream of a single Spanish-speaking market place of 300 million, made up of 260 million Latin Americans and 40 million Spaniards, is not matched by the reality.

In America's own Hispanic market - 30 million strong with a majority under 35 years of age — the two major players are Univision (owned by a consortium which includes Televisa, the world's largest producer of Spanish language programming) and Telemundo (owned by Sony and Liberty Media Group). Telemundo broadcasts Spanish-language cartoons produced by Nickelodeon. In 1998, Liberty Media Group launched an eight-channel digital network - Canales n, including Discovery en Espanol, Fox Sports Americas, CBS TeleNoticias and CNN Espanol. In Africa, the launch, in 1995, of PanAmSat4, heralded the arrival of DTH satellite operators such as Multichoice's DStv, in the continent. As a result, the number of commercial satellites covering Africa has increased substantially, though most programming is in English language.

The South Africa-based ATV (Africa Pay Television) is a major player in the continent, carrying CNN, TNT, Cartoon Network, Canal + Horizon, whose programmes are also widely available in Francophone Africa. Since satellite services still remain out of the price range of much of Africa's population, the growing introduction of Multipoint Multichannel Distribution (MMDS) technology or 'wireless cable' has made this expansion possible, coupled with deregulation of major markets such as Nigeria and South Africa. The opening up of the media as a result of restricting government control of broadcasting is likely to contribute to the continent's gradual integration with global media culture, from which it is mostly cut off at present.

Globalization, localisation or something else?

While the meaning of globalization remains ambiguous, 'media globalization' or 'global media' have quickly become clichés in communications studies. Two questions can be raised about the use of such terms, however. First, what is meant by a globalise communications industry, and secondly, can we assume that a genuine globalization of the industry has already taken place? More precisely, what is the direction of changes that we can observe now-globalization, localisation, or something else? All too frequently when the term 'global' is used in conjunction with the communications media or industry, it refers primarily to the extent of coverage, with the popularity of satellite television and computer networks serving as evidence of the globalization of communications.

Indeed never before in human history has a single television channel been available in over 150 nations, nor has there been any communications medium which managed to attract hundreds of

million of users. However, as Ferguson has pointed out, the linkages brought about by the so-called globalization process are largely confined to OECD and G7 member countries, which constitute one-third of the world population. And even when a medium, e.g., CNN, can be seen in 150 countries, the rate of penetration and actual consumption can present rather a different picture. As Street has said, the fact that a product is available everywhere is no guarantee that it achieves the same level of popularity, let alone acquires the same significance, meaning or response. It is no secret that CNN's audiences normally account for only a small fragment of a nation's population.

However, the meaning of a globalised industry would be seriously distorted if other dimensions were left out of the discussion. These dimensions, including the dynamics of the market, modes of production, the contents and messages transmitted, that are closely related to the perception of the role and function of communications in the globalization process, the direction of change in the industry, and ultimately, the cultural images presented by the theories of globalization.

There is no denying that competitive pricing is a major reason for the availability of American and Japanese programs in most parts of the world. However if prices were the single most important factor at work, those companies that produce the cheapest and most attractive products, with the most extensive global distribution networks and best promotional skills would have become the sole suppliers for the global market, leaving very little to the smaller, less competitive national and local players.

To critical theorists, communications media can be viewed as industries which commercialise and standardise the production of culture. This definition highlights an important property of the media: a business that produces, distributes and sells marketable products. But the recognition of this property is not to overlook the media's other equally important characteristic: its being cultural. Cultural products, more than any others, reflect the cultural values of their producers and the social reality in which they are produced. Viewing a television program or listening to the radio, therefore, cannot be seen as a simple act of consumption; these acts involve a rather complex process of decoding cultural meanings. Although competing prices may contribute to the wide availability of certain cultural products, the purchase of cultural products differs from the purchase of typical consumer goods in that considerations such as product quality may bear little significance in the decision to watch, or not to watch, a television program.

The cultural products market, therefore, does not operate on economic forces alone. Following a similar logic, communications technologies, the other purported major force for globalization, also have their blind spots in explaining all changes—a conclusion which we can derive, without too much difficulty, from the discussion of the significance of 'place' and 'local cultures' in the literature on globalization.

Some neo-Marxists view globalization as a process where the feeling of belonging is no longer connected to different places; they argue that under globalization people's sense of belonging is to one single global society. Therefore it is fair to say that the local culture and the local 'place' is still more important to most people than the global. Therefore, many scholars today see globalization as interlinked with localisation. But although scholars agree that globalization and localisation are linked, sometimes referred to as glocalization, there still remains a lot of uncertainty and discussion around the question on how these two concepts are linked.

Viundal describes this linkage by using the analogy of a tree: 'As the tree grows stretches out and widens its horizon, its roots at the other end also need to grow stronger. In my case, going to Australia, stretching out my branches, as a way of globalising, my awareness of my cultural background and roots as a Norwegian have at the same time grown stronger, as a sign of localising. Consciously or unconsciously my culture might have been challenged or changed due to my exposure to other cultures, but in this process my Norwegianness also tends to be confirmed'.

Cultural identity

Various cultures manifest different and fragmented identities. There are at least two possible ways of conceiving cultural identity: one essentialist, narrow and closed, the other historical, encompassing and open. The former thinks of cultural identity as an already accomplished fact, as a 'product'. The latter conceives cultural identity as something which is being produced, always in 'process'. Furthermore, the term cultural identity refers to two complementary phenomena: on the one hand, an inward sense of association or identification with a specific culture or subculture; on the other hand, an outward tendency within a specific culture to share a sense of what it has in common with other cultures and of what distinguishes it from other cultures.

Cultures seem no longer to be geographically fixed. At least this is what many global/local scholars want us to believe. But at the same time, some of these global/local scholars recognise that all interpretations are still locally constructed. That knowledge is always local. This again, is a paradox. Culture travels; vertical, through all kinds of flows, but also horizontal, through all other kinds of other communications. It has been argued that these communications of cultures are best analysed in spaces where several cultures meet. It is in these communications that cultures surface and identities are built. These so-called 'intercultural communication spaces' can be discourses, (public) spheres, civil societies, countries, debates, supermarkets, (virtual) communities, folk societies, trains, airports, squares, classrooms, organisations, universities, living rooms, global cities... It is in these kinds of spaces that culture travels. In studying these intercultural communication spaces through a culturalistic, interpretative and people-centred approach, we can distinguish between an individual approach that emphasises being in such spaces, and a complete approach that emphasises the spatial formations of these themselves.

In the latter approach, people in these spaces are one of the elements that give meaning to these spaces. In the first approach, people live the spaces. By these approaches, all kinds of cultural transforming processes can be studied in these intercultural communication spaces, but you can also study the space itself as a transforming process.

All intercultural communication spaces have identities, and these identities are of course made by people. All identities are therefore global as well as local, and this in-between status is not static at all. It is mobile, constantly in flux and continuously reformulated and reconstructed towards a new balance. To unravel the building of such a balance, we could follow the following steps:

- (1) establish a willingness to study a globalising/localising identity as a complex whole, as a human socio-cultural process;
- (2) select an appropriate 'intercultural communication space' where to study such a globalising/localising identity, and

(3) study the globalising/localising identity in or of the specific intercultural communication space.

Three examples: Pokemon

In the case of Pokemon, aspects of Japanese culture have been transmitted to other countries where the game has been introduced. However, cultural transmission is seldom prominent in such exchanges. Pokemon has undergone a cleansing of its cultural aspects to make the game more appealing (marketable) to its overseas recipients, an attempt to hide its 'Japan-ness'. 'We tried not to have violence or sexual discrimination or religious scenes in the U.S.,' says Kubo of Kubo Publishing (on the Pokemon website). 'Some graphic sequences involving punching were taken out. The names of the characters and monsters were westernised.' The production of popular culture and cultural mixing makes the original source of consumer goods irrelevant. According to Iwabuchi, Japanese corporations, one of the major exporters in the international market, found success in globalising, or more precisely, 'de-Japanising' their game and cartoon programs for traces of Japanese culture may trigger unpleasant memories of the Second World War, especially in Asian nations. Another strategy that proved to have worked with Japanese corporations was localisation in the form of hybridisation and creolisation, a strategy which heavily involved local producers. A combination of globalization and localisation, therefore, proved to be the best strategy for Japanese transnationals.

This demonstrates the trend of globalization through localisation. The global market is an aggregation of local markets and maximisation of market share is obtained by penetrating as many local markets as possible. This is done by the merger of, or co-operation among, transnational corporations of different countries of origin. Local subsidiaries often specialise in giving transnational products a 'local' feel.

But however successful Japanese corporations may be, in order to expand market, they often relied on transnationals from other countries-American or Australian-for distribution, or even production. The rise of non-Western transnational media corporations, therefore, has not so much countered West-centric power relations as co-solidified it by co-opting it to join the alliance.

Thus, though the potential for cultural enrichment through globalization is great, in reality most products are stripped of their cultural values in order to make the product more marketable. This 'cultural striptease' makes products in potential more appealing to more cultures. But, this does not necessarily mean that the product is simplified. The product is differently encoded by the producer (or better sub-producer) and is encoded in such a way that it becomes more multi-cultural interpretable. It offers the possibility for multi-cultural interpretations. Such a process leads of course to the loss of national or cultural identity of the original product, and in this way simplifies processes of intercultural communication. But, taking the other end of the communication process into consideration, it does not mean that the phenomena is part of a homogenous world wide pop culture. The active process of cultural localisation includes a process of interpretation that accounts for local cultural embedding of multi-cultural products.

Advertising is everywhere, cultivating particular attitudes to problems or creating problems where none existed previously. When advertising is aimed at children, the emotional and irrational drives of young children can be exploited. Minors are not capable of defending themselves against such an 'influence'. In this case, the advertiser is seen as the seducer and the child is cast in the role of the

innocent. In the case of Pokemon advertising, transnational communication could be considered exploitative. Pokemon has steadily maintained its popularity through its television series and movies. This is especially true of the after-show section of its TV series called 'Who's that Pokemon?' which is used to advertise new monsters for children to add in their collection. Even in the case of the official Pokemon web site, it is used to advertise new products and as a place for children to purchase or auction Pokemon products.

Pokemon is the latest in a series of fad toy preferences for children. These fads are the result of transnational communication through advertising, the linking of cultures through globalization, the penetration of local markets through localisation, and the targeting of children by advertising. These fad toy preferences probably have little long-term effects on culture or society. Though many problems have arisen around the Pokemon craze, these are generally viewed as symptoms of general cultural troubles, not the cause.

Coca-Cola

Why is Coca-Cola a global product? The production of Coca-Cola can be located at the global level. The product is globally distributed and known in almost all countries in the world. Furthermore, the product/company uses a global strategy in the communication flow. Coca-Cola is not specifically or only aiming at national or local entities. It is global in its outlook and approach. A global strategy can however insist on approaching nations and localities in its own terms. For instance, the low-calorie sugar-free Coke is in some countries called Diet Coke (as for instance in the United States) and in other countries, it is called Coca Light or Cola Light. The word Light is used instead of Diet, because in some cultures, 'diet' conjures up the image of a strict diet of bread and water. However, these kinds of local adjustments in the advertising strategies do not make the product less global. Coca-Cola's strategy is sometimes referred to as a 'multi-local' global marketing strategy. Moreover, consumers in their outlook towards the product (the cultural interpretation of the product) can reach all the way up to the global level. People in local settings can see a product as being a global product. This is certainly true for Coca-Cola.

This example is of course not limited to Coca-Cola, but applies to other brands and TNCs. Many so-called 'global companies' now recognise the importance of being seen as a local/national company/product and support a 'multi-localised' approach. But this is not uni-directional. Seattle-based Boeing for instance, aims at the year 2017 in which people should have forgotten that Boeing is an American company. Wherever people live in the world, the aim is that people should be seeing Boeing as part of their own culture. But, for other companies like Sony (the inventor of the classic slogan 'Think global, act local.') and Toyota, there is no doubt that they will be associated with Japan. They have written 'Made in Japan' all over their products. Though, the name Toyota itself was chosen at the beginning of the sixties by the car manufacturer because of its suitability for the international market. Previously, Toyota had a completely different and more local name. Toyota on the other hand can be pronounced in any language.

But also the media themselves, such as CNN and MTV now have regional variations like those in Europe and Asia. In several disciplines, inside, as well as outside the academics, this global-local complexity is recognised as a fundamental cultural issue. In advertising studies for instance, it is common to distinguish between three approaches in such a global-local context: 1. the standardised approach, 2. the localised approach, and, 3. 'the middle of the road' approach. The first approach is

related to cultural globalization, the second to cultural localisation and the third, to what some have termed, glocalisation. All three approaches can be found in different corners of the world, but one trend that can be identified is the growing importance of the local in relation to the global.

Lecture # 25

Global Communication Infrastructure - The Privatization of Telecommunications

In the 1980s and 1990s fundamental ideological changes in the global political arena led to the creation of pro-market international trade regimes which had a huge impact on international communication. The processes of deregulation and privatization in the communications and media industries combined with new digital information and communication technologies to enable a quantum leap in international communication, illustrated most vividly in the satellite industry. The resulting globalization of telecommunications has revolutionized international communication, as the convergence of the telecommunications, computer and media industries have ensured that much more information passes through a digitally linked globe today than ever before in human history.

This was made possible with the innovation of new information and communication technologies, increasingly integrated into a privatized global communication infrastructure, primarily as a result of the policy shifts - from a state-centric view of communication to one governed by the rules of the free market - among major powers and, in turn, in multilateral organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

Analysis of international communication has traditionally been confined to government-to-government activities where a few powerful states dictate the communication agenda, but with the growing availability of regional and global satellite networks, communication systems have become more far-reaching for telecommunications, broadcasting and increasingly in electronic commerce. Therefore, an overview of the world's satellite industry and its impact on global communication is given, to provide a framework to understand the hardware of international communication. Finally, the chapter discusses why the transnational corporations (TNCs) have benefited most from the liberalization and privatization of international communication, with Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation analysed as a case study.

The Privatization of Telecommunications

In the arena of telecommunications, the state was, for most of the twentieth century, the key player in providing a national infrastructure and equipment, and regulating international traffic. In the 1990s, the state monopolies of Post, Telegraph and Telecommunication (PTT) were forced to give ground to private telecommunication networks, often part of transnational corporations. This shift, which started among some Western countries, has now affected telecommunications globally, with the majority of PTTs privatized or in the process of privatization.

Since the founding of the International Telegraph Union in 1865, regulation of international telecommunication was the subject of multilateral accord, setting common standards for telecommunications networks across the globe and prices for access to and use of these networks. These conventions were based upon the principles of national monopoly and cross-subsidization, so that national telecom operators such as the British Post Office - which had a monopoly of equipment and services within Britain - could keep the costs affordable for small users by subsidies from international telephony revenues. In the 1980s, this regulatory framework was criticized as not taking into account technological innovations, such as computing, fibre-optic cables and fax machines. Especially significant was the blurring of the distinction between the transmission of voice and data made possible by these new technologies.

As telecommunications traffic increased, so did the demand from transnational corporations for the reduction of tariffs, especially for international services. These companies opposed national monopolies, arguing that a competitive environment would improve services and reduce costs. In 1984 US President Ronald Reagan announced an 'open skies' policy, breaking the public monopoly and allowing private telecommunications networks to operate in the national telecommunication

arena. American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), the biggest US telecoms company, for example, was split into 22 local companies, which enabled it to enter into new types of business. As a result, the US telecommunication sector was gradually deregulated, liberalized and privatized.

A year later, Margaret Thatcher's government followed suit in Britain, allowing 51 per cent of British Telecom (the former telecommunications arm of the Post Office) to be privatized, while the Japanese government permitted partial privatization of the national operator, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT). The privatization of BT and the US/UK demand to reduce the state's role in the telecommunication sector also influenced policy in Europe.

Martin Bangemann, European Union Commissioner for Telecommunications, conceded in his report that liberalization was 'absolutely crucial' and that the European Commission had 'got to push organizational restructuring of telecoms operators to prepare for privatization'. However, the major European countries proceeded much more slowly in this process, with Germany's Deutsche Telekom, for example, being prepared for sale only in the late 1990s. The general shift from the public-service role of telecommunications to private competition and deregulation had a major impact on international telecommunications policy, shaped by the USA, Britain and Europe, all of whom have companies with global ambitions.



Free Trade in Communication

The negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, established in 1947 to provide a framework for international trade after the Second World War), included trade in services for the first time on a par with the traditional commercial and manufacturing sectors. The agenda of this seventh round of GATT talks, which started in 1986 and were the most wide-ranging and ambitious so far, reflected the neo-liberal push towards opening up protected markets.

The Final Act of the Uruguay Round, signed in 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco, included in addition to tariff cuts of up to 40 per cent on industrial products, and liberalization commitments to remove them further, trade in services, investment and intellectual property rights. Their inclusion in the GATT negotiations was the culmination of Western efforts to liberalize the worldwide trade in services.

The USA, leading the West, argued that the world would benefit from the resulting huge expansion in investment and trade. It was estimated that the Uruguay Round, when fully implemented, could boost world income by up to \$500 billion, and increase world trade volumes by up to 20 per cent. However, there was a tension between the free-marketeers and those who argued for a more regulated system to protect domestic markets and interests. The former wanted to end state intervention in world trade and promote liberalization and privatization.

This position was strengthened with the move from GATT to the permanent World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into existence on 1 January 1995, with stricter legal mechanisms for enforcing international trade agreements. The WTO was set up with a clear agenda for privatization and liberalization:

The fundamental cost of protectionism stems from the fact that it provides individual decision makers with wrong incentives, drawing resources into protected sectors rather than sectors where a country has its true comparative advantage. The classical role of trade liberalisation, identified centuries ago, is to remove such hindrances, thereby increasing income and growth.

As part of this, the WTO also argued that dismantling barriers to the free flow of information was essential for economic growth. It was even implied that it was not possible to have significant trade in goods and services without a free trade in information. The importance of a strong communications infrastructure as a foundation for international commerce and economic development was increasingly emphasized by international organizations.

One key outcome of the Uruguay Round was the 1995 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the first multilateral, legally enforceable agreement covering trade and investment in the services sector and the one with the most potential impact on international communication, though it is also important for other sectors of global trade and investment. The services sector encompasses financial services (including banking and administration of financial markets), insurance services, business services (including rental leasing of equipment), market research, computer services, advertising, communication services (including telecommunication services - telephone, telegraph, data transmission, radio, TV and news services).

The most significant component of this agreement for international communication was the GATS Annex on Telecommunications. Telecommunications forms one of the largest and fastest-growing service sectors and plays a dual role as a communications service, as well as the delivery mechanism for many other services. As a sector of crucial importance to all service exporters for both production and supply, the world market for telecommunications services is expected to double or even triple in the next decade. The overall network-generated revenue by 2001 is expected to reach

\$1 trillion. There are interesting similarities between GATS, in particular the Annex, and the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the US and Mexico - the first trade agreement with commitments to reduce barriers to services trade, thus opening up Mexico's services market to US firms.

A year after the agreement was signed, Mexico's constitution was amended to allow foreign investment in Mexican media companies. The Annex encourages private corporations to invest in privatized telecommunication networks in developing countries and, in turn, Southern governments are encouraged to open up their markets to private telecommunications operators. It also extends the 'free flow of information doctrine' to cover both the content of communication and the infrastructure through which such messages flow. The GATS Annex sets out the rules for trade in telecommunications and deals with access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services. One key guiding principle says that foreign and national suppliers of telecom facilities should be treated equally, thus exposing domestic telecommunications industries to international competition. It obliges countries to ensure that foreign services suppliers have access to public networks and services on an equal basis, both within the national market and across borders. The rules require free movement of information, including intra-corporate communications and access to databases, with detailed guidance on acceptable conditions for access and use. To ensure transparency, information on charges, technical interfaces, standards, conditions for attaching equipment, and registration requirements has to be made publicly available. The Annex also encourages technical co-operation and the establishment of international standards for global compatibility and interoperability.

In essence, the proposed liberal global regime in telecommunication, with fewer restrictions on telecommunication flows and encouragement of investment in infrastructure in the South, aims to create the conditions to enable transnational corporations to penetrate the 'emerging markets' of Asia and Latin America, where the potential of the services sector was seen to be enormous. According to the WTO, the global trade in services is growing very rapidly (it grew 25 per cent between 1994 and 1997 alone), not least due to advances in information and communications technologies.

Liberalization of the Telecom Sector: Privatizing space and the final frontier***Case study: Huawei and Intelsat***

The opening up of the global market in telecommunication services pitched the International Telecommunication Union against GATT over the regulation of telecommunications. The ethos of the ITU was based historically on the concept of telecommunications as a public utility, with operators having an obligation to provide a universal service. With a policy of co-operation, not competition, the ITU supported restrictions on ownership of and control over telecom operations, in contrast to the neoliberal telecommunication agenda, which championed privatization and deregulation. Though initially hesitant to accept these changes, the ITU was forced to play a key part in the shaping of a new, privatized international communications regime in which the standards of universal public service and crosssubsidization were increasingly being replaced with cost-based tariff structures.

One area of controversy was the renewed pressure on the ITU from Western governments to reallocate radio and satellite frequencies to commercial operators. Traditionally, ITU had administered frequency allocation on the basis of 'first come, first served'. One result of expansion of international radio broadcasting during the Cold War was that the high-frequency portion of radio spectrum became a contested area in international communication, as both Cold War blocs demanded greater access to it. The controversy was fuelled by the defence-related space race which received new momentum in 1957 with the launch of the world's first satellite - *Sputnik* by the Soviet Union, necessitating a need for space frequency allocation.

Two years later, in 1959, the UN established a committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, creating an international regulatory framework with the aim of reducing Cold War tensions and culminating in the Outer Space Treaty. Article I of this 1967 treaty, which forms the basis of international law in the field of space, stated that the exploration and use of outer space 'shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind', while its Article II established that outer space 'is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use of occupation, or by any other means'.

Despite these noble sentiments, the controversy over frequency allocation continued to figure prominently in the ITU's World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARC) in 1959, 1971, 1977 and 1979. By the time of the 1992 WARC conference, held in Torremolinos in Spain, however, the political complexion had changed - superpower space rivalry had ended and the Soviet Union had been dismantled. More importantly, perhaps, in a technologically- driven environment, new advances in communications had fundamentally changed the nature of debate. The growing digitization and availability of fibre optics had made it possible for TNCs to transmit globally new communication forms and services, including satellite TV, electronic data and mobile telephony.

The mobility and portability of satellite terminals ensured that international communication became much more commodified. Aware of the commercial potential for mobile telephony, the TNCs lobbied at WARC for additional use of the electromagnetic spectrum to effectively offer these new services. In addition, with the fragmentation of the market and the proliferation of operators resulting from the processes of privatization and deregulation, the need to ensure international standards for network compatibility became increasingly obvious. Accordingly, the ITU constitution was amended at the 1998 Plenipotentiary Conference held in Minneapolis to give greater rights and responsibilities to the ITU's private-sector members. This constitutional change also ensured that private companies would have a greater role in providing advice and making decisions on technical

issues. This was a culmination of a process of 'reform', made necessary by the 'changing telecommunications environment', which started at the 1989 Nice Plenipotentiary Conference and was given more concrete shape at the 1992 Geneva conference.

The 1998 conference also agreed a 'Strategic Plan for the Union - 1999-2003', which included proposals to 'improve the structure and functioning of the radiocommunication sector, the ITU's biggest and most expensive sector, which was labouring under an increasing regulatory burden'. It also aimed at reviewing international telecommunication regulations with a view to 'adapting them to the liberalised international environment resulting from the WTO agreements'.

The amendments made to the ITU constitution and conventions opened the organization up to private corporations interested in developing global telecommunications networks and services. ITU members, public and private, were now on an equal footing, with the same rights and obligations. In the area of 'technical recommendation', as one senior ITU official conceded, they 'effectively transfer the power to decide from government to the private sector'. Thus, under the new international communication regime, the ITU advises countries to dismantle structural regulations preventing cross-ownership among broadcasters, cable operators and telecom companies. Since 1990, more than 150 countries have introduced new telecommunication legislation or modified existing regulation, while the percentage of international telephone traffic open to the market has more than doubled from 35 per cent in 1990 to 74 per cent in 1998; in 1990 only four countries allowed more than one operator for international telephony, by 1998, 29 countries were permitting multiple operators.

In essence, the ITU was following the communication agenda set by the world's most powerful nations and the telecommunications corporations based in them. One indication of this was that, following the October 1998 OECD Ministerial Conference on electronic commerce, the ITU began to play a leading role among international organizations in the development of electronic commerce, particularly through standardization activities and working with developing countries, where the goal (part of the strategic plan) was to promote global connectivity to the GII (Global Information Infrastructure) and global participation in the GIS (Global Information Society).

The United States sees the creation of a GII as critical for the success of electronic commerce, which will require, according to a policy document of the US Government, 'an effective partnership between the private and public sectors, with the private sector in the lead'. Among the governing principles behind the US administration's policy are that the private sector should lead and the government should: avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce; where government involvement is needed, its aims should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce; and electronic commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a global basis.

Pekka Tarjanne, the outgoing Secretary General of ITU, welcomed the participation of top telecommunications companies in global policy development. He even suggested that to make the process transparent, that the industry itself, rather than the state, should be involved in the process of regulation. The ITU, Tarjanne commented: 'will play an instrumental role in facilitating implementation of the WTO Agreement. This redefined structure and governance of the ITU will fit the landscape of 21st century telecommunications'.

The policy of liberalizing the global telecommunication system was greatly influenced by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which transformed the industry within the USA, facilitating the expansion of private US telecommunications corporations to operate globally. These US-based corporations have in turn played a leading role in pushing the WTO and the ITU to further liberalize global communication. Always a champion of free trade, the United States wants to further reduce the role of its state regulatory mechanisms. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for example, now sees its role changing from 'an industry regulator to a market facilitator', promoting competition

in the international communications market. The aim of the FCC is to refocus to meet what it calls 'the challenges of a rapidly progressing global information-age economy and an evolving global communications market'. Over the next five years the Commission will pursue an aggressive agenda aimed at increasing competition in communications markets around the world.

Increased international competition will benefit American consumers in the form of lower rates for international telecommunications and will open new market opportunities for American companies. By the end of 1999, there were enough indications to show that the US Government had succeeded in building an international communication infrastructure conducive to the transnational corporations. By 1999, partly as a result of the WTO agreement, 88 countries had fully or partially privatized their telecommunications networks, with interest in free market communications varying from enthusiasm in Latin America to caution in many Asian and Arab nations.

Although the WTO-led liberalization of international communication has transformed global communication, nevertheless demands for 'a new multilateral agreement on regulatory provision which causes the WTO Members to credibly and strongly commit themselves to open markets' have continued. With the increasing privatization of global satellite networks, the satellite industry was set to benefit from liberalization of international communication.

Privatizing space - the final frontier

The extraordinary growth of global communications via satellites in the 1990s has been compared to the technological leap forward of cabling the world in the nineteenth century and, in the twenty-first century, satellites are set to become the 'trade routes in the sky'. Economic growth and technological progress have fuelled a huge rise in demand for global telecommunications services of all types, resulting in the phenomenal growth of the satellite industry. Satellites are now crucial in providing the cheap, dependable and fast communication services that are essential for international businesses to operate in the global electronic marketplace, especially in such areas as transnational broadcasting and telephony, global banks and airlines, international newspapers and magazine distribution. Ever since the mid-1960s when geostationary communications satellites first began to provide direct telecommunications links across nations and oceans, they have played a key if unsung role in the development of international communication.

Complementing ground-based systems, such as cable and microwave, satellites are able to reach huge areas, unrestrained by geographical terrain. They have enabled the expansion of broadcast and telecommunications services all over the world, from metropolitan cities to the furthest flung islands and remote rural areas. These factors make satellites a lucrative and highly competitive industry in which a few big players operate, given that there are a limited number of orbital slots in the geostationary orbit and multiple satellites covering the same footprint. To be able to fully exploit space communication services, access to the appropriate radio frequencies and orbital positions is essential. Demand is particularly high for the geostationary (and geosynchronous) orbit (GSO), some 36,000 km above the equator, where satellites move at the same speed as the earth.

At this optimal location, communication satellites can cover up to one-third of the earth's surface. All satellite operators — whether global or regional - have to make use of the 180 available orbital slots (though there are 360 degrees in the orbit, geostationary satellites need at least two degrees spacing between each other, halving the number of slots available). With communication satellites being launched by many countries, for example, India (1983), China (1984) and Mexico (1985) and by regional consortiums, Eutelsat, Arabsat, AsiaSat and Hispasat, the GSO has become very crowded. Though the ITU upholds 'equitable access to the GSO' for all countries, it continues to be dominated by a few nations. In major satellite markets such as Europe, the governments are encouraging private satellite operators. The European Commission's Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, published in 1998, called for 'market-based mechanisms', a euphemism for auctions, to allocate the spectrum in an 'efficient manner'.

More geostationary satellites have been launched in the 1990s than in any other decade combined. As Figure 3.1 shows, in just six years more satellites were launched than in the past three decades. According to a 1998 global survey of satellites by the US-based publication *Via Satellite*, 192 Western-built geostationary commercial communications satellites were in orbit, carrying 4241 transponders (components that receive, amplify, and retransmit a TV signal). In addition, 67 were on order, which will add another 1918 transponders to the global supply. Contributing to this vigorous growth were the international agreements on telecommunications in the late 1990s, especially the WTO's Fourth Protocol also referred to as the Basic Agreement on Telecommunications Services, which endorsed the US position that the distinction between 'domestic' and 'international' satellite systems was no longer valid in a digitally connected world and that satellite transmissions could cross national borders. Such has been the change in the global communication industry that even intergovernmental organizations have been increasingly driven by market.

This inevitable trend towards the privatization of intergovernmental organizations is demonstrated by the case of Inmarsat (International Marine Satellite). Based in London, Inmarsat was established in 1979 as an internationally-owned co-operative of 86 countries to serve the maritime community and is the sole provider of a broad range of global mobile satellite communications for distress and safety communication, as well as communications for commercial applications at sea, in the air, and on land. In April 1999, it became the world's first international treaty organization to transform itself into a commercial company. Part of the company's attraction to likely investors was that it would be operating in the mobile satellite communication industry, estimated to grow to 4-8 million subscribers and to generate revenues of up to \$13 billion a year by 2002.

With privatization, some of the largest national telecommunication businesses in the world, from among its former 86 member countries, have become the shareholders and backers of the new company. Other telecommunications bodies set up along similar lines, such as the Paris-based pan-European intergovernmental organization Eutelsat, which operates 14 satellites, broadcasting more than 500 digital and analogue channels to over 70 million homes in Europe, Middle East and North Africa, are also getting ready for privatization, euphemistically called the 'restructuring process'. However, in an international context, a more significant change has been the gradual commercialization of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat).

The privatization of Inmarsat and Intelsat raises important questions about telecommunications access for the world's poorer countries. Intelsat has played a crucial role in bringing satellite technology to the South. The economies of scale coupled with innovations in satellite technology made it possible for Intelsat to progressively cut the rates charged for the use of its services. Under its policy of rate averaging - high density routes, for example between North America and Western Europe, had lower costs per circuit than low density routes - much of the developing world came under the latter category. In order to provide services to thin routes, Intelsat charged the same rate for all routes, thus in effect the high density traffic subsidized the others. The new Intelsat is unlikely to continue this practice. Given their economic situation, it would be extremely difficult for poorer countries to afford transponder fees or to acquire other commercial satellite services. Despite its recent growth, the satellite industry demands very substantial investment and high risk, and only the large transnational corporations will be able to exploit this communication hardware. In terms of satellite footprints, the most heavily covered regions are North America, followed by Asia-Pacific and Europe.

Intelsat

Intelsat was created in 1964 as an intergovernmental treaty organization (in the spirit of the UN) to operate a global satellite system for telecommunications services, offering affordable satellite capacity on a non-discriminatory basis. At the time of its creation commercial satellite communication did not exist and most telecommunications organizations were state-controlled

monopolies, operating within a highly regulated environment. As it was the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies inevitably saw Intelsat as a US instrument to control satellite communication. Intelsat operated as a commercial co-operative and a wholesaler of satellite communications, providing advanced telecommunications services to its 143 member countries, and indeed to all nations. In 1971, Intelsat endorsed the landmark UN resolution on space communication, made ten years earlier, that had affirmed that satellite communication should be available to every nation 'as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis'.

To ensure that the less developed countries could also benefit from satellite technology, Intelsat followed a policy of global price averaging, using revenues from high-traffic routes, such as North America, Europe and Japan, to subsidize the less profitable routes. However, Comsat (the Communications Satellite Corporation, a privately owned corporation with AT&T as its largest stockholder) which represented the USA and therefore the dominant interests within Intelsat, aggressively pushed for commercial applications of satellite television. Contrary to UN resolutions, notes Schiller, the space communications development was affected by decisions 'based on market considerations emphasising capital distributions, volumes of international communications and expectations of profitability'.

Although ostensibly a non-profit international co-operative, giving all countries access to the global satellite system, Intelsat has in fact been controlled by a few nations. As Figure 3.2 shows, eight Western countries account for half the controlling shares, with the USA holding the largest investment, followed by Britain. The share of investment has ensured that Intelsat, like other international organizations, has reflected the concerns of Western countries. In a technology-driven industry, the countries that control the technology inevitably have greater power to set and implement the policy agenda. The growth of regional satellite systems, such as Eutelsat and Arabsat, threatened the near monopoly status that Intelsat had enjoyed during the Cold War years. In 1989, the decision of the FCC to authorize a private company, Pan American Satellite Inc (PanAmSat) to provide international carrier services between the USA and Latin America, triggered the process of privatization of satellite-based international communication.

Commercialization received a boost with the end of the Cold War-related space race, as many eastern bloc countries, including Russia, joined Intelsat. The International Organization of Space Communications (Intersputnik), which was established in 1971 as a rival to Intelsat to provide satellite communications to socialist countries, began to negotiate with Western satellite companies for joint ventures. By June 1999, the politics of space had changed so much that a Russian rocket was used to launch the European satellite, Astral H, with the world's first commercial Ka-band payload for use over Europe from the cosmodrome at Baikonur in Kazakhstan. Reflecting the strides made by satellite communications globally, Intelsat massively expanded its operations in the 1990s. After an agreement with the UN in 1993 to increase satellite services globally, the pace of development was rapid. In Latin America alone, Intelsat's revenues grew from \$64 million in 1994 to \$130 million in 1997.

In 1997-98 Intelsat launched five new satellites in the Intelsat VIII/VIII-A series. The Intelsat IX programme, costing approximately \$1 billion, is being equipped with Intelsat IX spacecraft, built by Space Systems/Loral, the first of which will start providing services in 2000, offering more and enhanced services to operators. In 1998, with revenues exceeding \$1 billion for the first time, the organization transferred a quarter of its satellite fleet to a newly created private commercial company, New Skies Satellites, based in the Netherlands, a global system currently with five satellites. The move was justified by Conny Kullman, the new Director General and Chief Executive Officer of Intelsat, in the organization's 1998 annual report: The creation of *New Skies* was a fundamental step toward the full commercialisation of Intelsat, a goal we consider vital to our continued ability to prosper in an increasingly competitive and dynamic marketplace Competition

breeds innovation and technological advancement, which leads to lower prices and better services for customers. The end result is a more vibrant market for all communications companies, and a confirmation that Intelsat's owners are prepared to undertake fundamental change to maximise value to shareholders and customers alike.

Testifying before the US Senate Communications Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation in March 1999, Kullman said that *'New Skies* was the first real test of whether the Intelsat Signatories and Parties would be willing to start down the path towards privatisation. The answer was yes, by unanimous consent'. In 1999, Intelsat owned and operated a global satellite system of 19 satellites, bringing both public and commercial networks, video and Internet services to over 200 countries and territories around the world. Though more than 60 countries still depend entirely on Intelsat for their satellite-based international communications, Intelsat's position was being increasingly threatened by competition from private telecommunications transnationals both regionally and globally. As Kullman told the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna, in July 1999, the answer was to create a 'new Intelsat', a privatized organization 'to continue our fundamental mission of providing connectivity to all countries of the world'.

We expect to obtain final approval for privatization from our owners and member governments by late 2000. New Intelsat could be established by early 2001 - in time for the new enterprise to reap the benefits of the fast-growing commercial satellite communications market. At their meeting in Hawaii in April 1999, Intelsat endorsed the restructuring of the organization from an intergovernmental co-operative to a fully commercial company. The General Assembly, responsible for making policy decisions relating to the treaty-based agreement which governs Intelsat, agreed to go ahead with the plan at its meeting in Malaysia in October 1999. The Assembly decided that Intelsat should be converted into a corporation, 'with an optimal tax, regulatory and operational structure without privileges and immunities'. Intelsat has targeted full privatization by 2001.

Privatization has opened up the debate about who would have strategic control of the new Intelsat, which still runs the world's largest commercial geostationary satellite network. The US-based Comsat, the largest individual shareholder in both the Intelsat and Inmarsat satellite systems, agreed to merge with Lockheed Martin in August 1999, one of the world's biggest defence corporations. Comsat is also the largest individual owner in New Skies. Will Lockheed Martin dominate New Skies and thus take a controlling position in Intelsat?

Huawei

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd is a Chinese multinational networking and telecommunications equipment and services company headquartered in Shenzhen, Guangdong. It is the largest telecommunications equipment maker in the world, having overtaken Ericsson in 2012.

Huawei was founded in 1987 by ex-military officer Ren Zhengfei and formed as a private company owned by its employees. Its core missions are building telecommunications networks; providing operational and consulting services and equipment to enterprises inside and outside of China; and manufacturing communications devices for the consumer market. Huawei has over 140,000 employees, around 46% of whom are engaged in research and development (R&D). It has 20 R&D institutes in countries including China, the United States, Germany, Colombia, Sweden, Ireland, India, Russia, and Turkey, and in 2011 invested around US\$3.74 billion in R&D.

In 2010, Huawei recorded profit of 23.8 billion CNY (3.7 billion USD). Its products and services have been deployed in more than 140 countries and it currently serves 45 of the world's 50 largest telecoms operators.

International expansion

In 1997, Huawei won its first overseas contract, providing fixed-line network products to Hong Kong company Hutchison Whampoa. Later that year, Huawei launched its wireless GSM-based products and eventually expanded to offer CDMA and UMTS. In 1999, the company opened a research and development (R&D) center in Bangalore, India to develop a wide range of telecom software. From 1998 to 2003, Huawei contracted with IBM for management consulting, and underwent significant transformation of its management and product development structure. After 2000, Huawei increased its speed of expansion into overseas markets, having achieved international sales of more than US\$100 million by 2000 and establishing an R&D center in Stockholm, Sweden. In 2001, Huawei established four R&D centers in the United States, divested non-core subsidiary Avansys to Emerson for US\$750 million and joined the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). By 2002, Huawei's international market sales had reached US\$552 million.

In 2004 Huawei continued its overseas expansion with a contract to build a third-generation network for Telfort, the Dutch mobile operator. This contract, valued at more than \$US25 million, was the first such contract for the company in Europe.

In 2005, Huawei's international contract orders exceeded its domestic sales for the first time. Huawei signed a Global Framework Agreement with Vodafone. This agreement marked the first time a telecommunications equipment supplier from China had received Approved Supplier status from Vodafone Global Supply Chain. The agreement established the terms and conditions for the supply of Huawei's solutions to any one of the Vodafone operating companies worldwide. Huawei also signed a contract with British Telecom (BT) for the deployment of its multi-service access network (MSAN) and Transmission equipment for BT's 21st Century Network (21CN), providing BT and the UK telecommunications industry with some infrastructure necessary to support future growth as these companies are multi vendor infrastructure.

In May 2008, Huawei and Optus developed a mobile innovation centre in Sydney, Australia, providing facilities for engineers to develop new wireless and mobile broadband concepts into "ready for market" products. In 2008, the company embarked on its first large-scale commercial deployment of UMTS/ HSPA in North America providing TELUS's new next generation wireless network and Bell Canada with high-speed mobile access.

Huawei delivered one of the world's first LTE/EPC commercial networks for TeliaSonera in Oslo, Norway in 2009. The company launched the world's first end-to-end 100G solution from routers to transmission system that same year, to help meet the rapid growth of network traffic and enhance router efficiency and reliability.

In July 2010, Huawei was included in the Global Fortune 500 2010 list published by the U.S. magazine Fortune for the first time, on the strength of annual sales of US\$21.8 billion and net profit of US\$2.67 billion. In late 2010 it was reported that Huawei is planning to invest around US\$500 million (Rs 2,200 crore) to set up a telecom equipment manufacturing facility in Tamil Nadu, India and \$US100 million to expand its R&D center in Bangalore.

In October 2012, it was announced that Huawei would move its UK headquarters to Green Park, Reading, Berkshire. The company also, in an effort to increase its prominence in the United States, became the main sponsor of the Jonas Brothers' 2013 summer tour.

In September 2013, Huawei opened a new Canadian office in Regina, Saskatchewan—Huawei had collaborated with the local carrier SaskTel to build its HSPA+ and LTE networks. The company also announced that SaskTel would carry its new Ascend Y300 smartphone.

Key Players in the Global Satellite Industry – *Case study: Murdoch's News Corporation*

Digital technology, with modern satellites experiencing nearly 500-fold capacity increase over 1960s' spacecraft, WTO-sponsored deregulation and the rapid privatization of national telecommunications organizations, have accelerated the flow of information across national borders. This has resulted in a flourishing global telecommunications industry led by commercial international satellite and cable communications operators, offering a wider range of services at lower prices. US companies and a French-led European consortium lead the world market for the manufacture of geostationary satellites. In 1999, the US-based Satellite Industry Association (SIA), which represents the leading US commercial satellite corporations, reported that the commercial satellite industry generated \$65.9 billion in revenue in 1998, a nearly 15 per cent increase on 1997 revenue, with the US-based companies accounting for \$30.7 billion of the total or about 46 per cent of worldwide revenue.

The three largest US contractors - Hughes Space and Communications, Lockheed Martin, and Loral - have between them built 68 per cent of the geostationary communications satellites in orbit, and were contracted to build 62 per cent of those on order in 1999. A European satellite consortium led by the French Aerospatiale, have built 17 per cent of those in orbit, and are building 30 per cent of those under construction. To have a better appreciation of the reach of Western satellite networks, it is useful to examine who the main international and regional satellite players are. Most of the information that follows has been obtained from the websites of the major satellite corporations and the trade press, since little academic work exists on this subject and whatever is available dates very rapidly given the changing nature of the industry.

Hughes Space and Communications Company

Of the world's three biggest satellite manufacturers, Hughes Space and Communications Company is the most significant, accounting for 40 per cent of the commercial satellite service worldwide. The Hughes conglomerate claims to be 'the most comprehensive vertically-integrated satellite firm in the world'. It includes PanAmSat (the world's largest commercial operator of communications satellites, with a network of 19 satellites in 1999) and Hughes Network Systems (a leading provider of satellite-based private communications networks for TNCs) and DirecTV, an international Direct-to-Home (DTH) operator (Hughes website). Among Hughes' main customers is the Luxembourg-based Societe Europeenne des Satellites (SES), the owner and operator of Astra, Europe's leading DTH satellite system, reaching an audience of almost 75 million households in Europe. In addition, Hughes is a major supplier for the US defence services, designing and launching the Leasat satellites - launched in 1984, 1985 and 1990 - used by the US government to create a global military communications and surveillance network.

Of the 179 satellites built by Hughes since 1963, the first 100 were launched over a period of 17 years, whereas 79 have been launched in the last nine years. Orders for satellites shown in Table 3.5 reflect the pattern of global distribution of communication hardware. In January 2000, the US defence giant Boeing bought Hughes' satellite operations for \$3.75 billion. Boeing, the largest aerospace company in the world, apart from being the world's top manufacturer of commercial and military aircraft, is also one of the biggest producers of defence-related advanced information and communication systems. The deal reinforces close links between civil and military operations among the world's top satellite corporations. *Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications*

The defence industry is also crucial for the satellite manufacturer, Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications (LMGT), part of the Lockheed Martin corporation, the largest defence contractor in the USA. In recent years it has expanded its operations globally and is now the main

actor within a privatized Intelsat. In what was termed as a space coup, Lockheed Martin formed a joint venture in 1997 with Intersputnik to launch and operate a fleet of advanced communications satellites, creating a global integrated system for communication and broadcasting services. Cash-strapped Intersputnik needed the support of one of the world's best-resourced companies, while Lockheed Martin was interested in Intersputnik's 15 highly valuable GSO slots.

By joining forces with the Russians, Lockheed Martin acquired the capacity to transmit video, data and phone services worldwide. Of particular interest were the two Intersputnik slots, registered in Cuba's name, that cover North and South America. However, the company is planning targeting first the largely untapped market of Eastern Europe, Asia and Russia, and the joint venture is expected to generate revenue of up to \$500 million annually by 2001. In 1998, LMGT established Americom Asia-Pacific, a joint venture company, owned with GE Americom, to launch and operate a new highpowered Ku-band satellite system. Lockheed Martin is also building a regional mobile personal communications system, including a satellite, ground network and user terminals, for the Asian Cellular Satellite System, with partners in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. For the crucial Chinese market, LMGT has built five satellites including ChinaStar-1 - to provide voice, data and television distribution services to one of the world's biggest markets.

In 1999, LMGT became a founding partner in Astrolink along with Telecom Italia, which will provide a Ka-band geostationary satellite system targeting the high-growth market for broadband high capacity data services. LMGT also operates Global Telecommunications Services, created in 1998 and composed of Astrolink, Lockheed Martin Intersputnik, Lockheed Martin Telecommunications and Americom Asia-Pacific, making it a major global force in the industry.

Loral Space Communications

The third key corporation is Loral Space & Communications, one of the world's largest satellite communications companies, which, since 1957, has been awarded contracts to build 196 satellites. In 1997, as part of what the company calls 'developing the building blocks necessary to create a seamless, global networking capability for the information age', Loral acquired Skynet, then a US-provider of transponder capacity, and extended its reach to Latin America with the 75 per cent purchase of Satelites Mexicanos (SatMex). Loral Skynet operates the Telstar and Orion satellite fleets. The Orion Network, which was bought in 1998, had licences for orbital slots covering Europe, Latin America and Asia. Loral Skynet's Telstar satellites provided coverage over most of North America, as well as trans-Atlantic coverage through the Orion 1 satellite. In the USA, Loral Skynet had links with EchoStar, the DTH service operating more than 300 channels of digital video and audio programming.

In 1999, the total combined on-orbit assets of Loral Skynet, SatMex and Loral Orion included seven satellites which, by 2002, were to be increased to 16 satellites with almost 740 transponders in its global system of networks, including two Europe * Star satellites jointly owned by a Loral/Alcatel SpaceCom venture, to deliver services throughout Europe, South Africa, the Middle East, India and Southeast Asia. Loral Skynet leads the Loral Global Alliance, which in 1999 had a worldwide network of satellite capacity on the North American Telstar fleet, the trans-Atlantic Orion 1 satellite, and the three-satellite SatMex fleet for South America, as well as on Europe*Star satellites. Its combined footprint covered 85 per cent of the world, providing a single resource point for broadcast and telecommunications companies around the world who can lease transponder capacity to distribute network and cable television programming to local affiliate stations. In the words of Loral Chairman and CEO Bernard L. Schwartz: 'Loral has moved aggressively to assemble the critical space and information-based building blocks that will result in a seamless, worldwide constellation of multimedia networks'.

Regional satellite services

The deregulation and privatization of the global telecommunications market, coupled with the perceived need for a strong communications infrastructure to open up new regions to the global economy, have resulted in fierce competition in regional satellite services. Regional operators in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia are striking alliances to extend their reach and that of their customers beyond their own territories. As a result of the gradual deregulation of broadcasting in Europe, private satellite companies have prospered. Astra (owned by Societe Europeenne des Satellites - SES) has seen its operations grow significantly since its launch in 1989. In less than a decade, the market share of satellite reception has risen from virtually zero to more than 26 per cent of TV households in Europe.

In 1999, Astra was carrying more than 400 TV and 300 radio channels, both digital and analogue, to over 74 million homes across Europe. SES also holds a 34 per cent share of AsiaSat, Asia's premier satellite operator, providing broadcast and telecommunications services to 53 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1999, the combined footprints of Astra and AsiaSat covered three-quarters of the world's population. In Latin America, PanAmSat, the first private satellite service for the continent, launched in 1988, has made the region important for satellite manufacturers. In 1997, PanAmSat launched three satellites for the Latin American region to support the DTH services operated by Sky Latin America and Galaxy Latin America, respectively. By 1999, PanAmSat, now one of the world's leading commercial providers of satellite-based communications services, was operating a global network of 19 geosynchronous satellites and seven ground facilities.

PAS 5 was the first Hughes satellite in PanAmSat's fleet to cater to the DTH services for Sky Latin America in Mexico. It was designed to provide simultaneous coverage of the Americas and Western Europe, with the potential of a comprehensive pan-American and transatlantic link using the same satellite. In 1999, PAS 5 was delivering more than 20 television channels to Latin America. Another major regional player is Galaxy Latin America, a Hughes-led Latin American venture, which since 1995 has provided a DTH service to the region, broadcasting in Spanish and Portuguese. In 1997 its Galaxy 3R was replaced with a more powerful Galaxy 8i satellite, while Galaxy 3R is used by the US DirecTV service to deliver Spanish-language broadcasting to the US market. Launched in Latin America in 1996, DirecTV is the leading DTH satellite television service in the region, reaching 26 countries, with broadcast centres in the USA, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina.

With more than 554,000 subscribers in Latin America, DirecTV's annual revenues nearly doubled in 1999, reaching \$61 million compared with \$31 million in the first quarter of 1998. In the USA, DirecTV had 8 million subscribers in 1999. There is also a trend towards the big players taking over the smaller ones, for example, Loral's 1997 purchase of SatMex, Mexico's satellite operator whose satellite system provides coverage over Mexico, the southern and eastern USA, Central America, the Caribbean and South America. This was followed by its entry into Brazil, the region's main market. In 1999, Loral's Skynet acquired a Brazilian orbital satellite slot through its local subsidiary Loral Skynet do Brasil, from which it will offer Ku-band satellite services throughout most of the Western hemisphere.

In Asia, the most significant development was the launch in 1990 of AsiaSat 1, which not only signalled China's entry into the market for launching commercial satellites, but made available, for the first time, two powerful regional beams, revolutionizing Asian broadcasting and telecommunications services. AsiaSat 1 had 24 transponders and its northern beam covered China, Japan, the Koreas, parts of Russia and Mongolia, while the southern beam stretched from Southeast Asia to the Middle East. AsiaSat 2, launched in 1995, extended the reach to cover large parts of former Soviet Union and Australia. Between them the two satellites covered 53 countries and two-thirds of the world's population. AsiaSat 3S, launched in 1999, replaced AsiaSat 1, carrying 28 C-band and 16 Ku-band high-powered transponders. In the last decade AsiaSat has emerged as the leading regional satellite operator, whose telecommunications and broadcast facilities are used by

governments, telecommunications services operators, aviation and travel services, financial institutions, news agencies and broadcasters. Without AsiaSat there would not have been a pan-Asian television network like STAR (Satellite Television Asian Region).

In 1999, apart from all the main Asian channels, STAR being its biggest customer, other services available on AsiaSat included: Deutsche Welle TV and Radio, TVE Internacional of Spain, Radio France Internationale, World Radio Network, Egyptian Space Channel, Voice of America, Worldnet, BBC and Associated Press Television News.

While the Societe Europeenne des Satellites already held a strategic 34 per cent participation in AsiaSat in 1999, there has been speculation about PanAmSat buying stakes in the company. Given the future potential for telecommunication and DTH services in hugely populated countries such as China and India, global players such as PanAmSat have eyed the Asian market. PanAmSat, which in 1999 was considering buying a stake in AsiaSat, would have 126 transponders on four satellites in the region. In 1998, it launched PAS 8, which had 48 transponders, ensuring that, for the first time, PanAmSat was able to offer two-way Ku-band connectivity between the USA and Asia. In 1999, Loral leased the entire available transponder payload of the Apstar IIR satellite. Launched in 1997, Apstar IIR covered Asia, Europe, Africa, and Australia, including over 75 per cent of the world's population.

In the Arab world, the regional satellite operator, the Arab Satellite Communications Organization (Arabsat), established in 1976 by members of the Arab League, is also following the path of privatization. DTH services have been available to the Arab countries since the launch of Arabsat 1C in 1992. Other satellites - Arabsat 2A and 2B - whose life span is expected to last until 2012, will further improve telecommunication services in the region, while the third generation Arabsat (3A) and the Arabsat BSS1 will carry Ku-band channels covering the Arab world and Europe. Based in Dirab in Saudi Arabia and with the Saudi government as the largest investor (nearly 37 per cent), Arabsat has also invested 10 per cent in a new commercial company - Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications Company. Founded in January 1997 with a capital base of \$25 million, Thuraya grew spectacularly as the list of shareholders increased, and by August the capital base had jumped to \$500 million. Though all the major telecommunication companies of the region are members of Thuraya, global players such as Hughes Space and Communications have also become involved. Thuraya was planning to provide regional mobile personal communications, based on geostationary satellite systems to be launched in 2000, covering 99 countries in Europe, North and Central Africa, the Middle East and Central and South Asia. Though the geostationary systems continue to grow, they are being brought under the wings of large corporations through mergers, take-overs and regional alliances between major operators.

From a commercial perspective, this makes market sense since large systems create economies of scale and boost the argument for further deregulation of satellite communication, especially in the DTH sector, to which several countries including India and Malaysia have been resistant. Unable to compete with global carriers, many state-run operators are privatizing their own satellite systems, as are the intergovernmental satellite operators. The net result of these changes is that the market for satellite services has become increasingly commercial, a trend which is likely to grow.

By 2003, more telecommunications deregulation will have taken place worldwide, further opening markets for Western operators. This will lead to a resurgence in the manufacturing sector, including the maturing of new technologies such as Ka-band. According to industry estimates, sales of satellites between 1998 and 2007 are expected to reach between 276 to 348 satellites, representing a commercial value ranging from \$29.7 to \$38.6 billion.

Murdoch's News Corporation - 'Around the World, Around the Clock'

News Corp. is the only vertically integrated media company on a global scale. In the course of 24 hours News Corp. reaches nearly half a billion people in more than 70 countries. (News Corporation Annual Report 1999)

One major beneficiary of privatization of the infrastructure of international communication was News Corporation, the company owned by the Australian-born media tycoon Rupert Murdoch, whose empire straddles the globe. With wide-ranging media interests - from newspapers; film; broadcast, satellite and cable TV; digital TV; television production, to the Internet- News Corporation is a major international player in all aspects of the communications and media market. Murdoch has made skilful use of liberalization of cross-media ownership regulations in Britain and the USA and the entry of private satellite operators into the arena of telecommunications and broadcasting. Risking an enormous amount of money by leasing time on new satellite ventures such as Astra and AsiaSat, he has been able to create a truly international media corporation, at the heart of which is satellite television. 'More than any other figure,' writes one observer, 'Murdoch has been the visionary of a global corporate media empire'.

The theme for the 1999 annual report *Around the World, Around the Clock*, echoes the global nature of News Corporation. The range of its media products can best be illustrated by the following extract from the company's 1999 Annual Report: Virtually every minute of the day, in every time zone on the planet, people are watching, reading and interacting with our products. We're reaching people from the moment they wake up until they fall asleep. We give them their morning weather and traffic reports through our television outlets around the world. We enlighten and entertain them with such newspapers as *The New York Post* and *The Times* as they have breakfast, or take the train to work. We update their stock prices and give them the world's biggest news stories every day through such news channels as FOX or *Sky News*. When they shop for groceries after work, they use our *SmartSource* coupons to cut their family's food bill. And when they get home in the evening, we're there to entertain them with compelling first-run entertainment on FOX entertainment on FOX or the day's biggest game on our broadcast, satellite and cable networks. Or the best movies from Twentieth Century Fox Film if they want to see a first run movie. Before going to bed, we give them the latest news, and then they can crawl into bed with one of our bestselling novels from HarperCollins.

It could have added, that with the successful 1998 launch of Sky Digital - a multiplechannel subscription service on British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB), the company is set to dominate interactive digital television. Murdoch already has considerable clout in Britain (where he owns, apart from BSkyB - in 1999, it claimed to have nearly eight million subscribers - the prestigious *The Times* and *The Sun* (Britain's largest selling popular newspaper, notorious for promoting a journalism based on sex, soccer and scandal). Apart from owning the largest number of English-language daily newspapers around the world, the company also owns Fox Network and *TV Guide* (the top selling magazine in the USA with 35 million readers every week), the first pan-Asian network STAR, the newspaper *The Australian* and television channel FOXTEL in Australia, and the publisher HarperCollins (see map). With worldwide operations, HarperCollins Publishing is a major global presence, with subsidiaries like HarperCollins UK, HarperCollins Canada and HarperCollins Australia. It also owns Zondervan Publishing House, the world's largest commercial Bible publisher. Though the USA remains its primary market, accounting for 74 per cent of News Corporation's 1998 revenue, Murdoch has wide-ranging media interests in the world's two biggest consumer markets - India and China. In 1999, Hong Kong-based STAR was producing, either in partnership or alone, 23 channels in eight languages, reaching 53 countries with an estimated audience of 300 million. The STAR network spans the world's most populous continent, having a prominent position in India (where News Corp. owns STAR Plus, and partly owned, until 1999, Zee TV, the

country's most popular Hindi-language private channel) and in China (where it has stakes in Phoenix, the Mandarin-language channel).

In the Middle East, STAR Select, the 10-channel direct-to-home service, was reaching 123 000 homes in 1999. In the USA, News Corporation's Fox network is already well established, producing such international television hits as *The X Files* and *The Simpsons*, competing with three traditional networks - CBS, NBC and ABC. In Latin America, Sky network has agreement with Televisa, the Mexican television giant and other regional broadcasters for a DTH operation, while among News Corp.'s pan-regional Latin American programming channels are Canal Fox, 'The Hollywood Channel', one of the most widely distributed channels in the region, and Fox Kids Latin America. This makes News Corporation one of the world's largest media empires, truly global in its reach and influence. What distinguishes it from its rivals such as Time Warner and Disney Corporation, is the fact that it is the only one created, built and dominated by one man - Rupert Murdoch, the 69-year old chairman and Chief Executive Officer of News Corporation. Murdoch has shown an exemplary knack in dealing with the media and entertainment business.

His risk-taking attitude combined with a deep knowledge of the media industries and an uncanny ability to feel the popular pulse, account for this extraordinary success. He understood, better than any other media baron, the centrality of live sports television and therefore a crucial element of

News Corporation's television strategy was its sports programming and acquiring broadcasting rights on live matches - a major earner for television. In the USA, its involvement in sports is extensive: from live broadcast of the NFL Super Bowl and baseball's World Series, to Fox Entertainment Group's ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers - a team that draws three million fans a year to its baseball games. It has affiliations with 25 regional sports networks, which have broadcasting rights to more than 3500 live sporting events involving most teams in the National Basketball Association, National Hockey League and Major League Baseball. The company also owns part of Canada's CTV Sports Net and in Australia, FOXTEL has rights to broadcast the National Rugby League, the country's premier rugby league competition.

In Latin America its cable-based FOX Sports Network boasts more than 65 million subscribers, while with a Brazilian partner NetSat it covers, among others, Brazilian and World Cup soccer and Formula One car racing. In the UK, News Corporation's key television interests rest with its 40 per cent holding BSkyB - now Europe's most profitable broadcaster - which made much of its money by buying up the rights to telecast live top football matches and pioneered the 'pay-per-view' sports television.

In 1998, Sky Sports broadcast 25 000 hours of sports on its five channels. It launched Europe's first sports news channel, Sky Sports News, while continuing to broadcast 60 live Premier League games a season and more than 140 other football matches. Having established a base in the UK, Murdoch expanded his business into continental Europe by establishing partnerships in Germany (VOX and TM3) and Italy (Stream).

With television operations on four continents, News Corporation's reach into the world's living rooms is unequalled. Television, delivered by broadcast, cable and satellite, remains the fastest growing part of the company. Another key area of importance was Murdoch's use of information technology. To sell its SkyDigital, Murdoch provided free digital set-top boxes and in less than a year SkyDigital had more than one million subscribers, making it the world's most successful launch of a digital platform. This was followed by Open..., an interactive service, partly owned by Sky, offering consumers home shopping, home banking and e-mail services. News Corporation also owns or has stakes in several information technology companies: NDS, the Israel-based designer and manufacturer of digital broadcasting systems; its US Internet operating subsidiary News America Digital Publishing and PDN Xinren Information Technology, a joint venture between News

Corporation and the *People's Daily*, the mouthpiece of the Chinese communist party. Murdoch's business acumen has obviously shown success - News Corporation's revenues have grown steadily. The company's total assets in June 1999 were \$54 billion. Parallel to his business acumen is Murdoch's very pragmatic political agenda. Despite being critical of US big business for decades, he took US citizenship in 1984 to meet government regulations on media ownership. He withdrew BBC World Service television from the northern beam of his STAR network after the Chinese Government criticized BBC's coverage of the country.

Murdoch's media solidly backed Margaret Thatcher in her efforts to liberalize regulations on cross-media ownership. *The Sun's* support for Tony Blair was crucial in the 1997 election victory of the British Labour Party. This 'Murdochization' of the media has changed the media landscape in Britain and increasingly in other countries, where Murdoch has been a major player in the 1990s. In essence, this has meant an emphasis on entertainment and infotainment at the expense of the public service role of the media. News Corporation has used an array of strategies to consolidate its position in Asia - potentially the world's biggest television market. In India, for example, its operations were co-ordinated by Rathikant Basu, a former director general of Doordarshan, India's state television network, and News Corporation Europe was launched in 1998 under Letizia Moratti, the former chairperson of the Italian state broadcasting group, Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI).

His growing political influence as a multi-media mogul and his extensive control of both information software (program content) and hardware (digital delivery systems) make Murdoch a hugely powerful global actor. And since he was one of the first to realize the commercial importance of digital television, investing a great deal of money to get it off the ground, his empire is most likely to dominate the digital globe. With the digitization of content, which News Corp. sees as 'perhaps the most important event in business since the invention of the telephone', it has been able to produce more country-specific television channels and develop many interactive media outlets. With the growing convergence between digital and interactive television and the Internet, News Corporation's interests are focused on developing advanced electronic programme guides, the portal of the multi-channel digital television environment. Its venture capital company, epartners, formed in 1999, was set up to exploit the new opportunities in a digitized and interactive media world. Murdoch's worldwide presence - with operations in the USA, Canada, Britain, Australia, Latin America and Asia - makes him a significant global media player and News Corporation one of the world's largest media companies with total 1998 annual revenues of \$14 billion.

The World of Telecommunications

The expansion of global satellite networks is also having a significant impact on the international telecommunications industry. Information liberalization and the deregulation which it promotes have led to unprecedented rates of merger activity and corporate consolidation in the information and communications industries. The increasing demand for wireless technologies and mobility is spreading into all aspects of telecommunications and represents a fundamental change that is transforming international communication. These trends will converge at a single point and profoundly change the industry and the marketplace. The telecommunications and 'dotcom' industries are merging, as are the computer and media industries.

A consolidation of business in these sectors is likely to lead to a global dominance of the telecoms by 10-15 companies in operator market. In 1998, the top 10 telecommunications corporations held 86 per cent of the market in telecommunications while the leading 10 computer companies controlled almost 70 per cent of the global market. By the end of 1999, the value of mergers and acquisitions in the telecommunications industry had nearly doubled to \$561 billion, mainly because of the two major deals in 1999 - the MCI Worldcom's acquisition of Sprint, and Vodafone Airtouch merger with German wireless carrier Mannesmann. The beneficiaries of such liberalization have been the major telecom operators. France Telecom's international sales grew 39 per cent as the company extended its mobile phone business to 24 countries, including major ventures in Spain and Italy. The company, which is 62 per cent owned by the government has grown more robustly since France's telephone market was deregulated in 1998. For British Telecom, 11 per cent of revenue came from overseas operations.

Ericsson, the Swedish world leader in mobile systems, connects nearly 40 per cent of the world's mobile callers in 140 countries. In 1998-, the company had annual sales of \$22.8 billion, with more than 95 per cent of sales originating from outside Sweden, making Ericsson the most international of all companies in the industry. The opening up of global telecommunications services is also set to benefit the suppliers of telecommunication hardware. In 1996 exports of telecommunication and broadcasting equipment from OECD countries was \$95.1 billion, an increase of 108 per cent over 1990.

The \$301 billion worldwide communication equipment market, growing at 14 per cent annually, is controlled by corporations based in a few, mainly Western, countries. As Table 3.9 shows, the USA is the biggest exporter of telecom equipment (equipment used in telephony, telegraphy and radio and television broadcasting and transmission apparatus). Japan, another leading exporter of telecom equipment, has in recent years experienced a decline in this area from the 1992 high of 899 billion yen to 695 billion in 1997. Other major Asian manufacturers of telecom equipment are found in Taiwan, which exported equipment worth \$1729 million in 1996, Singapore, South Korea and China, but often work for Western or Japanese TNCs. The rapid growth of the Internet has also benefited the exporters of communication equipment. For example, exports of modems from the USA more than doubled between 1994 and 1997, from \$501 million to \$1,025 million, while sales of companies such as US-based Cisco Systems, which specializes in internetworking equipment, increased from \$2.2 billion in 1995 to \$6.4 billion in 1997.

Underlying long-term growth is strong in the communications industry. The number of fixed telephone subscribers, mobile subscribers and Internet users is predicted to reach one billion before 2004. According to the OECD, the total revenues of the communications sector, including telecommunication services, broadcasting services and communications equipment, exceeded one trillion dollars for the first time in 1998. At the end of 1997, the total telecommunication services

market in OECD countries had grown to more than \$617 billion, with 64 telecommunication operators having revenue greater than \$1 billion.

Implications of a Liberalized Global Communication Regime

The global shift from state regulation to market-driven policies are evident everywhere. The WTO claims that the expansion of capital through the transnational corporations has contributed to the transfer of skills and capital to the global South but that it may have also contributed to widening the gap between rich and poor is not mentioned. International communication is increasingly being shaped by trade and market standards and less by political considerations, what Cees Hamelink has called 'a noticeable shift from a political to an economic discourse'.

The move to open up world trade by reducing tariff barriers has been unevenly applied, as India's former representative to GATT, Bhagirath Lai Das points out. After the Uruguay Agreement came into force, several developing countries made huge reductions in their tariffs: India reduced its average tariff on industrial products from 71 per cent to 32 per cent; Brazil from 41 per cent to 27 per cent and Venezuela from 50 per cent to 31 per cent. In contrast, the average tariff on industrial products in the North has been reduced from 6.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent. In addition, giving priority to the service sectors - financial services, insurance, maritime transport, telecommunication - has benefited the North, while the areas where the South might have had an advantage were not given much consideration. One key such resource is labour. As Das points out, while there are specific provisions for free movement of capital associated with GATS, there is no provision for the movement of labour in a 'borderless world'. If anything, immigration laws in the European Union and the USA are being made more stringent.

The major trading blocs have insisted that in a globalized world economy, with growing internationalization of production and consumption, it is important to harmonize domestic laws and regulatory structures affecting trade and investment, and remove any advantage or protection for domestic industries. A global market can only be created, runs the argument, through deregulation and letting the market set the rules of international trade. Opposition to the process of deregulation and privatization has been undermined by changes in international policy at an institutional level. International organizations, as Schiller notes, 'have either been bypassed, restructured, weakened or neutered'. For example, in 1992, the status of the UN Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) was fundamentally changed, making it work toward strengthening global market forces as part of the transnational corporation and management division within the UN. The UN is positioning itself closer to the operation of international business. As part of his 'quiet revolution' to renew the United Nations for the twenty-first century, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan is building a stronger relationship with the business community. A joint statement issued in February 1998 by Annan and the International Chamber of Commerce stressed the UN's role in setting the regulatory framework for the global marketplace in order to facilitate cross-border trade and investment. Among the business leaders present were executives from Alcatel Alsthom, Anglo Gold, BAT Industries, Coca-Cola, Goldman Sachs, McDonald's Worldwide, Rio Tinto, Unilever and US West. Increasingly, UN agencies are co-operating with businesses on projects, with mutual benefits. For example, the Italian fashion giant Benetton helped to design the campaign promoting the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Who benefits from liberalization and privatization?

The biggest beneficiaries of the processes of liberalization, deregulation and privatization and the resultant WTO agreements have been the TNCs which dominate global trade. As the primary 'movers and shapers' of the global economy, the TNCs have been defined as having three basic characteristics:

- co-ordination and control of various stages of individual production chains within and between different countries;
- potential ability to take advantage of geographical differences in the distribution of factors of production (e.g. natural resources, capital, labour) and in state policies (e.g. taxes, trade barriers, subsidies, etc.);
- potential geographical flexibility - an ability to switch its resources and operations between locations at an international, or even a global scale.

So powerful are the TNCs that the annual sales of the top corporations exceed the GDP of many countries - for example, the 1997 annual sales of General Motors surpassed the GDP of Thailand, while Shell Group earned more in global sales than the GDP of Greece, and Mitsui sales were higher than the GDP of Saudi Arabia - one of the world's richest countries. According to the 1999 *World Investment Report* from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 1998, the world's largest 100 TNCs, measured in terms of foreign assets, accounted for \$4 trillion in total sales and held a stock of total assets in excess of \$4.2 trillion. With the exception of two corporations - Petroleos of Venezuela and Daewoo of South Korea - the other 98 were Western or Japanese firms. The TNCs are rapidly boosting their foreign activities through a variety of non-equity firms (e.g. management contracts, franchising), as well as building technology networks with local enterprises.

The free-market ideology and the new international trading regime that it produced have encouraged the free flow of capital across a borderless world. Concerns about transborder data flows and their impact on national sovereignty have been replaced by the race to embrace the global electronic marketplace. According to UNCTAD, in 1998, foreign direct investment flows increased by 39 per cent over the previous year to \$644 billion, mainly as a result of more cross-border mergers. In 1998, mergers and acquisitions reached an all-time record, with more than 12500 deals totalling over \$1.6 trillion, profoundly affecting companies dealing in financial services and telecommunications.

The trend continued in 1999, when the rush towards mergers and acquisitions accelerated and in the USA deals worth \$570 billion were completed in the first half of 1999 while European deals, fuelled by monetary union, were worth \$346 billion in the same period (*The Economist*, 3-9 July 1999). The twenty-first century opened with the world's biggest merger between America Online (AOL), the largest Internet-based company with Time Warner, the world's biggest media and entertainment corporation. That US-based businesses have benefited most by global deregulation is clear from examining the *Fortune 500*, the annual list published by the US business magazine *Fortune* of the world's top 500 corporations. Of the seven companies with profits above \$6 billion, six were American, and US corporations were among the top revenue-generating corporations in 24 out of 43 industries represented in the 1999 survey. The USA led with 185 companies (37 per cent of all companies) followed by Europe with 170 companies (Germany - 42, France - 39, Britain - 38) and Japan with 100. Of the remaining 45 corporations, Canada had 12, Australia 7 and Russia 1. The global South was represented with just 26 companies of which South Korea had 9, China 6, Brazil 4, Taiwan 2, India, Venezuela, Malaysia and Mexico had one each. The top 500 corporations had a total revenue in 1998 of \$11.46 trillion, assets of nearly \$39 trillion (a 14 per cent increase over 1997) and profits of \$440 billion.

That communications industries are central to this global growth is evident from the rapid expansion of electronic-based commerce. It is indicative of the changing contours of the global economy that in the 1999 *Global 1000*, the ranking of the world's biggest corporations on the basis of market capitalization, Microsoft tops the list - its market value has surged 95 per cent in the past year. As Table 3.12 shows, high-tech corporations such as IBM, Intel and AT&T were in the top 10, eight of which were US-based companies. The US corporations, which account for 57 per cent of the

world's publicly invested capital, headed the list, with nearly half of the companies listed - 494, followed by 314 European corporations and 135 from Japan.

While the liberalization of global trade has created unprecedented prosperity for some countries, the benefits are confined to a select few countries and the corporations based there. The 200 richest people in the world more than doubled their net worth in the four years to 1998, to \$1 trillion. Of the top 10 richest people in the world seven were American, with Bill Gates leading the pack with a wealth of \$90 billion. But market-based progress is also causing much misery in the world. The 1999 *Human Development Report* of the United Nations Development Programme notes that the income gap between the richest fifth of the world's people and the poorest fifth, measured by average national income per head, increased from 30 to one in 1960 to 74 to one in 1997. Worse still, despite claims to have created jobs and prosperity, marketbased solutions and cuts to the public sector are having a devastating affect on employment, especially in the global South. According to the International Labour Organization in 1998 one billion workers - or onethird of the world's labour force - were either unemployed (150 million) or underemployed (e.g. part-time and wanting to work longer, or earning less than a living wage), while in contrast, US unemployment was at its lowest level since the early 1970s.

Lecture # 31

Media Conglomerates and Merger of Traditional Media with Interactive Media: The Case study of MSNBC

The deregulation and liberalization of the international communication sector in the 1990s were paralleled in the media industries and, in conjunction with the new communication technologies of satellite and cable, have created a global marketplace for media products. The end uses of commercial satellites, show that the largest growing application of international communication infrastructures is for the delivery of media products - information, news and entertainment. As demonstrated by the case study of News Corporation in Chapter 3, it is now imperative for media conglomerates to plan their strategies in a global context, with the ultimate aim of 'profitable growth through exploiting economies of scope and scale'. The convergence of both media and technologies, and the process of vertical integration in the media industries to achieve this aim, have resulted in the concentration of media power in the hands of a few large transnational companies, with implications for global democracy.

Convergence

Before globalization, most media corporations had distinct areas of business: Disney, for example, was primarily concerned with cartoon films and theme-park operations; *Time* was known mainly as a publishing business; Viacom was a TV syndication and cable outfit, and News Corporation was a group which owned a chain of newspapers in Australia. With the privatization of broadcasting across the globe, coupled with new methods of delivering media and communication content - namely, satellite, cable and the Internet - the distinctions between these industries are being dissolved. With deregulation, and the relaxation of cross-media ownership restrictions, especially in the USA and Britain, media companies started to look to broaden and deepen their existing interests and since the mid-1980s there has been a gathering wave of mergers and acquisitions.

In 1985 Rupert Murdoch bought Twentieth Century Fox in order to acquire a base in the USA and in 1989 Sony bought Columbia TriStar. In the same year Time Inc. merged with Warner Communication, forming Time Warner to which Turner Broadcasting Systems was added in 1995. Disney bought Capital Cities/American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) in 1995, thereby adding a broadcast network to a traditionally entertainment company. Seagram acquired Universal Studios in 1995 and in 1998 bought music company PolyGram. Viacom bought Blockbuster video distribution and Paramount in 1994 and Bertelsmann purchased Random House in 1998. The \$80 billion merger in September 1999, of two major US corporations, Viacom and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), created at that time the world's largest entertainment and media company in the production, promotion and distribution of entertainment, news, sports and music. However, it was soon to be overtaken by the megamerger of the biggest Internet-based company America On Line (AOL), Time Warner and EMI in the opening weeks of the new millennium, creating the world's fourth largest corporation worth an estimated \$350 billion.

In the twenty-first century, such trends towards media consolidation are likely to reduce even further the number of corporations controlling both content and delivery internationally. Less than ten corporations, most based in the USA, own most of the world's media industries, with AOL-Time Warner being at the forefront, followed by Walt Disney, Viacom-CBS, Bertelsmann, News Corporation, Seagram, Telecommunication Inc. (TCI), Sony and the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). All the major television corporations - Disney, Time Warner, News Corporation and Viacom - own multiple broadcast and cable networks and production facilities. With the convergence of the media industries and integration from content origination through to delivery mechanisms, a few conglomerates will control all the major aspects of mass media:

newspapers, magazines, books, radio, broadcast television, cable systems and programming, movies, music recordings, video cassettes and on-line services.

Time Warner

The New York-based Time Warner, the world's largest entertainment and information company, has major businesses in movies, publishing, music, and cable TV and the Internet. With the acquisition of Turner Broadcasting it gained an international television presence in news and entertainment, from Cable News Network (CNN), the 24-hour global news channel, which claims to be the 'world's most extensively syndicated television news service,' to Turner Network Broadcasting (TNT) and Turner Classic Movies and Cartoon Network, the international children's channel.

The publishing arm of the company is Time Inc. with its flagship international magazine *Time* and 32 other magazines, including *Fortune*, *Life*, *People*, *Sports Illustrated*, *Entertainment Weekly*, and *Asianweek*. The total readership of the Group's magazines is estimated at 120 million. It is also a leading book publisher and a direct marketer of books, music and videos. Its music wing, Warner Music Group, whose record labels include - Warner Music International, Atlantic, Elektra, Warner Bros. Records and their affiliate labels - is one of the world's leading music entertainment companies, that owns one million music copyrights. With a growing presence overseas, Warner Music Group derived more than half its 1998 recorded music revenues from outside the USA. With its merger with EMI, Time Warner-EMI has become the world's second largest music company, accounting for 20 per cent of global market share.

The group's other major interest is in filmed entertainment through Warner Brothers, one of the world's best-known film companies, which has evolved into a global entertainment corporation with businesses ranging from film and television production and product licensing to a broadcast television network. Drawing on its vast library - 5 700 feature films, 32 000 television programmes, 13 500 animated titles, including 1500 classic cartoons - Warner Brothers products are ubiquitous. The group also owns TBS Superstation, which claims to have the largest audience of any cable network in the USA, and Home Box Office (HBO) cable network with 10 branded channels and more than 34 million US subscribers in 1998. Apart from being a supplier of programming, Time Warner is heavily involved in the cable industry, providing digitally compatible cable networks to households in the USA, in second place after TCI, the world's biggest cable operator. After its merger with AOL, Time Warner is set to become one of the most powerful media and entertainment corporations, with the potential to dominate all forms of media.

Bertelsmann

With annual revenues of \$15.2 billion in 1998, the German media giant, Bertelsmann, is not only the world's largest publisher of books and magazines but also has interests in television, film and radio, in music labels and clubs, and in on-line services and multimedia. Bertelsmann supplies news, entertainment, music and on-line services in more than 53 countries. Nearly 60 per cent of its business is in Europe, followed by the USA, which accounts for nearly 35 per cent. Besides owning Random House, one of the world's largest publishing organizations, the company also owns many book clubs, including Britain's Book Club Associates, Doubleday Direct of the USA, and has major publishing interests in France, Spain and Germany. Founded in 1835, the firm began as a regional publisher of religious books but expanded its publishing operations in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, especially through book clubs.

Though the corporation has diversified its operations, the emphasis has remained on publishing, accounting in 1998 for nearly 31 per cent of its business. In 1999, Bertelsmann was the world's largest publisher, with Random House alone shipping over one million books a day. The group's Doubleday book club is one of the world's biggest, with some 25 million readers in Europe, North and South America and China. The group also owns Gruner and Jahr, Europe's leading magazine publisher, producing more than 80 magazines (magazines accounted for 20 per cent of business in

1998) and has 50 per cent equity in the Internet book retailer barnesandnoble.com. Another major area of interest is music, accounting for nearly 30 per cent of all business in 1998. The music arm of the corporation, the Bertelsmann Music Group (BMG), produces more than 200 labels, including RCA, Arista and Ariola, along with the world's biggest music club, available in most of Europe, North America, Brazil, Australia, Japan, Singapore and South Africa. Hardware is provided by Sonopress, the world's secondlargest manufacturer of CDs. This Bertelsmann company has pioneered new audio and video formats such as digital video disk (DVD). The record labels are also promoted on the net through Getmusic.com, the company's music site. Bertelsmann has been one of the major beneficiaries both of the growth of commercial television and radio in Europe and of the privatization of the media in eastern and central Europe after the reunification of Germany. In 1997, Bertelsmann's UFA combined with the Luxembourg broadcaster CLT to form CLT-UFA. In 1999, it claimed to be Europe's highest revenue-generating media group.

Viacom/CBS

The merger of Viacom and CBS, one of the top TV networks in the USA, announced in September 1999, created another huge global media conglomerate. The operations of Viacom, one of the world's largest entertainment companies, span film, TV and publishing. The group owns Paramount Pictures, a leading producer and distributor of feature films since 1912, with more than 2 500 titles in its library, including such popular films as *The Ten Commandments* and *The Godfather* and modern blockbusters like *Forrest Gump*, *Deep Impact*, *Star Trek: Insurrection* and *Titanic* (the highest grossing motion picture to date). United International Pictures, partly owned by Viacom, manages the foreign distribution of Paramount's feature films to over 60 countries around the world. In television, the company has a global presence through such channels as Music Television (MTV), Nickelodeon, VH1, Showtime and The Movie Channel. Its Paramount Television is one of the largest suppliers of television programming for broadcasters worldwide, drawing on a library of 16000 television episodes.

MTV, the most widely distributed cable network in the world, reaches more than 314 million households in 83 countries, while Nickelodeon, one of the world's largest producers of children's programming, reaches more than 135 million households in over 100 countries. The group also has interests in publishing through its ownership of Simon & Schuster, which has 34 imprints, including Scribners, Pocket Books, The Free Press and Touchstone, and annually publishes more than 2400 titles. Following the success of MTV, in 1995 it launched the MTV Books imprint and children's books under the Nick Jr. imprint. The Simon Spotlight imprint publishes books tied to Viacom properties such as Rugrats. Simon & Schuster is also the world's largest audio publisher, owning Famous Music Publishing, one of the top 10 music publishers in the USA, whose catalogue contains over 100000 copyrights from six decades of Hollywood films, as well as the music from Paramount's hit television shows including *Star Trek*, *The Odd Couple*, *Cheers* and *Frasier*. The group also has an interest in UCI, an international cinema chain.

The group owns Blockbuster, Hollywood's largest customer and, with more than 6 000 video and music stores in 27 countries, is one of the world's leading distributors of filmed entertainment. There are around 60 million Blockbuster cardholders worldwide, making over one billion store visits annually. Viacom's five theme parks, which feature characters from its TV programmes, are visited by more than 13 million people each year. The group has a significant and growing Internet presence, including cbs.sportsline.com, mtv.com, vhl.com, and Nick.com. With the addition of CBS, which owns CBS Television Network and 15 CBS-owned TV stations; CBS Cable - two country networks and regional sports operations; Infinity Broadcasting Corporation which operates 163 radio stations, Viacom is set to further consolidate its international media presence, especially in the area of news. Viacom has been called 'a cradle-to-grave advertising depot', catering to toddlers

with children's channels such as Nickelodeon, to youth, by way of MTV and to the older generation through CBS.

The Walt Disney Company

The California-based Walt Disney company, the world's second largest media corporation after Time Warner, with one of its strongest brands, has interests in all the main aspects of international media. Disney owns ABC, one of the three biggest TV networks in the USA, apart from owning and operating 10 local TV and nearly 30 radio stations in the USA. The Disney Channel and Toon Disney, are two major cable channels in the USA. In addition, Disney owns Entertainment and Sports Network (ESPN) and partly owns, with Hearst and GE, Arts and Entertainment Television (A&E), as well as shares in The History Channel and E! Entertainment channel. Disney channels also have a global presence. In 1998, there were country or area-specific Disney channels operating in Britain, Taiwan, Australia, Malaysia, France, Italy, Spain and the Middle East. In international sports, ESPN owns one third of Eurosport, the pan-European satellite service, 25 per cent of Sportsvision of Australia and half of ESPN STAR in Asia and Net STAR (33 per cent) owners of The Sports Network of Canada.

The company also has Professional Sports Franchises through stakes in major US national hockey and baseball teams. The company also had minority stakes in television companies in Germany (Tele-München), France (TV Sport), Spain (Tesauro), the Scandinavian Broadcasting System, and Japan Sports Channel. In the area of television production and distribution, the company has a global presence with Buena Vista Television, Touchstone Television, Walt Disney Television, Walt Disney Television Animation, with production facilities in Japan, Australia and Canada. The same is the case in movie production and distribution through Walt Disney Pictures, Touchstone Pictures, Hollywood Pictures, Caravan Pictures, Miramax Films, Buena Vista Home Video, Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Buena Vista International. Its publishing arm, Walt Disney Book Publishing, produces Hyperion Books and Miramax Books and has other subsidiary groups, such as ABC Publishing, Disney Publishing, and Fairchild Publishing. The Group also publishes more than 20 magazines, including *Automotive Industries*, *Institutional Investor*, *Disney Magazine*, *ESPN Magazine*, *Video Business* and *Top Famille* (a French family magazine). In the arena of music, Disney owns several recording labels, including Buena Vista Music Group, with its Hollywood Records (popular music and soundtracks for films), Lyric Street Records (country music label), Mammoth Records (popular and alternative music label) and Walt Disney Records. Disney is developing a presence on the net, with such major sites as ABC.com, Disney.com, ESPN.sportzone.com, Go Network. It also partly owns Infoseek, the Internet portal. The company also develops and markets computer software, video games and CD-ROMs, based on Disney characters. Another major sphere of operations is its theme parks and resorts: Walt Disney World, Disney's Animal Kingdom, and the Magic Kingdom in the USA; Disneyland Paris and Tokyo Disneyland, and more than 660 Disney shops spread across the world, retail Disney merchandise - an estimated 14 per cent of its revenue came from merchandising and Disney Store sales in 1998.

Sony

Another global conglomerate is the Tokyo-based consumer electronics and multimedia entertainment giant, Sony, with 72 per cent of its sales and operating revenues from overseas sales. The USA is Sony's biggest market, followed by Europe. In 1999, its total sales and operating revenue stood at \$56.62 billion. Sony is an interesting example of expanding into content creation from a base in hardware and equipment. Since its founding in 1946, the Sony corporation has grown to become a global producer of communication hardware, especially electronics products, which accounted for 64 per cent of sales in 1999 at \$36 billion. Among its major products are MD systems, CD players, stereos, digital audio tape, recorders/players, DVD-video players, video CD players,

digital still cameras, broadcast video equipment, videotapes, digital TVs, personal computers, cellular phones, satellite broadcasting reception systems and Internet terminals.

Another area in which Sony has a global dominance is the computer game market, accounting for more than 11 per cent of sales and operating revenue at \$6.3 billion in 1999. Since the sale of the first PlayStation game console in 1994, this sector of Sony has grown extremely fast, with sales and revenue demonstrating a more than 200-fold increase in the period 1995-99. By developing new genres of software, with advanced computer graphic technology, Sony is set to make video games a major leisure activity among the youth across the globe - by 1999, cumulative production shipments worldwide of PlayStation reached 54.4 million units.

Sony's global business interests in music and music publishing accounted for more than 10 per cent of its sales and revenues in 1999, at nearly \$6 billion. Through its global network of label affiliations, Sony tapes and CDs are sold in their millions in all the major regions of the world. In 1998, for example, the album by Mariah Carey and the soundtrack from the film *Titanic*, sold more than eight million, while the soundtrack of the Indian blockbuster film *Kuch Kuch Hota Hai* sold over five million copies worldwide. Ricky Martin's *La Copa de la Vida*, the official song of the World Cup France '98, was a number one single in more than 30 countries (ibid.). Sony is also a major player in the international entertainment business by virtue of owning Columbia TriStar, one of the world's top film and television production company, which includes Columbia Pictures, Screen Gems, Sony Pictures Classics and Columbia TriStar Film Distributors International. Sony's television interests include Columbia TriStar Television, producer of such internationally adapted game shows as *Wheel of Fortune*., the highest rated game show in the USA for the past 13 years; Columbia TriStar International Television and Game Show Network, while its home video operations are conducted through Columbia TriStar Home Video.

Besides operating more than 900 cinema screens around the world, Sony is also involved in local-language film production in the UK, Germany, France and Hong Kong and television programming in eight languages. In 1999, it had more than 25 international channels with a global audience of approximately 120 million. Revenues from licensing films and programmes from Columbia's library of more than 3 500 films and 40 000 television episodes, have more than doubled between 1995 and 1998. Already operating its own international channels, such as Sony Entertainment Television (India), the company is expanding its action channel AXN into Spain and Japan and starting a Japanese animation channel - ANIMAX. In 1999, Sony was planning a children-oriented family entertainment unit 'to create and acquire properties and characters we can market across all lines of business'.

With its experience in information technology, Sony is well placed to exploit new forms of digital content and distribution - it is already a producer of new and library films in the DVD format and is using the advent of Internet technologies and digital distribution to promote its record labels.

Other major players

Apart from these top global players, TCI, NBC (owned by General Electric) and the Canadian entertainment company Seagram have a significant international presence. The Montreal-based Seagram, which runs one of the largest distilleries in the world, is also a major entertainment corporation with global presence, offering movies, television programmes, music and theme parks. With 1998 revenue of \$9.7 billion, its Universal Studios (formerly MCA), produces and distributes films, television, home video products, music and operates theme parks and more than 500 retail gift stores. In addition to 84 per cent ownership of Universal Studios, the company owns PolyGram, the largest record company in the world, which it acquired in 1998. Universal produces and distributes films worldwide in the theatrical, television, home video and pay television markets. In addition, it licenses merchandising rights and film property publishing rights. It also has interests in multiplex cinema chains, for example, United Cinemas International Multiplex.

Synergies

Few large conglomerates dominate the global media industries and the exponential growth in the reach of the media coupled with diversification of its forms and modes of delivery have made convergence a reality. The media conglomerates can promote their products across virtually all media segments, including broadcast and cable television, radio and on-line media. For example, *The Times* of London can be used to promote Murdoch's television interests in Britain, while TNT films can be advertised on the CNN networks. The exploitation of synergies - the process by which one company subsidiary is used to complement and promote another - by media conglomerates has greatly increased their power over global news, information and entertainment. Much of the global film and television production and distribution is in the hands of a few Hollywood studios - Paramount Pictures (part of Viacom); Universal Studios (part of Seagram); Warner Brothers (part of Time Warner); Disney; Twentieth Century Fox (part of News Corporation) and Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer (MGM). The California-based MGM company has a library of 4 000 films and more than 8 200 TV episodes and it includes MGM Studios, United Artists, Goldwyn Entertainment and Orion Pictures. These companies develop, produce and distribute film and television programmes, soundtracks, cartoons and interactive products for a global audience. They also make money by charging for the rights to use the characters, titles and other material, and rights from television and films and other sources are licensed to manufacturers and retailers.

Typically, a film is first distributed in the theatrical, home video and pay television markets before being made available for worldwide television syndication. Some made-for-TV films are licensed for network exhibition in the United States and simultaneously syndicated overseas. After its showing on a network, a series may be licensed for broadcast on cable. The film soundtrack albums are released by the music publishing arms of the corporations, who also license music from their copyright catalogues for a variety of uses including recorded music, videocassettes, videodisks, video games, radio, television and films. Concerts and live events are presented at and promoted by the corporation's television channels. This synergy can be illustrated by the following example: Viacom capitalizes on the strength of its internationally known brand name MTV to launch MTV Books, an imprint launched with company's publishing arm Simon & Schuster's Pocket Books; MTV Films produces and develops film and TV programming, including *Beavis and Butt-head Do America* with Paramount Pictures, owned by Viacom. These films are sold by its 6000 Blockbuster video stores across the world.

A variety of programming-based CD-ROMs and a host of home videos, albums and products from more than 50 international licensees are then promoted, including on the Internet, at MTV On-line. Another example of cross-promotion is the phenomenally popular Paramount Television's *Star Trek* franchise, which has generated three more television shows, including *Star Trek: Voyager*; nine *Star Trek* films from Paramount Pictures; more than 65 million copies of *Star Trek*-related books from Simon & Schuster; four CD-ROM titles for Simon & Schuster Interactive; and *Star Trek: The Experience* at the Paramount theme park. Disney has its own central synergy department charged with maximizing company product sales, through cross-selling and cross-promotion strategies involving hundreds of media markets round the world. It publishes a series of books based on Disney characters; its own magazines, videos, CDROMS, on-line programmes; it produces top-selling toys, and promotes its products through Disney theme parks and retail stores. The model has been compared with a wheel: At the hub lies content creation. The spokes that spread out from it are the many different ways of exploiting the resulting brands: the movie studio, the television networks, the music, the publishing, the merchandising, the theme parks, the Internet sites. Looked at this way, the distinction between manufacturing and distribution begins to blur, because the various ways of selling the brand also serve to enhance its value.

Despite intense competition among major corporations to control distribution and production to feed satellite and cable channels worldwide, they have many overlapping operations. Media rivals can share content through programming consortiums like Latin America Pay TV (News Corp., Universal, Viacom, MGM), HBO Ole and HBO Brasil (Time Warner, Sony, Disney), and HBO Asia (Time Warner, Sony, Universal and Viacom). Likewise, Disney shares programming with TCI in E! Entertainment and News Corp. in ESPN Star Sports in Asia. Sony has aligned itself with Canal Plus, Europe's leading pay-TV company. In movies, Paramount frequently splits costs with studios like Miramax, owned by Disney. Viacom TV stations are major buyers of Sony broadcasting equipment, while Sony Music can be promoted on MTV, owned by Viacom. Many commentators have expressed fears about the possibility of so much of power being concentrated in so few corporations and that these few mainly American conglomerates may act like a cartel in production and distribution of global information and entertainment.

Monitoring this trend towards concentration, in his 1983 book *Media Monopoly*, the US media scholar Ben Bagdikian argued that the US media were dominated by 50 private corporations. By 1997, when the book was republished in its fifth edition, the number of corporations controlling most of US media had dropped to just 10. In the twenty-first century, it would appear the US-led global media is in the grip of a new communications cartel. The growing involvement of industrial conglomerates in the media business, including such major defence industry players as General Electric (NBC) and Westinghouse (CBS, before it merged with Viacom), also has implications to what is covered by global media and how.

MSNBC

This cable and online news channel was launched in 1996, which is jointly owned by Microsoft and General Electric, the parent company of NBC. MSNBC.com is the leading news site on the web with 12.3 million unique visitors.

It provides 24 hour news and information content on both cable television and the web. Visitors can view segments, participate in audience jury vote or watch the the MSNBC cable news channel live. Strategic alliance with The Washington Post allows MSNBC.com to also post print stories from the Washington Post and Newsweek on its site.

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Lecture # 32

Global Trade in Media Products - Case study: Televising Sport Globally (ESPN)

The global trade in cultural goods (films, television, printed matter, music, computers) has almost tripled between 1980 and 1991, from \$67 billion to \$200 billion and is growing at a rapid pace with the liberalization of these sectors across the world. The United States is the leading exporter of cultural products and the entertainment industry is one of its largest export earners.

Television

Most of the world's entertainment output is transmitted through television, which is increasingly becoming global in its operations, technologies and audiences. One of the most significant factors is the growth in satellite television, which cuts across national and linguistic boundaries, creating new international audiences. In 1998, according to the *Screen Digest*, more than 2 600 television channels were operating in the world, the majority of which were private channels. The number of television sets in the world has tripled since 1980, with Asia showing the highest growth. The potential of this market, especially in China and India, showing the levels of TV ownership and the penetration of cable and satellite television internationally. The volume of US trade in cultural products and its capacity to produce and distribute to an international audience ensure that US-based networks are the most prevalent in the global television system.

In most countries outside the USA, imported programming forms a significant part of the television schedule, making the USA a 'world provider' of television programmes. The main players in global television, ranked in terms of the number of households where these networks are available. US entertainment programmes - drama serials, soaps and shows, such as *Star Trek*, *Baywatch*, *Friends*, *ER*, and *The X Files* are shown on television channels all over the world. In addition, syndication companies also sell 'format rights' for programmes that are more nationally specific, such as game shows. The formats of such US-made shows as *Family Feud* and *Wheel of Fortune* have been adapted for production in many countries. Some genres of television, notably animation, music, wildlife documentaries and live sporting events, are relatively easy to sell into different cultural contexts. Wildlife programmes, for example, can translate easily into other languages, since they often do not have a visible presenter and therefore it is cheaper for voice-over track to be laid down.

The US-based Discovery network, making factual programmes about history, science and technology, art and natural history, is the key player in this genre. From its modest beginnings in 1985, it has grown to become the world's biggest producer of documentaries, reaching 144 million households in more than 140 countries. Half owned by Liberty Media Group, the Discovery Networks International (DNI), its international network and programme distribution division, includes Discovery Channel, Discovery Kids, Discovery Home & Leisure, and two joint-venture channels with the BBC - Animal Planet and People+Arts. With 1999 revenues at \$1.1 billion and its services being translated into 24 languages, Discovery was planning to launch a travel and a health channel as well as Discovery Civilisation and Discovery Science channels on a digital platform, which is estimated to increase the company's value to around \$14 billion.

In addition, through its chains of Discovery Channel Stores it sells catalogues, videos, books and travel packages. National Geographic Television, which has a business partnership with NBC since 1996, and had its overseas debut in Britain in 1997, broadcasts to 54 countries, reaching 40 million households in nine languages. The History Channel, owned by the A & E Television, has a 50-50 joint venture with BSkyB in Britain. The Sci-Fi channel brings latest science and technology news and science fiction to viewers across the world. One reason for the international expansion of such channels is that most of their tailoring to local markets is dubbing and sub-titling and the content is portable and generally non-political. In the global adult TV market, Playboy TV International, is pre-

eminent. This joint venture between Playboy Enterprises and Latin American media giant Cisneros Television Group, owns and operates nine Playboy-branded channels, available in Latin America, Europe and Japan. The channel also has international rights to its huge programmes library of adult television material and it aims to set up new Playboy channels across the world.

The USA also is a major player in religious television, which is being increasingly commercialized and globalized. The Family Channel, which was launched in 1977, the first 24-hour religious cable network, as the Christian Broadcasting Network, and which since 1997 has been part of Fox Network, is a major player, along with the 24-hour Trinity Broadcasting Network, founded in 1973, and carried by thousands of cable affiliates in the USA, also owns, or is affiliated with, more than 530 broadcasting stations throughout the world. The Eternal Word Television Network, 'the global Catholic network' which claims to be the world's largest Catholic television, founded in 1981, now reaches more than 55 million homes in 38 countries in Europe, the Pacific Rim, Africa and the Americas. In Europe the biggest player is the British-based Christian Channel Europe, available in 22 million homes across 24 countries including Russia and countries of North Africa. Two major areas of international television are sport and popular music, which reach across national barriers of language and culture, delivering the largest audiences for US networks, ESPN and MTV. MTV, part of the media giant Viacom, is the world's most widely watched television network, which with its local and regional channels, dominates global youth music, while ESPN, with 24 networks is the global leader in sports television, claiming to reach 250 million households in 21 languages.

Televising sport globally - ESPN

A major factor in the expansion of satellite and cable television internationally has been television's unique ability to transmit live sports events. As a genre, sports programmes cut across national and cultural boundaries. Live coverage of a prestigious football league match is as much a media event in Cameroon as it is in the Czech Republic. Unlike films, which the consumers can rent from video outlets, the live nature of sports coverage makes it suitable for pay-television, a fact which media companies are using as an incentive for subscribing to pay-TV. Sport is increasingly becoming a major industry and advertisers are keen to exploit the reach of TV channels dedicated to sport. During the 1998 World Cup soccer some games were watched by over a billion people. FIFA which licenses the World Cup, sold the global rights for the 2002 and 2006 tournaments for \$2.24 billion - in 1998 the same rights were sold for \$230 million.

This reach is making television an expensive proposition. In 1949, the BBC paid just £5 387 for Britain's FA Cup, by 1998 ITV paid \$51 million for the same rights. Such has been the change that when FA Premiership announced a \$6.17 billion five-year joint deal with BSkyB and the BBC it did not seem to evoke much surprise. The cost of global TV rights for the Olympic Games has increased ten-fold from the Moscow games of 1980 to Atlanta in 1996. As indicated by Table 4.6, only broadcasters from the media-rich regions can afford to pay TV rights for major sporting events like the Olympics. US networks have provided up to 75 per cent of total Olympic revenue from TV rights and production costs, with NBC being one of major networks to benefit from this commercialization of sport. One consequence of the soaring cost of rights for sports coverage is the creation of new contests by media giants. In 1998, the Milan-based Media Partners tried to establish a new European Super League football tournament and in the same year Manchester United, the world's most profitable football club, launched its own channel MUTV, jointly owned by BSkyB, Granada Media Group and the Club. For a major domestic sporting league such as National Football League (American Football) ESPN has signed a \$2.2 billion annual fee sports rights agreement with ABC and Fox, for the period 1998-2006. The increasing commercialization and 'media-ization' of sport are also reflected in commercial sponsorship of the games and teams themselves. The 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, for example, set records by selling more than \$1 billion in corporate sponsorship.

Merchandising such as baseball caps in the USA and football shirts in Europe, along with corporate public relations and cross-marketing have become an integral part of televised sports. Apart from selling company products, the trend is towards marketing of sport stars themselves. A US basketball player Michael Jordan has become an international icon by selling Nike shoes, while Indian cricket captain Sachin Tendulkar is the best salesman Pepsi ever had. A symbiotic relationship has evolved between global sport and the international television industry. Given the profit involved, sport networks have to find new and innovative ways to fill their international channels and keep the advertisers happy. ESPN, for example, is investing in promoting its X Games, started in 1995, featuring the world's top athletes in several sport categories. There are plans to expand the 'X' franchise with several events throughout the world - an Asian X Games Qualifier and a new Junior X Games, co-developed by the Disney Channel and televised by Disney around the world. ESPN International will televise six original hours from the qualifier on several networks. The Entertainment and Sports Network (ESPN) is the world's leading sports television broadcaster and one of the world's most profitable networks, 80 per cent owned by Disney Corporation, with the remaining 20 per cent owned by the Hearst Corporation. In 1999, it was reaching 242 million households across the globe.

ESPN has a share in the pan-European sports network Eurosport, of which it owns 33 per cent, the rest being owned by EBU, TF1 and Canal Plus, and reaching 80 million homes in 47 countries in Europe and the Middle East. ESPN's Latin American operation has a viewership of 9 million, while with its 50 per cent ownership of Star Sports, part of News Corporation, the ESPN network claims to reach nearly 91 million viewers across Asia. This global television audience is made possible by PanAmSat satellites which act as its global programme distribution network. ESPN's cable affiliates downlink its customized signals from five PanAmSat satellites, serving the USA and the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean regions. Apart from its highly popular domestic cable networks in the USA (ESPN, ESPN2, ESPN Classic, ESPNEWS - presents coverage of 195 live news events and press conferences each month), the network has been steadily increasing its global presence since it launched ESPN International in 1988. In 1999, ESPN International had 20 international networks and syndication, including - Sports-i ESPN (Japan), ESPN Asia, ESPN Taiwan, Sky Sports (New Zealand) and ESPN Australia. It owns 50 per cent of ESPN Brazil and one-third of Net STAR, owners of The Sports Network of Canada, and a quarter of Sportsvision of Australia. Syndicated programming from ESPN Radio is broadcast globally while Hearst Group distributes ESPN Magazine. ESPN.com is one of the most popular sport websites. In addition, ESPN also has a number of real and on-line shops, selling ESPN digital games, books, music, videos and CD-ROMs.

There is even an ESPN credit card and ESPN Visa card. The company has developed global strategies to exploit the explosion of channels on satellite television and the potential of multi-million dollar sponsorship from transnational corporations, using television to promote their products. In the area of supplying sports news and features a key player is TransWorld International (TWI), the world's largest independent supplier of sports programming. In 1996, TWI launched a joint venture with AR Sports News Television (SNTV), a sports news video agency, which serves more than 100 broadcasters worldwide.

Apart from promoting corporate products does the globalization of sports television have more significant ideological implications? It has been argued that televised sport can be used to further political aims. Given that ESPN is the world leader in televising sport, it is conceivable that only those sports that are sponsored by big corporations and of interest to the widest possible audience will be encouraged. The new global media-sport industry offers interesting sites for future research.

Lecture # 33

Global News and Information Networks - *Case study: CNN — The 'World's News Leader'*

In the realm of international news, US/UK-based media organizations produce and distribute much of the world's news and current affairs output. From international news agencies to global newspapers and radio stations, from providers of television news footage to 24-hour news and documentary channels, the US/UK presence seems to be overwhelming.

News agencies

As collectors and distributors of news to newspapers, magazines and broadcasters globally, news agencies play a central role in setting the international news agenda. It has been argued that news agencies contributed significantly to the globalization and commodification of international information. Though traditionally the news agencies sold news reports and still photographs, today they have diversified their operations, for example, by offering video news feeds for broadcasters and information and financial databases. Most countries in the world have a national news agency - in many cases state-owned or a government monopoly. However, there are only a few transnational news agencies and these continue to be owned by US and British companies. Two of the world's three biggest news agencies are British or American, with AP leading the trio.

Associated Press

In terms of overall news output, the Associated Press is the world's largest news-gathering organization, serving more than 15 000 news organizations worldwide with news, photos, graphics, audio and video, claiming that 'more than a billion people every day read, hear or see AP news'. AP operates as a not-for-profit co-operative with its subscribing member organizations, supplying news, photographs, graphics, audio and video to an international audience. It also has a digital photo network - supplying 1 000 photos a day worldwide to 8 500 international subscribers, a 24-hour continuously updated on-line news service, a television news service (APTN) and AP Network News (largest single radio network in the USA).

Apart from English, AP's service is available in German, Swedish, Dutch, French and Spanish, while subscribers translate its stories into many more languages. As newspapers, radio and television stations have cut back or folded, AP has endeavoured to sell selected, packaged news to nonmembers, such as governments and corporations, for example, by AP Online, a group of subject-specific news wires, tailored to each client's industry and news needs. Since 1995, AP has operated an on-line service called The WIRE.

Reuters

In the world of news Reuters remains a major actor, supplying news, graphics, news video and news pictures to a global audience. However, Reuters Holding, the company which owns the news agency, deals in 'the business of information', making its main profit in transmitting realtime financial data and collective investment data to global financial markets. Over 519 000 users in 57 720 locations access Reuters information and news worldwide. In 1999, Reuters provided news and information to over 225 Internet sites reaching an estimated 12 million viewers per month and generating approximately 130 million pageviews. With regional headquarters in London, New York, Geneva and Hong Kong, and offices in 217 cities, Reuters employs more than 16000 people of 40 nationalities.

Agence France Presse (AFP)

The third global news agency is the Paris-based Agence France-Presse, with subscribers including businesses, banks and governments, apart from newspapers, radio and TV stations across the world. Though subsidized by the French government, AFP claims to provide 'accurate, speedy, quality

reporting' of world events. Every day it distributes two million words, 250 news photos and 80 graphics in English, Spanish, French, German, Arabic and Portuguese. AFP is particularly strong on coverage of the Middle East and Africa, perhaps reflecting French geo-economic interests. It has regional centres in Washington, Hong Kong, Nicosia and Montevideo. Apart from news, AFP produces on average 20 graphics each every day in English, French, Spanish and German. Its ImageForum offers Internet or ISDN access to AFP's international Photo Service - 150000 digital images are available. It has also launched an email service la carte news, tailored to client specifications. According to UNESCO, the three main news agencies are the source of about 80 per cent of the public's information worldwide and they operate in a commercial environment: though it is a not-for-profit organization, AP's mission states unambiguously that the agency 'is in the information business'. The dominant position of Western news agencies is based on professional output - a reputation for speed and accuracy in the coverage of international events, though their interpretation may often reflect Western, or more specifically, US editorial priorities.

Other major agencies

United Press International (UPI) 'the world's largest privately owned news service' which was considered one of the 'big four' until the 1980s, is another US-based news agency with international influence. For most of the 1990s the majority of shares in UPI were owned by Saudi media interests but in 2000 it was taken over by the Rev Sun Myong Moon's Unification Church ('the Moonies'). In 1999, it had 600 correspondents in 90 bureaux worldwide, distributing on average 1 000 stories daily. Other major Western news agencies with notable international presence include Germany's DPA (Deutsche Presse-Agentur), particularly strong in eastern Europe, and EFE of Spain, with close links in Latin America. China's Xinhua news agency, founded in 1931, has expanded steadily since the country began to open its doors for business in 1978. It has four regional offices in the Pacific region, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East and branches in more than 100 countries. Its average daily output is 250 stories. TASS, the official Russian news agency renamed, in 1992, ITAR-TASS (*Informatsionnoe telegrafnoe agentstvo Rossii-Telegrafnoe agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza*), had 74 bureaux and offices in Russia and other former Soviet republics and 65 bureaux in 62 foreign countries, distributing on average 105 stories daily. ITAR-TASS also co-operates with more than 80 foreign news agencies and operates a photo service, the largest of its kind in Russia and has also entered into joint ventures in operating private and corporate telecommunication networks based on satellite, fibre-optic, microwave, radio and cable lines. It also produces multimedia products to clients in Russia and abroad. The English-language service of Japan's news agency Kyodo, established in 1945, produces 200 stories per day, accounting for some 100000 words.

Financial news services

In the globalized free-market world of the twenty-first century, speedy and regular transmission of accurate financial intelligence has become very important for news organizations. According to a UNESCO report, the global market for financial news stood at some \$5 billion in 1996. The growth of televised financial news market has made this sector even more lucrative. The blurring of boundaries between financial news and financial data has contributed to news screens carrying news and financial information side by side or even on a single screen. Reuters, which changed through the 1970s and 1980s, from being merely a news agency to an international electronic data company, is the leading international player in financial news and data. In 1999, it was providing data for over 940 000 shares, bonds and other financial instruments as well as for 40 000 companies. In the past five years, financial information products revenue accounted for 64 per cent of the company's total, while media and professional products revenue accounted for just 7 per cent.

Other global key players in financial journalism are AP-DJ economic news service, formed as a result of AP's teaming with Dow Jones and the recently launched AFX News, an agency providing real-time news service with a European focus, and produced by AFP and *The Financial Times*.

However, the most important new player is Bloomberg which has emerged as a major rival to Reuters financial market.

Bloomberg

Started in early 1980s by Mike Bloomberg, a former employee of Salomon Brothers, Bloomberg offers a 24-hour, worldwide real-time financial information network of news, data and analyses of financial markets and business. By 1999, it was providing financial information to more than 140 000 users in 91 countries. Its news service, Bloomberg News, available in five languages - English, French, Spanish, German and Japanese - is syndicated in over 250 newspapers around the world. Bloomberg Radio, syndicated through more than 100 affiliates worldwide, reports market news every hour while Bloomberg Television - a 24-hour news channel that reports market news, is broadcast throughout the world in seven languages. Apart from producing its own business programmes, it also provides syndicated reports to television stations. In addition, it produces two monthlies *Bloomberg Personal Finance* and *Bloomberg Money* for investors. Bloomberg Press publishes business books while its website draws select content from the financial service and its media products to provide up-to-the-minute information. Other major international players in financial news are Knight-Ridder Financial, an international news service that reports on business, finance and economics from around the world. Among business-related regional agencies are AsiaInfo Services, a joint venture between US-based BDI Group and Wanfang Data Inc, China's largest database company, providing daily abstracts of news from China; and Sydney-based Asia Pulse, a joint venture, formed in 1996, by major news and information organisations, including Xinhua, Press Trust of India and Antara of Indonesia, to distribute business intelligence on Asia. Many financial news services make revenue from large-scale trading in shares and currencies and a fluid and insecure financial market is good news for them since they take commission from billions of dollars worth in weekly currency trading. This raises questions about whether their role is promoting and sustaining free-market liberalization of financial markets.

International television news

Two of the world's biggest wire services - AP and Reuters - are also the two top international television news services. These two companies largely control global flow of audio-visual news material, thus influencing global television journalism. In the realm of television news - both raw footage and complete news channels - the US-UK predominance is obvious, as is indicated in Table 4.20. Reuters Television (formerly Visnews) one of the world's two largest television news agencies, remains a key player in global trade in news footage, and is used by major news organizations such as CNN and BBC. Reuters also owns 20 per cent of the London-based Independent Television News (ITN). Its rival is Associated Press Television News (APTN) which was launched in 1998 following the acquisition from ABC of TV news agency Worldwide Television News (WTN) by AP, integrating it with the operations of APTV, the London-based video news agency launched by the AP in 1994. This development indicates further narrowing of international television news sources - just two organizations now supply most of the news footage to broadcasters worldwide. ABC News, part of the Disney empire, had a 80 per cent stake in WTN (formerly UPITN) since 1998, while 10 per cent was owned by the Nine Network Australia and the rest by ITN. Why it sold such a powerful resource - the second largest provider of international television news pictures - is a matter of speculation. Perhaps Disney's priorities are in the entertainment business, as news and current affairs, though very influential, can struggle for revenues.

Given their access to global satellite networks, APTN and Reuters Television offer satellite news-gathering deployments around the world. Their feeds are sent, both with ready scripts to allow immediate broadcasting, or with natural sound which can be re-edited with local voice-overs. Through dedicated 24-hour uplinks in Beijing, Hong Kong, Moscow, Jerusalem, New York and

Washington, APTN offers individual regional services for Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia Pacific and the Middle East.

International news channels

In the category of news channels, the Atlanta-based Cable News Network (CNN) is undoubtedly the world leader. CNN, 'the world's only global, 24- hour news network', best symbolizes globalization of American television journalism, influencing news agendas across the world and indeed shaping international communication.

CNN - The 'world's news leader'

Started by Ted Turner in 1980 as the world's first 24-hour dedicated television news channel, CNN grew, in just over a decade, to become a premier global news network. From its rather modest origins - CNN was derogatorily referred to by rivals as 'Chicken Noodle Network' - it was able to start an international service within five years of its launch. One reason for the rapid expansion of CNN was its use of satellite technology. Satellites gave CNN first a national audience in the USA, and CNN was one of the first international broadcasters to take advantage to 'blanket the globe', using a mixture of Intelsat, Intersputnik, PanAmSat and regional satellite signals. Its move from a national to a global news organization was also due to its aggressive strategy of covering live international news events, through news exchange programmes with more than 100 broadcasting organizations across the world. The resultant *CM World Report*, started in 1987, was a key factor in its initial acceptance among international broadcasters and its eventual growth.

UNTV, the United Nations television unit, was one of the most prolific contributors to *CM World Report*- perhaps related to Turner's 1997 announcement of \$1 billion gift to the UN - the largest such award the organization has received in its 55-year history. CNN played an important role in integrating the media systems of the former socialist countries into the Western fold - it was involved, for example, in the 1993 launch of TV 6, the first private television network in Russia; it entered into an agreement with China's CCTV to receive and selectively distribute its programmes, and CNN was one of the first Western news organizations to open a bureau in Cuba. Such moves have won accolades from many including former US President Jimmy Carter: 'CNN has done more to close the gaps of misunderstanding between the world's people than any enterprise in recent memory'.

CNN shot to international fame during the 1991 Gulf War, when its reporters in Baghdad beamed live the US bombing of the Iraqi capital, thus contributing significantly to making it the world's first 'real-time' war, in which television became 'the first and principal source of news for most people, as well as a major source of military and political intelligence for both sides'. CNN's on-the-spot reporting of global events gave it unparalleled power to mould international public opinion and even contributed to influencing the actions of people involved in the events it was covering. Chinese students protesting against authorities in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989 were aware that through CNN the world was watching the unfolding events - the Chinese government pulled the plug on the CNN transmission before its crackdown on protesting students. Similarly, politicians such as Boris Yeltsin astutely used the presence of CNN cameras during his very public opposition to the 1991 coup in Russia, which acted as a catalyst for the break-up of the Soviet Union. Such instances show that networks like the CNN can contribute to a new version of TV-inspired public diplomacy, presenting 'opportunities to constantly monitor news events and disseminate timely diplomatic information'.

There is little doubt that CNN established the importance of a global round-the-clock TV news network, a concept which 'certainly changed the international news system - especially during times of international crisis and conflict'. As it gained respectability CNN also expanded its operations, facilitated by it becoming part of the Time Warner group in 1996. A financial service CNNfn was started in 1995 to provide coverage of the stock, bond and commodities markets; and especially

breaking stories about business news; a 24-hour sports TV news service CNN-SI (Sport Illustrated) was added to the CNN platform a year later. By the late 1990s, CNN had regional versions for audiences and advertisers in Europe/the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the United States. Europe remained one of its key markets and in 1998, CNNI had become Europe's most watched news channel, reaching 79 million households, broadcasting 24 hours a day to 37 countries, with 4.5 hours a day of programming from its London centre.

In 1997, it launched CNN Deutschland, a half-hour daily German language slot for the German market. In Japan, the number of localized transmissions in Japanese through simultaneous translation, on the JCTV cable system, Tokyo was doubled to 86 hours in 1999. Reflecting that there is a greater need for local news in local languages (Parker, 1995) and already operating, since 1997, CNN en Espanol, a Spanish language channel based in Atlanta for the Latin American market, in 1999, CNN launched CNN Plus in Spain, its first branded local-language version in collaboration with Sogecable, the cable operator owned by media group Prisa. This was followed by CNN Turk, a Turkic channel started in autumn 1999. CNN is also aiming to expand the localization process in other major non-English markets.

CNN has spawned imitators across the world. By the end of 1990s other dedicated round-the-clock global news services - BBC World and CNBC were in operation. Regionally too networks such as Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) aspire to be 'CNN in Arabic'. In the USA, where CNN was being distributed to 77 million homes in 1999, the established three networks - ABC, NBC and CBS - have had to adapt their operations to the 24-hour channel, while Fox network, part of Murdoch's empire, has already launched a 24-hour news channel. In Britain, apart from Murdoch's Sky News, BBC was also operating News 24 - a round-the-clock service for the domestic audience, launched in 1997. State broadcasters in both India's Doordarshan and China's CCTV have launched dedicated 24-hour news channels. Among private round-the-clock channels were Murdoch's India-based Englishlanguage Star News, the Hindi-language Zee News, and Brazil's Globo News, launched in 1996, all available outside the countries of their origin. Though CNN is watched by a relatively small proportion of viewers, they fall into the category of what CNN calls 'influentials' - government ministers, top bureaucrats, company chief executives, military chiefs, religious and academic elites (Flournoy and Stewart, 1997). Perhaps more importantly, it is constantly being monitored by journalists and news organizations worldwide for any breaking news stories. It is the only network capable of covering international news instantly, given its wide network of correspondents - in 1998 it had 32 international bureaux with 150 correspondents and its communications resources - in 2000 it was beaming its programmes through a network of 23 satellites to cover the entire globe.

However, it remains an advertisement-based channel whose output may sometimes lack depth in its desire to catch up with the speed and delivery of stories, and veering towards infotainment. Larry King, host of one of its most watched chat-shows *Larry King Live*, has no hesitation in calling himself an infotainer. As competition grows and more and more national all-news channels appear with the expansion of digital broadcasting, the pressure to be first with the news - TV news is a \$3 billion business - is likely to grow. Already, there is a discernible tendency among television news channels to sacrifice depth in favour of the widest and quickest reach of live news to an increasingly heterogeneous global audience. In the era of live and instant global communication there is a danger that 'by making the live and the exclusive into primary news-values, accuracy and understanding will be lost'. For some the 'CNNization' of television news has become a model for expanding American news values around the world'. For many non-Americans, CNN was and remains the voice of the US Government and corporate elite, despite its international presence, its multinational staff (usually US-educated or domiciled) and its claims to be free from US geo-strategic and economic interests. At the start of the twenty-first century, CNN was available in more than 150 million television households in more than 212 countries and territories worldwide. CNN News Group was one of the

largest and most profitable news and information companies in the world. Available to more than 800 million people worldwide, the group's assets included: six cable and satellite television networks (CNN, CNN Headline News, CNN International, CNNfn, CNN/SI and CNN en Espanol); two radio networks (CNN Radio and a Spanish version CNN Radio Noticias); 11 web sites on CNN Interactive; CNN Airport Network, the only live TV service broadcast to travellers in US airports; and CNN Newsource, the world's most extensive syndicated news service, with more than 200 international affiliates. By virtue of the AOL-Time Warner merger of 2000, CNN has become part of the world's biggest media and entertainment conglomerate, whose significance in international communications is likely to grow and its version of world events - more often than not an American one - is likely to define the worldview of millions of viewers around the globe.

Setting the Global News Agenda

The West, led by the United States, dominates the world's entertainment and information networks. These mainly Western corporations are the major global players in most sectors of the media - book publishing, news agencies, international newspapers and magazines, radio and television channels and programmes, music, advertising and films. Apart from showing the validity of the arguments of dependency theorists and the proponents of the NWICO, the evidence presented suggests that Western control and its ability to set the agenda of international communication debates have, in fact, increased.

During the 1970s and 1980s the debates about global cultural flows were mainly concerned with news agencies, but with the expansion of television - a medium which transcends language and literacy barriers - the Western way of life is in the process of being globalized. Though there are more producers of images and information, the global entertainment and information flow between Africa, Latin American and Asian, is still mediated, to a large extent, through content provided by Anglo- American news organizations, who share information, visuals and even journalists. It is not unusual to find an ITN report on CNN or CNN visuals on the BBC news. For nearly 40 years, between 1954 and 1993, NBC had an arrangement to share news pictures with the BBC. These exchanges also include magazines and newspapers, given the linguistic, political and cultural affinity between the USA and Britain. A market-led global media system benefits TNCs on whose advertising support the media edifice is based. The TNCs have increasingly taken an active role in promoting a global privatized international network. Corporations have used their media power to placate governments, some have even used it to acquire direct political power. One prominent example was Italian media magnate Silvio Berlusconi, owner of the AC Milan football club, who used his popular appeal and his media empire, crucially satellite channels, to launch his political party Forza Italia that vaulted him, in 1992, to Rome as Prime Minister of a right-wing coalition government.

Media organizations are often part of major entertainment conglomerates. Does the corporate nature of the global media industry affect its content? Sometimes, broadcasters themselves exercise self-censorship when dealing with sensitive issues. In May 1999, NBC, which claims to reach a global audience, took a last-minute decision to redub the two-part adventure drama *The Atomic Train* to delete all references to nuclear waste, in what critics said was NBC acting out of deference to its parent company, General Electric, a major investor in the nuclear industry. It is tempting to wonder how people would react if the world's books, visual media and journalism were controlled, for example, by the Chinese. Would they be concerned that such concentration of media power could lead to globalization of a Chinese perspective on world events? However, unlike the media in China, the US media, despite close links with officials, are independent of government control, a fact which adds to their international credibility.

At the heart of this credibility is the ability to consistently provide accurate, fast and authoritative news and information to an international audience, something which has been earned over two centuries of journalism - indeed, it has been argued that journalism itself is an Anglo- American invention. Though the French and the Germans may dispute this assertion, there is little doubt that from its inception, the mass media has operated in a market system. In an age of privatized global communications is it possible that the Western media is becoming conduits for promoting Western consumerism and a free-market ideology? In the new media landscape, observes one commentator: 'Consumerism, the market, class inequality and individualism tend to be taken as natural and often

benevolent, whereas political activity, civic values, and anti-market activities tend to be marginalised or denounced'.

There is a danger that rather than being used by governments for propaganda purposes, as was the case during the Cold War years when anti-communism defined the Western media's ideological orientation, in the era of globalization and increasing corporate control of the channels of international communication, the media may become the mouthpiece of global corporations and their supporters in governments. It has been argued that in Western democracies a symbiotic relationship exists between the media and governments. 'Information is power in the foreign policy sense ... and one may grant the necessity for governments to manipulate it on occasion as they would other instruments of national power,' wrote Bernard Cohen in his famous book, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (1963). If during the heydays of radio, governments could use the airwaves to promote their viewpoint, in the era of round-the-clock global news, they have refined their public diplomacy to the extent that it can be marketed successfully to international publics. This is true as much for the Bush Administration's attempts to 'sell the war' during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis as for the subsequent 'humanitarian interventions' which have defined US foreign policy in the 1990s. The world's view of US military interventions were, to a very large extent, moulded by the US-supplied images of Operation Just Cause in 1989 in Panama; Operation Provide Comfort (in Northern Iraq, following the Gulf War in 1991); Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994.

A recent study of how television news can influence foreign policy, based on US 'peacekeeping' operations in Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia, argues that the relationship between the government and media is more complex than is sometimes believed. The CNN effect is highly conditional. Images and written accounts of the horrors of the post-Cold War world that stream into the offices of government officials do not dictate policy outcomes. Sometimes they suggest policy choices ... at other times media reports become an ally for an entire administration, or individual member of it, seeking to pursue new policies.

Others have maintained that US media have let the government set the terms of military policy debate in the news and American journalists rarely criticize US military interventions. In the market-driven media environment there is also a discernible tendency to simplify complex international issues into what may be called easily digestible 'sightbytes', given the proliferation of 24-hour TV and on-line news culture. In such an environment, the coverage of the South, already 'deplorably infrequent and misleading' may be further reduced. Already, US networks have cut back on their foreign coverage. Partly as a result of this and partly as a consequence of depoliticization in many postmodern Western societies, only certain parts of the world - where the West might have geo-political and economic interests - and particular types of stories, which have wide appeal, are given prominence. So for example, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka barely gets a mention in mainstream media while when the West decides to bomb Yugoslavia - Operation Allied Force - to defend Albanian communities in Kosovo, the coverage is almost wall-to-wall. It is not just a question of the quantity, also crucially important is how issues impinging on Western geo-political interests are covered by mainstream Western, and by extension, global media, especially television. The 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was presented by the media as the only course of action to stop 'ethnic cleansing' in its Kosovo province. The media generally omitted to comment on the fact that it was the first incidence of NATO actively interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, thus rewriting the rules of international law. However, the bombing may have more to do with changing the character of the Western military alliance from a relic of Cold War into a 'humanitarian force' which with its rapid reaction units can be deployed anywhere in the world. Already, NATO's remit has been extended to allow it to operate out of area. However, this crucial aspect was rarely discussed in the mainstream media, which



focused on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis and how a benevolent West was resolving it. Despite protestations from Western media organizations, such double standards in reporting are not uncommon and have been well documented in the context of Vietnam, East Timor and Central America and Iraq. In the post-Cold War era communism seems to have been replaced in the media by 'Third World threats', especially emanating from Islamic fundamentalism, which often receives more negative coverage than other forms of fundamentalism, namely Christian, Hindu or Jewish. The news discourse is also biased in terms of nuclear issues - if a developing country aspires to join the exclusive nuclear club, as India has tried to do, the US media, reflecting the US Government's position, tend to argue that such moves would threaten world peace. Exhortations of moral rectitude from the only country which has used nuclear weapons - in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 - and not balked at dropping chemical weapons in Vietnam, air-fuel explosives in Iraq and bombs tipped with depleted uranium on civilian populations - most recently in Yugoslavia, may not be universally acceptable. Yet, in the absence of a credible alternative media system, the US position - given the reach and influence of the Western media - often becomes the dominant position, whether on nuclear issues, trade policy, human rights or international law.

Contraflow in Global Media - Seeing the Big World on a Small Screen

The globalization of Western media has been a major influence in shaping media cultures internationally. While there are forces for convergence and homogenization, the spread of the US model of professional, commercial television has also brought beneficial changes to some national and regional media industries, leading to a revival of cultural nationalism. The availability of digital technology and satellite networks has enabled the development of regional broadcasting, as with the pan-Arabic Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) and the Mandarin language Phoenix channel, which caters to a Chinese diaspora. This has also enabled an increasing flow of content from the global South to the North, for example, the Brazilian television giant TV Globo, which exports its *telenovelas* to more than 100 countries, while the Indian film industry is an example of a non-Western production centre making its presence felt in a global cultural context.

Seeing the big world on a small screen

With the developments of the 1990s, television has come to dominate the media scene in virtually every part of the world and such icons of global television as CNN and MTV have become ubiquitous. The role of television in the construction of social and cultural identities is now much more complex than in the era of a single national broadcaster and a shared public space, which characterized television in most countries in the post-war years. Though national broadcasters continue to be important in most countries, still receiving the highest audience shares, the availability of a myriad television channels has complicated the national discourse. In the multi-channel era, a viewer can have simultaneous access to a variety of local, regional, national, and international channels, thus being able to engage in different levels of mediated discourses. In Russia, for example, since the end of the Cold War, global television has helped promote Western consumerist culture. The secret of the success of the new privatized Russian television, says a recent UNESCO report, 'is a mix of American and Latin American soap operas, games inspired by channels in the West, talk shows and occasionally sensational news bulletins'.

At the other end of the world, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation provides loans and technical support to the island nations of the Pacific region to ensure that they can download their TV signals and retransmit Australian programming and Australian products. Global television has created a new phenomenon of 'media events' - the live broadcasting of 'historic' events around the world - Olympic Games, Tiananmen Square violence, the Gulf War, natural or human disasters. The global coverage of the 1995 televised trial of US sportsman O. J. Simpson, television's treatment of the death of Princess of Diana in 1997, 'Monicagate' in 1998 and the millennium celebrations in 1999, can be added to the list of such shared global media experiences. Transnational corporations, governments and militant groups have harnessed the power of television to put across their case. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has used the medium to have his own three-hour face-to-face TV show, with live phone-ins from the audience, which attracted more than 11 million viewers in a country of just 23 million. In Malaysia, the Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, Asia's longest-serving leader, commissioned a 33-part soap opera based loosely on his life, called *Unfinished Struggle*. When rebel gunmen stormed the parliament and killed Armenian Prime Minister Vazagen Sarkissian in October 1999 as he was addressing the parliament on TV, they did not shoot the television crew, aware that their pictures and messages were being broadcast live in the country and through national broadcasters and thanks to modern digital technology, beamed across the newsrooms through global TV channels. The Kurds have established their own satellite channel MED-TV, which broadcasts in three main Kurdish dialects - Kirmanci, Sorani and Zazaki - and in Turkish and Arabic to Kurds living in Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria and those of Kurdish diaspora in Europe.

The station which operated from London from 1995 took its name MED from Medes, the ancient people from whom the Kurds are descended, now the world's 'largest stateless nation'.

The Turkish government alleges that MED-TV is a mouthpiece for the PKK, the Turkish Workers Party, which has been waging a guerrilla war for the past two decades in eastern Turkey. Visual media have tremendous power to influence people's political and social attitudes. As Reeves and Nass observe: 'Media can evoke emotional responses, demand attention, threaten us, influence memories, and change ideas of what is natural. Media are full participants in our social and natural world'. Television images of emotionally charged funerals of soldiers, broadcast on Indian news channels during the 1999 border conflict with Pakistan, labelled as 'India's first conflict in the information age,' created 'a direct impact on policy makers, the armed forces, the families of the dead - and the public opinion'.

The globalization of such a powerful visual medium has tended to increase Western cultural influence but other models do exist, argues UNESCO World Culture Report, based on 'a different cultural institutional and historical backgrounds and such alternatives are likely to multiply in the era of globalisation, in spite of appearances, which may paradoxically witness greater diversity than uniformity'. The US-led Western media conglomerates have used an array of strategies, including regionalization and localization of their content to extend their reach beyond the elites in the world and to create the 'global popular'. The proliferation of satellite and cable television channels, made possible with digital technology and growing availability of communication satellites, has undoubtedly made the global cultural landscape much more complex. While their well-publicized commercial agenda has been criticized, the globalization of Western or Western-inspired television also has benefits. It has contributed, for example, to the creation of jobs in media and cultural industries. As localization becomes part of the business strategy of media transnationals, it is likely more jobs will be created in these industries in many developing countries to make programmes taking on board cultural specificity. At the beginning of the 1990s there was no television industry worth the name in India, which until 1991 had just one state-controlled channel, little more than a mouthpiece of the government and notoriously monotonous. By the end of the 1990s, there were 70 channels, more than 20 national, others regional, some joint ventures with international operators. This expansion demanded new programme content - from news to game and chat shows, from soap operas to documentaries, which has been provided by a burgeoning television industry. It has also been argued that the extension of Western media, and with it 'modernity', across the globe has a liberatory potential that can contribute to strengthening liberal democratic culture and promoting gender equality and freedom from the 'national strait-jacket'.

There is little doubt that digital technologies have made it possible to beam a range of specialized channels across the world, some in local or national languages, which are giving more choice to consumers and opening up their window on the world. This is particularly the case in many developing countries, where the media, especially broadcasting, had been under state control and where often unrepresentative and sometimes unelected governments could use the airwaves to control their populations, severely restricting plurality of opinions and possibilities of open discussion.

In Turkey, the privatization of television has challenged the monopoly of the state-run national broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Authority (TRT), and brought 'openness and plurality' to the airwaves. There is also more evidence of liberalism in the press. After the advent of 'multi-partyism' in Africa, there has been a rapid increase in the number of privately-run small newspapers and magazines. As state after state moves towards democracy this trend is likely to grow. In Indonesia, for example, more than 730 press publication licences were issued in 1998-99, compared with a total of 289 during President Suharto's 32-year one-party rule. In other areas of the media too, examples can be given of how globalization has improved the quality of media products. Expansion

of Western publishing houses in the global South has had some positive impact. For example, after NAFTA, US publishing giants such as McGraw-Hill and Prentice Hall entered the Mexican publishing market, opening up new avenues for Mexican writers as they become popular in the USA, with many more being translated into English. The English translation of the Mexican author Laura Esquivel's novel *Como agua para chocolate*, sold more than a million copies in the USA as well as 200 000 copies in the Spanish market in the USA, leading to what one Mexican scholar called, surely as a hyperbole, the 'Latinization of the United States'. Similarly, since the launch of Penguin India, in the early 1990s, many books on Indian politics, economics and culture, including a series of translations of Indian classics, have been produced to international publishing standards and are also available for a wider global market, given the vast marketing network of Penguin.

Global culture's discontents

Despite such welcome developments, the growing Western cultural presence in the developing world has also produced unease in some quarters. In many developing countries, Western influence is bringing mixed results. The Islamic revolution that overthrew the Shah of Iran in 1979 was not spurred by modernization as much as by opposition to what Iranian intellectuals called 'westoxication', the adoption and flaunting of superficial consumerist attributes of fads and commodities, originating in the USA. Though Iran may be an extreme case of an anti-Western cultural backlash, degrees of xenophobic reaction emerging in response to such superficial elements of Western way of life, often mediated through television, can be found in many other non-Western cultures - the ideological revival of *Hindutva* (Hinduness) in India is a case in point.

Countries such as China, Singapore, Saudi Arabia and Iran have tried to restrict the reception of Western satellite television by introducing licensing regimes. Iran banned Western television on the grounds that it was culturally inappropriate in an Islamic nation, primarily because of the sexual content and orientation of Western television programmes, films and advertising. In other traditional societies like India, worries have been expressed about the representation of women in the media, especially advertising. 'The commodification of women so evident in the West during the 1960s', wrote two observers of India's media scene, 'is likely to become far more virulent in India'. There is also a feeling that in the Me World, culture is being commodified to the extent that it impacts on religious sensibilities of various communities.

In Asia, Western culture, based on individualism and mediated primarily through television, is seen as undermining traditional Asian values, revolving round the family and the community. Disney's animation film *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* drew criticism from many in France for its trivialization of Victor Hugo's famous novel, while its *Hercules* offended many Greeks. The release in China of Disney's 1998 feature *Mulan* was delayed by the government which was unhappy with the portrayal of aspects of Chinese culture in the film. It is interesting to note that despite its theme and supposed cultural sensitivity *Mulan* did not do very well in China. Hindu groups in the USA took exception to the portrayal of Hindu deity Krishna in an episode of a popular New Zealand-made and globally syndicated television serial *Xena: Warrior Princess*. Partly as a reaction to perceived Westernization of their cultures and partly as a reaction to the alleged distortion in representations of non-Western cultures in the global media, many countries have experienced a cultural revival, often influenced by religious groups and encouraged by political establishments, acting as a barrier to the flow of Western media products.

In China, the revival of the traditional *Beijing opera* and the screening of classics on television have contributed to a renewed interest in the country's history and culture, after half a century of its denigration under Maoist ideology. Episodes of the TV series *Outlaws of the Marsh*, screened on CCTV, drew 900 million viewers and by 1998, three further leading Chinese classic novels, *Journey to the West*, *A Dream of the Red Mansions* and *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* had been adapted for TV. The popularity of the *man lum* (song-story) in Thailand and the *telenovela* in Latin America are other

examples of the trend towards capitalizing on the popularity of mediated tradition. In the Muslim world, where a majority of the populations perceive Islam as a civilization rather than a culture, Western liberalism has its most robust resistance. This is reflected not merely in the political discourse characterized by anti-Western rhetoric but also in the symbolism of interactions with Western cultural artefacts. In 1996, Iran released Sara, who wears Islamic dress - its answer to the glamorous US doll Barbie, which has iconic status among young girls across the world.

The Bosnian Muslims have also introduced their own doll called Amina and, in 1999, Arab nations introduced an Arab doll, Leila. In Malaysia, for example, the reaction to Western popular music has been in the form of the growing popularity of the Islamist music groups such as Huda - an all-female group whose music, promoting family values, has been very successful. These examples show that fears of a global harmonization of culture due to the globalization of Western television forms and formats may not be entirely justified. Although Western domination of the global media and communication industry remains overwhelming, the cultural interactions between Western media products and non-Western societies are deeply complex. There is little doubt about the existence of American cultural products worldwide, though how these are used and interpreted by various cultures remains largely unexplored, given the limited number of concrete case studies which systematically examine these issues. Often the discussion has focused on the media consumption of the ruling elites in developing countries, ignoring how the majority of populations for whom Western products - be that Hollywood films, pop music or computer related leisure activities - are inaccessible and, even if available, with which they cannot relate easily. Not surprisingly, people prefer entertainment in their own language, catering to their own cultural priorities - one key reason why most of imported programmes rarely make it to prime-time slots in the world's television schedules. Audiences can critically negotiate with an imported programme - something more than many have given them credit for. The tendency to lump the 'third world' as one homogenized 'Other' in many Western discourses - unfortunately within both the critical and liberal traditions - is partly responsible for such an omission. Obvious unfamiliarity or limited and often distorted understanding of history, traditions, languages and cultures of many developing countries leads to such undifferentiated view of the 'majority world'. One only has to look at the popularity of the Indian film industry, discussed below, in South Asia, or the *telenovelas* in Latin America to discount notions of hapless 'traditional' viewers in the developing world. Some critical scholars seem to have given far too much credit to the media's capacity to shape a nation's cultural agenda. To just give one example - despite 200 years of British colonial subjugation, a vast majority of Indians practise their own religion, speak their own languages and pursue their traditional culture. It is therefore unlikely that a CNN or an MTV will achieve what the British Empire failed to do. This is not to argue that US-led media are not influential but to submit that the interaction is much more complex and there are aspects of Western media and culture which have been easily adapted and assimilated by non-Western cultures.

Communication and Propaganda

Propaganda is one of the oldest terms that we associate with global communication. It has been in use for centuries and affects communication both domestically and abroad. With advances in communication technologies, propaganda has become increasingly important, even dangerous, in this modern day. Propaganda has to do with the use of communication channels, through known persuasive or manipulative techniques, in an attempt to shape or alter public opinion. In international communication spheres, propaganda is used in three ways. First, government leaders, with intent to mold public opinion on international issues that have bearing on a country and its people, often use its techniques. The second use of propaganda is in attempts to influence matters abroad, normally to reinforce a country's public actions or policies, or perhaps to change or reinforce perceptions of a country, its citizens, or its reputation among individuals elsewhere in the world. Finally, nongovernmental entities may seek access to global communication channels in order to sway public opinion or affect public policy formation. Sometimes the term propaganda is a bit deceiving. When we hear the word propaganda, it is likely we think of dominant, devious world leaders who spread a campaign of lies and intimidation, so they might manipulate or brainwash a public. The horrors that were possible under the reigns of Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler may quickly come to mind. Yet, rarely would we think of our own country and its leaders and institutions being equally cunning and scheming in the management of its information campaigns. All nations conduct propaganda campaigns, however, on both the international and domestic levels. We are all affected, and it happens much more than we may realize. Highly persuasive messages are designed to support public policies, nurture feelings of patriotism, or just convince us that certain activities, situations, or products will serve our best interests if engaged in, consumed, or embraced. The term propaganda is not that simple to define, nor is it always easy to identify. Activities traditionally referred to as propaganda today may further be labeled as public relations efforts, image consulting, the news, and information sharing by organizational spin doctors. Even advertising may be considered propagandistic in nature. Simply put, the purpose of propaganda is to persuade and convert by using intentionally selective and biased information. Examples of propaganda use are widespread and include Napoleon's use of the press, paintings, and even his image on china in the early 19th century; efforts to dissuade U.S. entry into World War II because of extensive business holdings with Germany; false news items placed in the international press by both the CIA and KGB during the Cold War; dropping leaflets behind enemy lines during military conflicts; use of a professional golf pro to ease relations between the United States and South Africa during Apartheid; the hiring of a public relations firm to help sway U.S. public opinion in favor of Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War; and the very recent employment of high-profile news commentators in the United States to promote a number of presidential initiatives without disclosure that public money had been used to build and disseminate such persuasive campaigns. Most of these examples will be discussed later in this chapter.

SEEKING A DEFINITION

Propaganda is not easy to define. Some hold it must involve a specific individual or group. Others contend it must comprise an activity that is secretive, sinister, or deceitful. Doob concluded, "Propaganda can be called the attempt to affect the personalities and to control behavior of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time". Linebarger, on the other hand, posits that "propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of public, or mass-produced communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific purpose, whether military, economic or political". As noted earlier, public opinion theorist

Harold Lasswell argued that control of public opinion was essential to support the essence of “justice and majority rule.” Lippmann echoes similar feelings when he notes that “... the public must be put in its place ... so that each of us may live free of the trampling and roar of a bewildered herd. Only the insider can make decisions, not because he is inherently a better man but because he is so placed that he can understand and can act. The outsider is necessarily ignorant, usually irrelevant, and often meddlesome”.

Someone from a different political persuasion or in a different time might have very well concluded just the opposite, pointing to the inherent danger implicit in any propagandistic message. Consequently, propaganda is a phenomenon of public discourse guidance or coercion that is not always immediately recognized as harmful by everyone. Propaganda might be spread through movies, comics, leaflets, broadcasting, or the Internet. It is found in everyday coverage of events in the national media, conservative talk radio hosts, commonplace broadcast and print media advertising, and radical hate group publications. Our definition of propaganda was noted at the outset of this chapter, but we repeat it here within this broader discussion. Propaganda has to do with the use of communication channels, through known persuasive or manipulative techniques, in an attempt to shape or alter public opinion.

STRATEGIES OF A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

The year 1937 saw the creation of the Institute for Propaganda, performing analysis headed by Edward Filence and designed to educate Americans about propaganda techniques, particularly the dangers and pervasiveness of political propaganda. While the Institute released a series of books, *The Fine Art of Propaganda*, edited by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee, was perhaps most influential. While there are many techniques of propaganda, the book identified seven frequently found devices, or “tricks of the trade.” These seven common “devices” were so artfully articulated that they are taught in schools and used in communication textbooks to this day. The seven instruments in the “ABCs of propaganda analyses” are name calling, glittering generality, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card staking, and the band wagon effect. We review these seven concepts here.

Name Calling

Name calling involves the use of labels to project an idea in a favorable or unfavorable light. The latter is likely the scenario most recognize, however. Its purpose is also to discourage individuals from examining substantive evidence on an issue.

One frequent use of name calling comes when stereotyping is employed to paint a negative image of the opposition or enemy. The intent may be to suggest major political or ideological differences, real or imagined. Name calling employs emotional reactions and encourages the public to draw hasty conclusions with only a cursory examination of issues. Individuals, ethnicities, and national groups have often been disparagingly labeled. In modern society, many examples abound. During the Cold War, Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “Evil Empire.” In the course of recent Gulf Wars, President Bush labeled Saddam Hussein another Hitler, and Hussein painted the United States as the “Great Satan.” Several countries were named as members of the “Axis of Evil.” In other conflicts, the enemy has been called “Commie,” “Gooks,” “subversive,” “Pinko,” and “Red.” Today the opposition are often labeled “terrorists.” In fact, when launching the Crusades in 1095, Pope Urban II is said to have referred to the Muslim nation as “despised,” an “accursed race,” “unclean nations,” and one people that worship demons. Whether in conventional or terrorist war, or simply a war of words, painting the opposition in a derogatory manner provides vast power.

In 1951, the new democratically elected president Arbenz of Guatemala announced a program for land reform by returning large tracts to the people. One large landholder was the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company (UFA) (known as United Brands since 1975) that stood to lose a portion of land it never developed. This land was valued at \$525,000 in its own tax statements, but UFA insisted it be paid \$16 million. UFA flooded media with their version of the facts and data and began circulating

a report that Guatemalan activities were “Moscow-directed.” UFA also arranged for trips for U.S. journalists and lobbied members of Congress. Using UFA vessels and facilities, the CIA was sent to overthrow the legitimately elected government. A violent civil war ensued, and the situation remains problematic to the present day, claiming more than 100,000 lives since it began. Furthermore, right-winged repression continues, along with gross imbalances in national wealth. Recently we saw another orchestration of public opinion. This time it came in the days just prior to the U.S.-led Allied involvement during the First Persian Gulf War. Soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the PR firm Hill & Knowlton was hired, with funding almost exclusively coming from the Kuwaiti government.

The agency was charged with helping to improve Kuwait’s image in the United States. An existing image at the time was that young Kuwaitis had fled to Cairo and were dancing away in its discos. The firm organized a variety of media interviews and other information programs to counter the image of a mass exodus. The most controversial story, though, involved a report that Iraqi soldiers were going into Kuwaiti hospitals and throwing babies onto the floors to die as they took the incubators back to Baghdad. President George H. W. Bush even referenced this allegation in a speech. Hill & Knowlton orchestrated testimony of an alleged 15-year-old Kuwaiti girl, Nayirah, relaying the incidents. Testimony took place before an October 1990 U.S. Congressional Human Right’s Caucus hearing, and media, including ABC’s Nightline, were persuaded to run the story. In retrospect, it was discovered that Congress and audiences were never told that the girl, who said she volunteered at al-Addan hospital and witnessed the atrocities, was in fact the Kuwaiti ambassador’s daughter and was living in Washington at the time of the alleged incidents. Because Nayirah’s surname was withheld, supposedly to protect her family back in Kuwait, Nayirah’s whereabouts were never questioned and collaboration was not sought. In defense of the interview, Hill & Knowlton responded that the testimony was true in substance and that the use of Nayirah as a witness was stylistic in nature. The firm Hill & Knowlton had been previously associated with defending human rights records in Turkey and Indonesia. As noted, the name-calling spin may be positive or negative. Yitzhak Shamir was a guerrilla fighter against the British and was dubbed a Freedom Fighter in Israel. He later became Israeli Prime Minister. Likewise, Northern Ireland’s Gerry Adams was labeled a terrorist by the British and Unionists but later was named leader of the Republican arm party, Sinn Féin, and he became a lead negotiator in Ulster peace talks. Throughout history, name calling has often been used as a one-sided attempt to dismiss the opposition on the basis of emotionally laden but logically unsound arguments.

Glittering Generality

The tendency to associate an issue or image with a noble or virtuous term is known as a glittering generality. This use of vague terms, typically with high moral connotations, is the key to the glittering generality. The device is intended to arouse both faith and respect in listeners or readers. The exact meanings of these glittering terms as presented are literally impossible to define, hence the vagueness of the generalities. When former President George H. W. Bush announced his “new world order,” he was using a glittering generality. The difficulty was that there was never great clarity of exactly what the world order was. John Steinbruner likened the Bush-inspired new world order to Voltaire’s sarcastic remarks on the “Holy Roman Empire,” “neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire”. The best Bush could do was the following: What is at stake . . . is a big idea—a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle, and worthy of our children’s future . . . The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order—where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance.

The difficulty is that his new world order evolved into nothing more than a euphemism for political supremacy, where issues of democracy and human rights have gone largely ignored. In recent years,

the make-up of a new world order appears to have meant that certain nations and people were at the top, while a system of second-class societies and economies was still perpetuated. The so-called “new world order” advocated by the president and promoted by late-20th-century United States, Western, and even United Nations policies failed to provide many answers that were initially expected of the staggering label. In the post–Cold War era, a new world order is essentially a world system largely led by the one remaining superpower. The terms *freedom* and *democracy* are also examples of this propaganda approach and in fact are cited in the same Bush address. For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens, and requires sacrifice.

As has been noted elsewhere, one person’s freedom may very well be another person’s idea of slavery. Consider that even in the United States, freedom is not always the same. The likelihood of criminal imprisonment and harsher penal sentences is much greater for the lower classes, as the more affluent can afford effective legal defenses. We also see a decline of personal freedoms in the post- 9/11 United States, particularly for those of Arab descent. In the post-9/11 environment, many were glad to sacrifice long-held human and personal rights in favor of promises for greater security and safety. The question remains, however, as to whether the risks were ever real or were simply manufactured rhetorically by political leaders seeking other objectives. Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor during the First Gulf War, has confirmed that when it was time to end that short battle and announce a cease-fire, General Schwarzkopf requested the decision to end the war be extended several hours in order to allow for the label, the “hundred-hour war.”

The reported purpose was so that it might play better on American television. Furthermore, intentional or not, Israel launched a memorable military activity in 1967 that is labeled the “Six Day War” after increasing terrorist attacks by Syria over the Golan Heights and the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon were poised at Israel’s borders, directing their sights on Sinai. While the Israeli victory was quite a surprise to the world community and thus holds meaning, the brief encounter in Iraq has seemingly much less meaning, given the grossly outmatched opposition encountered by the United States. Finally, Gerbner has pointed out that certain communication industry terms, such as broadband, or the Clinton–Gore campaign promoting the construction of an information superhighway, are in themselves all meaningless terms. The debate around them, argues Gerbner, essentially hides the content standardization campaign that industry or government leaders wish to assert over the public’s communication channels. We would add the most unfortunate term, collateral-damage, that came out of the Vietnam War and has the effect of playing down, even eradicating, the terrible notion that innocent civilians are injured and killed as a result of being in the general area of an attack or because our weapons systems and “smart bombs” are not as sophisticated as we may pretend. The use of collateral damage is at times likely used as a way of circumventing issues of misdirected attacks where weapons totally miss their intended mark. Both of the Gerbner-cited terms, broadband and information super highway, plus smart bombs and collateral damage, are examples of glittering generalities. Such generalities tend to be accepted placebos by the communicators, the media, and the audience. These short yet captivating phrases reduce matters to systematic maneuvers, thus creating a level of comfort and audience acceptance of information. They can be a powerful tool by maintaining a semblance of valid information flow. These generalities present information with minimal details camouflaging contentious ideas and possibly distorting facts. These may be used too by people who seek to muzzle freedoms and democratic governance.

Image Transfer

When one takes the power, respect, or good reputation bestowed on an existing entity or concept, and then attempts to share these positive qualities through association with a product, individual/group, or position/program, the perpetrator is hoping to benefit through the phenomenon known as image transfer. In transference, the use of images is the key. The cross seen in Christian churches is omnipresent and immediately symbolizes Christianity along with the many teachings and the power of the church. The use of the cartoon character Uncle Sam represents a consensus of public opinion by Americans. Both symbols stir emotions. Immediately one thinks of a complexity of feelings we have with respect to church or nation. One example of transference involved an internationally renowned professional golfer and a heart surgeon. During the 1970s, South African leaders wished to boost their international image and to combat effects of apartheid. Several public relations firms were employed for the task. One result was that Dr. Christian Barnard was used as a go-between in a labor dispute between South Africa and the American AFL-CIO. Barnard argued for compassion, and his presence is attributed as having led to a solution to the problem via new South African business opportunities. And, during the same period, golfer Gary Player was asked to write letters to U.S. corporate executives concerning declining interest in continued investments in South Africa. Player wrote to Bank of America, McDonnell Douglas, and Union Carbide offering corporate officers a week with him in South Africa. The notion of playing golf with Player was attractive. Player, in turn, was compensated for the time he wasn't on the pro golf tour. While both Barnard and Player were critical of apartheid, they allowed themselves to be used in their country's propaganda campaign. Another area where transference often takes place is in advertising. At the global level, product country of origin often affects image. This is the case with U.S. cultural products today. For motion pictures, television programs, rock music, and fashion, American-style has become somewhat of a fascination among young people worldwide and dominates many cultural and commercial trends. We saw criticism against the United States, however, as cultural hegemony was being threatened by this global spread of culture. The sheer dominance and glamour associated with U.S. images are often too much to handle as countries see their national traditions falling prey. Countries such as Egypt had long fought the entry of MTV into their marketplace but acquiesced in an attempt to avoid isolationism. Yet, it is the fear of encroachment by U.S. culture that is one of the principal reasons for Middle Eastern hatred of the West today. Concern about transborder data flow is not limited to Arab countries, of course. The French have long fought to keep the English language out of their culture by banning many English words. Cookie was one of those words banned. Frankly, the term chocolate chip biscuit does not convey the same image for many, even though this was the required term in France when a specialty bakeshop was to be established in Paris over a decade ago. This is one reason that French farmers have targeted McDonald's restaurants when they protested U.S. trade policies in recent years. The protesters feared Western economic policies would jeopardize their agrarian livelihoods. Historically, U.S. products such as Coca-Cola, IBM computers, and Ford cars have been quite successful in Japan. Throughout the world, English has become the dominant business language and controls some 65–80 percent of the world's Internet content. We can see the anger levied toward largely American, almost always Western, transnational corporations and in the Western-led International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank protests staged in Mexico, Switzerland, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, Norway, and the Czech Republic, and at the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle in late 1999. The corporate symbols of these huge transnationals have been transformed into cultural icons and represent more than just the commercial products they were originally designed to promote. They represent the Occident or West, and everything that is good or bad about it. In some ways, corporate image building was so good and so effective that these corporate symbols now represent something far beyond the original intent. Consequently, image transfer may

not always serve the purposes of the marketer. While good reputation is the goal of marketers and public relations pundits, unintended negative associations may evolve almost by accident.

Testimonial

A testimonial is when a distinguished or recognized but highly unpopular person is used to cast a product, individual/group, or position/program in either a positive or negative light. On March 14, 2002, accompanied by U2 rock musician Bono, President George W. Bush relied on success testimonials to support his development aid campaign in a speech delivered to the Inter-American Development Bank. Bush cited recent economic development successes in Mozambique, Uganda, and Bangladesh to support his plan to provide increased relief efforts to countries that embraced his standards of just rule, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom. He went on to acknowledge that “successful development also requires citizens who are literate, who are healthy, and prepared, and able to work.” He also promised that the United States would increase development assistance by \$5 billion in its new Millennium Challenge Account. In this global development and self-investment address, Bush cited data he says demonstrates that a dollar of foreign aid attracts two dollars of private investment. While embracing free-market objectives that some have challenged as not universally appropriate, the speech was an inspiring one that showed new levels of international concern from the U.S. administration. The argument certainly acquired greater power through the use of Bono’s testimonial. In another incident, this time a CNN interview with George H. W. Bush on relations with the Soviets following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the senior Bush acknowledged that the administration had . . . tried hard to co-operate . . . to understand the pressures on Gorbachev and not stick our fingers in Gorbachev’s eye . . . Who knows how they would have had to react. And we didn’t do that. And there were a lot of examples where we tried to understand his

position, tried to be restrained, probably as good an example was the Baltic states we never recognized in the U.S., the Soviet occupation or the takeover of the Baltic states . . . this wasn’t that all problems weren’t behind us, and surely they weren’t all behind us in terms of arms control and exactly how we negotiated cuts in conventional forces, nuclear war forces. But having said all that I think it was a breakthrough. Hence, the administration’s foreign policy approach with the Soviets is spun quite favorably and the White House appears to have been very wise in retrospect. Going back to U2 and Bono, recently the controversial Department of Defense and Iraq War architect, Paul Wolfowitz, became the White House nominee for World Bank president. Once again, Bono was sought for endorsement to defuse some criticism of the candidate. Not only was the earlier Bush affiliation with Bono an example of the use of image transfer, as noted earlier, but it also enters into the realm of testimonial by association. In Wolfowitz’s case, the Americans were trying to defuse criticisms against the nominee, particularly those emanating from Europe. Worldwide, we often see images of politicians and government officials visiting sites of battle or memorials to war victims. U.S. officials, including the president, sometimes made surprise visits to troops in Iraq.

Likewise, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited the Falklands Islands in January 1983, in the aftermath of that war. For Thatcher, the 1982 war attributed to a dramatic change in her political image, leading to a landslide victory in the 1983 elections and eight additional years in office. When Prince Charles visited the region in March 1999, he was photographed placing a wreath at the 2nd Parachute Regiment memorial in Goose Green, the East Falklands. Besides serving official duties expected of public office holders, officials also benefit through association with wartime events and memories, particularly the gallantry and sacrifice that others gave in support of a national cause. To further exemplify testimonial usage, we turn to advertising, where celebrity affiliations may be arranged. Business activities benefit from arranged ties with personalities, events, or venues. In 1996, the first television commercial shot in outer space featured Pepsi in the MIR space station. In 2000, a space launch featured the new Pizza Hut logo. Furthermore, popular music is often used

as background narrative for broadcast commercials. As promotions company Entertainment Marketing Communications International (EMCI) (2005) advises: “Stand next to a celebrity, event or lifestyle property to help accomplish corporate or brand marketing objectives.”

As we so often see, the use of personal experience, whether resulting in success or failure, is often used to lend credibility in campaigns.

Plain Folks

The use of plain folks comes in when a communicator wishes to convince others that they or their ideas are good or valid since they are similar to everyone else, just everyday ordinary people. In recent U.S. presidential elections, various candidates have run on the “regular guy” or “plain folk” image. John Kerry was often labeled an elite in his election bid against George W. Bush. It is somewhat ironic when the highest elected office in the land resorts to bashing of opponents who are painted as too well educated or having too high a business or political stature. Jimmy Carter, the former peanut farmer, often wore blue jeans in the Oval Office. He also ran as a Washington outsider, undamaged by the Watergate scandal, further reinforcing his everyman appeal. Yet Carter’s outsider position also presented problems for him once he was in office. This happened despite his many accomplishments, particularly on the international front. It was during the Clinton candidacy that the regular folk image was truly manipulated. Bill Clinton’s penchant for cheeseburgers, Big Macs, and French fries was a positive for him when it came to public-image building.

Even George W. Bush was quite successful with his bus trips into the American heartland, stopping to eat pancake breakfasts and chatting with the electorate, although admission to the latter events was normally controlled and participants hand-picked. Comparable examples are found in other countries. As Bush once pronounced, “I am not an imperial president.” Yet political leaders with regular-guy images must still demonstrate the ability to achieve, particularly in the international domain. This sometimes produces problems for elected officials. This regular-guy approach may also work when it comes to crafting a positive image with a country’s military personnel stationed abroad. Such was the case for recent leaders such as Ronald Reagan and the two Bush presidents. The junior Bush used the technique when he arranged his “Mission Accomplished” photo-op by landing in a Navy S-3B Viking jet on the aircraft carrier USS Lincoln as it returned from Iraqi duty on May 1, 2003. The image sought was that of a commander in chief fully in control. When Mike Dukakis attempted a photo-op riding in an Army tank in 1988, during his campaign against the senior Bush, the similar attempt backfired. John Kerry also was not very successful when he was seen wearing a camouflage jacket and carrying a 12-gauge shotgun while goose hunting during his 2004 Ohio campaign.

Vice President Dick Cheney quipped that the Second Amendment (right to bear arms) was more than just a photo opportunity. The regular-guy approach then does not always give a distinct advantage. In Britain, Prince Andrew served as a helicopter pilot aboard the HMS Invincible during the 1982 Falklands War. Pictures of him helped fuel the image of the British royal family and their involvement in the country’s military affairs, just as did photos of Prince Charles training as a Royal Navy pilot in September 1971, where he followed in the footsteps of his father, grandfather, and both great-grandfathers. Additionally, images of Fidel Castro, Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Shamir, Gerry Adams, and others as freedom fighters earlier in their careers certainly helped fuel political aspirations years later. Despite the success of George W. Bush as a regular-guy at home, his difficulty with Europe’s leaders may in part be a result of low image credibility. We saw such fallout in October 2004 when citizens of 8 out of 10 nations (Russia and Israel not included) were reported to prefer Kerry to Bush, according to a poll initiated by Canada’s Quebec-based *La Presse* newspaper. Even Prime Minister Tony Blair’s strong support for Bush did not translate into an endorsement of the U.S. leader in Great Britain. This was the case despite the more than \$1 billion annually that the administration was spending to improve its international image, according to a September 14, 2003 article in *USA Today*.

A Globescan-PIPA poll conducted at the University of Maryland found that international citizens with higher education and income levels felt more negatively about Bush and U.S. influence in general in late 2004. Bush's strong moral character honed at home was not as effective on the international stage, where many expressed displeasure with his poor stance on the environment and military coalition building.

Card Staking

Card stacking occurs when a presentation uses a selection of facts and distortions, elucidations and confusions, and both logical and illogical statements. Put another way, the propagandist stacks cards against the truth. It is also the most difficult to detect, for not all information has been provided, through distortion or omission, for the audience to make an informed decision. The "Big Lie" was a label used to characterize disinformation campaigns in Nazi Germany. Adolf Hitler was known to espouse this approach when attributing Germany's First World War loss to Jewish influence on the media: From time immemorial, however, the Jews have known better than any others how falsehood and calumny can be exploited. Is not their very existence founded on one great lie, namely, that they are a religious community, whereas in reality they are a race?

Statements such as this were used to generate hatred of Jews that later fed support of genocide. Plus, while never verified, it was Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's minister of propaganda, who has been credited with having said that if a lie is repeated enough times, it would become widely accepted as truth. A more contemporary case also involves the activities of Germany in World War II, this time as promoted by British writer David Irving. Irving considers himself a historian, and he challenges the very existence of a Holocaust. He concludes that it is nothing more than "an ill-fitting legend." While Irving acknowledges that many Jews died, he claims they were not killed in gas chambers under direct orders from Hitler. Irving contends the killings were no different than any other atrocious deed we would find in war. Deborah Lipstadt counters that while familiar with historical evidence, Irving "bends it until it conforms with his ideological leanings and political agenda".

Richard Evans, Cambridge professor of modern history, goes on to add that Irving's work is fraught with deep duplicity in treatment of historical sources and that his misuse of these sources results in mistakes that appear to be calculated and deliberate. In recent years, we have seen similar distortions of truth in U.S. foreign policy issues. In one such case, the Bush administration asked news networks to refrain from playing tapes from Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden yet could not supply direct evidence as to why it would be harmful. Instead the justifications were vague and amounted to card stacking, as we see in the following briefing by Condoleezza Rice: [L]et me just say that I think the networks have been very responsible in the way that they have dealt with this—my message to them was that it's not up to me to judge news value of something like this, but it is to say that there's a national security concern about an unedited, 15- or 20-minute spew of anti-American hatred that ends in a call to go out and kill Americans. And I think that that was fully understood. We are still concerned about whether there might be some signaling in here, but I don't have anything more for you on that yet.

This use of suppression of opposing points of view clearly falls under the heading of card stacking. Furthermore, consider that the media were regularly provided with information on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the "Axis of Evil," and suicide bombers. It therefore is not difficult to understand how Americans may widely conclude that all Arabic and Muslim people are likely terrorists. Such selective omission forms the basis of U.S. stereotypes against all Arabs. We consequently see racial stereotyping or profiling at airports, or for that matter at any public gathering place. During many special events, law enforcement officials have increased their surveillance, and charges that Muslims are being singled out are common. Stereotypes clearly have been perpetuated by a marked absence of news showing Arabs in a favorable light. Therefore, by implying that an opponent is evil

or guilty of reprehensible acts, the emphasis has shifted to an emotional one, and reasonable discussion has been curtailed.

Bandwagon Approach

The bandwagon approach involves utilization of a notion that “Everybody is doing it,” or “We are all doing it,” so that group members are encouraged to just join or follow the crowd. In post-9/11 United States, it became difficult for anyone to speak out against U.S. foreign policy generally or the Bush administration specifically. To not support the administration’s war on terror was likened to nonpatriotism, even though many aspects of the Homeland Security legislation and its ultimate implementation were blows to civil rights for both citizens and visitors. Racial profiling was just one of the practices used by law enforcement officials as thousands were unjustly detained or imprisoned. The country paid a major price in areas of personal freedom and expression when it sacrificed many long-fought battles for civil liberties. To assert that everyone must join the fight against terrorism is a clear bandwagon technique. So too were the criticisms levied against lawmakers who failed to support the administration as it entered a war based on the presupposition that weapons of mass destruction were being held by the Iraqis. In fact, it now appears that Iraq may have been in general compliance with UN sanctions. “You’re either with us or against us” is the battle cry often heard in times of national crisis when criticism of the status quo is being discouraged. Such was the mentality when war protesters against the Vietnam War were faced with the criticism, “America, love it or leave it” during the 1960s and 1970s. Another slogan based on strong feelings of nationalism is “My country, right or wrong.”

Such a reaction denies the very foundations upon which the republic had been established. British journalist G. K. Chesterton observed “‘My country, right or wrong’ is a thing no patriot would ever think of saying except in a desperate case. It is like saying ‘My mother, drunk or sober.’” While we all would want our motherlands to remain free, open, and beyond reproach, it is the ability to withstand doubt that may be the greatest test of its freedoms. The slogan “Four out of five dentists use this toothpaste” is a form of bandwagoning. Bandwagoning also appeals mostly to those who are “joiners”; they join “because everyone else is.” Additional examples are the profuse use of flags, “support our troops” bumper stickers, or magnetic pro-troop and anticancer ribbons that people place on their automobiles. These and similar campaigns appeal for individuals to join the groundswell of public opinion and activity on the rationale that “everybody else is joining.” The methods are not really scrutinized, and winning is thought to be everything. The bandwagon technique additionally appeals to sentiments of loyalty and nationalism.

Political Economy of Communication

Before taking up the political economy of communication, we need to examine the general field of political economy. After defining the approach, this chapter discusses a set of its central characteristics. The next chapter addresses the major schools of thought that have provided political economy with its richness and diversity. Beginning with the classical political economy of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and others, the chapter proceeds to take up the criticisms leveled by conservative and Marxist theorists. In the late nineteenth century, influenced by the drive to create a science of society modeled after developments in the hard sciences, William Jevons and Alfred Marshall, among others, established the neoclassical paradigm that continues to provide a model for mainstream economics. Choosing to concentrate on describing, preferably through a set of mathematical equations, the outcomes of different combinations of productive factors (land, labor, and capital), this school of thought eliminated most of the political from political economy.

Raymond Williams suggested that when taking up a definition, one should start with basic social practices, not fully formed concepts. He called for an etymology based on social as well as intellectual history because the meaning of ideas is forged in concrete social practices.

Offering a conceptual point of view, a dictionary of economic terms tells us that “political economy is the science of wealth” and “deals with efforts made by man to supply wants and satisfy desires”. But following Williams’ socially grounded etymology, it is important to stress that before political economy became a science, before it served as the intellectual description for a system of production, distribution, and exchange, political economy meant the social custom, practice, and knowledge about how to manage, first, the household, and later, the community. Specifically, the term “economics” is rooted in the classical Greek *oikos* for house and *nomos* for law. Hence, economics initially referred to household management, a view that persisted into the work of founding influences in classical political economy, Scottish Enlightenment figures like Francis Hutcheson and, crucially, Adam Smith. “Political” derives from the Greek term (*polis*) for the city-state, the fundamental unit of political organization in the classical period. Political economy therefore originated in the management of the family and political households. Writing fifteen years before Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, Steuart made the connection by noting that “What oeconomy is in a family, political o economy is in a state.” It is also important to note that from the very beginning, political economy combined a sense of the descriptive and the prescriptive. As communication scholar Dallas Smythe describes its driving force or “meta-political economy,” it is “the body of practice and theory offered as advice by counsellors to the leaders of social organizations of varying degrees of complexity at various times and places”.

This is in keeping with the *Dictionary of Economic Terms*, which defined the original intent of political economy as a “branch of statecraft,” but which is now “regarded as a study in which moral judgments are made on particular issues”. Other definitions concentrate on how the development of economics narrowed what was originally a broadly-based discipline. As early as 1913, a standard economic dictionary noted that “although the name political economy is still preserved, the science, as now understood, is not strictly *political*: i.e., it is not confined to relations between the government and the governed, but deals primarily with the industrial activities of individual men”.

At the same time, there is evidence that the transition from political economy to economics was not inevitable. This same 1948 volume notes the beginnings of a revival of interest in a more broadly defined political economy. It senses that “the emphasis is once again returning to political economy” with the “recent rise of state concern for public welfare.” This was echoed later on in a standard book on economic terms. According to it, the combination of Marxists who “never abandoned the

old terminology of political economy” and “by the 1960s the radical libertarian right from Chicago and the Center for the Study of Public Choice at Virginia Polytechnic” gave a renewed life to this old discipline. Drawing on these ways of seeing political economy, which emphasize that definitions are grounded in social practice and evolve over time in intellectual and political debate, the next sections concentrate on definitions and characteristics of the field that have influenced the political economy of communication. One can think about political economy as the study of *the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of resources*. From this vantage point the products of communication, such as newspapers, books, videos, films, and audiences, are the primary resources. This formulation has a certain practical value for students of communication because it calls attention to fundamental forces and processes at work in the marketplace. It emphasizes how a company produces a film or a magazine, how it deals with those who distribute the product and market it, and how consumers decide about what to watch, read, or listen to. Finally, it considers how consumer decisions are fed back into the process of producing new products. But political economy takes this a step further because it asks us to concentrate on a specific set of social relations organized around *power* or the ability to control other people, processes, and things, even in the face of resistance.

This would lead the political economist of communication to look at shifting forms of control along the circuit of production, distribution, and consumption. Examples include how the shrinking number of big media companies can control the diversity of content or how international marketing firms have strengthened their power in the media business by using new technologies of surveillance and measurement to produce valuable information about consumers. It would also lead us to consider the extent to which activists can use new media tools like blogging and social networking sites to resist the concentration of power in business and government. The primary difficulty with this definition is that it assumes we can easily recognize and distinguish among producers, distributors, and consumers. But this is not always so and particularly not in some of the more interesting cases. For example, it is useful to separate film producers, those who organize and carry out the steps necessary to create a finished product, from distributors or wholesalers who find market outlets. But film-making is not so simple. Distributors are often critical to the production process because they can guarantee the financing and marketing necessary to carry on with production. Does that make our distributor in reality a producer or a producerdistributor? Similarly, notwithstanding the common-sense value of seeing audiences as consumers of media products, there is a sense in which they are producers as well. One might say that consumers produce the symbolic value (or meaning) of media products (or texts) as they consume them. Similarly, producers consume resources in the process of production. They also distribute by virtue of their reputation as producers. This suggests that while the definition is a useful starting point, it is limited by what we miss when we apply it in a too rigidly categorical or mechanistic fashion.

It is interesting to observe the vast range of fields that have found it necessary to address the meaning of communication from their specific vantage points. Areas of study and practice, including engineering, computer science, sociology, information studies, philosophy, linguistics, architecture, and several others, including, of course, communication and media studies, have examined the nature of communication. In keeping with a basic theme of this book, there is no single definition that works across all fields. But for the purpose of exploring the political economy of communication, it is useful to see it as *a social exchange of meaning whose outcome is the measure or mark of a social relationship*. From this perspective, communication is more than the transmission of data or information; it is *the social production of meaning that constitutes a relationship*. We proceed to examine the specific characteristics of the political economy of communication by taking up the social and intellectual forces that propelled its development.

North American research has been extensively influenced by the contributions of two founding figures, Dallas Smythe and Herbert Schiller. Smythe taught the first course in the political economy of communication at the University of Illinois and is the first of four generations of scholars, linked together in this research tradition. Schiller, who followed Smythe at the University of Illinois, similarly influenced several generations of political economists. Their approach to communication studies drew on both the *institutional* and *Marxian* traditions. A concern about the growing size and power of transnational communication businesses places them squarely in the institutional school, but their interest in social class and in media imperialism gives their work a definite Marxian focus. However, they were less interested than, for example, European scholars, in providing an explicit theoretical account of communication. Rather, their work and, through their influence, a great deal of the research in North America has been driven more explicitly by a sense of injustice that the communication industry has become an integral part of a wider corporate order which is both exploitative and undemocratic. Although Smythe and Schiller were concerned with the impact in North America, they both developed a research program that charts the growth in power and influence of transnational media companies throughout the world.

Partly owing to their influence, North American research has produced a large literature on transnational corporate and government power, coupled with active involvement in social movements to change the dominant media and to create alternatives to its commercial emphasis. One objective of this work is to advance public interest concerns before government regulatory and policy organs. This includes support for those movements that have taken an active role before international organizations, in defense of a new international economic, information, and communication order. North American communication scholarship has called for a renewed critique of global capitalism, including its use of information and communication technologies, and its media practices. Authors working in this tradition highlight the continuing significance and unique vantage point of Marxism for media and communication studies.

While those who employ a Marxian framework do disagree on some of the specifics, they all insist on the necessity of including power and social class relations in media and communication studies as well as committing to praxis by combining research and action to advance a more democratic society. European research has been less clearly linked to specific founding figures and, although it is also connected to movements for social change, particularly in defense of public service media systems, the leading work in this region was, from the start, more concerned to integrate communication research within various neo-Marxian and institutional theoretical traditions. Of the two principal directions this research has taken, one, most prominent in the work of Garnham and in that of Golding and Murdock has emphasized *class power* and the fundamental inequalities that continue to divide rich from poor. Building on the Frankfurt School tradition, as well as on the work of Raymond Williams, it documents the vast expansion and integration of the communication industry, its connection to government power, and its integration into the wider system of capitalism. Media reinforce social class divisions and help to build solidarity within a dominant class. A second stream of research foregrounds *class struggle* and is most prominent in the work of Armand Mattelart.

Mattelart has drawn from a range of traditions, including dependency theory, Western Marxism, and the worldwide experience of national liberation movements to understand communication as one among the principal sources of *resistance* to power. His work has demonstrated how people in the less developed world, particularly in Latin America, where Mattelart was an advisor to the government of Chile before it was overthrown in a 1973 military coup, used the mass media to oppose Western control and create indigenous news and entertainment media. Two scholars who provide good examples of how to put these perspectives into practice, particularly in their analysis of labor in the media industries, are Bernard Miège and Peter Waterman.

From a class power perspective, Miège offers an assessment of different labor processes that tend to cohere with different forms of media production within the overall logic of capitalist social relations. He suggests that there is a connection between the type of media product, the structure of corporate control, and the nature of the labor process. Research on labor and class struggle has also been prominent in the work of Waterman, who has documented labor and trade union use of the mass media and new communication technologies to promote democracy and the common interests of workers worldwide. Communication research from and about the less developed world has covered a wide area of interests, although a major stream or political economy research arose in response to the modernization or developmentalist theory that originated in Western, particularly US, attempts to emphasize the role of the media in its particular vision of economic and social development. The modernization thesis held that the media were resources which, along with urbanization, education, and other social forces, would mutually stimulate economic, social, and cultural development. As a result, media growth was viewed as a sign of development. According to this view, societies became modern when they demonstrated a specific level of media development, including newspapers, broadcasting stations, and movie theaters. Drawing on several streams of international neo-Marxian political economy, including world systems and dependency theory, political economists challenged the fundamental premises of the developmentalist model, particularly its technological determinism and the omission of practically any interest in the power relations that shape the terms of relationships between rich and poor nations and the multilayered class relations between and within them.

When massive media investment failed to promote development, modernization theorists went in search of revised models that include telecommunication and new computer technologies. While Asia, especially China and India, have made extensive use of network technologies to speed economic growth, political economy emphasizes that the former has done so with precious little progress toward democracy and the latter remains overwhelmingly impoverished with a few big companies and over half the population without electricity.

Africa is the poorest, most marginalized continent and has been subject to numerous development schemes. With the growth of the Internet and the rise of a global information economy, the proliferation of new information and communication technologies, like media growth, is now seen as a key index of development. It is assumed by some in influential academic and policy-making circles that their wide dissemination will cause progressive social, cultural, political, and economic change in a simple, direct, and linear manner. In addition to their neoliberal orthodoxy, which insists that developing countries take a market-based approach with as little government intervention as possible, these dominant views are clearly situated within the developmentalist paradigm and take technological determinist positions. Such visions and policy formulations have been subjected to considerable critique as they have so far fallen short of their promises and predictions in relation to actual accomplishments in most of Africa.

Political economists have also responded by addressing the power of these new technologies to integrate a global division of labor. A first wave of research saw the division largely in territorial terms: unskilled labor concentrated in the poorest nations, semi-skilled and more complex assembly labor in semi-peripheral societies, and research, development, and strategic planning limited to first-world corporate headquarters to where the bulk of profit would flow. Current research acknowledges that class divisions cut across territorial lines and maintains that what is central to the evolving international division of labor is the growth in flexibility, or flexible accumulation as it is called, so that firms can overcome any constraints on their ability to control markets and make money.

The field is no longer characterized by specific regional tendencies, nor does North American and European research dominate its agenda to the extent that it once did. Political economy research is

now international in that it is carried out by scholars from all over the world who are increasingly interested in addressing global issues. The field has also expanded its commitment to communication history, especially the history of opposition to dominant powers in industry and government. In doing so, it has uncovered the unexamined stories of attempts to build alternatives to the dominant commercial system that fed into wider resistance movements in society. Political economy has also broadened its traditional focus on examining dominant powers and processes of exploitation to address standpoints of resistance. These especially include feminist and labor perspectives on media and communication. Political economy has begun to make the transition from its established strength in examining how power operates in older media to a variety of approaches to new media, especially to the Internet. As it has in the past, the field continues to account for continuities between old and new media, including describing how dominant powers use both to make money. But it also now examines discontinuities by considering the challenges that new media pose for traditional patterns of capitalist development.

Moreover, political economists have documented the connections between the promises made about old and new media and, more importantly, they have linked efforts to create a technological utopia, present from the telegraph to the Internet, to systems of power in society. Political economists are also taking on social issues that new media make especially prominent. These include control over intellectual property, electronic surveillance, and the significance of a network economy. The fifth and final current trend in political economy research is the expansion of political activism. This includes the continued growth of established organizations such as the Union for Democratic Communication and the International Association for Media and Communication Research. The trend is embodied most substantially by the media reform movement in the United States. But it is also exemplified in the success of new national (Free Press) and international (the World Summit on the Information Society) movements.

Lecture # 38

Media Exports from the South to the North - Case Study: TV Globo and Others

Apart from the regional broadcasters discussed above, which are likely to become more important in the coming years, there are also international players from the global South, whose presence is increasingly being felt in international cultural communication. In the evolution of channels like MBC and Phoenix, global, regional and national experiences interplay and produce something which is unique and whose impact on media globalization is yet to be assessed. The following case studies offer two main examples of this contraflow of cultural products from the South - Brazil's TV Globo and the Indian film industry. TV Globo reflects the international acceptance of a genre like the soap opera, which has evolved from its origins in French and English serial novels - through serializations in magazines and newspapers, to their adoption by US radio and television and then its adaptation as a genre at a global level.

These examples of a counter-flow of cultural products in no way show that the Western media domination has diminished. There is a temptation, even a valorization, of seeing such a flow having a potential to develop counterhegemonic channels at a global level to balance this. Indeed, TV Globo and Phoenix channels were modelled on transnational corporations and Phoenix is still part of a top media conglomerate. Their output too is relatively small and their global impact is restricted to the diasporic communities, their primary target market. They are all market-driven private organizations for whom the most important consideration is to make a profit. Therefore, the emergence of regional players contributing to a 'decentred' cultural imperialism, is not likely to have a significant impact on the Western hegemony of global media cultures. Nevertheless, there does exist a blurring of boundaries, mixing of genres, languages and a contraflow of cultural products from the peripheries to the centres. The process of what has been called 'transculturation, hybridity and indigenisation' has sometimes made scholars enthuse about the possibilities of developing parallel cultural discourses.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, though the West continues to set the international cultural agenda, non-Western cultures are more visible than ever before. The international interest in Chinese cinema; the globalization of Afro-Caribbean style of music, and the growing popularity of Karaoke point to this trend. Japanese computer games, for example, are a major influence among the youth in the West - the Japanese fighting monsters, *Pokemons*, emerged as the most popular toy in 1999. Japanese animation has been exported worldwide while its serial dramas have been shown on television in Arab countries and in Canada.

Today, Indian film-maker Shekhar Kapur can direct *Elizabeth*, a quintessentially English feature film, while a Taiwanese born, US-educated Ang Lee is director of Jane Austen's *Sense and Sensibility*. Indian film musician A. R. Rahman recorded a duet *Ekam Satyam* with Michael Jackson in 1999 and after the success of his music for the film *Taal*, whose album entered the top 20 of the UK audio charts, he was offered a chance to collaborate with British composer Andrew Lloyd Weber on a musical *Bombay Dreams*. West African beats mingle with Arabic tunes which are adapted in Indian film songs - Brazilian soap operas are watched by Ghanaians; Tai Chi is becoming a popular activity with many Westerners - all these are indications of what has been called the postmodern sensibility. Such categories as 'world music', 'world cinema' and 'global culture' are routinely mentioned in media and academic discourses. Yet the desire to experience the new is balanced by that to protect cultural sovereignty.

TV Globo

One key example of cultural export from the South to the North is the Latin American soap opera, the *telenovela*, and the Brazilian media giant TV Globo is the primary exporter of this popular genre

of television across the globe. The *telenovela*, whose origins lie in radio soaps, thrives on melodramatic and often simplistic narrative which can be understood and enjoyed by audiences in different cultural contexts. Though US-generated programmes, films and cartoons are widely shown on Brazilian and other South American television channels, the prime time is dominated by *telenovelas*.

Globo, along with Mexico's Televisa, the world's largest producer of Spanish-language television programmes, are two major regional players in the continent. Though developed as a genre by other Brazilian channels, it was TV Globo which made *telenovela* into a export product. TV Globo is part of Rede Globo, one of the world's largest multimedia conglomerate which owns Brazil's leading newspaper, founded 1925; Globosat satellite; the Globo radio system, inaugurated in 1944; a publishing firm; a music company and a telecommunications firm. In 1999, Globo television network had 113 broadcast and affiliate stations and an audience share of 74 per cent, while it absorbed 75 per cent of all Brazil's advertisement revenue. Launched in 1965 in collaboration with the US-based Time-Life group, TV Globo was instrumental in building a national network, based on the commercial television culture of the USA. With US financial, managerial and technological help, Globo was able to bring television to the masses in Brazil, one of the biggest consumer markets in Latin America. Though Time-Life withdrew in 1968, the US model continued to be the guiding principle for TV Globo. In the early years, the *telenovelas* were sponsored by transnational corporations such as Procter and Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive and Unilever. Gradually however, production was taken over by Globo. This was made possible partly because of massive support from the Brazilian government. TV Globo was clearly aligned with the successive authoritarian governments following the 1964 military coup. The right-wing military dictatorships, which dominated Brazilian politics until 1985, used this powerful medium to legitimize their rule and shape public opinion.

In return the Globo group received special treatment from the generals, who besides investing heavily in Brazil's telecommunications infrastructure including national satellite networks - gave TV Globo most of government advertising. The launch of Brazil's first telecommunications satellite, Brazilsat, in 1985, facilitated the further expansion of TV Globo. Such government support not only enabled the commercialization of television but also helped create a sense of Brazilian national identity. As a result of the close ties with the military regime the Globo group was allowed to have a virtual monopoly on media in Brazil, restricting alternative viewpoints to emerge in a country deeply divided in social and economic terms. As part of an array of new cable and satellite TV services targeted at Brazil's 36 million TV households, Globo News, a 24-hour news channel, was launched in 1996. In 1999, TV Globo's programmes were available in Japan on Sky PerfecTV! and on DTH platform on Sky in Chile, Columbia and Mexico, with plans to extend them to other parts of Latin America, Canada and Europe. *Telenovelas* in the 1970s had already pushed the American canned programmes to less popular hours. While imported programmes in 1972 occupied approximately 60 per cent of the total programme share, they decreased to 30 per cent in 1983.

TV Globo entered the international market in 1975 with exports of *telenovelas* to Portugal. *Gabriela*, a *telenovela* based on an adaptation of a best-selling novel, telecast daily in Portugal, was a major hit, leading to the charge of 'reverse colonization'. In subsequent years, Brazilian *telenovelas* became extremely popular in Portugal and their style was adapted for domestic production. However, *telenovelas* were less than successful in former Portuguese colonies in Africa and to reach a bigger audience in Latin America, TV Globo started dubbing its programmes in Spanish, the most widely spoken language in Latin America and also one of the fastest-growing languages in the US. The availability and popularity of Latin American *telenovelas* in the US have also been called 'reverse media imperialism'. One of TV Globo's biggest international successes was the historical romance *Escrava Isaura* (Slave Girl Isaura), which was a great hit in Italy, France, the former Soviet Union, and,

particularly, in China, where 450 million viewers watched the series. The Chinese translation of the book on which it was based sold 300000 copies.

Globo opened sales offices in New York, Paris and London as television channels proliferated in the wake of the satellite revolution. Since 1993, Globo has been exporting television formats to even well-established broadcasters such as the BBC, whose game show *Do the Right Thing* was adapted and licensed from TV Globo and was based on the Brazilian format *Voce Decide* (You Decide). By 1996, this interactive game show had been adapted in 37 countries as diverse as China and Angola, with the Spanish-language version being broadcast in 12 countries, including the USA, 18 productions in Europe and six in the Middle East. Virtually all the Rede Globo programmes are produced in-house. In 1999, the group claimed to produce a total of 4420 hours of programming annually, including news and current affairs, entertainment and soap operas, making it one of the world's largest television programme producer. *Telenovelas* are edited to make them intelligible with fewer specific Brazilian references. Many *telenovelas* are dubbed in different languages, especially in Spanish for other Latin American countries, still the biggest market for such a genre. In 1999, TV Globo's programmes, mainly entertainment oriented, were being exported to 130 countries across the globe. In 1998, Globo had a total revenue of \$4.4 billion, of which nearly 32 per cent of the total company's revenue - \$1.4 billion - was TV revenue (*Television Business International*, July/August 1999). The international success of TV Globo is primarily based on its commercial nature. In the crudely advertising-driven media environment with few regulations on what can be advertised, TV Globo has consistently used its programmes to promote consumer products, from Coca-Cola to ladies underwear. 'Merchandising' is integrated into the narrative, either by actors directly advertising a product or through product placement, when the consumer items appear in the programme. Apart from such crass commercialism, TV Globo also claims to use what it calls 'social merchandising', weaving public information - such as awareness of gender rights and birth control - into the plots. International organizations such as UNICEF have acknowledged the importance of such methods in reducing the infant mortality rate in Brazil. It is debatable to what extent TV Globo reflects the realities of Brazilian life. Is it a localized version of US television, a 'creolization' of US commercial culture? Such a form of programming, common in much of Latin American television, it has been argued, could be seen as legitimizing free market capitalism, substituting the government's hegemony by private initiative, which is also projected as the key link between national and international culture.

Globo is one of the strongest media corporations in Latin America and in 1995 established a consortium of DTH broadcasters with News Corporation, Televisa and TCI to provide a range of programming to the continent. However, it is important to remember that unlike US media giants, TV Globo's primary market is local and among the Latin countries, and none of its *telenovelas* have had the international impact comparable with US soaps such as *Dynasty*, *Dallas* or the cult following of an *X Files* or a *Friends*. The challenge that organizations such as Globo pose to the traditional dominance of the USA in the world audio-visual trade is, as one observer notes 'more conceptual than real: that is, it has more to do with our theoretical common wisdom about that dominance than with the actual degree of commercial threat'. Indeed, it can be argued that television channels such as TV Globo are instrumental in legitimizing consumerist values and are more often than not complementary rather than oppositional to the US-based media transnationals.

Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) – Contraflow Example

Partly as a reaction to the availability of Western television in the region, pan-Arabic channels such as Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) have emerged on the Arab broadcasting scene. The primary objective of these channels is to broadcast Arabiclanguage programmes to Arab nationals

living in Europe and North America - an estimated five million Arabs live in Europe and another two million in North America.


This well-established and wealthy diaspora has created new foreign markets for Arab broadcasters. Intra-Arab communication was first established by the international Arabic newspapers, written with datelines across the Arab world, edited in London and printed in major world capitals, using satellite communications.

The newspapers such as *al-Sharq al-Awsat* (started in London in 1978), *al-Hayat* (originally a Beirut newspaper which was resurrected in London in 1988 but only became famous in 1990 with Saudi funds) and *al-Quds al-Arabi*, (unlike the other two, this is a radical newspaper and supports the PLO) cover issues of importance to Arab readers and are available on the day of publication in most Arab capitals. In 1998, *al-Hayat* was being printed in eight cities, including Riyadh, London, Frankfurt and New York, with a combined circulation of 168 000 copies.

Prior to the availability of satellite television, regional broadcasting was largely about exchange of government propaganda between Arab state-regulated broadcasters through such organizations as the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU). In the 1990s with the rise of a privatized Arab satellite broadcast television, a new type of pan-Arabic television emerged, challenging state monopolies that had characterized broadcasting in the Arab world.

Phoenix Chinese Channel

Major media corporations have endeavoured to enter China market, language barrier and the tight control of airwaves by the Chinese government, have made it difficult for transnational media players to operate in China. News Corporation's launch in 1996 of Phoenix Chinese Channel, the round-the-clock, Mandarin language channel was an attempt to get round these barriers by localizing the media product. Though partly owned by Murdoch, the channel has most of its programming in Mandarin and the top management, including Executive Chairman and CEO, are Chinese. More than other media tycoons, Murdoch has realized that it is local programming that sells best. Therefore his priority is to make original programming in Chinese for the Chinese mainland and for the Chinese diaspora - estimated to be more than 30 million - mainly concentrated in south-east Asia but also present in sizeable numbers in North America.



Media in Conflict Resolution

There are different kinds of conflict and the role media can play:

- Media & humanitarian assistance
 - Non conflict related disasters : e.g. disease
 - Rapid onset disasters : e.g. environmental
- Media and conflict reduction
 - Latent conflict : political, religious, economic or ethnic tensions
 - Open conflict: violent conflict, light weapons, blurring of combatants & civilians
 - Post conflict: once peace achieved, peace building, enhanced reconciliation & reconstruction

War Journalism's News Values

- Violence orientated
- Propaganda orientated
- Elite orientated
- Victory orientated
- Such emphases pre-dispose journalists to patterns of reporting which is biased in favour of war

WHAT IS PEACE JOURNALISM?

Johan Galtung, first began using the term 'Peace Journalism' in the 1970s. Galtung noticed that a great deal of War Journalism was based on the same assumptions as Sports Journalism. There was a focus on 'winning as the only thing' in a zero-sum game of two parties. As every journalist has an ideology, peace journalists have too – their ideologies are, to contribute something for peace, to contribute something for justice. And they also supports the peace. Peace journalism advocates the peace.

Galtung suggested that peace journalism would be more like health journalism. A good health correspondent would describe a patient's battle against cancerous cells eating away at the body. McGoldrick and Lynch defined peace journalism as a broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing stories, drawing on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation. They claimed that the peace journalism approach provides a new road map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their reporting – the ethics of journalistic intervention. Also they argued that: "...respect to one party, (even if you don't like them and think they're to blame) leads to bad and biased journalism. There are countless examples.

Acknowledging the suffering of all sides is not a substitute for analyzing the conflict - it is essential to establishing the real formation or map of the conflict".

The former British Ambassador to Indonesia, Sir Robin Christopher said that: "Journalist have to decide whether they are going to be part of the problem or part of the solution." Also peace journalists believe that journalists should be part of the solution.

The Peace Journalism Option

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM
I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTATED Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues. General “win, win” orientation. Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture. Making conflicts transparent. Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding. See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity. Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons. Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs. Focus on invisible effects of violence. (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)	I. WAR/VIOLENCE ORIENTATED Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation. Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone. Making wars opaque/secret “Us-them” journalism, propaganda, voice, for “us”. See “them” as the problem, focus on who prevails in war. Dehumanization of “them”; more so the worse the weapon. Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting. Focus only on visible effect of violence. (killed, wounded and material damage)
II. TRUTH-ORIENTATED Expose untruths on all sides / uncover all cover-ups.	II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTATED Expose “their” untruths / help “our” cover-ups/lies.
• III. PEOPLE-ORIENTATED • Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged children, giving voice to voiceless. • Give name to all evil-doers. • Focus on people peace-makers.	• III. ELITE ORIENTATED • Focus on “our” suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece. • Give name to their evil-doers. • Focus on elite peace-makers.
• IV. SOLUTION ORIENTATED • Peace = non-violence + creativity. • Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war. • Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society. • Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation.	• IV. VICTORY ORIENTATED • Peace = victory + ceasefire. • Conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand. • Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society. • Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again.

Manoff describes a number of roles which the media could play in preventing and moderating conflicts. He also offers examples of media peace initiatives.

Media Roles

The media can publicize the principles of human rights and other moral norms, and can act to enforce those norms by publicizing violations. They can also focus public censure on hate groups. They can publicize and support peace-keeping operations.

The media can act as a go-between for parties who lack any other means of communication. When the parties were unwilling to meet, the South African "Peace Cafe" program interviewed each side separately, edited the videos into a presentations of each side's case, and then showed the tape to the other side. This process eventually led to direct negotiations between the parties. In a more direct mediation, Walter Cronkite served as a very public mediator between Sadat and Begin, and helped pave the way for Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem. The media can draw attention to brewing conflicts, and so create pressure to address the conflict. They can also give early warning of potential conflicts.

The media can educate the parties about each other's interests, needs, and core values, and help to confirm the parties' claims of transparency. They can help to undermine harmful stereotypes and promote rehumanization of the parties. Education in general is helpful for conflict resolution. The "Capitol to Capitol" broadcast in 1986 filled some of these roles by bringing together American and Soviet lawmakers in a live interactive program. Both the lawmakers and the audience were able to see the other side as simply other human beings. Similarly, the "Ism Project" gives college students video cameras with which to create video diaries of their experiences with intergroup conflict. These video diaries are later broadcast.

The media can help educate the parties and public about existing conflict resolution resources, and about other successful cases of conflict management. The Voice of America radio broadcasts take this approach. The Akron Beacon Journal took a much more active approach seeking to reduce racial tensions in that city. The Journal convened meeting, hired facilitators, brought in community groups, and got over 20,000 citizens to pledge to work for racial harmony.

The media may itself reframe the issues in ways which make the conflict more tractable. They may aid the parties in reframing issues, and in formulating possible solutions. The media may also help maintain or achieve a balance of power between the parties, or work to strengthen the morally superior position.

The media can reinforce leaders' credibility with their constituents, and engage in other confidence-building activities. The media can work to deflate rumors and propaganda. The "Radio Boat" was one such, albeit unsuccessful, attempt. A private European organization stationed a boat in the Adriatic to counter xenophobic propaganda in Yugoslavia with more objective reporting. Unfortunately, the boats broadcast range was sharply limited by mountains. The media can offer an outlet for the parties' emotions, and otherwise aid in the healing and reconciliation process. The "Ism Project" described above fills this role also.

The media can respect the need for privacy and confidentiality in the negotiation process. They can also reinforce settlements by publicizing them as important, shared historical events.

Muslim Portrayal in the Western Media

Intolerance to 'others' has provided a huge literary substance to the disciplines of social sciences, and elicited many new grounds of intellectual discourse. Discourses (for there are many constructions of this phenomenon) of Islamophobia is one of such fields of investigation which has generated a colossal literature in the last ten to fifteen years. The phenomenon has been discussed and researched from many perspectives with considerable input on identifying its antecedents. However, although the questions of its nature and antecedents have been discussed at length, there has been a notable absence of quantitative analysis of these issues. At the same time, while there can be little doubt that attacks on Muslims, mass media generated processes of mythologisation, or even demonization are occurring. The concept of Islamophobia covers a complex range of subjective, social and mass mediated constructions and we shall examine these further in this paper.

Anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia constitute a few of the constructs which find their place in the ambit of 'intolerance to others'. Hostility, hatred, prejudice and fear/threats towards out-group are some of the observable outcomes of such 'intolerance to others'. Almost all constructs have some identical manifestations and latent grounds, of course towards or between the groups in variance. Islamophobia also stands in the same line which is under the strong influence of 'intolerance to others' menace in the present day world. The stereotypes associated with the phenomenon portray Muslims as 'alien and foreign to western society', 'backward, uneducated, vulgar, and violent' which has resulted in an immense tension between Muslims and non-Muslims. But, these are surely the stereotypes at the extreme end of the spectrum. As risk lies in putting too many categories into one pot, it would be better to use Islamophobias in the plural – many discourses, many manifestations, and many realities.

'Islamophobia is a new word for an old fear'. It is a form of religious intolerance, of which manifestations can be found in historic wars spread long over centuries, crusades and genocides. Islam as a religion posed a great danger to other religions and its rapid spread in a short span of time made it appear as a 'problem' to the world. It was seen as 'a theological heresy at the level of morals and practice in 14th century'. Even before the 14th century, as Karen Armstrong said, Islam was regarded as evil and 'absolutely alien to God'. The 15th Century also witnessed the mounting differences between Islam and non-Muslims. It can be viewed, for example, in the shape of Giovanni Da Modena's controversial painting "The Last Judgement" where the holy Prophet of Muslims was attacked or in ideology such as in the surfacing of racial indignation observed in the phenomenon of *La Raça* in Spain.

Contemporary literature on hostility towards Islam and Muslims, in fact, supplements what has been common in the past; however, it appends many new dimensions to the discussion. Growth of social psychology discipline opens up new vistas to understand the phenomenon, to trace its history from social psychological and anthropological perspectives besides focusing on the axiology (the study of value and value judgments) and ontology (study of the nature of being, of reality) of the subject. Meanwhile, new braches of knowledge and perspectives emerged such as '*Orientalism*', which does exist in the archaic literature but hardly anywhere in an 'ism' form. *Orientalism* used to be perceived as a 'realm of stories, fictions and fables but now appears to be a perspective to study Islam and its relations with other civilizations'.

Edward Said, the author of one of the most celebrated book *Orientalism*, confirms the 'subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arabo-Islamic people and their culture'. He imaginatively divided the world into 'orient' and 'occident' or the West. Prior to Said's view and refinement of the notions of 'Orient' and 'Occident', Norman Daniel crystallized the differences

between these opposing forces. He commented on how Islam had been viewed by the Christian orthodoxy over recorded history. His work was reviewed by James Kritzeck to a great applaud and has also been referred to by Elizabeth Poole to argue that anti-Islam polemic was used as a tool for limiting the growth of Islam chiefly by posing Islam as a 'threatening other' to the West.

John Esposito has also been critical and clear in recognizing the ideological differences between Islam and West in his renowned work *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* Similarly, Homi K. Bhabha, following the footsteps of Said, attempted to refine his work and presented overlapping binary oppositions like 'centre-margin, civilized-savage, enlightened-ignorant' etc. between the West and other cultures.

Fred Halliday, a contemporary of Samuel Huntington, whose famous work '*Clash of Civilizations*' appeared parallel to Edward Said's thesis, also presented Islam as a threatening 'other' for the West. Huntington's thesis that a new cold war would take place not on the basis of economics or politics but based upon culture and civilization marked by epistemic orders and religions. This reflects the academic and intellectual endeavours of Hall who replaced the biological notion of race by cultural definitions labelling it 'cultural racism' associated as much with ethnicity as race.

Succinctly, it is argued that Islam has been viewed as a contra religio-political force which is capable of posing grave threats to the West. It has been viewed as the 'new enemy' of the West, often justifying arguments for 'heavy hoarding of ammunitions and the West's desire for expansionism'. Some other titles given to Islam are: 'cultural anomie', 'opposing cultural ecologies', a 'challenge' and 'threat' to the Western world, 'threat to Western security', 'present terror of the world', and 'the Other', and 'fifth column'. Strangely enough, it is not Islam and any other religion they have contrasted, or the East and the West, but Islam, a religion, and the West, a geographical area.

Analysis of the historical depictions of Islam generates quite interesting discussion. It appears that Islam posed itself as a 'powerful' socio-politico-religious force of the medieval age when followers of other religions were in deep slumber, passing through the 'Dark Age'. Hostility towards Islam and Muslims was the net outcome of the subjugating-subjugated relationship between the West and Islam, which finally resulted in the Crusades – an effort to create a balance of power between dominant socio-politico-religious forces of the times. Strangely enough, centuries long prevalence of the hostility turned into racial and cultural anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiments during contemporary times. Extremists among Muslims and Islamism: 'political' or 'active Islam', augmented the cultural and racial prejudices with fear threats from Islam and Muslims.

Interestingly, racial and cultural prejudices against Islam and Muslims are visible and have been stereotyped in different ways, but hardly any traces of Islam as threatening 'other' can be found in literature; yet could be seen in abundance after the demise of communism. Until recent changes in the world politics, communism used to pose immense 'threat' to the West and the rest; Islam replaced communism as a threatening 'other'. Could it be taken that one threatening 'ideology' is being replaced with 'another' having a historical background of being a 'problem' for the world's peace and normalcy? Quite interestingly, there are plenty of events of terrorism, subjugation, subversion and animosity to prove Islam and Muslims as 'threatening others' on the basis of religion in the contemporary world.

How and when did Islam and its followers become subject of racial or cultural prejudice? Probably, it was Islam's 'expansion across the continents in a short span of time which constituted theological, political and cultural challenges to the West'. 'Mass conversion of people from other religions to Islam' added insult to injury, as a result of which the 'West found it easier to demonize Islam and Muslims than to understand'. This demonization labelled Islam and Muslims with different demonizing stereotypes which were meant to create hatred against the religion and its followers. Centuries long Crusades based on hostility between the warring factions furthered the hatred by giving it an institutionalized outlook – 'us and them'. The contemporary world carried these prejudices and stereotypes against Islam and Muslims which has historical justifications and

the situation has become further aggravated due to the growing unrest and rise of 'Jihadi' movements in and across the Muslim world. Hence, a new terminology developed to name the difference that was there historically and seems to have continued for considerable time – Islamophobia!

Islamophobia as a social construct is a relatively new phenomenon. However, the components which constitute the construct have been discussed, researched and analysed at length in different social science disciplines. Islamophobia as mediated construct has been (theoretically) reviewed heavily in the last decade; nevertheless, we do not find sufficient literature studying it in a quantitative fashion.

The Pew Research Centre regularly conducts 'Global Attitude Projects' to measure people's attitude on various issues and people across the globe. Its latest survey on Muslims and Jews has been released on September 17, 2008 which says that unfavourable opinion against Muslims has notably increased comparative to what it was in 2005 in Great Britain, France and Spain. Negative opinion about Muslims is also widespread in parts of Asia: 61% of Japanese, 56% of Indians, 55% of Chinese and 50% of South Koreans have negative impression of Muslims. Although unfavourable opinions towards Muslims are on the rise all across Europe and the United States, but in Latin America, France, and Spain are notably more negative than in other parts of the world.

The Pew Research Center's conducted surveys are mostly based on phone or face-to-face interviews. While, conducting face-to-face interviews in the course of research on such a sensitive issue, we felt that respondents were not comfortable in responding to the questions which ask their opinions about some particular group of people with some specific religious identity. Perhaps, they were wary of being stamped as racist or prejudiced about people they find in large number around them.

Dekker and van der Noll's work on Islamophobia titled "*Islamophobia and its Origin*" is a seminal study. They have tried to view and explain the construct from many different perspectives. Our study has been greatly assisted by this research endeavour which attempts to explain Islamophobia and measures it quantitatively.

Dunn opted for a telephone survey to measure Islamophobia in Australia in 2003. To collect data, measure and evaluate Islamophobia, he categorized the construct into different threat perceptions; viz, cultural, political and terror threats. He associated the intensity of these threats with the knowledge about Islam and the respondents contact with Muslims. We also have tried to operationalize Islamophobia by incorporating some of his concepts into the present study.

Saeed suggests that British Muslims are portrayed as an 'alien other' within the media and this misrepresentation can be linked to the development of a kind of 'racism': Islamophobia, that has its roots in cultural representation of the 'other'. His focus has been to see how Muslims and different races have been portrayed by the media and cited some useful references in his research. Seemingly, he observes Muslim minorities from a race perspective and attempts to evaluate their representation in the media which is 'biased and at times overtly racist'.

Islamophobia has also been seen as a form of racism or 'Islamic-racism' or 'anti-Muslim racism' in many studies. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to determine which kind of racism refers to Islamophobia: symbolic racism which was initially defined in reference to black Americans, or ethnocentrism which creates a differentiation between the in-group and out-groups, or biological racism which says that differences between the ethnic groups are innate, or aversive racism where contact with out-group is threatening or a social problem. In this wake, Hall replaced the biological notion of race by cultural definitions labelling it 'cultural racism' associated much with ethnicity as race.

Islamophobia is a complex bundle of epistemes and discourses; therefore, it would be oversimplification or schematization to label it with only racism. It stems from a powerful religious ideology. According to Buchanan who wrote in 1990 in the *Sunday News* that the US is 'searching for

a new enemy...after the death of communism, Islam is the preferred antagonist'. Similar thought has been pronounced by Esposito who said that 'transnational Islam might increasingly come to be regarded as the new global monolithic enemy of the West'. In his renowned book *Seize the Moment*, Richard Nixon also posed Islam as a major challenge to the West and he expected that 'West will be forced to form a new alliance...to confront a hostile and aggressive Muslim world'.

As said earlier, Islamophobia is a heavily mediated/mediatised construct. The phenomenon has taken birth in 'a global media environment where media hold a power position capable of representing or misrepresenting a social group or minority'. Said also highlights this delicate aspect on media when he says that if knowledge is power, then those who control mass media are the most powerful people. Even those who work in relatively high positions in media recognize this fact. They themselves feel feeble with regard to their personal control over what the masses should be given. So much so, John Swinton, the former chief of staff, *New York Times*, says that 'we are intellectual prostitutes'.

Contemporary Islamophobia

It's now just over a decade that Islamophobia as a construct has been in use. It has different connotations and its use is situation specific; thus, giving various interpretations of the construct in different scenarios. An accepted definition of what Islamophobia stands for is awaited. However, some organizations that are working on Islamophobia conceptualize Islamophobia with some variations. The following lines shed some light on the definitions given by these organizations and various researches for the sake of measuring the phenomenon.

The Runnymede Trust in the UK was the first to use the term Islamophobia in print in 1997 in its report titled "*Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All*". The Runnymede Report itemized the different attributes of Islam and Muslims, more in a binary fashion to the West.

Similarly, the Mayor of London launched a project to study Islamophobia in 2007. The project report titled "*The Search for Common Grounds: Muslims, non-Muslims and the UK Media*" revisited the Runnymede definition and defined it as 'a shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam - and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims'.

There is hardly any dictionary which clearly defines Islamophobia. We could not find it in the printed Oxford English Dictionary, however, the website of the dictionary defines Islamophobia as 'hatred or fear of Islam, esp. as a political force; hostility or prejudice towards Muslims'. We can find the definition of 'phobia' in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary which says that 'phobia' is a 'strong unreasonable fear or hatred of something'. Islamophobia in the light of this definition will appear to be the 'strong unreasonable fear or hatred of Islam'.

Encyclopaedia of Race and Ethnic Studies explains the construct as 'an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of Muslims, Which results in practices of exclusion and discrimination'.

A web based organization declares Islamophobia as 'a neologism used to refer to fear or prejudice towards Muslims and Islam'. Another organization FAIR (Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism) recognizes 'Islamophobia as a form of racism'. CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations) agrees that 'Islamophobia refers to unfounded fear of and hostility towards Islam, which results in discrimination against Muslims'.

Heitmeyer & Zick have conceptualized Islamophobia as 'a form of group-oriented enmity and a general attitude of rejection of Muslims and all that stems from Islam'. While, as mentioned earlier, Hall introduced another facet to the conceptualization of Islamophobia by describing it as a 'cultural racism'. Nevertheless, Raold characterizes Islamophobia as 'a fear of the religion of Islam and Muslims' and contends that 'Islam as a religion is not only unacceptable but a threat to the Western world'.

From the above discussion on the definitions of Islamophobia, we find some visible variables which constitute the definition. These are fear/threats, hostility and prejudice towards Islam and Muslims. For the sake of conceptualization of the construct, we further refine these variables by changing fear/threats into perceived threats in cultural, political and security domains, while hatred as an observable form of hostility. Prejudice is taken as cultural prejudice to form a nominal definition of the phenomenon. However, it is pertinent to mention that we have assumed Islamophobia as an attitude; hence, it is required to be seen at three different components of an attitude: cognitive, affective and conative/behavioural.

Thus, we conceptualize Islamophobia as an essentially negative cognitive, affective, or conative posturing of individuals and social orders towards Islam and/or Muslims. Here, Islamophobia has been taken as an audience attribute by assuming it an attitude. Furthermore, the construction of Islamophobia as a social phenomenon relates to the dynamics of a society and moves away from the scope of this research.

Media Framing of Muslims/Islam and the Construction of Islamophobia

‘Media images, representations and discourses relating to Islam/Muslims in the mainstream Western media are negative and hostile’. There are exceptions in the mainstream media and the picture is far more complex than what Poole and Richardson suggested, yet, such a representation provides the masses a great amount of material for political discourse and helps them shape their opinions and view on minority communities and worlds far from them. Of course, the opinion formation process would have the same tenor that the media have set for its audience/readers. This process continues due to ‘significant effects’ of media on masses which eventually results in the construction of a social reality that’s based on media framing of a reality ‘in a predictable and patterned way’.

Nevertheless, it’s not only the media frame which contribute to building a social reality, but individuals’ own internal frames – ‘information-processing schemata’, also play a vital role in the process. In other words, the ultimate opinion or response of an individual is a synthesis of media frames that they are exposed to and their individual frames. In this regard, the work of Berger & Luckman and Tuchman is highly recognized and focuses on the social construction of reality debate. Even Lippmann recognised the significance of individual schemata many decades from now and labelled it ‘the pictures inside our heads’. He probably wanted to pronounce that ‘meanings are in the minds’.

Then what do media do if we have all in mind? Why is media framing so critically objected to? Entman responds to this question in the following manner:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to set some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in the communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Frames then, define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing and costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of cultural values; diagnose causes, identify the forces creating the problems; make moral judgements – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problem and predict their likely effects.

For our research in terms of media as an active antecedent for formation of Islamophobia is based on Constructivist Media Effects Model which explains a ‘reality built from personal experience, interaction with peers, and interpreted selections from mass media’. This interactive model of construction of reality has significant implications for conceptualizing framing as a theory of media effects.

McCombs, Shaw and Weaver also suggested that agenda setting and framing effects are related, rather, they concluded framing as an extension of the agenda setting. They used the term 'second-level-agenda-setting' to describe the impact of the salience of the attributes of the issue.

Tuchman asserts that mass media actively set the frames of reference that the audience use to interpret the significant events taking place around us. However, this interpretation is a complex process which undertakes and bases the new experiences on pre-existing meaning structures or schemas as used by Nicklas Luhmann in *The Reality of Mass Media*. Entman defines the pre-existing schema - 'information-processing-schemata', as individual frames as compared to media frames or 'self-reference' as defined by Luhmann. Abandoning the corresponding theories of realist epistemologies, Luhmann argues that mass media functions are not determined by external values of truthfulness, objectivity or knowledge, but it is regulated by the internal code information/non-information for selection of news and communication. Nonetheless, the other side of the picture predicts the active role of audience in opinion formation and attitude building as the 'meanings are in mind'.

Lecture # 41

Role of Supra-National Organizations in Conflict Resolutions and Perception Management through Media

Conflict, the modern world and the media Conflict is one of the defining features of the modern world. Since the end of the Cold War there have been countless conflicts that have involved the deaths of millions of people and the suffering and displacement of millions more. It is impossible to accurately quantify human suffering due to conflict. To take one indicator – it has been suggested that, in the last ten years, over two million children have died in conflicts, more than one million have been orphaned and more than six million have been disabled or seriously injured¹. One striking factor is the growth in the number of conflicts which have fundamentally corroded the ability of the state to care for its citizens. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has analysed 59 ‘major’ armed conflicts occurring since the end of the Cold War. In this case ‘major’ means that they involved in excess of 1,000 battle-related deaths in one year. Of these, the majority were intra-state².

As a result of these prolonged conflicts many states have effectively collapsed or are very fragile. There is no rule of law, public services and facilities have been wrecked or plundered, and populations displaced. Such conflicts exacerbate poverty, bring massive human suffering, destroy the environment, displace substantial numbers of people and create enormous problems for the international community. Very few of these conflicts have attracted serious concern from the international community, although those that have attracted international attention have had a significant impact. The genocide in Rwanda (itself a part of an internal conflict) and the wars in the Balkans that marked the break up of Yugoslavia have led to much debate about the powers and responsibilities of the international community, as well as triggered serious rifts inside the United Nations, making the effective work of that organisation more difficult.

In both of these conflicts the media played a pernicious role – directly inciting genocide in the case of some Rwandan media (and organising it in the case of Radio Mille Collines) while acting as a vehicle for virulent nationalism in former Yugoslavia. This is not just a modern phenomenon – both the Nazis and the Soviet Union used the media to create a hegemonic climate in which they could more easily exercise power. However, policy makers have been slow to understand the importance of media in shaping modern conflict or how, with proper support, it can help create the conditions for peace. Despite the amount of violent conflict in the world there is still little common understanding of how modern internal conflicts are triggered.

Although there is growing concern among the developed democracies about the problem of failed or fragile states, and the way that conflict areas nurture crime, terrorism, disease and other threats to human security, no-one has mapped the key indicators that signal the onset of violence. Wars between states can be explained in geo-political terms – as a contest for natural resources, a means of resolving disputes over territorial boundaries and so on. However, internal conflicts are little understood. We still do not know how the instability or ethnic tension that marks many societies can suddenly escalate into organised violence. Perhaps one explanation for this lack of understanding is the relatively inconsistent approach to media coverage of conflicts around the world.

It is obvious that the political significance of some conflicts affects the response of the most powerful governments and this in turn affects the media’s coverage of conflict. However, it is also the case that the extent to which the media assigns priority to covering one conflict rather than another in turn shapes the response of the international community. The common factor appears to be that the media pays close attention to the concerns of their domestic audience – which in the

case of the most powerful international media tends to be the peoples of North America and Europe – who need a point of identification in the conflict for their attention to be engaged. One consequence is that while some conflicts have acquired global attention through exposure in the media, others have failed to receive significant attention through neglect.

Many of the African conflicts of recent times in which millions have died – whether it is the wars in the Congo since 1997, the renewed civil war in Angola, the inter-related conflicts in Sierra Leone, Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia – have passed almost without notice under the international radar. The wars in the North and South Caucasus are in a similar category; hundreds of thousands of dead, dwarfing for example the deaths in the second intifada between the Palestinians and Israelis, but with little expressed international concern either from governments or civil society. The media's role in this is central and will be examined in more detail in Part Two. Of course conflicts do not fall into neat typological categories. Conventionally, it used to be thought that wars between states have a beginning, when war is declared, a middle when organised fighting takes place, and an end, when either one side secures victory and imposes its settlement or peace is negotiated.

Modern conflicts, including those between states as well as those internal to states, often follow a different pattern. Violence can be spasmodic and appear almost random – it breaks out, subsides and breaks out again. The presence of international peacekeepers can prevent organised violence, but the potential for violence remains ever present. Underneath the shifting occurrence of organised violence we see the emergence of what has been called “institutionalised war economies”. These are self-sustaining conflicts where “peace” is hard to determine and where there are significant vested interests (even at state level) in continuing the conflict. Among the characteristics are the following:

- Violence is committed by paramilitary groups and non-state actors, either solely or in conflict with state forces (sometimes state forces also “appear” as paramilitaries for purposes of looting etc);
- Conflict is sustained by an informal war economy based on looting, hostage taking, protection rackets, smuggling, seizure of primary commodities – coltan, timber, diamonds, oil and so forth;
- Terror and destabilisation is a predominant tactic, attacks on civilians become the military strategy, and gross and mass violations of human rights are common;
- State authority is weak, collapsed or failing; organised crime and terrorist networks flourish; and there aren't stable or enduring political institutions
- Media is under physical threat or mobilised for partisan purposes; all media are vulnerable but local media more so; conditions for a stable media environment (rule of law, legal structures, etc) probably do not exist;
- Conflict areas are characterised by human insecurity; violence can erupt or die down rapidly, but threats of violence/ intimidation may be ever present and the “pre/during/post conflict” typology does not apply. Instead violence flows in different waves of intensity and can disappear or re-appear dramatically.

Understanding this picture is important for anyone who wishes to build peace. It is not enough to focus on the actions of the combatants. Unless the underlying war economy is understood – and challenged – then ‘peace’ will be merely a temporary cessation of violence. Any strategy to tackle the underlying causes must also recognise how the media are an integral part of the strategy of combatants, with acts designed to intimidate and terrify or appeal to the wider international community. Control over local media is an important objective of all parties in conflict. Building an independent pluralist media must therefore be an objective of the peacemakers.

Media and the international community

Probably the most important event in terms of the way conflicts were perceived as priorities by the international community followed the first Gulf conflict when the Kurdish community of northern Iraq rebelled and were attacked by Saddam Hussein's state. As refugees flooded to the border they received blanket and distressing coverage in the international news media. NGOs and civil society called for intervention in the face of apparent indifference by the western governments who had led the prosecution of the war.

Having ejected the Iraqis from Kuwait, the dominant coalition members, particularly the United States, Britain and France, had no desire to intervene further in the affairs of Iraq. The displacement of the Kurds was an internal issue for Iraq and the refugee problem was for Turkey to deal with. Under the classic Westphalian principle of state sovereignty there was no mandate for other governments to intervene. However, the power of the media coverage (and the concern it aroused in public opinion) proved stronger than the will of governments. As international competition between increasingly globalised news corporations grew more intense so the international media began to hunt in packs, seeking the next exclusive. The volume of their coverage, aided and abetted by NGOs concerned to avoid an overwhelming humanitarian crisis, forced western governments into a significant U-turn.

The sovereignty of Iraq was breached, intervention took place to provide security for the Kurds, leading eventually to the imposition of no-fly zones that removed the Iraqi air force from the region, and finally to significant autonomy for the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. From this event sprang the subsequent debate about the limits of state sovereignty. Pressure on western governments to intervene to protect people from gross human rights violations increased. Contrary to those who see imperialist motives at every step, the fact is that western governments have generally only intervened after long and public media campaigns urging them to do so. Where the media spotlight has been absent (as it was in Rwanda for example), they have undergone extraordinary contortions to avoid taking action.

Of course there may be powerful geopolitical motives for governments intervening when and where they have – Iraq being an obvious example. However, it cannot be denied that the role of the international media has been crucial in shaping the policy response of those governments.

Inevitably this raises the question of the responsibility of the international media in such circumstances. The nature of this responsibility came to the fore during the conflict in Bosnia when many journalists found their traditional "objectivity" tested to the limit. As a consequence some felt that it would be irresponsible of them not to use the influence they might possess to secure a particular outcome for the war – especially given the atrocities they were witnessing, which for many European journalists were painful reminders of the continent's past.

Christiane Amanpour, reporting for CNN on the Bosnian conflict said that it was "the war of our generation: this was our Vietnam"⁷. This understandable response had the consequence of making the international media an actor in the conflict. When the UK based Independent Television News (ITN) reported the existence of the Serb detention camps at Omarska and Trnopolje it helped build support for UN Resolution 770, which allowed for "all necessary measures" in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Coverage of the mortar bomb attack on Sarajevo market in February 1994 was instrumental in securing NATO's ultimatum to stop the bombardment of the city. Martin Bell, the BBC correspondent, spoke of a journalism of "attachment"⁸ and went on to say that journalists "were drawn into this war as something other than witnesses and chroniclers of it. We were also participants".

The international media can also complicate attempts to resolve conflicts as their actions can engender resentment among local people at the editorial priorities of the media organisations. Modern communities are very sophisticated in their understanding of the media and its potential

power. People often find it difficult to understand why they are the intense focus of media attention one day but then disappear of the media horizon the next. While it is understandable that editors and producers must constantly seek new ways to engage their own domestic audiences, their behaviour can give rise to all kinds of resentment, suspicion and conspiracy theories. The local media and internal conflict The Balkan conflicts demonstrated the growing recognition of the importance of local media coverage in shaping and developing the conflict on the ground. This has been best documented in Mark Thompson's groundbreaking account of the role of the local media in former Yugoslavia, *Forging War*, which documents how the media aided and abetted the destruction of Yugoslavia, the rise to power of extreme nationalism and the forging of a conflict between groups of people who had lived together peacefully all their lives.

It was a frightening example of how a society can disintegrate, how fear can be exploited by the power of a media in the hands of those unscrupulous enough to wield it as a weapon. War was neither inevitable nor the only means of resolving the conflicts that lay behind the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the local media played an important role in preparing the ground for war, by ensuring public opinion was mobilised behind the different participants. Media campaigns between rival media outlets prefigured the war itself. As regional communist leaderships mutated into nationalists they saw, true to their communist heritage, the various media as important instruments of policy and were prepared to use them. The intervention of the Western media simply provided another arena for the conflict to be enacted. With coverage guaranteed the so-called war (in reality usually waged by attacks upon unarmed civilians) was conducted with an eye permanently upon how it was portrayed in the media.

All the participants in the struggle became adept at using the media to generate the political conditions for victory. Publicised attacks on civilians and the purpose of terrorising those who the combatants wished to target next accelerated the move towards so-called "ethnic cleansing". Those media who tried to stay outside of this ethnic polarisation were either marginalised and retreated into self-censorship (like the federal state's news agency Tanjug) or were subject to tremendous pressure to conform. Few media outlets held out and those that did struggled to maintain an independent perspective. What the wars in former Yugoslavia showed is that the battle for hearts and minds is as important as the battle for territory. The media arena is often where that battle is conducted. The media itself becomes a rallying point for all the combatants – and every combatant aspires to control its own media. In the case of Zimbabwe the state media are a direct instrument of government control, constantly attacking members of the opposition as stooges of the British government and accusing them of launching anthrax attacks against Zimbabwean government officials.

The few independent newspapers left have a circulation of around 200,000 in the major cities with the result that the constant attacks on opposition figures creates an atmosphere of violent intimidation. One of the underestimated complications of the Middle East conflict between Palestinians and Israelis is the inflammatory media on both sides.

Following the deaths of Israeli soldiers and settlers in the Gaza Strip in May 2004, hawkish commentator Nadia Matar of the Settler radio Arutz-7 called on 13 May for large-scale military action against "the Arab Nazi murderers". "We should have erased the whole Arab village from which the Nazi murderers who carried out this massacre had come," she said. Israelis meanwhile can listen to a steady output of anti-Semitism from the official state media of surrounding Arab countries while digesting a claim by Saudi de facto ruler, Crown Prince Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, who stated at a gathering of Saudi university professors that "Zionists" were to blame for an attack on the offices of a petrochemical company in the Red Sea port of Yanbu, killing six Westerners and a Saudi citizen. The official Saudi news agency SPA carried a report with the following headline: "Crown prince says Zionism is behind terrorist actions in the kingdom." "It became clear to us now

that Zionism is behind terrorist actions in the kingdom. I can say that I am 95 per cent sure of that”, the agency quoted the crown prince as saying. His remarks were also broadcast on Saudi TV Channel 1. In this climate politicians seeking to secure a peace agreement will always struggle to be heard over popular anxiety and hatred incited by this kind of coverage. This is perhaps not surprising – after all partisanship at least guarantees some kind of survival in a war zone. A non-partisan newspaper, like the Standard Times in Sierra Leone, can face problems sufficient to daunt any journalist or editor, however dedicated.

The Standard Times offices were destroyed during the war and all its equipment destroyed. The collapse of the internal transport system meant that the paper could not be delivered to many areas and circulation fell from over 10,000 to around 2,000 or lower¹². At such levels advertising income is sparse and sales income too low to be sufficient. In circumstances like these the temptation to become partisan and secure the sponsorship of one of the political actors can be very strong. This is not just for financial reasons – no warlord killed as many journalists as Foday Sankoh, the late rebel leader in Sierra Leone. Newspapers like the Standard Times, which hold out for editorial independence are rare indeed. The role of the media in conflict resolution The growing recognition of the crucial role the media can play in helping provoke conflict has led many to examine how the media can play a constructive role in resolving conflict. This created considerable controversy – should journalism stay detached, even from horrific events unfolding around them, or should it take up the stance suggested by Martin Bell and become attached to a cause – even that of peace. The obvious problem with such an approach is that it might involve taking sides in a conflict – after all, conflicts require a solution that addresses the underlying problems and this means assessing the weight of the different claims in a conflict and seeking to resolve them. Peace is something more than the absence of war.

The dangers of journalists taking sides in a conflict are obvious – professional independence is impossible to maintain, access to the other sides’ combatants will disappear and journalists will become even more of a target than they already are. One limitation of the discussion about peace journalism is that it speaks to only part of the reality of the modern media, where the media is an actor in its own right. Part of the problem with the debate about “peace journalism” is confusion about the different roles the media fulfils. The media is a place in which journalists convey ideas, information and stories to the listener, viewer or reader – in this way they represent a version of reality. It is sometimes said that the journalist acts as a vehicle, which conveys the different views, outlooks and perspectives experienced in a society. In this capacity there is fierce resistance to any attempt to encroach on the independence of the journalist carrying out this function, or any attempt to impose an ideological purpose upon them, however worthy. The media understood in this way is a structure that carries the debates of a society.

However, in addition to the representation of the groups they are reporting on – in this case parties to the conflict – journalists also present their own views and interests. In this respect the media itself becomes an actor in the conflict, for example when it takes an editorial position or when the media focus on certain issues or aspects of the conflict leads to the exclusion of others. The idea that the journalist sits outside of the events they are covering, whatever their perspective on “peace journalism” is misleading. The media, in this sense, are themselves actors or agents in the conflict and their behaviour will have an effect on the way the conflict develops. To use more abstract terms the media constitute a space in which the conflicts of a society can be articulated and are inevitably themselves actors in that conflict. Moreover the combatants in a conflict will usually relate to each other either on the battlefield or through the way they are represented in the media (and this latter, as is evident in many recent conflicts, may often be more important to them than the battlefield).

To use sociological terms, the media is both structure and agency. The idea therefore that they can be simple instruments of any point of view – state or non-state – is profoundly misleading and

policy towards the media in conflict has to take on board the sense in which they play both interweaving roles. Policy makers therefore need to focus on the media's role in constituting the public sphere of society – how that can be fostered and nurtured in such a way as to allow non-violent resolution of conflict. By public sphere it is meant that range of communication outlets and media which enable a society to view the representations of itself. To function properly a public sphere must have free flowing access to information and enable the views of ordinary citizens to be heard.

In the words of Jurgen Habermas it is “a discursive arena that is home to citizen debate, deliberation, agreement and action”¹³. Nor should it be assumed that conflict itself is wrong or can be avoided in any society. The clash of interests, needs and desires balanced against the allocation of scarce resources means that conflict itself is inevitable in a society. Conflict is, after all, an extreme form of communication. Where the media can play a vital role in allowing a peace process to develop is by enabling the underlying conflicts in a society to be expressed and argued through a non-violent manner. This requires the creation of a suitable media space in which this can happen. The key question for policy makers and media alike is how to create a media framework and practice that can sustain such a public sphere in a conflict area. Over time the public sphere has been constituted through a range of institutions which changed through time. Media, such as newspapers, were part of this process from the eighteenth century onwards, but by the end of the twentieth century we have ‘mass societies’ constituted by mass media, principally broadcast media (more radio than television internationally, but supplemented by newspapers, cinema, internet and mobile phones – the increasingly converged world of modern communications).

This is a complex situation that requires a careful and measured policy response. A number of organisations have begun to consider how to create a situation in a conflict and post conflict environment that allows the media to play a constructive part in tackling conflict, taking account of its true role. It has been increasingly recognised that an effective media is an essential part of preventing violent conflict from breaking out, as well as being an important element in its resolution. There are an increasing number of attempts to produce a more comprehensive and coherent policy approach to this problem. On the 5 and 6 October 2003, IMS convened a roundtable in Copenhagen to examine conflict reporting.

It acknowledged that there was no consensus on the best approach to conflict reporting among media professionals. The roundtable considered how conflict reporting impacted on war and how such reporting could be improved. The focus was on recent conflicts and participants sought to explore the distinction between peace journalism and conflict sensitive journalism through analysing specific interventions on conflict reporting¹⁴. Some participants suggested that the best approach might be to examine what the professional responsibilities of journalists should be in a conflict area. This would include avoiding portraying conflicts as a zero-sum game contested by two combatants, but rather disaggregating the various interests that clash. It also would involve seeking to humanise both parties – making it clear that sometimes (though not always) there are no simple villains and victims.

Such journalism would try to look behind the positions that combatants take and identify their interests, which may create more common ground than is apparent. This kind of peace journalism would also seek to place the immediate fighting in a more long-term context and would highlight the profound long-term consequences of violence. In recent years there has been a profusion of projects and initiatives designed to support and promote peace journalism of one kind or another. Most focus on professional training initiatives to promote better coverage of diversity issues or more actively encourage reporting on peace initiatives¹⁷. The Canadian based Institute for Media Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) suggests five kinds of peace intervention, including training, promoting positive images and providing fictional storylines that have a positive peace message¹⁸.

Some of these approaches are little more than applying the best techniques of professional journalism to the reporting of conflict.

However, the very term “peace journalism” causes many journalists real concern. They worry that “peace journalism” implies that journalists are no longer covering stories, but becoming part of them. They argue that society needs information, and the exchange of ideas and opinions in the public sphere, and the media must be free to play the role it chooses in fulfilling that obligation. Arguing that the media promotes peace suggests to them the sense of an ideologically committed journalism reminiscent of the old Soviet Union (which was always keen to promote “peace” on its own understanding of the term).

Some media organisations have argued that the very practice of good professional journalism is itself a form of conflict resolution – or at least is something that has strong parallels to conflict resolution. For example, Johannes Botes, a journalism and conflict resolution trainer, identified a number of crossover points between the work of journalists and the work of conflict resolution experts. Both give combatants a voice. Both approach a conflict with an open mind and the ability to summarise vague aspirations in more concrete terms. Both spend time analysing the conflict and try to understand motives and possible outcomes. Both try and give objective views of the causes of the conflict²⁰. What few would deny is that in any conflict there are certain parameters on which all can agree. In conflict the provision of reliable information is crucial and is often difficult to provide. Even the international media can find themselves at the mercy of rumour and propaganda and the situation can be even worse for the local media. In the corresponding information vacuum, combatants will use information to cause the maximum confusion and to dehumanise their opponents. The media will become specific targets.

The provision of accurate information about a conflict is therefore a priority for all agencies and developing and maintaining a culture of professional journalism is important. Learning how to provide basic humanitarian information is vital. A range of NGOs and institutions concentrate on improving these basic skills in conflict areas, from the BBC World Service Trust (which also provides programme content) to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR). Even if the media is physically secure from attack, it is likely to have to deal with some kind of censorship – and the temptation for self-censorship in many circumstances will be strong. Moreover, conflict is very disruptive of the normal market conditions in which the media operate. Newspapers, in particular, will face serious production and distribution problems. In these circumstances the local media will need external support from the international community if they are to play a constructive role in conflict. Despite the volume of evidence that suggests that the media play an important role in the coverage of conflict, media planning by the international community is still haphazard.

For example, nothing in the Dayton accords dealt with the importance of the media or placed any requirements upon parties to the agreement to respect the independence of the media. Such provisions as there were, were inserted at the subsequent Bonn conference. In general it is still the case that while many governments recognize the importance of the media in a conflict and support media projects, there is very little coordination between governments. Historically there has been an undercurrent of tension between those who see an unfettered media market (based on the US model) as the best guarantor of democracy and human rights, and those who take the more “European” view that some degree of regulation and structure is necessary to foster a climate where peace and reconciliation are possible. More recently – in Iraq for example – that tension appears to have been resolved in favour of the mixed model with a regulatory element.

Media and Foreign Policy

Introduction

The interrelationship between the mass media and political decision-makers in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy has changed enormously over the last few decades, not least as a result of substantial progress in communication technologies and significant developments in the international political arena. The analysis of their interrelation and interdependence has evolved into one of the most significant and complex branches of research in the study of media–state relations. A considerable number of studies have investigated media–foreign policy relations and provided various conceptual frameworks for their analysis.

A consensus “as to the nature of such a relationship”, however, has not yet been developed. The challenge of developing a coherent model of media–foreign policy relations is grounded in the difficulty of conceptualising it with regard to cause and effect. Since both foreign policy making and mass media communication remain highly complex processes, which are affected by numerous factors, it is difficult to analytically isolate intervening variables as part of an attempt to determine directions and conditions of influence. The research field was initially characterised by rather rigid assumptions concerning influence and power potentials, either on the side of the media or the one of political actors. More recent approaches, however, are based on the premise that causal links in media– foreign policy relations are contingent, multidirectional and dynamic. Though increasing academic attention has been devoted over the last decade to the conceptualisation of integrative models that consider the mass media and foreign policy actors in one coherent approach, scholars criticise the fact that analytical approaches in the study of international relations (IR) still underestimate the role of the media in their analysis of foreign policy. At the same time, political communication scholars advocate devoting more academic attention to foreign policy processes. Only recently scholars like Sarcinelli and Menzel have proposed that the systematic analysis of the media’s influence on German foreign policy remains “remarkably deficient”.

In political communication studies, these authors argue, foreign policy still plays a subordinate role. So far, analytical instruments for investigating media–foreign policy relations often do not sufficiently capture the complexity of bilateral and international relations and their portrayal in the media – therefore missing to understand the media’s diverse roles. The goal of this paper is to shift the focus onto the foreign policy context, under which the media operates. While proposing an analytical framework of media– foreign policy relations that integrates political context conditions as a research variable, the paper aims to provide explanatory power to the media’s contingent roles. The analytical framework is based on the assumption that media performance varies across diverse foreign policy contexts which differ in their intensity of foreign policy involvement. In doing so, the paper argues that the integrative consideration of political context conditions for the analysis of the media’s role in foreign policy processes provides explanatory power to its contingency. After outlining the theoretical starting point of the paper, influential theories and empirical findings in the study of media–foreign policy relations will be briefly reviewed, while stressing the necessity to consider political context conditions for respective research. Based on these arguments, the analytical framework will be developed and its main components defined. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide self-collected empirical data on the basis of the analytical framework. Secondary empirical evidence, however, will be presented in support of the proposed analytical framework. In order to demonstrate the framework’s practicability, the paper will finally suggest a case study for future research: the German media coverage of Russia.

Theoretical starting point and basic assumptions

The analytical framework is based on various assumptions which constitute the theoretical starting point and justifies the relevance of studies investigating media–foreign policy relations. Both are grounded in the conviction that the public sphere is of constitutive significance for democratic societies. The analysis of the interrelationship between media and foreign policy allows one to estimate the “appropriate closeness or distance [...] or balance between autonomy and interdependence” of the media and its political environment both from an institutional and a normative perspective. Normatively, scholars in particular aim to assess the media’s function to control and criticise democratic political systems.

The vast majority of respective research designs are at least implicitly based on theoretically derived normative assumptions regarding the public sphere in democratic societies, which are again essentially shaped by an underlying notion of democracy. Since the research field on democratic theory is characterised by enormous plurality, there are consequently conflicting notions of normative demands for the analysis and evaluation of democratic public spheres. Despite this variety, and although this rather ideal perception of public sphere is repeatedly questioned among scholars, there is a broad consensus that in liberal democracies the public sphere is indispensable for its legitimacy. Nevertheless, the necessity of governmental decision-making competence remains. Democratic quality is not only measured according to the decision-making power of elected political actors, but through the public sphere. Following Sarcinelli, political communication is a “*conditio sine qua non*” of democratic legitimacy.

The demand for public debates is equally relevant for *foreign* policy issues. As the public is often excluded from executive or elite-centred debates on political key issues in Western democracies, decisions on foreign policy are often “enforced against the will of the majority of the population”, Sarcinelli and Menzel note down for the situation in Germany for instance.

Moreover, due to the lack of direct political experience and knowledge about foreign countries, their image and the foreign policy towards them are even more exclusively constituted by the mass media than in domestic politics. It therefore becomes even more relevant to create a public sphere independently and autonomously deliberating on foreign policy issues. Among political communication scholars, a consensus has emerged that in the public sphere the media are the most important public forum and central mediating actor between political decision-makers and the public. They are considered “highly important agents in the construction or denial of legitimacy” of foreign policy. The media enables public deliberation, examination and control of politically negotiated and agreed-upon issues. An independent and autonomous media is therefore essential and conditional for the quality of democracy. As even the assumption of media influence on politics has consequences on policy making processes, the media becomes an integral part of the decision-making process.

Political actors are aware of media selection mechanisms and rules in their formulation of policies. According to O’Heffernan both actors incorporate “each other into their own existence, sometimes for mutual benefit, sometimes for mutual injury, often both at the same time”.

Current state of research

The literature examining media–foreign policy relations “is divided as to the degree and manner of influence of the media on formulation of government policy” and can be divided, in simplified terms, into two schools of thought: one claiming the existence of a strong and active media, the other arguing for a weak and passive media performance. Instead of reviewing established theories and models in detail according to their chronological development, the current state of research will be presented with regard to these two research paradigms. Advocates of one research tradition attribute enormous power to the media in policy-making processes. Such notions of the media performance have found clearest expression in the CNN effect.

These perspectives on the media argue that the media has become the dominating actor in the formulation of foreign policy during times of international conflict and crisis, while elected and appointed policymakers are replaced. With regard to the aftermath of the Cold War, Entman stresses the media's interpretational power in shaping public opinion in times where policy definitions were lacking. This vacuum, he argues, was filled by the media while increasing their independence and simultaneously decreasing the influence of decision-makers on public opinion. The media is perceived as an independent actor that claims foreign policy actions. Scholarly findings on the CNN effect, though, present contradictory and mixed results. Doubts have been consequently expressed concerning its validity: while Shaw (1996) and Cohen (1994) for instance provided empirical evidence in support of the CNN effect and proved that media coverage highly influenced the 1991 US intervention of Northern Iraq and the 1992 intervention in Somalia, Gowing (1994) and Strobel (1997) reasoned – based on interviews with policy-makers – that there has been a resistance towards the conclusion of exclusively acting in response to the media coverage.

Various studies indeed question the popular notion of decision-makers losing control to the media. The most prominent theory, in contrast to the notion of a highly influential media role, is presumably Bennett's indexing hypothesis, which stresses the media's passive role. He notes: "mass media news professionals [...] tend to 'index' the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate". At its core, the hypothesis argues that media coverage of political issues would follow the conditions of political elite debate. In times of political elite agreement, the media would reflect the consensus within their coverage; on the other hand, when political elites disagree on certain issues, Bennett argues, their coverage in the media would decline. The indexing hypothesis equally found empirical evidence in numerous studies, both in UScentred research as well as in research on the German political and media system.

Both research paradigms may therefore claim plausibility and demand further empirical verification in diverse political contexts. Finally, one needs to critically note that a vast majority of these empiricallybased theories have been developed in US-centred research, thereby often focusing on the use of force, military interventions and terrorism. Since the US-political system is constituted as a two-party system, their generality and applicability to other Western democracies have to be called into question. The dividing line of diverse positions obviously is less complicated to assess when they are expressed in a two party system than in a multiparty democracy. Similarly, diverse political cultures and media systems need to be considered. Moreover, research on media–foreign policy relations aims at critically examining the media's performance with regard to its autonomy and independence. It is essential to note that both the CNN effect and the indexing hypothesis do not sufficiently develop a benchmark for these examinations. For this reason, the evaluation of the media is largely based on the individual interpretation of researchers. Such differences and shortcomings are not necessarily obstacles for the application of these theories. However, they need to be reflected upon and modified, if required, for empirical analyses. In summary, the complexity of the research field is reflected in the diversity of its starting points, its approaches, and consequently its empirical findings. Even attention-grabbing theoretical approaches have proven themselves only to a limited extent. Interim results for research on media–foreign policy relations thus were critical: While some authors refer to "diverse and dispersed" literature on the subject, others metaphorically compare the field of research to an "academic large construction site".

Equally Löffelholz concludes that the scholarly field is far from a systematic analysis of diverse forms and contents of the role of the media, and demands a systematic and differentiated secondary analysis, in which already conducted studies are described, evaluated and compared. Other authors warn against categorical perspectives and "overly naive actor-theoretical reflections of political media roles", which long characterised the research field. Ultimately, the impression of an initially

fragmented and inconsistent field of research long seemed obvious. For more than a decade now scholars have demanded a more differentiated reflection of media–foreign policy relations and the field’s “reconceptualisation”.

Rather rigid attributions are now denied for the benefit of systematic and differentiated research approaches. As some authors argue, an approach that assumes a homogenous role of the media in the making of foreign policy would be too narrow. Generalised assumptions on the media’s performance in policy processes would consequently undermine the media’s complexity and diversity. More recent research designs therefore develop a more profound perspective on the “interaction and interdependence“, and “symbiotic” relationship between media and foreign policy. They are based on the premise that the role of the media varies in diverse issue areas and processes and phases of foreign policy. Additionally, diverse media formats have an equal but different effect on the role of the media.

In a nutshell, there is a diverse and to some extent contradictory debate on media– foreign policy relations that still remains inconclusive. In order to capture the obvious complexity of media–foreign policy relations, new approaches are demanded that consider specific media constellations and foreign policy context conditions.

Introducing an analytical framework: Foreign policy involvement

Following this demand, the paper aims to shift the research focus onto *foreign policy context conditions*, in which the media operates. Considering empirical findings, an analytical approach is proposed, which systematically integrates context conditions into its conceptual framework. The latter is implicitly based on the question, whether and to what extent the role of the media varies in diverse foreign policy contexts. Due to the high complexity and diversity of media–foreign policy relations, it remains highly complicated, if not illusionary, to comprehensively mirror underlying causal mechanisms within a single analytical framework. It therefore seems more promising to concentrate on partial mechanisms. Whereas some authors stress the necessity of considering diverse phases of foreign policy, the paper introduces another research variable: The analytical framework is based on the assumption that the media performance varies across diverse foreign policy contexts depending on the intensity of foreign policy involvement. This observation of a functional coherence between the media performance and the intensity of *foreign policy involvement* in foreign affairs will serve as a research hypothesis, as will be outlined on the basis of secondary empirical data in the subsequent paragraph. When proposing his theory of foreign correspondence – applied on a quantitative long-term study and qualitative case studies concerning the image of the Middle East and Islam in the German national press – Hafez refers to an initially similar contradictory observation outlined in the state of research: analysing the media coverage of the oil crisis in 1973, Hafez provides empirical evidence for a close orientation of the media towards national political and societal interests– a result in support of Bennett’s indexing thesis. Even so, the comparative analysis of the Algeria crisis 1991/92 does not show any evident indication of a similar orientation.

Aiming for explanatory power to the variation in the media’s autonomy, Hafez draws attention to the political context factors and notes that the crucial political difference between these two case studies is the intensity of foreign policy involvement: “The case of the Algeria crisis differs from the oil crisis in particular in the way that German foreign policy and the Federal Republic of Germany were only very limitedly involved”. Whereas the potential impact of “national documents and the political and economic systems on the Middle East coverage” is rather high in the case of the oil crisis, as he points out, the case of Algeria on the contrary offered preconditions for autonomous media coverage. The author argues that “the interrelation between the media content and the type of conflict [...] cannot be generalised from the perspective of system theory, instead [the interrelation] depends on to what extent the media feels compelled to ‘align to its environment’, in particular to its national system environment [...]”. Based on his empirical observation, Hafez concludes: “the

existence of a functional coherence between the self-involvement of the media's surrounding societal system and the partiality of their foreign correspondence is [...] a veritable research hypothesis for empirical case study analyses".

Other authors also empirically support the thesis of a functional coherence between the involvement of societal systems and the partiality of the media coverage, even though not explicitly discussed under the perspective of political context conditions or diverse contexts of foreign policy involvement. Maurer, Vogelsang, Weiß, and Weiß (2008), for instance, comparatively investigate the German media's autonomy in their coverage of the Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003 conflicts and provide empirical evidence for Bennett's indexing hypothesis. Even though the authors do not explicitly refer to the degree of diverse foreign policy involvement as explanatory variable, they further discuss the political context conditions of each of their cases and implicitly demonstrate that the German government was differently involved in these conflicts. Nohrstedt, Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Ottosen, and Riegert (2000) on the other hand conducted a comparative „combined discourse and propaganda analysis“ of four daily newspapers in Greece, Norway, Sweden and the UK regarding the question “how the various national/local contexts influenced the media discourse's relationship to the propaganda discourse in the [Kosovo] conflict”.

The differing intensities of both the NATO- and EU-membership served as an indicator for the foreign and security political context and thus as a selection criterion for the countries included into the sample. The authors regard the assumption “that these variations of national political-historical contexts will significantly influence the media coverage” as largely empirically proven: “The general conclusion is that ‘national’ variations are clearly visible in the material”. Nohrstedt et al. propose that countries that were involved in the conflict displayed a more critical attitude towards the Kosovo conflict than countries not engaged in the civil war: “[...] the ‘Swedish’ discourse takes a more critical position than the Norwegian and British newspapers, but less than the ‘Greek’ discourse”. The underlying assumption of the analytical framework therefore follows the empirical observation of a nexus between a societal system's involvement in foreign affairs and the media's partiality. In order to advance this empirical observation for future systematic and comparative research, the term *foreign policy involvement* demands further definition. Though in different contexts, the term *involvement* has unfolded diverse working definitions in the study of political communication. In the field of research on media effects in particular, scholars have undertaken various attempts to operationalise *involvement* and to make it empirically measurable.

Since these definitions have been mostly shaped under the perspective of micro-analytical approaches focusing on the individual level, they are not directly compatible with the analytical framework proposed in this paper, even though they resemble the very core of the meaning of the term ‘involvement’. In this paper, involvement is comprehended politically: *foreign policy involvement* is understood as an expression for political concern of one government towards another. For the purpose of comparative research considering diverse nuances of foreign policy involvement, the paper proposes to classify involvement into three dimensions: *no involvement*, *indirect involvement* and *direct involvement*. Essential for the terms' operational definition is a widely accepted understanding of foreign policy, which is located in the political science sub-discipline of IR.

Despite divergent definitions, which emphasise different elements of foreign policy, most of them are based on a common core: Foreign policy is understood as the *entirety* of governmental actions that a state undertakes in order to “realise its fundamental interests [...] with respect to its international environment”. Other authors also stress the *entirety* of governmental actions as the subject area of foreign policy. This notion of foreign policy emphasizes long-term decision-making processes, which ideally are based on a “consistent common strategy, integrating various policy areas as framework of orientation”. As stated above, the underlying notion of foreign policy becomes relevant when defining the diverse dimensions of foreign policy for the analytical framework: (1)

Direct involvement is understood as involvement on either bilateral or/and multilateral basis between at least two (or more) states, e.g. conflicts, bilateral/multilateral agreements or common economic projects. (2) *Indirect involvement* encompasses events where the respective government is not directly involved as a conflict party, but affected by its political dimension, such as geographically close conflicts or actions in which important political partners are directly involved. (3) The so-called *foreign dimension* is characterised by *no involvement* of the respective government into foreign affairs. This definition encompasses foreign policy events, in which a government is neither directly nor indirectly involved, but affected for its sphere of foreign policy responsibility. Whereas the definitions of both *direct* and *indirect involvement* are rather obvious, the analytical distinction of the foreign policy dimension *no involvement* might demand further explanation: This dimension ties in the notion of foreign policy offered by authors as Lauth and Zimmerling (1994, p.145), who explicitly include refrained political actions to the options of action of foreign policy. The classification is also supported by Haftendorn's definition of foreign policy, in which she differentiates between fundamental goals and values that a state attempts to realise.

Human rights issues or natural disasters, for instance, fulfil these criterions and illustrate the subject area of that dimension: Occurrences as human rights issues in one state neither directly nor indirectly influence the interests of another state. According to Haftendorn, however, violations of human rights concern a foreign government's sphere of foreign policy responsibility, since its subject area explicitly includes values. Since a number of foreign policy partnerships in fact are explicitly based on common interests and values, violations of these values are likewise relevant as bilateral agreements for instance. Principally the analytical framework allows two research perspectives. Firstly, it is conceivable for the comparative analysis to examine *diverse states* concerning one *single issue* (e.g. a comparative media content analysis on the Iraq war 2003 in three different countries). Secondly, the framework could be applied to *one state's foreign policy* towards another concerning *diverse issues* (e.g. a comparative media content analysis of the German foreign policy towards Russia concerning examining diverse foreign policy events, as will be proposed in the paper). Whereas the former might provide explanatory power to diversely portraying one international event across diverse states, the second approach might help to understand under which conditions and to what extent one media system emphasises diverse aspects or adopts a certain attitude concerning another country in diverse contexts. Applying the analytical framework, two aspects need to be taken into account. Firstly, it would be important to support the selection of the case studies with an objective indicator of the degree of involvement.

This objective indicator would have to be individually defined with regard to the specific case study under investigation, so that the following indicators only serve as examples. The intensity of memberships of international political organisations, as in the study of Nohrstedt et al. (2000), the frequency of respective parliamentary debates, or simply the number of documents published on governmental level are conceivable indicators. Secondly, when selecting the case studies with regard to their diverse involvement, they will most likely differ through various intervening variables that are complicated to analytically isolate. Consequently, for the purpose of valid comparability, in both perspectives the selection of case studies has to ensure further constant parameters: either by similar political and media systems, or – in the second research perspective – by similar news values, for instance.

Proposing a conceivable case study for future research: The German media coverage of Russia

Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to present self-selected empirical data, one case study shall be exemplarily introduced to demonstrate the analytical framework's explanatory potential. The relevance of investigating the coverage of Russia in German media starts in the political significance of both actors – Russia and Germany. Their relevance is grounded in Germany's and Russia's

strongly interlinked, ambiguous and contradictory history as well as their political and economic relations. Nowadays their relation is sealed with a strategic partnership, including political, economic as well as civil society issues, whereas the economy and energy sectors indeed play a key role in their bilateral relations. Economically, as well as politically, Germany evolved into one of Russia's most important Western partners. Germany, on the other hand, has likewise signalled its strong interest in Russia's further integration into European and world economic structures. Though considerable academic attention has been devoted to the study of the perception of Russia in German media discourse, most studies approach the German media coverage of Russia from a descriptive research perspective; only very few propose a normative one.

The insights of previous studies undoubtedly provide relevant insights on images, stereotypes and issue agendas in the German media coverage of Russia. Their comparability – and therewith the development of a cumulative research agenda – however, is complicated for a number of reasons: Focusing on diverse time periods and media sectors, the results they provide are highly fragmented. Moreover, they are presented through the lens of various disciplinary and methodological approaches. To date in the study of political communication, there has been no attempt to conduct a systematic, long-term analysis of the German perception of Russia, which is striking if one considers how pivotal actors perceive the image of Russia in the German media. In 2008, for instance, Mikhail Gorbachev openly criticised the media for its coverage of Russia, comparing it to negative campaigning. His criticism is shared by a number of state as well as non-state actors. They, too, affirm that the once extensive and predominantly positive media exposure “has transformed into a relatively extensive and rather negative media exposure – with the degree of media exposure currently decreasing”. Empirical data of descriptive research approve this observation of “several changes, even discontinuities, in the image of Russia in the German media” as well as “findings by communication researchers that German newspaper comments tend to be more critical than supportive, focusing primarily on negative evaluations”.

The complexity of German-Russian history and relations is inevitably mirrored in the media coverage of Russia. Normative approaches on the image of Russia in the German media and attempts to explore under what political conditions the media operates in a certain role are still missing. Whether the aforementioned criticism concerning the media's negative portrayal of Russia is appropriate or linked to the German government's position towards its foreign policy partner remains unanswered. Established theoretical instruments which would enable normative research perspectives, however, so far were based on rather rigid assumptions concerning the role of the media, as has been outlined throughout the paper. If applied, they surely would shed light on specific case studies under investigation, but not sufficiently capture the complexity and dynamic of both the image of Russia as well as the media's performance. Against this background the analytical framework promises to allow both an inductive and unbiased analysis of the diverse roles of the media in various political contexts and therefore measures up with complex and ambiguous foreign policy relations, such as the ones between Germany and Russia.

International Communication in the Internet Age

Communication technologies were crucial in the establishment of European domination of the world during the era of colonial empires. The new technologies of the nineteenth century 'shattered traditional trade, technology, and political relationships, and in their place they laid the foundations for a new global civilisation based on Western technology'. If trains and ships facilitated the movement of manufactured products from one part of the world to another, fibre optics, satellites and the Internet can trade information, instantly, and across the globe. From telegraph to telephone, from radio to television, from computer and direct dial telephony and DBS to the Internet, international communication has been greatly affected by technological innovation. The convergence of telecommunication and computing and the ability to move all type of data - pictures, words, sounds - via the Internet have revolutionized international information exchange. At the same time, information processing has become far cheaper and faster, resulting in what the *Business Week* has called the dawn of 'the Internet age'.

The digitalization of all forms of data - text, audio and video, words sounds and pictures - has increased exponentially the speed and volume of data transmission compared with analogue systems. At first the introduction of digital communication was closely linked to the laying down of new fibre optic cable for telephones and television but even this constraint has been removed with the move to wireless transmission via satellite. Digitalization has had a major impact on international telephony: by 1997, for example, 89 per cent of telephone lines among the world's most industrialized countries were digital. In the use of fibre optic cable, the USA leads the way with 19.2 million cable miles deployed by 1997. The impact on capacity can perhaps be most easily seen in television with the numbers of channels increasing from units to hundreds. Combined with the exponential growth in computing capacity and concomitant reduction in costs, the convergence of computing and communication technologies opens up potential for global interconnectedness such as that offered by the Internet. As Craig Barrett, Intel's Chief Executive points out, 'We are moving rapidly towards one billion connected computers. This does not just represent an online community: it represents the formation of a "virtual" continent'.

The dawn of the Internet age

The origins of the Internet lie in the US Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), created in 1969 as a communication network linking top defence and civilian branches of the US administration in case of a Soviet nuclear attack. In 1983, ARPANET was divided into military and civilian sections, with the latter giving rise to the Internet. For the next decade this operated as a network among US universities and research foundations (Hafner and Lyons, 1996). The explosion in the use of the Internet took off with the establishment of the World Wide Web (WWW) in 1989, which began as a network of servers using a set of common interface protocols developed by a British computer specialist Tim Berners-Lee of CERN in Geneva. Any individual using these protocols could set up their own 'home page' on the web. This involved giving each page or website a unique address or URL (universal resource locator) and using the hypertext transfer protocol (http) which enabled the standardized transfer of text audio and video files, while the hypertext mark-up language (html) inserted links from one document to another anywhere on the web.

In the history of communication, it took nearly 40 years for radio to reach an audience of 50 million and 15 years for television to reach the same number of viewers - but it took the WWW just over three years to reach its first 50 million users. By 2000, it had become a global medium, with 320 million users. According to a 1999 survey of the World Wide Web by US-based Inktomi, there were

one billion unique Web pages. The instantaneous and relatively inexpensive exchange of text, sound and pictures has made a huge impact on international communication. The Internet, 'the fastest-growing tool of communication', with the number of users expected to grow from 150 million in 1999 to more than 700 million by 2001, is making this possible. As Figure 7.1 shows, the growth of the Internet has been remarkable. At the end of the 1990s, IP (Internet Protocol) traffic was rising by 1 000 per cent a year, compared to a growth of less than 10 per cent on the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), and if new technologies can meet the demand for bandwidth, IP traffic will surpass PSTN traffic. The proposed Internet 2, backed by major communications companies such as IBM, will give more speed to global communication and thus a boost to e-commerce - trade that takes place over the Internet.

The new wireless world

The next stage of convergence is that of the Internet and mobile telephony, combined with the development of mobile satellite communication. The birth of the wireless Internet is being heralded as a new telecommunications revolution. There is increasing realization that despite the continuing expansion of telephone companies and cable-TV providers to connect users to high-speed lines, it would be cheaper for consumers to receive entertainment and information by satellite. Satellite communication also offers the widest possible customer base, given that even in heavily wired Western Europe and North America an estimated 30 per cent of customers are far from major population centres. By 2003, there will be thousands of satellites in low, medium and geostationary orbits, providing universal voice data, multimedia and 'Internet in the sky' services across the planet. For businesses, one of the most significant technological developments has been the ability of the new mobile telephones to offer Internet access and high-speed wireless data services. Such 'value-added' services have contributed to the exponential growth of mobile telephony. While the fixed 226 telephone networks took more than 130 years to reach one billion subscribers, at the current rate of growth, the mobile industry will take just over two decades to reach that many subscribers.

By the late 1990s, it had emerged as an industry in its own right, with revenues of around \$155 billion and more than 300 million subscribers around the world, up from just 11 million in 1990. In 1998, mobile cellular accounted for one-third of all telephone connections - there were almost twice as many new mobile subscribers as fixed ones and, by 2005, according to ITU forecasts, the number of mobile cellular subscribers will surpass conventional fixed lines.

In 1999, Motorola, the world's biggest manufacturer of mobile telephone equipment, announced an alliance with leading network equipment company Cisco Systems to invest more than \$1 billion over the next four years to build a wireless Internet. The two companies will develop hardware and software to simplify connection of wire devices to the Internet. Microsoft has an alliance with British Telecom to create a wireless Internet service, based on devices using Microsoft's Windows CE operating system. Ericsson, the world's third largest mobile phone maker, has also joined forces with Microsoft to develop an Internet web browser and e-mail access from mobile phones and hand-held computers. Ericsson, along with Motorola, Nokia and Matsushita, is involved in the Symbian venture, which is working on the next generation of smart mobile phones and palm-top computers with Internet access. To make this a success, the wireless and computer companies have collaborated with major corporations like Microsoft in the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) Forum in order to develop a common protocol that allows users to gain easy access to the WWW. Many international telecom companies have joined forces to exploit the potential of a global communications system based on mobile satellites. Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) systems will allow users to make and receive calls via mobile handsets from virtually anywhere in the world. Satellites in Low-earth Orbits (LEOS), 500-1200 miles above Earth, can be reached by a new generation of mobile phones with a much smaller aerial. As they do not remain stationary relative to the earth, like geostationary orbits, LEO satellites will not experience

delay in routing calls from one LEO satellite to another. In 1999, the US-based cable company NTL merged with Cable and Wireless of Britain and towards the end of the year the German mobile giant Mannesmann merged with the British company Orange in the race to become a long-distance operator. The most significant corporate development in this area was the takeover in February 2000 of Mannesmann by Britain's Vodafone, creating a 'global telecommunication behemoth' with a market capitalization of \$340 billion.

In 1999, BT and AT&T entered into an alliance to integrate their services and networks so that mobile phone users could send and receive voice and other data using the same handset on both sides of the Atlantic. Transnational telecom corporations are most interested in the so-called B2B (business to business) transactions, as businesses are by far the biggest data users and mobile wireless communication offers a cheap and speedy way for remote offices to connect to their corporate centres. In early 2000, Hughes announced that its focus would be on wireless broadband opportunities and the emphasis on business-to-business communication, to cater to what, in industry jargon, is called 'enterprise' customers. Spaceway, backed by Hughes, is a two-way, interactive broadband service providing highspeed data communications, beginning in 2002. By the late 1990s, US telecom giant MCI WorldCom was spending one billion dollars per year to link businesses to high-speed networks that circle the globe.

Motorola, along with other telecommunication giants, such as Boeing and Microsoft, have started Teledesic, which plans a network of 200 satellites, at the cost of \$10 billion each, to become operational by 2004. In the new wireless world, the electronic organizer, personal computer and mobile phone will all be combined into one portable gadget connected to the Internet via satellite, enabling users to buy or sell shares, book tickets, shop online, listen to music, watch a video, receive the latest news or play online games. By early 2000, Japan's top mobile communications operator NTT DoCoMo was offering i-mode cellular phones with many such services. With interactive digital television, consumers can dial up the programme of their choice or a film they have missed in the cinema and pay for what they watch. Or if they are watching a live sporting event they will be able to pause and get instant replay at any time. Electronic programme guides will select and inform viewers about programmes in which they might be interested. Tapeless VCRs, where images are 'streamed' onto the computer, can also be set to record the user's favourite programmes or programmes on particular subjects, even without the user's knowledge. Although this will offer viewers greater choice and freedom to use television in a more active way, such technology will also make consumers vulnerable to exploitation by direct marketing and advertising as well as having implications for security and privacy. Another, quicker and cheaper technology for delivering multimedia information is the Data Broadcasting Network (DBN), which allows data services to use the existing infrastructure of DTH satellite broadcasters to distribute electronic content directly to personal computers. It uses a DBS broadcasters' extra satellite transponder space to broadcast content into the home via the consumer's satellite dish. With the satellite's footprint, many subscribers can be reached from just one transmission, making Data Broadcasting cheaper than upgrading the public telephone networks to be able to provide the high bandwidth required for multimedia services. This also opens up possibilities for DTH operators of new revenue streams. At the heart of the technological push to provide seamless communications is the potential use of the Internet as a global marketplace.

Harmonizing global technical standards

The unprecedented growth in the volume of international communication and possibilities of increasing businesses through the Internet has made it imperative for transnational corporations to demand the harmonization of standards of equipment and frequencies so that telecommunication and broadcasting equipment can be used across national borders. They are taking a lead role in setting worldwide standards in new communication technologies, since the standardization of

equipment and frequencies is an essential basis for servicing a global market. The USA, in co-operation with the ITU (which defines global telecommunication standards) and the Geneva-based International Organization for Standardization (ISO), is creating a global communication system to include, for example, mobile telephony which is affected by 'an anarchy of standards', as different systems operate in various parts of the world. In the early 1980s, the EU decided to impose a common standard within its borders - the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), which has become the standard of choice in 118 countries, with 324 networks serving more than 150 million subscribers - or 40 per cent of the world's mobile phones.

The Nordic region, home to some of the world's leading mobile networks, was among the first to establish a cellular standard (the Nordic Mobile Telephone system, NMT), creating a market for regional equipment manufacturers. Even though NMT never became the dominant standard globally, it provided Nokia with experience in producing mobile phones. Japan has also developed its own standard - Personal Digital Cellular (PDC). Until 1999, the USA had failed to establish a national standard for digital; the USA is a battle ground between warring technologies and the policy has been to grant regional licences instead, with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) carving out cellular markets. In mobile telephony, as in other communication arenas such as the Internet, the US Government supports the private sector development of technical standards, set up and guided by 'the requirements and processes of the marketplace', and opposes efforts by governments to impose standards or to use standards for electronic commerce as non-tariff trade barriers.

In 1997, the Steering Committee of Global Standards Conference, comprising TNCs as well as governments, endorsed private sector leadership in standards development. One internationally recognized initiative was the US-inspired Advanced Encryption Standard. The challenge to standards development and implementation was summarized in a 1999 report: 'timely and appropriate standards are critical to the long-term commercial success of the Internet, as they allow products and services from different vendors or industry sectors to work together, facilitate competition, and assist towards enabling the global electronic marketplace'. Internationally, cellular networks have evolved from 'first-generation' analogue networks to 'second-generation' digital systems. The existing cellular landscape consists of a mix of analogue and digital systems with different networks often co-existing in the same country. The ITU did not issue technical recommendations for first or second-generation mobile systems. However, the growth of mobile cellular networks has forced the ITU to create a global standard for 'third generation' wireless, using a much higher frequency than the current generation. This is intended to produce a quantum leap in the capacity available, making it possible to download data at high speeds and preparing the way for new services, such as interactive games, and also to eliminate existing incompatibility between rival standards. The ITU's International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT- 2000) initiative will bring together different types of networks — cellular, cordless, wireless and satellite systems - and thus enable the possibility of seamless global roaming in which users can communicate across borders, using the same telephone number and handset. The IMT-2000, expected to be launched in Japan in 2001 and in Europe a year later, will offer higher transmission rates and standard service delivery via fixed, mobile and satellite networks.

It is in the interests of the countries and corporations that dominate global trade to ensure that electronic commerce operates in a free-market environment. Within the WTO, the USA has been arguing that new regulations should not be imposed upon online service providers that might hinder e-commerce. Under US pressure, in May 1998, the WTO's Ministerial Conference adopted a declaration committing members to refrain from imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions. The USA was working towards a more inclusive Information Technology Agreement II, to further liberalize global trade in information technologies. Its policy is unambiguous: 'enforce

existing agreements and secure new agreements to make electronic commerce 'a seamless global marketplace' to ensure 'a free flow of commerce'.

From a 'Free Flow of Information' to 'Free Flow of Commerce' - Case Study: The Microsoft Monopoly?

Technological developments, combined with the liberalization in trade and telecommunications, have acted as catalysts for e-commerce. This has been made possible largely because of the opening up of global markets in telecommunications services and information technology products that are 'the building blocks for electronic commerce' as a result of the WTO agreements. Trade on the Internet has taken hold very quickly - in 1998, companies did \$43 billion in business with each other over the Internet. So important had e-commerce become by 1999, that the American business magazine *Fortune* had started *The Fortune e-50 index*, to be published every quarterly, unlike its annual *Fortune 500* listing of the world's biggest corporations. The growth of electronic commerce has outpaced even the most optimistic predictions and is now expected to exceed \$1.4 trillion by the year 2003, according to a 1999 report from the US Government. Though electronic payments made up only about 1 per cent of all consumer settlements in 1999, the predictions were that they would grow to 5 per cent by 2005. The top 300 companies doing business on the Internet in 1999 had an average market capitalization of \$18 billion.

The Internet has dramatically lowered transaction costs and facilitated online transnational retail and direct marketing. The 'e-corporations' operating in a 'net-centric world' break every business free of its geographic moorings. According to *Business Week*, in 1998 corporations did \$43 billion worth of business with each other over the Internet, predicted to rise to \$1.3 trillion by 2003, or nearly 10 per cent of total business-to-business sales. The Internet is still in its 'Stone Age' and the scope for colonizing cyberspace is virtually limitless, as AOL chairman Steve Case admitted after his company bought Time Warner: 'We're still scratching the surface' of the Internet's potential. Major web-based corporations have reached respectable revenue levels within a surprisingly short period of time, as the date of their Initial Public Offering (IPO) demonstrates.

Though most of e-trading is between businesses, it is also having a profound effect on the retail market - on-line business is undermining off-line transactions. Increasingly, global trade in computer software, entertainment products, information services and financial services is taking place using the Internet. In 1999, 39 million Americans shopped on-line and computer software, airline tickets and books were among the main products bought. The so-called 'webonomics' favours the world's rich countries. Nearly 75 per cent of all e-commerce in 1999 took place within the USA, which also accounted for 90 per cent of commercial websites. As monetary transactions via the Internet become more secure and new services are offered, e-commerce is set to go global. Already, cyber loyalty schemes are in operation, such as Beenz, ipoints and floz, which pay customers who visit Internet sites in credits which can be spent on-line. One of the biggest potential growth areas for e-commerce is in Asia, which had just over 14 million people on-line in 1998, but by 2000 their estimated numbers had reached nearly 40 million, with Singapore, China, Japan and South Korea having the highest net penetration in the continent. On-line advertising was predicted to grow in Asia at an unprecedented rate - from \$10 million in 1998 to \$1.5 billion in 2001.

China, in particular, is emerging as a major market for e-commerce. The Chinese economy has been steadily growing for the last two decades, and by joining the WTO and integration with the global economy, it is set to become an important global player. China is the world's fifth largest PC market and Internet use in the country has jumped from 1600 in 1994 to an estimated six million in 2000. In recognition of this, US corporations have struck deals with Chinese companies - Yahoo!, the most popular portal in China, launched a Chinese site in 1998, while News Corporation has been involved in developing two websites, ChinaByte and CSeek. In 1999, the most popular Chinese-language

portal Sina was backed by Goldman Sachs, Sohu by Intel and Dow Jones, while China.com was supported by AOL. Youjing Zheng, Director of the Centre for Information Infrastructure and Economic Development in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued: 'Informatisation is the foundation for China's economic modernisation; information resources is one of the most basic and important inputs for modern economic development; information industry should become the fundamental sector of China's economy'.

In 1998, China merged all the information and telecommunication related regulatory institutions into one single regulator - the Ministry of Information Industry. *Media on-line* According to the industry outlook for 2000 published in *Business Week*, the Internet was the fastest-growing part of the media sector. With the reducing cost of computers and telephone networks, more and more people are connecting to the Internet, making it a major source of revenue. A 1999 survey by *Publishers Weekly* of the on-line bookselling market, covering four major e-retailers, reported that on-line book sales rose 322 per cent in 1998 to \$687 million. The largest on-line bookseller, Amazon.com, had total sales of \$610 million, while the fastest-growing site was Barnesandnoble.com, where sales jumped 419 per cent to \$61.8 million. With the convergence between the Internet and television, media corporations are developing strategies that include the new electronic media. For example, News Corporation's *TV Guide*, (the bestselling US television listing magazine), in its deal with United Video Satellite Group (provider of electronic and interactive programme guides), has created a leading television news and listings service, operating across multiple platforms. In the future the *TV Guide Channel* will become a portal, similar to that of existing Internet search engines. News Corporation's US new media unit, News America Digital Publishing, is providing high speed Internet access and also delivering FOX news and sports content. Its E-Direct develops databases of customer information, opening up the e-commerce opportunities in book, video and 'merchandise sales already flowing from this knowledge are enormous'.

The creation of an Internet-based media giant valued at around \$350 billion, a result of the merger of America Online and Time Warner, is indicative of the commercial potential of this new medium. Signed just weeks into the new millennium, the deal marks the coming of age of the Internet as the next stage of communication, bringing together television, film, radio, publishing and computing into one accessible medium. In this marriage of the old and the new media, AOL will provide its Internet subscriber service via Time Warner's huge cable network, while the media giant will use AOL's customer base to gain new consumers for its various media products. Time Warner's extensive fibre-optic cable networks in the USA mean that AOL can offer a service 100 times faster than traditional phone lines, cutting the time needed to download movies, music and 3-D graphics. Coupled with Time Warner's enormous stock of information and entertainment products, the new group is poised to dominate global communication. AOL-Time Warner can draw from the huge library of more than 5 700 Warner Bros, feature films, or thousands of record labels produced by Warner-EMI, the world's second biggest music company. For children it offers Cartoon Network and for sports fans, the leading magazine *Sports Illustrated*. In the area of news and current affairs, the group has such global brands as CNN, *Time* as well as *Fortune*. Founded only in 1985, America Online has become the world's biggest Internet company, whose stock value has increased from just \$5 billion in 1996 to \$164 billion at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Already America's largest Internet service provider (ISP), AOL also owns another well-known ISP, CompuServe, as well as Netscape, the most widely used browser among 'net-izens' worldwide.

Its informal style helped to make AOL famous, promoting on-line 'chat rooms' for people looking for romance. It gave the world the message 'You've got mail!', later the title of a successful Hollywood film about a love story blossoming in virtual space. Not surprisingly, the Warner Bros, film was extensively promoted by AOL to its 20 million subscribers. With the number of Internet users expected to rise rapidly, all the major media and communication companies are scrambling to

get on-line. By sharing their resources, AOL and Time Warner can dominate the cyberworld and encroach on the market share of rivals in media, entertainment and the Internet access business. The world's top media corporations see the potential of using the new medium to exploit synergies between their print, broadcast and on-line operations in a multimedia environment, in which cross-promotion is the norm. According to Bob Eggington, editor of BBC Online, in global terms, the three major news websites were CNN, BBC and Yahoo!, the last, though not a primary news provider, but a 'news aggregator', which acquires news content from world's top news agencies, newspapers and other organizations. The BBC on-line service is trying to exploit the BBC brand to develop e-commerce revenue around the world. The BBC World Service has steadily extended its on-line presence with plans to operate interactive websites in twelve languages. Its first interactive programme, *Talking Point*, which enables Internet and radio audiences to join live debates, is becoming popular globally. Within a year of the development of the WWW, most major newspapers in the USA had started a web edition and all the major broadcasters had a presence too on the Internet. In the initial years these were seen more as a supplement to the main newspaper or magazines rather than entities in their own right, though apart from the *Wall Street Journal* no newspaper on the web has as yet made a profit.

By 2000, this had become a normal phenomenon and a web presence was an integral part of media organizations, not only in the media-rich North but increasingly across the world. As in other sectors of the media, major corporations such as CNN also dominate on-line journalism. CNN Interactive, for example, had eleven web sites in 2000: CNN.com, CNNi.com, a CNN and Sports Illustrated sports news site, CNNfn.com, a unit of CNN Financial News, AllPolitics.com, a US political news site operated in conjunction with *Time* and *Congressional Quarterly*, *Custom News*, CNN's news personalization product with Oracle and CNN's web sites in Swedish, Spanish, Portuguese, Norwegian, Danish and Italian. With mobile telephones linked to the Internet, news has become instant and personalized. Now the news will come to subscribers rather than the other way round. With the arrival in 1999 of WAP, phones can offer direct access to the Internet, making the newsroom redundant. CNN, which gave the world the concept of *Headline News*, launched in 1981 in the USA to update viewers on news issues every 30 minutes, has taken the lead again by providing a personalized service through its alliance with Nokia to offer news that has been specifically designed for phones. In 1999, CNN was running myCNN, a personalized news service. Other Internet content providers too are tailoring their products for phone users and 'distilling long-winded news stories into the bald facts'. Already question are being raised about the relevance of traditional journalism 'in an online world where brevity and speed seem far more important than elegance or intelligence'.

By 2000, Ananova, the world's first virtual newscaster which CNN called 'a personality designed to rival flesh and blood anchors', had already become a feature of on-line media. In the digital media age the future of newspaper itself was in doubt, with the US company Xerox announcing in 1999 that it will be producing electronic paper - which unlike ordinary paper can be scrubbed and reused. In the new media environment the boundaries between advertising and programming are constantly blurring. The growth of cable and satellite television has already made the task of selling products less cumbersome and the development of interactive television and on-line retailing means that advertisers will no longer have to conduct expensive and time-consuming market research but will have access to relevant information about individuals' leisure and consumption habits. In the age of narrowcasting, the consumers are self-selected on such specialist channels as MTV, ESPN, Disney or CNN and their purchasing patterns and predilections will in the future be relatively easy to monitor for advertisers. The international media survive on advertising. Programme production on television would be prohibitive if it were dependent on subscribers only, while newspapers and magazines would have to double their cover price if they were not supported by advertising.

However, advertising on the Internet can be more complex. Surfers may just ignore the advertisers' logos on the margins of the screen, unlike TV, where advertisement breaks in the middle of movies or TV programmes are the norm. Not surprisingly, Internet revenue from advertising was just 0.2 per cent of all media advertising in 1999.

Despite accounting for a very small proportion of global advertising, the growing commercialization of the Internet and its increasing use among consumers are likely to make it a sought-after advertising medium. Already, 'dot.com advertising' has become a regular feature on television and print - in 1999 the on-line magazine *Salon* launched a \$4 million TV campaign. Given the nature of the Internet, on-line advertising can be used by corporations to record not only every transaction but also which advertisement the consumer clicks on and how long they stay on it. Apart from making one-to-one marketing possible, this type of information has security and privacy implications since it can also be misused by corporations or governments. By being able to monitor and record pattern of Internet use, the governments can control citizens' political activities while businesses can have access to private information - about bank accounts, insurance details and spending habits of consumers, which can be traded for marketing purposes.

Protecting intellectual properties in a digital era

A significant proportion of e-commerce, such as music, video or publishing, involves the sale and licensing of intellectual property. To promote this trade, sellers must feel sure that their intellectual property will not be stolen and buyers must know that they are obtaining authentic products.

International agreements to establish effective copyright, patent, and trademark protection are therefore necessary to prevent piracy and fraud. While technology, such as encryption, can help combat piracy, a legal framework is necessary to protect intellectual property, and to provide effective recourse when piracy occurs. For TNCs it is critical that the legal framework for electronic commerce is governed by principles valid across international borders. Protection of copyrighted works - including motion pictures, computer software, and sound recordings - disseminated via the Internet, performances and sound recordings in the digital environment have brought the issue of intellectual property to the fore. New formats for storing music, especially MP3, make it very easy to share over the Internet recordings that can be played, in full stereo, on PCs. In 1998, listeners downloaded billions of songs from websites free of charge, threatening the \$38 billion-a-year recording industry. The merger of EMI and Warner Music, announced in January 2000, was partly influenced by the realization that more and more people were downloading music from the web and Warner Music - part of the AOL-Time Warner group - has a good Internet base. Digital technologies make the tracking of copyright infringements more difficult as any intellectual property encoded as a digital data stream can be copied perfectly via the Internet. Digital technology also threatens traditional methods of distribution, when text messages, images, audio, video can all be distributed electronically. This issue is not completely new: in the 1960s, publishers tried to restrict photocopies, the recording industry fought hard to stop development of magnetic cassette recorders and film-makers tried to stop the spread of low-cost video cassette recorders. International treaties for the protection of copyrights, notably the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, provide nations with a means of protecting copyrighted works under their own laws. In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a UN specialized agency, which promotes the protection of intellectual property rights, updated the Berne Convention and provided new protection for performers and producers of sound recordings by adopting two new treaties - the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Both treaties include provisions relating to technological protection and copyright management information and facilitate the commercial applications of on-line digital communications. The USA has consistently tried to force countries to implement the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which came into force in 1996, and to join the two WIPO treaties.

It has demanded that all countries establish laws and regulations that provide protection for copyrighted works, and that these are implemented and enforced. Another significant effect on electronic commerce is the issue of legal protection for databases. One major lobbying group demanding stringent regulations to protect intellectual property is the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA). It was formed in 1984 to represent US copyright-based industries - films, videos, recordings, music, business software, interactive entertainment software, books and journals. The IIPA consists of the American Film Marketing Association; the Association of American Publishers; the Business Software Alliance; the Interactive Digital Software Association; the Motion Picture Association of America; the National Music Publishers' Association and the Recording Industry Association of America. According to a 1999 report, *Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy*, prepared for the IIPA, the estimated trade losses due to piracy were \$12.5 billion in 1998.

The significance of intellectual property in the US economy can be gauged from the fact that the intellectual property income of the US jumped from \$1.10 billion in 1970, to \$4.80 billion in 1983 and \$13.81 billion in 1991. In 1997, in the USA the copyright industries accounted for \$348.4 billion or 4.3 per cent of the GDP. The foreign sales and exports of the copyright industries were \$66.85 billion. Between 1977 and 1997 their share of GDP grew more than twice as fast as the remainder of the economy, while employment in these industries more than doubled to 3.8 million. Another major area for concern is the possibility of conflict between Internet domain names, which function as a source identifier on the Internet, and trademark rights, if the same or similar trademarks for similar goods or services are registered in different countries. Countries may also apply different standards for determining infringement. As the use of domain names as source identifiers has increased, the courts have attributed intellectual property rights to them. The US Government played a crucial role in the privatization of the Internet domain name system (DNS), when in 1998, in alliance with TNCs, it created the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to take over its management of the domain name system.

Under a 1999 agreement signed with the US Government, ICANN can accredit domain name registrars from around the world to provide competitive registration services for the .com, .net, and .org domains. Organizations such as the IIPA were instrumental in including TRIPS into the Uruguay Round of GATT and, accordingly, by 2000 most developing countries were obliged to be in full compliance with TRIPS requirements. The extension of this international intellectual property regime has raised concerns among many developing countries which see these as new taxes on knowledge, aimed to benefit the TNCs - according to the UN, industrialized countries hold 97 per cent of all patents worldwide. This can block the access to new technologies' innovation and knowledge diffusion and restrict the competitive power of developing countries. A more stringent international patent regime, argues one observer, 'will greatly facilitate the process of global commodification of human intellectual and artistic creativity,' leading to 'an even greater concentration of copyright ownership in the hands of the global cultural industries'.

The Microsoft monopoly?

The world's computer software industry is dominated by the US-based Microsoft Corporation. Like the aspiration of the nineteenth-century colonial traders who dreamt of a common global currency, Microsoft has created a common computer language for worldwide use. In 1998, nearly 90 per cent of the world's PCs were using its office applications and 88 per cent its operation systems, as well as 44 per cent of its Internet browsers. As worldwide computer use increases, driven by e-commerce, the issue of who controls and sets the agenda of on-line technology has acquired great significance. Microsoft, the largest maker of PC software and the world's biggest corporation in terms of market value, was founded in 1975 by Bill Gates in partnership with Paul Allen. Within five years of its founding it was chosen by IBM to create an operating system for its first PC. The software, which runs the machine's basic functions, was called MSDOS. In 1983, Microsoft introduced the Word

word-processing programme and within two years it launched the first version of Windows, which improved MS-DOS with graphical icons that make PCs easier to use, followed by its spreadsheet programme, Excel, introduced in 1987. Microsoft has seen its revenue grow at an astonishing rate, from an initial turnover of just \$16005 in 1975, to \$197.5 million in 1986, when it became a public company, and its revenues in 1999 were \$19.7 billion.

So powerful had it become by the early 1990s, that in 1991 the US Federal Trade Commission began to investigate claims that Microsoft was monopolizing the market for PC operating systems. The European Commission anti-trust investigators also started investigations into monopoly charges. These forced Microsoft to rethink its strategy and in 1994 it agreed to change contracts with PC makers and eliminate some restrictions on other software makers, ending the US and European anti-trust investigations. However, in 1995, a Microsoft deal to buy Intuit, maker of a personal finance software, was blocked by the US Justice Department, on the grounds that it could reduce competition in the computer industry. Microsoft was one of the first major corporations to launch a cybermag - *Slate*, in 1996. Later in the same year Microsoft launched MSNBC, the 24-hour news and information network with NBC News. In 1998, *Slate* became the first Internet-based magazine to join *The New York Times* global news distribution service, which includes content from *The Economist* and *Le Monde*.

The entry of Microsoft into the world of journalism raised fears among many that it would use its enormous financial power to undermine well-established media organizations. Critics see Microsoft as a giant which has tried to stifle software from its competitors such as IBM, Intel and Apple. Partly in response to such criticism, the US Justice Department filed a case in 1997, alleging that Microsoft had violated a 1994 decree dealing with licensing the Windows operating system to computer manufacturers. It asked the court to stop Microsoft linking the use of its Windows 95 operating system, which sold more than one million copies within the first few days of its release in 1995, to the use of its Internet browser, a tool to navigate the Internet. Microsoft launched Internet Explorer to rival Netscape and its Internet Explorer 2.0, the first browser to support advanced multimedia and 3-D graphics capabilities, was widely available for free downloading, after its launch in 1995.

In 1997, Microsoft also bought WebTV Networks, offering consumers access to the Internet via television. Though, in 1998 Microsoft agreed to offer the newest version of its Windows 95 operating system without requiring easy access to its Internet Explorer software, the Justice Department sued Microsoft, alleging it illegally thwarted competition to protect and extend its monopoly on software. The antitrust trial which lasted for a year labelled Microsoft as a monopoly. Despite these setbacks, Microsoft continues to overwhelmingly dominate the global PC software, selling a new version of its Windows operations and its Office desktop applications software - products which provide nearly three-quarters of Microsoft's revenues and even more of its profits. Its focus has shifted to exploring Internet business to facilitate e-commerce through its Windows NT, which Microsoft wants to make the standard for nearly every size of computer. Renamed as Windows 2000, it was released in February 2000. With offices in 50 countries, Microsoft employs more than 30 000 people to develop products, available in 30 languages for most PCs, including Intel microprocessor- based and Apple computers.

By 1999, Microsoft had total assets of \$37.1 billion, revenue of \$19.7 billion and net income of \$7.7 billion. Gates has acquired the status of an international icon, especially among the younger generation - his 1995 international best-selling biography *The Road Ahead* was published in more than 20 languages. *Forbes* magazine in 1999 declared him the world's richest man with a total net worth of \$90 billion. Such has been the attraction of computers for youth that even pre-school children are getting hooked on to the new technology. The three-year-old Ajay Puri, Microsoft's 'youngest software executive' in the world, was comfortable working on the computer using a variety of software. The emphasis is now on e-commerce, using mobile phones and satellites to access the

Internet in a business environment where prices will be driven down by the consumer's ability to shop around, a phenomenon dubbed by Gates as 'Frictionless capitalism'. With this in view, Microsoft was among the backers of Teledesic, the company which is building the new breed of satellite systems for Internet use. Microsoft has stakes in telecom operators and is allied with AT&T, America's biggest telecommunication corporation. It is also developing, with Ericsson, an Internet web browser and e-mail access for mobile phones and handheld computers. As the demand for wireless services increases with the availability of new technologies, Microsoft is set to become a major player in this field too. The deal has implications for the entire wireless industry - Ericsson has handsets and Microsoft has operating systems and the two together are likely to dominate the wireless communication industry. Microsoft is trying to ensure that Windows CE, a slimmed-down version of the system that runs most PCs, finds its way into the world's mobile phones. It wants to turn Windows CE into the operating system for a whole range of devices, from set top boxes for cable television to notebook computers. It is also working towards revolutionizing electronic publishing. Its Microsoft Reader will bring to the screen clean type, uncluttered format like books and one would be able to download books directly from the Web, while electronic news kiosks would allow readers to download newspapers and magazines onto mobile computers with flexible screens. A corporation which has effectively monopolized the global computer software industry may also turn out to be the portal controller of electronic publishing.

The Global Digital Divide - *Case Study: Alternative Communication*

The global imbalance in access to information must be viewed within the overall context of international inequality. The fifth of the world's people living in the highest income countries has 86 per cent of world GDP, 82 per cent of world export markets, 68 per cent of foreign direct investments and 74 per cent of world telephone lines: the bottom fifth, in the poorest countries, has about 1 per cent in each sector. Inequality between the information-rich North and information-poor South was central to the 1970s' demands for a NWICO but with the globalization of new information and communication technologies the issue of access to information has once again become significant. A recent UN report explores innovative financing arrangements involving public and business partnerships for promotion of access to new information and communication networks. Conceding that the costs of building new information infrastructures are prohibitive for developing countries, the cost of not so doing would risk exclusion from the global electronic economy.

The information divide between the North and South remains as pronounced in the late 1990s as it was during the NWICO debates. In 1957, the UN General Assembly endorsed the objective of universal access to basic communications for all, but the global information and communication disparity in terms of vast differences in access to telecommunications remains. Though 'the right to communicate', was promoted in 1996 by the ITU as a fundamental human right, the organization, which claims to be committed to redress global inequity in telecommunication, admits the existence of an information poverty gap between the North and the South. The most common measure of telecommunication access, teledensity or the number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, shows that in 1996, teledensity ranged from 0.07 in Cambodia to 99 in Monaco. When the Maitland Commission published its report, three billion people, more than half the world's population, were living in countries with a teledensity of below one. The commission envisaged that by the first decade of the twenty-first century, everybody should be brought within easy reach of a telephone. However, by 1996 there were nearly 800 million people in 43 countries with a teledensity of below one.

Many developing countries lack affordable access to information resources and their telecommunication systems need technological upgrading. The biggest dilemma they face is that in order to widen access, telephone tariffs need to be reduced and the sector opened to international operators, thus undermining the often subsidized domestic telecoms. As the UN statement on Universal Access to Basic Communication and Information Services proclaims: We are profoundly concerned at the deepening maldistribution of access, resources and opportunities in the information and communication field. The information and technology gap and related inequities between industrialised and developing nations are widening: a new type of poverty - information poverty - looms. Supporters of communication technologies argue that such information poverty will be reduced with the deployment and distribution of new tools and technologies, yet this disparity is still in evidence. According to the ITU, in 1998 the worldwide volume of international telephone traffic was more than 90 billion minutes and nearly 75 per cent of international outgoing traffic was generated in 23 Northern countries, which also accounted for 57 per cent of international incoming traffic. Though mobile telephony offers possibilities of improving telecommunication access in the South, as systems can be installed relatively cheaply and more rapidly than fixed-line networks, nearly 80 per cent of mobile subscribers are in developed countries, while China, Brazil, South Korea and Turkey account for another 12 per cent. In more than 100 countries, which between them only accounted for 8 per cent of mobile communication access, mobile telephones

are priced beyond the reach of the average citizen. In addition, frequency constraints and the high level of initial investment in developing networks are further barriers to telecoms in poorer countries. Therefore coverage in many developing countries is typically limited to major towns.

Alternative communication

Though the Internet has the potential of evolving into a new and relatively cheaper medium for alternative communication, the tradition of providing an alternative viewpoint to the mainstream media has a long history - from radical pamphleteers in Europe and the USA, to anti-colonial newspapers and magazines in Asia, to alternative media organizations using video, fax, satellite and now, the Internet. In the USA, such organizations as PeaceNet, established in 1985, to co-ordinate peace activists internationally through computer networks, and the New York-based Deep Dish TV Satellite Network, which has been providing programming since 1986, to public access channels, have contributed to an alternative media discourse. In Britain, video-based networks such as Undercurrents, have sold their footage to more than 120 TV stations in 15 countries on subjects like environment and genetic engineering, while OneWorld Online, launched in 1995, has emerged as a site dedicated to providing alternative voices on issues of global importance. In the context of the South, alternative communication has taken the form of development journalism, partly as a result of the NWICO debates.

Initially developed in Asia, this journalism claimed to pursue a news agenda different from the mainstream media, steeped in the so-called 'coups and earthquakes' syndrome, and investigate the process behind a story rather than merely reporting the news event itself. In a market-driven news environment there is a discrimination against news that cannot be 'sold', resulting in a distorted presentation of events to make them more marketable. The civil war in Angola - one of the world's longest-running conflicts dating back to 1970s - is a case in point. Whenever it is covered in the international media, the focus seem to be on the inability of Angolans to live in peace while their 'traditional' tribal rivalry, and ethnic nationalism are often emphasized. Rarely, if ever, are economic factors adequately covered - in this case, control over the country's diamond industry. An analysis of British television's coverage of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which claimed one million lives in a country of only seven million, within just three months, found that it became a television story only after it was framed as a humanitarian crisis, with an emphasis on Western support for refugee camps. The study from Britain's Glasgow Media Group reported that most of the coverage was devoid of historical or political context. 'Through this distortion,' it found, 'the media unwittingly helped Western governments hide their lack of policy on genocide behind a mask of humanitarian zeal'.

However, such coverage may be rooted in racism in reporting - it is worth reflecting how British television would have reacted if the dead were not black Rwandans but white South Africans. Such distortions in the media's coverage of crises in developing countries can affect the understanding of the South in the North and among the countries of the South since most of the newsflow continues to be from North to South and limited South-South news exchange takes place. Worse, in most of the developing world, the media generally caters to the requirements of the urban readership, with little contact with the villages where the majority of the population live. The acceptance of Western definitions of what constitutes news by most journalists in the South can affect the coverage of development issues directly and adversely. One reason why a Southern-oriented news agenda has not emerged is that in much of the developing world governments have sought to use the media to promote their viewpoints, in the name of providing 'positive news'. Historically the media in the Third World formed part of the anti-colonial nationalist movements. After independence the anti-colonial press assumed, by and large, a supporting attitude towards the new states. In many African countries, for example, journalists were part of information bureaucracies as newspapers and the electronic media were wholly or partly controlled by the state or the ruling parties.

Not surprisingly then, the news Third World agencies put out, often referred to as 'protocol news' - coverage of official functions and state visits - was perceived as government propaganda. Where independent journalism existed, the media's freedom to critically examine state policies were severely restricted by the governments' indirect editorial control by introducing draconian censorship laws or threatening to stop newsprint supply. To improve South-South news and information traffic, regional exchange mechanisms, supported by the IPDC, were established in the late 1970s. Though regional news agencies such as Pan African News Agency (PANA), Caribbean News Agency (CANA) and Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies (OANA), encouraged journalists in developing countries to think in terms of regional issues, they failed to make major difference to the global, or even regional newsflow, as a UNESCO study found. The Non-aligned News Agencies Pool, an international exchange designed to promote news among Non-aligned countries, was another international contributor to promoting alternative communication, though as a collection of government-sponsored news agencies, it was seen as lacking journalistic credibility. Other smaller organizations such as the Third World Network features service based in Malaysia have been used among Asian newspapers, though its output- known for advocacy rather than conventional journalism - has been extremely modest. Equally small but a far more effective alternative voice has been that of the London-based Gemini News Service, an international news features agency with an explicit development agenda. Established in 1967, Gemini is a non-profit agency, supplying topical news features to more than 100 subscribers in 80 countries around the world. Gemini's ideology, as characterized by its founder editor Derek Ingram is to promote the 'decolonization of news.' One factor which distinguished it from other Western-based news organisations was its emphasis on using local journalists, to reflect local perspectives rather than the outsider's view provided by most of the transnational news agencies. During the NWICO debates, Gemini was almost alone in the West in recognizing the need to balance press freedom with an understanding of the role of the media for nation-building.

Another key player in international alternative media is the Rome-based Inter Press Service (IPS), an international news agency, set up by a journalists' co-operative in 1964. With its focus on covering the issues affecting developing countries, it was a major news initiative in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in Latin America, where its Spanish language service received a good response. However, by the 1990s it had ceased to be a global presence in the spot news category - with its relatively modest output and limited resources it could not compete with transnational news agencies such as AP and Reuters. It is now known more for its features and commentary pieces than on-the-spot reports. By 1999, it was producing a fortnightly package of 10 features, special reports and analyses, distributed in English, and translated into Bahasa Indonesia, Bangla, Hindi, Nepali, Tamil, Thai and Urdu, through e-mail via Internet and the Association for Progressive Communications, whose services span the electronic globe. In addition, it produces *Terra Viva/IPS Daily Journal*, a selection of its wire stories for UN officials and INGOs, and distributes *The G-77 Jowrra*/for the Group of 77 developing countries within the UN system. With regional branches in Harare, Manila, Amsterdam, Montevideo, Kingston, Washington and New York and 250 journalists covering more than 100 countries, providing services for more than 1000 clients and users, IPS has been called 'the world's largest purveyor of information about the developing nations'.

Yet its financial situation has remained precarious. Dependent on funds from Western aid agencies and the UN organizations, IPS has failed to make it economically and commercially viable and is recognized as an international non-governmental organization by the UN. Consequently, it has become more of a pressure group, putting Southern concerns on the UN agenda rather than a news organization and the NGO approach to journalism is evident in its coverage of global issues. By concentrating on news features it has retained a niche for itself in a highly competitive global news market. In addition, the training programmes and projects that IPS undertakes have helped many

Southern journalists to develop an alternative news agenda. Its operations are directed 'toward improving South-South and South-North communication capacities, and opening up space to those traditionally marginalised or excluded from communication systems'. Such an approach is crucial for the democratization of international communication. An alternative to corporatized global communication is a moral imperative and a necessary democratic requirement. There is a need for a news agenda which covers issues of relevance to the majority world and examines the impact of globalization on the world's poor, as a result of the policies of such multilateral organizations as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the WTO. However, given the encroachment of market-led media in the South, such an alternative seems difficult to evolve. Media agendas in most developing countries are set by an elitist, urban-based professional class with an emphasis on entertainment. These are defined by the growing commercialization and privatization of state-controlled media, increasingly being bought by global conglomerates, as a result of deregulation in broadcasting. Although the original mandate of many broadcasting systems in the South stressed education and information, there is an unmistakable trend towards commercialization.
